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ABSTRACT
From its inception, intermodal transport of goods has served trade, shippers and carriers,
radically increasing transactions of goods worldwide. Multimodal carrier liability rules,
however, have not evolved with the same rhythm and remain fragmented cross-modally and
cross-country. This is also the case of the U.S. and Canada. The need to seek uniformity of
applicable rules in these two countries led us to the comparative analysis of unimodal (land-
ocean) rules in these two countries. Guided by past failed initiatives (1980 United Nations
Convention on International Multimodal Transport), the European intermodal reality,
transport deregulation, pragmatism, fairness in the relation between the carrier and the
shipper and Law & Economics principles, we used harmonization, codification and
contractualism in advancing our suggestions on uniform multimodal carrier liability rules.
Key words: intermodal, goods, pragmatism, fairness, Law & Economics, harmonization,
codification, contactualism, Europe.
RESUME
Des sa naissance, Ie transport intermodal a servi Ie commerce, les chargeurs et les
transporteurs, augmentant de fayon importante Ie transport des marchandises au niveau
mondial. Pourtant, les regles de responsabilite du transporteur multimodal n' ont pas evolue
au meme rythme et restent fragmentees atravers les modes et les pays. C'est aussi Ie cas des
Etats-Unis et du Canada. Le besoin de chercher l'uniformite des regles applicables nous a
conduit al'etude comparee des regles unimodales (terrestres-maritimes) dans ces deux pays.
Guides par l'echec des initiatives passees (Convention de Nations Unies sur Ie Transport
Multimodal International des Marchandises, 1980), la realite intermodale europeenne, la
dereglementation du transport, Ie pragmatisme, la justice dans Ie rapport entre Ie
transporteur et Ie chargeur et l'analyse economique de droit, nous avons utilise
I'harmonisation, la codification et Ie contractualisme en vue d' avancer nos suggestions sur
des regles de responsabilite uniformes du transporteur multimodal.
Mots eMs: intermodal, marchandises, pragmatisme, justice, analyse economique de droit,
harmonisation, codification, contractualisme, Europe.
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Introduction
Today, international shipments of goods III Canada, North America and
worldwide are commonly transported by vessel, motor, train or plane (unimodal
transport) or by a combination of different modes of transportation (multimodal
transport)!. Although there is no consensus on the definition of intermodal
transportation today, multimodal, 'combined', intermodal' or 'door-to-door'
transport appear to be synonymous terms involving the shipment of cargo or people
through more than one mode of transportation during a single, seamless journel.
While we see vestiges of intermodalism in antiquity, its global manifestation
is traced back to the 1960s when the advent of container trade dramatically changed
the transportation industrl. It is surprising to note that multimodal transportation
did not develop in response to demands of the cargo interests but, rather, due to
competition and economic pressures on the transport industrl. Intermodal carriage
has performed satisfactorily in the last half of the 20th century as logistics has grown
1 Although not as developed as unimodal and, specifically, motor transport, multimodal transport at the
NAFTA level is rapidly and steadily on the increase. fMC Market Activity Report (2000) online: Intermodal
Association of North America Homepage (press releases) <http://www.intermodal.org/pr/pr-2nqtr.html> (last
visited: 20th Oct. 2000). See also U.S., D.O.T., The Freight Story (2002) online: U.S. Department of
Transportation Homepage <www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freightipublications/freight%20story/freight.pdt> (last
visited: Nov. 27, 2002).
2 W. Brad Jones, Richard Cassady, Royce O. Bowden, "Symposium on Intermodal Transportation:
Developing a Standard Defmition ofIntermodal Transportation" (2000) 27 Transp. L. J. 345 at 349. This is the
defmition of multimodal carriage which, as limited to the transportation of goods, we will adopt in the present
study. It does not refer to multimodal carrier liability rules which are quite complicated in practice as we are
going to affirm later. Seemless means that transitions between modes occur smoothly with minimal delay. Ibid
at 350. We will use the terms 'multimodal', 'intermodal' and 'combined' carriage interchangeably and give
them the same meaning as herein explained.
3 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage
and Delay" 5 J. Transnat' I L. & Pol'y 1 at 4 and Jonathan B.L.K. Jervell III, Anthony Perl, Patrick Sherry,
Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Symposium on Intermodal Transportation: Intermodal Education in Comparative
Perspective" (2000) 27 Transp. L. J. 419 at 420. Containers are large metal boxes that can be loaded and
sealed at the exporters plant, shipped by truck or train to the port, lifted onto a container ship by a dockside
crane and stacked in specially designed slots. The container is then unloaded at destination. This occurs
without directly handling the cargo inside the container. Ibid and Hugh M. Kindred, Mary R. Brooks,
Multimodal Transport Rules (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 12 and 5 and 12-13. Even though
historically multimodalism main focus has been restricted to containers, our present thesis will concern
containerized and non-containerized multimodal shipments.
4 The whole purpose and raison d'etre of the international transportation industry is to serve international
commerce. C. W. G. Wilson, "Through Transport: The Role of the Freight Forwarder" Through Transport
Seminar (London: London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 4.
to a profession integrating deregulation of transport services5. While once rare,
multimodal transport is used even more today to speed deliveries and reduce
handling costs, serving, in this way, the exploding expansion of trade at the regional
and the internationallevel6.
The principal instrument of shipment of goods in unimodal transport is the
'bill of lading' (BOL), 'bill of loading' as it was once called? Transport under a
BOL is one of the oldest and most international forms of transportation of cargo8.
This document may serve three functions: it is proof of the contract of carriage, it
acknowledges receipt of the shipment by the carrier and, when negotiable, it is a
document of title controlling possession of the goods in the hands of its holder9.
5 Logistics was originally a military term used to describe the organization of moving, lodging and supplying
troops and equipment. It was somewhat broader than transport since it covered everything needed to deliver
troops and equipment to the right place at the right time and in the right condition. Modem business logistics is
based on exactly the same concept and sets out to deliver exactly what the customer wants, at the right place,
time and price. Very often transport is a major component of the 'supply-chain' which delivers to the customer
the goods and services needed. Transport, Logistics and All That (2001) online: The Institute of Logistics and
Transport (ILT) Homepage <http://www.iolt.org.uk/whoweare/allthat.htm> (last visited: July 23,2001).
6 (World, per container throughput) : the number of movements taking place in port has grown from zero in
1965 to 225.3 million moves in 2000. Container traffic is forecast to more than double from 1997 to 2006 to
around 1 billion tons. It is also to note that in 2000, the value of manufactured goods exported globally has
risen to 75% of all goods exported. UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility
ofan International Legal Instrument (Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/200311, 2003) at par. 6. See also "Why
Integrated Transport Systems?" OECD Observer (1998) online: LEXIS (World ALLWLD). Thomas R.
Denniston, Carter T. Gunn, Alfred E. Yudes, "Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties other than
Carriers and Shippers" (1989) Tul. L. Rev. 517 at 518.
7 W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 215.
8 Ibid.
9 The contract of transport is not an ordinary contract. Its specificity resides in:
a) the presence of three contracting parties: the shipper, the carrier and the consignee even though most of the
time the former and the latter are the same persons, the consignee being shipper's agent.
b) the nature of the contract: the transport contract can be of a commercial nature, (this is often the case when
the shipper is a merchant), or of a hybrid nature (when the shipper ships goods outside of commercial
activities). Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime et Aerien, (Montreal: Editions Themis
1986) at 15 and 17.
c) being a contract of adhesion or a standardized contract. A standard form contract is a printed contract in
which there are many blanks to be completed with information supplied by both parties. The speed with which
the transport transaction is completed is a common feature to all modes of transport, especially where sea
carriage is concerned. Being an adhesion contract, BOL provisions usually favour the carrier. William Tetley,
"Evasion/Fraude a la Loi and Evasion of Law" (1994) 39 McGill. L. J. 303 note 4. See also UNCTAD,
UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/200311, 2003) at 15.
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'Negotiable' BsOL are commonly used in sea carriage10. On the contrary, in land
transport 'non-negotiable' or 'Straight' bills are more frequently encounteredll .
Multimodal shipments worldwide frequently move under a 'Multimodal or
Combined Transport Bill of Lading' (or 'through' BOL) that covers the 'door-to-
door' journey or under multiple unimodal BsOL12. 'Through' BsOL do not differ
from unimodal bills in their general characteristics except for the fact that they are
generally negotiable documents "without which international trade would soon be
brought to a standstill"13 .
Usually, -not always-, the issuing carrIer of a 'through' BOL agrees to be
responsible for the cargo from the point of delivery to the point of final destination
even if the damage occurs in segments of the journey not covered by himI4. In this
case, issuing carrier liability is determined by the regime applicable to the carrier
where the damage actually occurs since the damage is evidentI5 . When multiple
unimodal BsOL are issued to cover the door-to-door journey and evident damage
occurs, the carrier performing the stage in question will be held liable. In both cases
of 'through' and multiple unimodal BsOL, the fate of the intermodal shipper
10 For ocean BsOL as documents of title in Canada and world wide see the very often cited case Champlain
Sept-lies Express Inc. v. Metal Coting Continuous Color Coat Ltd (1982),38 O.R. (2d) 182 (Ont. Pro C.). For
the U.S. see "Carriers" Am. Jur. (2000) online: WESTLAW (TP-ALL).
11 In Canada, truck BsOL are not documents of title. In the U.S., however, we may encounter an 'order' truck
bill by way of exception. For instance, shippers of goods with destination Mexico occasionally request
negotiable BsOL for protection against insolvent buyers in Mexico and, also, because of the extended transit
times at the U.S.-Mexican border. Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lic. Martin Gerardo Olea Maya,
Transportation and Practice in North America, (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American
Free Trade, 1996) at 4.
12 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 927.
The denomination 'through bills' is also used for unimodal successive carries. For instance, the 'pure ocean
through bill of lading' and 'ocean through bill of lading' involve successive ocean carriers. Ibid. This type of
'through' bills will not retain our attention.
13 William 1. Coffey, "Multimodalism and the American Carrier" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 588-589. This
is also the case when 'through' bills only concern land intermodal transport.
14 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 927.
When the multimodal journey includes a sea leg of transportation, the sea carrier is almost always the issuing
carrier. William J. Coffey, "Multimodalism and the American Carrier' (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 586. In
this respect, we have to note that the international multimodal channel in the U.S. and Canada is dominated by
ocean carriers who have long taken a leadership role in interrnodal transport worldwide constituting the clear
channel captain. John C. Taylor, «Conflict, Power and Evolution in the Intermodal Transportation Industry's
Channel of Distribution» (2000) 4/1/00 Transp. 1. 517 at 519.
15 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 928.
3
depends on the portion of the intermodal route where the damage occurs and the
liability principles applicable to it!6.
In case of concealed damage in the presence of a 'through' BOL, the terms of
the bill contain most frequently, although not always, a presumption that the loss
occurred on the ocean carrier leg of the transportation!? Generally, not always, when
the issuer of the intermodal through bill accepts responsibility for the cargo from the
point of origin to the point of final destination, then no matter where the loss
occurred, the cargo owner can hold the issuing carrier liable for the damage!8.
However, issuing carrier is entitled to the benefit of liability provisions applicable to
his leg of the transportation!9. When non-through BsOL are issued, the cargo owner
may not always be able to establish which, if any, of the carriers received the cargo
in good condition and delivered it damaged (shipper prima facie case)20. Thus, the
cargo owner may not be able to recover from any carrier for the damage2!.
In reality, multimodal transportation today is almost entirely the domain of
the international freight forwarding industry22. Freight forwarders or multimodal
16 Kurosh Nasseri, "The Multimodal Convention" 191. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 233. See combined transport
Bills of Lading provisions in Annex I, Table No.1 at i-xvii.
I? Consequently, the cargo owner may recover from someone. Jack G. Knebel Savoie Blocker, "United States
Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 562, 563 and 567. Kurosh Nasseri,
"The Multimodal Convention" 19 1. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 233. Concealed damage is damage produced
during the multimodal journey when it cannot be determined in what stage of the journey the damage actually
occurred. This may be the case when the carrier ships sealed containers where he cannot verify the condition
of the goods therein contained. Proof of receipt of goods in good condition makes part of the prima facie case
the shipper has to make against the carrier in case of damaged goods. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims,
3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 142. In the present study we oppose 'concealed
damage' to 'evident damage' since, in the latter case, it is obvious in what stage of the journey the damage
took place.
18 Jack G. Knebel Savoie Blocker "United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L.
Rev. 543 at 563-564.
19 See ibid at 563 and doctoral thesis of Nicole Lacasse, International Multimodal transport of Goods.
Comparative Study ofCanadian and French Laws (D. Jur. Thesis, University of Paris 1, 1988) [unpublished:
archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 78 for the case of the
ocean carrier. For ocean BsOL and tariffs provisions see Annex No.1, Table No.3.
20 Jack G. Knebel, Savoie Blocker, "United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L.
Rev. 543 at 562. Also, if the carrier makes reservations on the BOL as to the description of the goods made by
the shipper or the shipment in general, the primafacie case is not established.
21 Ibid.
22 Multimodal Liability: Extracts from a Statement by the CIFFA Seafreight Committee (1998) online:
Forwarder Law Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/multim.htm> (last modified: Nov. 26,
1999).
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transport operators23 agree to be responsible for the complete movement of the goods
and may carry the goods on their own vehicle for one stage of the journey or, simply
procure performance of the entire contract through sub-contracting with other
carriers24. They arrange for the door-to-door transport of goods and act as principals
(contracting carriers) vis-a.-vis shippers or as their agents in sub-contracting with
performing carriers who actually transport shipper's goods25 . While liability of
unimodal carriers is governed by various conventions and national laws, freight
forwarder liability is not subject itself to any convention or national law but is rather
determined by contracts26. Although freight forwarders may frequently undertake
intermodal carriage of goods as principals, their contractual relationship with the
shipper has tended to be that of an agency27.
Even though, when acting as principals, freight forwarders are liable for
evident or concealed damage where ever these might occur, they attempt to contract
out as much responsibility as possible28. In this way, they try to shift their liability to
the limited extent of liability imposed on the performing carrier opting, therefore, for
23 Freight forwarders perform a number of services ancillary to the carriage (customs clearance of the goods,
warehousing) and also the contract for carriage. Even though the terms 'freight forwarders' and 'multimodal
transport operators' are, most frequently, used as synonymous and as such will be used in the present study,
they have also created challenges in legislative and commercial issues. Ibid and Mandate of CIFFA 's
Seafreight Committee (1999) online: CIFFA abbreviations Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/aboutciffa_mandateseafreight.html> (last visited: continuously). One should note that
ship owners, charterers, terminal operators, inland depots, Non-Vessel Operating Carriers, air cargo operators
and container lessors can also be freight forwarding agents. A.M. Stirling, "Insurance for Through Transport
Operators" Through Transport Seminar (London: London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 2.
24 Hugh M. Kindred, Mary R. Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997)
at 5.
25 Freight forwarders may act in their traditional role of shipper agents (paying freight charges, insurance,
custom duties) or as principals (contractors) arranging the carriage in their own name. In the latter case, freight
forwarders are liable to the shipper as carriers. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal:
International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 692s. For the role of freight forwarders under French and
Canadian law see the doctoral thesis of Nicole Lacasse, International Multimodal transport of Goods.
Comparative Study ofCanadian and French Laws (D. Jur. Thesis, University of Paris 1, 1988) [unpublished:
archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 110-240.
26 Multimodal Liability: Extracts from a Statement by the CIFFA Seafreight Committee (1999) online:
Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/Feature/multim.htm> (last modified: Nov. 26,
1999).
27 C. W. G. Wilson, "Through Transport: The Role of the Freight Forwarder" Through Transport Seminar
(London: London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 2-3.
28 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 692s.
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a fragmented, rather than a uniform, liability regime applicable to the intermodal
carriage29 . This further confuses the already chaotic multimodal carrier liability
regime and makes necessary the examination of existing conventions governing
unimodal carriers in considering uniformitlo.
For these reasons, multimodal transportation has gIven rIse to commercial
world's dissatisfaction with myriad and inconsistent rules to govern it31 . The
multiple contractual relationships involved in multimodal transport of goods
frequently lead to court rulings that tend to treat essentially similar disputes
inconsistentll2. The ensuing complexity is overwhelming to small businesses-
shippers since the need to use lawyers or additional cargo insurance to resolve these
complexities may, in some cases, cost enough to make the shipment uneconomical33 .
Small shippers are not the only ones to have suffered from the confusing rules
of multimodal carrier liability. As we are going to affirm, cargo and liability
insurers, the main pillars of today' s multimodal transport are faced, themselves, with
the multiplicity of national and modal applicable legal regimes and can get entangled
1997) at 5-6. The identity of the responsible person towards the shipper, (whether it is the carrier or the freight
forwarder), will not retain our attention in the present study.
29 Hugh M.Kindred, Mary R.Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at
5 and at 6-7. E. c., (Eur.Com.), The Economic Impact ofCarrier Liability on Intermodal Transport (2001)
online: Europa Homepage http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/library/finaIJeport.pdf (last visited: Dec. 5,
2001). Jan Ramberg, Unification of the Law ofInternational Freight Forwarding (2001) online: UNIDROIT
Homepage <http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/1998-1.htm> (last visited: Jan. 10,
2001). Freight forwarders have traditionally avoided carrier liability by declaring that they do not act as
common carriers but merely as shipper agents transferring, in this way, liability to individual carriers involved
in multimodal transport. Evasive freight forwarder liability as a carrier, has qualified him as the 'legal
Pimpernel Smith': "They Seek him here, They Seek Him There, Those Frenchies Seek Him Everywhere. Is He
In Heaven, Is He In Hell, That Damned Illusive Pimpernel?". Ibid.
30 Hugh M. Kindred, Mary R. Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997)
at 6-7. De Wit Ralph, Carrier Liability and Documentation in Multimodal Transport (D. Jur. Thesis, Law
Faculty of the Vrije Universiteit at Brussels, 1993) [published by Informa Law and is part of the Lloyd's
Shipping Law Library] at 865-868.
31 Thomas R. Denniston, Carter T.Gunn, Alfred E. Yudes, "Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties
other than Carriers and Shippers" (1989) Tul. L. Rev. 517 at 519.
32 Ibid. Under the present regulatory framework both the incidence and the extent of carrier liability may
depend crucially on a) whether a loss can be attributed to a particular stage and mode of transport; b) on which
of a considerable number of potentially applicable rules and/or regulations is considered to be relevant by a
court or arbitral tribunal in a given forum. UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The
Feasibility ofan International Legal Instrument (Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1, 2003) at par. 10.
33 Kurosh Nasseri, "The Multimodal Convention" 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 233-234.
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m very expensIve disputes, often resulting in court decisions34. The resulting
unpredictability and subjectivity of judge's decisions do not facilitate transport nor
promote trade. The current situation creates pressure for simplification of legal rules
involved in multimodal transport35 .
Having made our introductory remarks on what some of the mam legal
concerns are in the area of multimodal transport, we will now proceed to announce
the manner in which the rest of our introduction will be organized. Our first part will
consist in formulating the central question of our thesis (search of uniformity of
intermodal carrier liability) followed by general remarks on its object and goals. In
the second part of our introduction we will comment on concepts and theories,
which are at the very foundation of the present analysis and uniformity suggestions:
pragmatism, fairness and Law & Economics.
1) The Core and Frame of our Thesis (central question, object and goals):
The present analysis revolves around the search of uniformity of applicable legal
rules and practices. The need for uniformity at the domestic or/and the international
level is not new or sector-specific. Its interdisciplinary and international reach
renders this concept common place among scientists and practitioners in practically
every field of study.
Our search of uniformity concentrates, more specifically, on rules and
practices applicable to multimodal carrier liability (uniformity-rationae materiae) in
the U.S. and Canada (uniformity-rationae loci). Absent uniform laws to govern
multimodal transport in these two countries, exploration of domestic unimodal
carrier liability rules and their intermodal applications constitute focal themes of the
present study. This means to say that our analysis will be limited to the study of
34 "Liability Limbo" 1. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). See also "Europe's Cargo Insurance
Lottery" Am. Shipper (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD). Infra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par.
3(B).
35 Thomas R. Denniston, Carter T.Gunn, Alfred E. Yudes, "Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties
other than Carriers and Shippers" (1989) Tul. L. Rev. 517 at 519.
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freight forwarders liability as principals and not as agents36 . In this respect, we will
only concentrate on ocean-land (motor and rail) intermodal carriage taking place at
the international -not purely domestic- level.
Moreover, it is not our intention to explore all aspects of multimodal carrier
liability. We will only concentrate on the 'basis' of intermodal carrier liability -
which basically includes carrier liability exemptions- and his statutory or contractual
limitation of liability provisions. The reason for this is that, from a legal point of
view, these two areas of carrier liability constitute the very essence of the law
governing carriage of goods. It is certain that other areas of carrier liability, (i.e.
duration of journey, prescription of claims, identity of the liable carrier), are not
negligible in importance but one cannot treat all subjects within the frame of a
doctoral dissertation.
Our task would have probably been easier had we undertaken our study in a
region such as Europe where legal developments in one country influence
neighbouring countries, shaping, in this way, the evolution of the continent37• In
effect, despite their geographical proximity and common law tradition38, (with the
exception of the civil law39 province of Quebec), the U.S. and Canada have been
relatively immune to influences from each other4o. This is said to pertain to the
deeply held U.S. belief that the American way is the best so that there is no need to
36 Because we concentrate mostly on unimodal carrier liability laws, the presence of freight forwarders will not
be very much felt in the present study. Our reference to 'carrier liability' or 'carrier' directs to 'freight
forwarder liability as a carrier' but also to unimodal carrier liability within the context of a multimodal
journey.
37 Stephen Zamora, "NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems" (1995) 12 Ariz. J. Int'1.
Compo L. 401 at 404.
38 (U.S. and Canadian) common law principles find their origins in English law. Common law was created
over seven centuries ago during the reign of King Henry II of England. For a discussion on common law
origins and influences before this point in time see John A. Makdisi, "The Islamic Origins of Common Law"
(1999) 77 N. C. L. Rev. 1635 at 1637-1638.
39 Civil law systems, as this is the case of most European country laws, find their origins in Roman law. Infra
at 23. On the history of the Quebec civil code see infra note 869. Ancient Greek Law was the precursor and
the intellectual source of Roman Law of the classical period (ius Greco-Romanum). Greek Constitution,
Government and Legislation (2002) online: Jurist Law Homepage-Pittsburgh University
<http://jurist.iaw.pitt.edu/world/greece.htm> (last visited: June 20,2003).
40 Stephen Zamora, "NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems" (1995) 12 Ariz. J. Int'1.
Compo L. 401 at 404.
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import foreign influence at the legal, economic or political field41 . Canada, on the
other hand, has looked to Great Britain and France for legal models due to historical
and political reasons42. We are looking, therefore, at two largely common law
countries with distinctive legal mentalities. The individuality of the Canadian civil
law province of Quebec adds to the diversified cultural and legal picture and further
complicates our analysis.
Moreover, the plethora of legal sources containing carrier liability provisions
In the two neighbouring countries is considerable and constitutes a source of
complications. The multiplicity of sources is due to the absence of a uniform
multimodal carrier liability regime but is also attributed to the federal-state structure
of the two countries. In effect, since multimodal transport is not regulated as such,
we have to go through the study of unimodal transport sources of law and determine
their multimodal applications. In Canada, international motor and rail transport
regulation is split between federal and provincial governments but federal regulation
is much more extensive in rail than in motor transport where provincial regulation is
omnipresent43. International ocean carriage in Canada is subject to a uniform set of
rules. We refer to the Hague-Visby Rules (Visby Rules)44 reproduced in the
Canadian Marine Liability Act45, applicable today. Land transport in the u.s. is
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 For motor transport see Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T.Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Maya,
Transportation and Practice in North America, (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American
Free Trade, 1996) at 6. The Canadian federal government has the power to regulate inter-provincial and
international trucking but federal regulatory abandonment in this field has made motor transport a provincial
responsibility. This does not mean to say that the federal government has abstained from regulating motor
transport. Ron Hishhorn, Trucking Regulation in Canada: a Review of Issues (Ottawa: Economic Council of
Canada, 1981) at 18. For rail: Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime et Aerien (Montreal:
Editions Themis, 1986) at 9. Infra at 132s.
44 The Visby Rules consist of two Protocols amending the Hague Rules (August 25, 1924): Protocol to Amend
the International Convention for the Unification for the Unification ofCertain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills
of Lading, Brussels, February 23, 1968; and Protocol Amending the International Convention for the
Unification ofCertain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, December 21, 1979 [hereinafter Visby Rules]
online: Admiralty Law Homepage <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/hague/html> (last modified: February 3,
1999). Annex No. II, Table No.3 at clio
45 S. C. 2001, C. 6. [hereinafter MLA]. This act contains many different parts such as carriage of passengers,
personal injuries and fatalities, rewrite and update of Part XIV of the Canada Shipping Act. However, in
Schedule III it reproduces the Visby Rules that Canada applied from 1993-2001 through the Carriage of
Goods by Water Act, S.c. 1993, C. 21 [hereinafter COGWA].
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regulated by federal acts that apply to international carriage only if the 'through
BOL' is issued in the U.S.46. International ocean carriage, on the other hand, is
subject to the Hague Rules, Visby Rules predecessor, enacted in the U.S. by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)47. To the dispersed material regulating
multimodal transport we have to add the importance of case law precedent in
dictating rules of law in both Canada and the U.S. as well as the need to watch over
for applicable transportation practices on the ground.
Finally, in seeking uniformity of the multimodal carrier liability rules we
believe that one has to be taught from currently ongoing and past unfruitful
initiatives already made in this area at the regional and the international level. Thus,
for instructive purposes and for the sake of the ultimately desired international
uniformity of multimodal transport rules, the failed international initiative of the
1980 Multimodal Convention48 and European laws on multimodal carrier liability
will be commented on.
The overall complexity of the present study is not negligible. In effect, we are
not only venturing in a comparative analysis of carrier liability principles concerning
three different modes of transport. We are undertaking this cross-modal analysis in
two different countries on the basis of federal or provincial statutes and regulations
as well as case law and practices that all compose the multimodal carrier liability
regime in the U.S. and Canada. Discovering material of unimodal carrier liability in
two different countries, detecting their multimodal applications, grouping them
together, comparing them, making suggestions on uniformity and, giving them, as
much as possible, an international and pragmatic perspective, is not an easy task.
46 Carmack Amendment 49 U.S.C. par. 14706(a)(1) (1906). See infra at 179 for Carmack Amendment
geographical scope.
47 International Convention for the .Unification of Certain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, Brussels
Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (entered into force on June 2, 1931) [hereinafter Hague Rules]. COGSA: Ch.
229, ss. 1-16, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. Ss. 1300-1315 (1995» [hereinafter 1936
COGSA]. We will later comment on the COGSA reform initiative. Infra at 169.
48 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, May 24, 1980
U.N.DocTDIMT/CONF.17 (not yet in force) [hereinafter 1980 Multimodal Convention].
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In undertaking such a complicated study, our objective is to make suggestions
on unifonn multimodal carrier liability provisions in the U.S. and Canada. We will
not go as far as propose a uniform liability regime. Years of negotiations have not
achieved the entering into force of unifonn multimodal carrier liability rules at the
international, regional or bilateral levels so as to aspire at the creation of such rules
by the present study. Our suggestions constitute only the starting point in the overall
procedure of rendering unifonn intermodal carrier liability rules. Completion of our
unifonnity suggestions should make the object of further and intense negotiation
among interested parties.
Although not easy to achieve, uniformity presents considerable advantages. It
involves elimination of the plethora of unimodal and domestic carrier liability rules
and promotes trade by subjecting multimodal carriers to one applicable regime at the
domestic, regional or international level49• Despite the absence of data supporting
this suggestion, a unifonn intermodal liability regime is said to reduce litigation and
transportation costs (especially costs associated with evidentiary enquiries, claims
handling) promoting efficient multimodal operations5o.
2) The Foundations ofour Thesis: Pragmatism, Fairness, Law & Economics:
Our unifonnity suggestions on multimodal carrier liability in the U.S. and Canada
will be based on two great, albeit not always compatible, in practice, principles.
Pragmatism (realism)51 and fairness of our proposals as applicable in the relation
49 Uniform international law is a boon to international commerce and thereby contributes substantially to
creating conditions that foster both national and international economic growth. One of the greatest proofs of
this is the European Union that, since 1957, has created a single market in goods and services among its
member-states. William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and
Alternatives to International Conventions-How to Adopt to International Convention" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J.
775 at 798.
50 Ibid at 797 and Intermodal Transport Liability (1999) online: Interpool Homepage
<http://www.interpool.comltcl/_discl/00000050.htm> (last visited: October 19, 2001) for litigation costs.
"Europe's Cargo Insurance Lottery" Am. Shipper (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD). UN (Economic
and Social Council), Inland Transport Committee (Working Party on Combined Transport) Possibilities for
Reconciliation and Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes Governing Combined Transport (1999) online:
UNECE Homepage <http://www.unece.orgltrans/new_tir/wp24/documents/wp.24-99-2e.pdf.> (last visited:
Nov. 12, 1999) for transportation costs. See also infra at 33s and at Part II, Chapter II, Section III, Par. 3.
51 The terms 'pragmatism' and 'realism' will be used interchangeably in the present study since they are
defined in very similar ways in everyday language. 'Realism' is defined as an inclination or attachment to
what is real and is opposed to idealism. 'Pragmatism' (deriving from the Greek word npaYllu: act, deed, thing)
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between carriers and shippers. The 'Law and Economics' doctrine is also an
important consideration we will take into account in formulating our proposals and
that we will later develop in our introduction and suggestions. As our analysis
unfolds, we will see how these principles condition adoption of our suggestions by
the interests involved in negotiations, which is what counts at the end of the day
when negotiating multimodal carrier liability issues52.
Pragmatism, as we are going to affirm, marks a direction to be followed but
does not set concrete game rules. This is why this concept will translate into the
notions of approximation (harmonization), codification and
contractualism/formalism which, along with fairness, are situated at the very heart of
our suggestions and our overall analysis. Whenever in conflict, pragmatism, (or its
component principles), will usually overrule fairness53 . However, when the out
casting of fairness to favour pragmatism leads to patently unjust results burdening
carriers or shippers, we will re-establish fairness to its position provided that such a
measure does not void pragmatism of its very essence54.
This subordinates the fairness concept to that of realism. Such a conclusion
can be easily explained! Fairness is a great principle law is intended to serve, but it
is defined as the method of treating history in which the phenomena are considered with special reference to
their causes antecedent conditions and results, and to their practical lessons. Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 1933) s.v. 'realism' and 'pragmatism'. See also Edward L. Rubin,
"Scholars, Judges and Phenomenology: Comments on Tamanaha's Realistic Socio-Legal Theory" (2000) 32
Rutgers L. J. 241 at 242. Mentioned defmition of 'pragmatism' is compatible with the one adopted in the
present study. Infra at 13-14.
52 Federal and state/provincial governments and their committees, which usually are organized along modal
lines, reflect, most frequently, carrier interests. This is so, even though modes of transportation exist only to
serve customers who, in the case of freight transportation, are shippers. Conflict between carrier and shipper
interests in the transport industry, therefore, creates a classic stalemate causing governmental inaction. "The
Proceedings" (1998) 25 Transp. L. J. 261 at 282, Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Intermodalism: the Challenge and the
Promise" (2000) 27 Transp. L. J. 299 at 309 and Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International Ocean Shipping
and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: a U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg
and the Multimodal Rules" (1995) 5 1. Transnat' 1. L. & Pol' y 1 at 27.
53 For a specific example see the conflict between 'formalism' (more protective of shipper interests) and
'contractualism' (favouring more free market principles certain carriers may take advantage of) and the
p,reponderance given, in principle, to the latter concept. Infra at 25s.
4 See infra at 301s on our rejection of authors suggestion that competition rules and insurance companies
should substitute for legal concepts such as intentional or willful faults that lead to loss of carrier limitation
benefit. However, in an imaginable scenario where all, or most, modes in the U.S. and Canada abolish loss of
carrier liability limitation provisions in theory and practice, insisting on the fairness of loss of carrier liability
provisions voids pragmatism of its very essence.
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raises its feast against knife's cutting edge and is doomed to fail when it is not given
realistic applications. It is certain that we want the weaker shippers to stand on an
equal basis when dealing with carriers55. However, proposing a mandatory liability
regime favouring shippers as was the case of the 1980 Multimodal Convention, will
simply result in this proposal being a dead letter, easily rejected by powerful carrier
and liability insurer interests as it happened with the said convention56. This is why
priority has to be given to a pragmatic uniformity approach in the present study,
without neglecting, however, fairness. As Mr. Robert D. Kaplan57 said: "Realists run
foreign policy, idealists comment from the sidelines".
We will now proceed to analyze the notions of pragmatism, its component
concepts and fairness.
Different countries and branches of human SCIences define pragmatism or
realism in different ways58. We align ourselves with the definition of Mr. Robert D.
Kaplan that opposes realism to idealism and defines former as "a perspective of
description or prescription in which tangible power is the determining feature of
policy, not some conception of a better or perfect world,,59. In other words,
pragmatism considers existing realities and elaborates rules that stay close to ground
practice while advancing solutions that produce the desirable result, in our case,
uniformity of multimodal carrier liability. We will not, therefore, achieve uniformity
in our study by elaborating rules too remote from present realities.
55 On shipper weaker position in the transport contract see supra note 9 and accompanying text and infra at
159-160.
56 This Convention was crafted by shipper countries (third world developing countries) and proposed a
uniform multimodal carrier regime not sanctioned in practice by sea-faring nations that participated to the
negotiations. "Liability Limbo" (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). This is one of the reasons that led to
the non-adoption of the said convention. Infra at 53s.
57 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy; Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War" (2000) 23 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 219 at 222. Robert D. Kaplan is a journalist and author of articles and books on policy matters. Even
though the comment is made on foreign policy, it is really adapted to the very essence of the present study.
Multimodalism is also an international affair involving great conflicting interests and is depended on
~overnmental policy decisions.
8 Neither the philosophical community nor the legal community have arrived at a settled, agreed upon
definition of pragmatism. Pragmatism can be more feasibly described than defined. Matthew A. Edwards,
"Posner Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests" (2002) 77 Wash. L. Rev. 299 at note 39 and at note 52.
59 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy; Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War" (2000) 23 Hous. J.
In'l. L. 219 at 222.
14
Our reasoning is explained by the fact that past uniformity initiatives in our
field of study were unsuccessful, partly because they were remote enough from
ground multimodal practice that their practical effects on carriers, shippers or their
insurers were too difficult to predict60 . It is also true that rules emanating from
ground practice have a better chance of surviving political (governmental) scrutiny
upon which their adoption is dependent. These are the reasons why we will always
verify that our suggestions stay close enough to ground practice while serving
uniformity.
Realism may indicate the need to consider tangible realities, but it fails to
determine its tools to achieve such goal. This is why we will make harmonization,
codification, formalism/contractualim, all concepts successfully applicable today on
the ground, the component elements of the pragmatism notion that we will analyze
as follows.
Harmonization: Uniformity, unification and harmonization of domestic legal
principles are concepts commonly used but not unanimously defined by doctrine.
Before defining uniformity we should note that this concept has been used
with respect to laws of different countries as well as laws of different sectors within
the geographic limits of one country61. In this sense, uniformity is a two-dimensional
concept in being both geographic and sectarian. This is an important affirmation to
make considering the fact that we are seeking uniformity of cross-modal and cross-
border transport laws and practices.
Uniformity has been defined as the process of 'conforming to one rule, mode,
pattern or unvarying standard, not different at different times and places; applying
equally to all within a class; sameness,62. The definition varies, however, according
to the field of study and authors subjective views of this concept. For instance, in
60 We refer here to the 1980 Multimodal Convention, infra at 52s.
61 Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Maya, Transportation and Practice in North
America (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1996) at 63.
62 Blacks Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990) s.v. "uniformity".
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criminal law there are institutions that have adopted the less ambitious definition of
'similar sentences for similar conduct by similar offenders, or treating similar cases
alike63; for bankruptcy purposes uniformity has been defined as 'taking the same
measures inside bankruptcy as outside bankruptcy procedures,,64.
The lack of precision and clarity in defining this concept goes even further.
Certain authors argue that the concepts of unification and harmonisation are
synonymous, if not inclusive of the concept of uniformitl5. Others, place the
uniformity concept at the top of the pyramid as being the goal to be achieved, with
harmonisation and unification being its vehicles66. The concept is, therefore,
polysemous when defined alone or in connection with other concepts such as
unification and harmonisation.
In tum, the unification and harmonisation concepts are not only ambiguous in
their interaction with the notion of uniformity. Their definitions are also far from
being clear.
Historically, authors were using the term 'unification of law' rather than
'harmonisation' to achieve uniformitl7. While there is no precise definition of the
unification concept, this term illustrates the need for a "'line-to-line' identity of laws
between two or more communities". It corresponds to what has been called
'complete' uniformitl8. In this respect, certain authors have argued that unification -
63 Defmition of the U.S. sentencing Commission as reported by Lisa M. Rebello, "Sentencing under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines" (1992) 26 Suffolk. U. L. Rev. 1031 at note 6.
64 Hanover Nat. Bankv. Moyses, 186 U.S. 183 (U. S. S. C. 1902).
65 "Uniformity or harmonization is the adoption of a single set of rules". Steven Walt, "Novelty and the Risk
of Uniform Sales Law" (1999) Virgo 1. Int'!. L. 671 at 674.
66 For harmonization see Boris Kozolchyk, "The UNIDROIT Principles as a Model for the Unification of the
Best Contractual Practices in the Americas" (1998) Am. J. Compo L. 151 at 151. For unification see Wayne R.
Lafave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy 1. King "An Overview of the Criminal Justice Process (Localism)" (1999)
1 Crim. Proc. S. 1. 9(b) stating that unification was spurred, among other factors, by the need to achieve greater
uniformity.
67 Brian R. Opeskin, "The Architecture of Public Health Law Reform: Harmonization of Law in a Federal
System" (1998) 22 Mel. U. L. Rev. 337 at 338. For sea carriage and international conventions see Brandon I.
Milhorn, "Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros V. MN Sky Reefer: Arbitration Clauses in BOL under the COGSA"
(1997) 30 Cornell Int'!. L. 1. 173 at 174.
68 Ibid and Benjamin Geva, "Uniformity in Commercial Law: is the UCC Exportable?" 29 Loy. L. A. L. Rev.
1035 at 1037: "the effect of unification is to make substantive law one and the same for all jurisdictions in all
or selected areas".
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as opposed to harmonization- of laws is, to a large extend, utopian even within one
nation69. Others, maintain that unification does not entail 'complete' uniformity but
permits variances in the applicable rules70.
More recently, there has been a discernible shift away from the unattainable
goal of unification towards the less ambitious but undeterminable notion of
harmonisation7!. This concept has been referred to as 'levelling the playing field' by
its proponents72. Less precise in its content than unification, it is 'as infinite in its
configurations as are potential problems of law,73. In this respect, harmonisation has
been defined as the 'bringing together of two or more standards,74, 'standardisation
of any number of trade criteria' 75, 'legally binding measures that enact substantially
similar legal rules,76, 'approximation' oflaws and policies of Member States,77. This
last definition of harmonisation appears to be less ambitious than that of 'complete'
uniformity or 'line to line' identity certain authors attribute to the unification
concept78. Finally, there are authors who claim that harmonisation constitutes a
unification tool where others argue that unification serves the harmonisation
process79.
69 Hannu Honka, "Harmonization of Contract Law through International Trade: a Nordic Perspective" (1996)
II Tul. Euro. Civ. L. F. II at 12.
70 Wright & Miller, "Admiralty and Maritime Claims" (1998) 12A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 2d App. E (
WESTLAW-Tp-all).
71 Brian R. Opeskin, "The Architecture of Public Health Law Reform: Harmonization of Law in a Federal
System" (1998) 22 Mel. V. L. Rev. 337 at 338.
72 Margaret Renee Herman, "Are we Learning from the Mistakes of Environmentalists?" (1999) 16 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Compo L. 543 at 543.
73 Stephen Zamora, "NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems" (1995) 12 Ariz. J. In'l.
Compo L. 40 I at 404.
74 Alexander M. Donahue, "Equivalence: Not quite close Enough for the International Harmonization of
Environmental Standards" (2000) 30 Env. L. 363 at 367.
75 Margaret Renee Herman, "Are we Learning from the Mistakes of Environmentalists?" (1999) 16 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Compo L. 543 at 543.
76 Patrick J. Murray, "The Adequacy Standard under Directive 95/46/EC" (1998) 21 Fordham Int'l L. J. 932 at
note 26.
77 Art. 94 and 95(1) of the consolidated version of the Treaty ofRome, a Treaty that established the European
Community (infra note 422). This treaty set up institutions and decision-making mechanisms through which
both national interests and a European Community view could fmd their expression. From that time onwards,
the EC was the major axis around which the movement for a united Europe turned.
78 David George Anderson, "The New International Economic Order" (1993) 87 Am. Soc'y. In1'l. Proc. 459 at
467.
79 It has been noted i.e. that unification of conflict rules is not feasible without foregoing harmonisation of
laws. Hans Kuhn, "Multi-state and International Secured Transactions under Revised article 9 of the V.C.C."
(2000) 40 Va. J. In1'l. L.I009 at 1095. In transportation law, however, the harmonisation process has been
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From the stated above, we conclude that definitions of the 'harmonization'
and 'unification' concepts differ, terms used to define them are often vague and the
interaction between the two concepts is indefinite. Based on mentioned doctrinal
definitions, it is not even clear today whether harmonisation and unification are two
distinct processes.
For the purpose of the present analysis, uniformity is placed at the top of the
pyramid as the objective to be attained with harmonisation of cross-border and
cross-modal transport rules and practices constituting its vehicle. We will use the
concept of unification as one of harmonisation tools since it is frequently used in this
way in the area of transport. Unification, for us, will involve a 'line-to-line' identity
of rules and practices of certain carrier liability principles ('complete' uniformity)8o.
It is on the European Union (EU)81 definition and methods of harmonisation
that our study will be based. This model of harmonisation has been qualified as the
most successful of its kind82. The EU harmonisation concept refers to
'approximation' of rules83. In this sense, harmonisation is designed to achieve
'compatibility', 'convergence' of laws of various jurisdictions and facilitate cross-
border dealings in a framework that allows retention of individuallaws84.
Following the example of the harmonization concept, 'approximating',
'converging', 'rendering compatible' are terms of some ambiguitl5. Some authors
consider these terms synonymous of the concept of harmonisation86. Others, admit
that they differ from the harmonisation concept but have difficulty in delineating the
argued to include unification and standardisation of transport documents used in transport. Dr. Boris
Kozolchyk, Gary T.Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Maya, Transportation and Practice in North America,
(Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1996) at 88. For sea carriage
W.Tetley, "Uniformity ofInternational Private Maritime Law" (2000) 24 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 775 at 787.
80 Supra at 15 and supra note 79 for authors opinion.
8l On the EU see infra at 18.
82 Alexander M. Donahue, "Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International Harmonization of
Environmental Standards" (2000) 30 Env. L. 363 at 368.
83 Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
84 Benjamin Geva, "Uniformity in Commercial Law" (1996) 29 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1035 at 1037.
85 Anita Bernstein, "Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community" (1991) 31 Va. 1. Int'1. L.
673 at 695.
86 EU material as reported by ibid.
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shades of meaning of these terms87 . Certain authors distinguish approximation from
harmonisation identifying the former concept with a more intensive process of
integration than the latter concept88 . For the purposes of the present study, we will
consider the approximation concept as synonymous of the notion of harmonisation
and both terms will denote presence of converged rules ('levelling the playing field')
and not 'line-to-line' identity of laws (adopted definition for the unification
concept).
It may be that our harmonisation concept does not seek the 'line-to-line'
identity of rules attributed to the unification notion. Our more modest approach is
more realistic, more pragmatic since it is based on making similar rules already
applicable on the ground. This makes our task more feasible and its end product
more likely to succeed in practice.
We will now tum our attention to the important question of how
approximation (harmonization) of laws is achieved at the ED level since our
suggestions find an important source of inspiration in the ED harmonization
methods. At the European -as well as the intemational- level, authors refer to
'formal' or 'negotiated harmonisation' to designate a process whose end product
derives from extensive negotiations among national authorities89 . These negotiations
take place within the frame of European institutions and result in the elaboration of
acts such as directives and regulations. Both these acts constitute secondary sources
of ED law9o. European directives are the vehicle of harmonisation of Member-State
laws whereas regulations constitute the unification tool of ED law91 . In other words,
87 Ibid at note 21.
88 D. Lasok and J. Bridge as reported by ibid.
89 Patrick Glenn, "Harmonization of Private Law Rules between Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions" Droit
Compare et Unification du Droit (Montreal: Institute of Comparative Law, 1990) 1 at 4.
90 Hermann Niessen, "Harmonization des Normes Comptables: Realisations et Perspectives OCDE",
Harmonization des Normes Comptables dans la Communaute Europeenne (Paris: OCDE 1985) 85 at 86.
Treaties that founded the ED and its institutions such as the EC Treaty are primary sources ofED law whereas
regulations, directives, recommendations, decisions are acts of the ED institutions and constitute, therefore,
secondary sources oflaw.
91 ED regulations are acts elaborated by European institutions, binding in all their elements, of general
application and directly applicable to the citizens and entities of all Member-States. Kluwer Graham &
Trotman, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities 2d ed (Netherlands: Kluwer Law and
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whereas directives modify rules of national law approximating, converging them,
regulations create rules of EU law92.
Under Article 249 of the consolidated version of the EC Treaty, a directive is
binding as to the results to be achieved but leaves the choice of form and methods of
implementation to the national authorities93 . Periodically, European institutions will
examine directives with the aim of tightening their provisions, thus, achieving
greater convergence94. In this way, 'formal' harmonisation is achieved at the
European level preserving, to a large extent, the individuality of Member-State laws
and procedures95 .
A directive may achieve approximation by adopting terms common to all
Member State laws and finding a 'middle ground' solution where these laws
diverge96 . It cannot be denied, however, that the Community institutions may have
authority to introduce, in certain matters, completely new rules97 . In this case, it may
be doubted whether such a process can be termed as 'approximation' of rules in the
way this is defined in the EC Treaty98.
Apart from the process of European 'formal' harmonisation, there is also the
subtler 'informal' harmonisation that we also find at the international level99. This
has been argued to be a less interventionist, less creative and uncoordinated form of
Taxation Publishers 1989) at 193. 'Binding in all their elements' as opposed to directives 'binding as to their
goals'; 'of general application' means of 'general, non-individualized character of the situation to which it
applies' as opposed to 'leaving to national authorities the choice ofform and methods'; 'directly applicable' to
Member-States as opposed to directives 'applicability through Member-States implementation measures'.
Ibid.
92 Dominic Lasok, Panayotis Soldatos, Les Communautes Europeennes en Fonctionnement 1981 (Brussels:
Etablissements Emile Bruyant) at 175.
93 On the consolidated version of the EC Treaty see infra note 422.
94 "Banking: Capital Requirements Directive" EUBUSLA W (1995) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
95 Martin Broodman, "The Myth of Harmonization of Laws", Droit Compare et Unification du Droit
(Montreal: Institute of Comparative Law, 1990) 1 at 3.
96 Anita Bernstein, "Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community" (1991) 31 Va. 1. Int'l. L.
673 at 696.
97 Dominic Lasok, Panayotis Soldatos, Les Communautes Europeennes en Fonctionnement 1981 (Brussels:
Etablissements Emile Bruyant) at 175.
98 Ibid.
99 The following in 'informal harmonization' are reported by Patrick Glenn, "Harmonization of Private Law
Rules between Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions" Droit Compare et Unification du Droit (Montreal:
Institute of Comparative Law 1990) 1 at 4.
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harmonisation. In effect, this concept does not involve the conscious, creative, co-
ordinated intervention of human institutions that 'formal' harmonisation entails. It
takes place in a less interventionist manner through doctrine, teaching and case law,
the latter being of great importance to our study. 'Informal' harmonisation does not
create a harmonized rule through negotiation in the way 'formal' harmonization
does. Rather, it 'effectuates a [common] understanding' of differing legal concepts
and practices within one country but also of existing gaps between concepts of
different legal systems (civil-common law). Nowadays, 'informal' approximation of
applicable rules is becoming popular among practitioners at the international level
who favour more and more the presence of an informal common legal ground100.
In borrowing the European model of harmonisation of laws, we do not seek to
achieve the same degree of economic and regulatory integration as in the ED. When
possible, however, we will follow European directives approach in approximating
unimodal and domestic rules and practices on carrIer liability (' formal
harmonisation') as well as case law principles on the issue ('informal
harmonization'). For instance, albeit not without exceptions, identical cross-modal
and cross-country carrier liability exemptions will constitute the unified -not
uniform- rules that our harmonisation concept encompasses. This corresponds to the,
common to all Member States, ED directives provisions and to our view that the
unification concept constitutes a harmonisation tool. Even when we adopt a total
new provision despite the presence of common cross-modal and cross-country
liability legislation, ED approximation methods provide support to our choice since
this also occurs with directives at the European level 10 1.
Where cross-modal and cross-country liability rules differ we will search for
the ED directive 'middle ground' solution102. This will constitute one of our
100 Franz Werro, "L'Harmonization des Regles de Droit Prive entre les Pays de Droit Civil et Pays de
Common Law" Droit Compare et Unification du Droit (Montreal: Institute of Comparative Law) 1 at 16.
101 Supra at 18s. See, for instance, our suggestion for the abolition of the nautical fault liability exception that
we find in both the Hague and the Visby Rules. Such suggestions will always be justified. Part II, Chapter II,
Section II, Par. 2.
102 However, not wanting to greatly distance ourselves from present reality, we will not too frequently have
recourse to 'middle solution' approximation measures.
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approximation methods provided that the solution it advances is pragmatic and
fair103 . When convergence of applicable rules and practices has already been
excluded by interests involved in negotiations or/and national authorities, or where
no specific rule applies cross-modally and cross-country or even where we opt for
one country's or mode's rule over the other, our task is rendered difficult. In such a
case, we opt for the rule more respectful of our general objectives (pragmatism and
fairness), inviting national authorities to consider it l04 . Where search of such a rule
proves fruitless we maintain the status quo and invite parties to negotiate.
Both types of 'formal' and 'informal' harmonisation do not translate into the
application of 'one rule' (line-to-line uniformity) to all modes or countries
concerned. Rather, they both refer to the adoption of 'one adapted rule' to the legal
specificities of domestic or sectarian laws and practices, including cultural, modal,
economIC, political diversities. These do not always require undertaking
approximation efforts. For instance, ocean carrier liability exemptions such as 'perils
of the sea' or 'saving or attempting to save life or property at sea' cannot be
sacrificed on the altar of harmonisation just because they are not encountered in land
transport (ocean specific)105. They should be maintained and applied to the sea
carrier in multimodal transport. In the same way, countries cultural or legal identity
as reflected in their statutes and judicial perceptions has to be respected to the
maximum degree possible in harmonizing, when this does not put in danger the very
existence of harmonization solutions and our objectives. We refer here mostly to the
civil law province of Quebec that frequently applies different or varied rules when
103 See, for instance, the approximation of the principles of presumption of fault and presumption of liability,
adopted liability limitation measures, adopted loss of carrier limitation benefit, Annex No. III, Table No. J2 at
cc-cci. This convergence does not follow any specific approximation pattern but is dependent on the nature of
the specific measures in question. This seems also to be the case with EU Directives on many issues
necessitating harmonization. Interview of the author with the personnel of the European Commission in
Athens, Greece (Summer 2001).
104 See, for instance, suggestions on concealed damage Annex No. III, Table No. J2 at cc-cci and
approximation of limitation ofliability amounts (Part II, Chapter II, Section III, Par. 1 (B)).
105 On the specificity of maritime law see the very interesting article of Pr. Yves Tassel, "La Specificite du
Droit Maritime" (2000) online: Universite de Nantes-Centre du Droit Maritime et Oceanique Homepage
<www.droit.univ-nantes.fr/labos/cdmo/nept/nep21_l.pdf> (last visited: June 20, 2003). The author stresses
the fact that although maritime law cannot subsist without general law principles underpinnings, it has
specificities that distinguish it from these principles. Ibid.
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compared to the U.S. and Canadian common law provinces. Respect for modal and
cultural differences in harmonizing results in uniform rules rich in connotations and
respectful, to the maximum degree permitted by approximation methods, of
individuality106.
Distinguishing between rules that are subject or not to harmonization and
coming up with the right 'adapted rule' respecting individuality while being, at the
same time, pragmatic and fair is not an easy task. It involves a careful comparative
study of far more than the mere black-letter rules of various jurisdictions prior to the
actual drafting107. It presupposes close monitoring of practices that shape, influence
or complement existing rules 108. Today, exact same wording of international
conventions is often interpreted in different ways at the domestic level109.
Uniformity, therefore, does not automatically result from agreeing on the same
words but, rather, from agreeing on the same interpretation and practice of employed
terms 110. Lack of close elaboration of existing rules and practices risks lack of
consensus of the contracting parties.
Codification: Undertaking harmonisation efforts presupposes the presence of
clear, well defined cross modal and cross-country rules and practices. At present,
lack of clarity of the liability rules applicable to the multimodal carrier is
characteristic of this type of transportation. Moreover, rules that govern multimodal
transport in Canada and the U.S. are dispersed in legislation, regulations, case law
and practices. Detecting, therefore, the applicable rules and practices is not always
easy and may involve a long and painful procedure of verification. It clarifies,
106 As William Tetley has noted: "When uniform laws concern extremely divergent rules .... or do not respect
cultural or other diversities, they lead to a regulatory amalgam that distances itself from the reality of things
and has little, if any, chances of survival". William Tetley, "Uniformity ofInternational Private Maritime Law-
The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to International Conventions (2000) Tu!. Mar. L. J. 775 at 778. Martin
Boodman, "The Myth of the Harmonization of Laws", Droit Compare et Unification du Droit (Montreal:
Institute of Comparative Law 1990) 1 at 3.
107 William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence: What Was it Like to Try a Rat?" (1995) 143 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1889 at note 173.
108 Kenneth L. Port, "Trademark Harmonization" (1998) 2 Marq. Intel!. Prop. L. Rev. 33 at 40.
109 Infra at Part I, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 2(A)(b) and Par. 2(B)(b) for divergent interpretations of the CIM,
CMR and the Visby Rules given at the European level and at 247 for the U.S. 'customary' freight unit.
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however, legislation applicable to multimodal transport, provides the only way
possible for a constructive comparison of cross-country and cross-modal legal
regimes offering, at the same time, an incentive for harmonisation in proclaiming
potential grounds of convergence. In the present study, when confronted with the
need to harmonize unclear rules and practices, we will proceed to their 'codification'
in order to clarify them (for instance 'shipper sophistication' concept elements, fair
opportunity doctrine, 'sufficient notice' test) before proceeding any further. We
(will) also invite the legal community to make codification of legal concepts and
transport practices a permanent task in order to facilitate harmonization efforts. This
makes codification a harmonisation tool and as such we perceive it in the present
study. This brings us to the definition of this concept.
Etymologically, the term 'codification' is a combination of the term 'codex'
and the Latin verb 'facere' (to dO)111. Historically, codification was part of the
history of European countries following the tradition of Roman law and the model of
the Codex Justinianus (6th Century A.D.)I12. Since most of the European countries
trace their legal origins to Roman law, the concept of codification has, historically,
been part of European countries legal order113. This is not the case of common-law
jurisdictions such as England, the United States and Canada (with the exception of
the province of Quebec) that delayed to embrace this concept but finally put it in
practice, albeit to a much lesser degree than that of European civil law countries114.
In effect, whereas civil law thinking is highly structured and systematized, common
110 William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence: What Was it Like to Try a Rat?" (1995) 143 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1889 at note 173.
III Gunther A. WeiSs, "The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World" (2000) 25 Yale Int'l L.
J. 435 at 448. The term itself appeared for the first time in June 1815 when Beutham wrote a letter to Tsar
Alexander I in which it distinguished normal legislation from codification. Interestingly enough, at that time,
the Prussian (1794), French (1804) and Austrian (1811) codes already existed. Ibid at 448-449.
112 Daphne Barak-Erez, "Codification and Legal Culture: in Comparative Perspective" (1998) 13 Tul. Euro
Civ. L. F. 125 at 126.
113 Ibid at 126s.
114 Ibid at 127-129.
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law rejects systematization and takes pride in its pragmatic flexibility rather than its
logical sequence1l5.
As with the notions of uniformity, unification and harmonisation, the concept
of codification is unclear and polysemous116. According to certain authors' scientific
codification' envisions a task of 'ascertaining' and declaring' existing international
law11 ? This definition seems to be consistent with the following ones: 'the process
of compiling, arranging and systematizing the laws of a given jurisdiction or of a
discrete branch of law into an ordered code,118; or 'the body of law laid out
systematically and comprehensively' 119. Mentioned definitions of the codification
concept, however, appear more modest than the ones of: 'a regulation that is meant
to be lasting, comprehensive and concluding and that leaves no scope in adjudication
for shaping the law,12o. Or that of 'the book of law that claims to regulate not only
without contradiction but also exclusively and completely the whole of the law or at
least a comprehensive part of it' 121. The latter definition being the most ambitious
among all others, attributes to the concept of codification an extensive regulatory
reach and a dominating presence.
For the purpose of the present study, codification will involve the process of
'ascertaining' and declaring' existing international law, providing, in this way, a
comprehensive and systematic presentation of the currently applicable intermodal
carrier liability rules and practices in Canada and the U.S .. In this sense, codification
constitutes an ongoing (systematic) process of 'compiling, arranging and
115 William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to
International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 804-805. The author refers to the 'concise' style of
civil law as compared with the 'precise' style typical of common law. Ibid at note 135.
116 Gunther A. Weiss, "The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World" (2000) 25 Yale Int'l L.
J. 435 at 451.
117 Scott L. Cunningham, "Do Brothers Divide Shares Equally?" (2000) U. Pa. 1. Int'1. L. 131 at note 86.
118 As reported in Gunther A. Weiss, "The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World" (2000)
25 Yale Int'l L. J. 435 at 451.
119 Ibid
120 Ibid at 449s.
121 Ibid.
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systematizing' applicable rules and practices with the objective of declaring the legal
'status quo' 122.
It may be that the definition of the codification concept adopted herein is not
as ambitious as the ones that attribute to this notion a regulatory power sweeping in
its reach and exclusive in its presence. It is conform, however, with its use in the
present study as a harmonisation tool destined to clarify confusing applicable
intermodal laws and practices rather than 'regulate the whole of the law or a
comprehensive part of it' .
To take a specific example we will refer to the judicial consideration of
shipper sophistication in contracting carrier liability. As we are going to affirm,
shipper sophistication refers to shipper experience in transporting goods, an
experience left to courts appreciation on the basis of different adopted criteria.
Today, certain u.s. courts consider shipper sophistication in giving effect to non-
conspicuous contractual limitative clauses that condition carrier liability. Canadian
case law generally follows the same principle. Other U.S. courts, however, conclude
that carriers should always give shippers written notice of BOL liability provisions,
notwithstanding shipper sophistication. Recently, certain of these courts have
consistently considered shipper sophistication in rendering their decisions. There is,
therefore, a discernible trend in U.S. case law to favour shipper sophistication in
sanctioning contractual limitation of carrier liability provisions as Canadian courts
generally seem to d0123.
Our effort of declaring, clarifying involved case law at the domestic level and
identifying dominant trends in our effort to achieve 'informal' harmonisation of
intermodal carrier liability rules in the U.S. and Canada amounts to a codification
effort. Once codification takes place, comparison of case law conclusions is made
easier enhancing, at times, the already existing trend towards uniformity. Following
122 Note that we are using three of the above-mentioned definitions in constructing our notion of codification.
As we have stated all these definitions are compatible.
123 Part I, Chapter II, Sec. 2, Par. 2 and Sec. 1, Par. I(C) and 2(B)(c).
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the ancient Greek saying: "To ao<p6v aa<p£c; Kat 'to aa<p£c; ao<p6v" (The wise is clear
and the clear is wise).
Successful implementation of our suggestions largely depends on their
clarity. This is why we will try to make our suggestions as clear as possible to the
reader. This may not always be easy or even possible to achieve since our
suggestions do not enter in great detail permitting, therefore, presence of 'loose
ends'. We will try, however, to deploy our best efforts towards this end.
Certain authors content that the success of codification resides in its 'external'
conditions, mainly the history of legal system and the underlying cultural
background124. In this respect, it is said that one of the main reasons why
codification has been successful in European countries is their common legacy of
Roman law125. As we have affirmed, however, u.S. and Canadian law do not find
their origins in Roman law (except for the Canadian Province of Quebec). Moreover,
we have noted the difference in mentality in the two countries, shaping respective
laws. For these reasons, it does not seem that codification of applicable rules and
practices to the multimodal carrier will successfully serve harmonisation following
mentioned authors reasoning.
However, we have to take into account that the retained definition of the
concept of codification is less ambitious than the one of regulating the whole of
multimodal carrier liability in the two countries126. Codification for us aims solely at
clarifYing confusing rules and practices. For this purpose, the need for common legal
origins is not of great importance, the concept serves its purpose notwithstanding the
legal background127.
124 Daphne Barak-Erez, "Codification and Legal Culture: in Comparative Perspective" (1998) 13 Tul. Euro
Civ. L. F. 125 at 129.
125 Ibid.
126 Daphne Barak Erez notes that codification is customarily defined as the 'legislative reform which is
comprehensive and professes to encompass an entire legal field', giving, therefore, to this term a more
ambitious meaning than the one herein adopted. Ibid at 125.
127 Supra at 24-25.
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Formalism/Contractualism: The last notions that we perceive as component
concepts of pragmatism, which is located at the very foundations of the present
study, is 'contractualism' and 'formalism'. In making suggestions on uniform
multimodal carrier liability rules, we make the assumption that the principle of
freedom of contract, the focal point of transport deregulation128, as well as the need
to maintain mandatory rules, quite common in the area of ocean carrier liability,
have to be taken into account.
'Formalism' and 'contractualism' are far from being clearly defined concepts.
'Formalism' in contract law has been defined in different ways: 'how formalities are
a perennial part of legal culture,l29, 'written rules of international or domestic
communities,13o, 'strict adherence to the letter of contract,131 or 'the notion that the
proper judicial decision can be deduced from a pre-existing set of rules' 132. These are
descriptive definitions of 'formalism' that contrast the more theoretical, still
imprecise definitions of uniformity or harmonisation.
'Contractualism', on the other hand, has been opposed to 'formalism' and
attached to: the 'deliberate policy choice that brings in judicial intervention in case
of breach of contract' 133; or, the freedom of contract' (laissez-faire policies) and the
moral element of 'sanctity of promises' (pacta sunt servanta)134. Certain authors
deny moral aspects of contractual obligations as being part of the concept135.
128 Part I, Chapter II of the present study comments exclusively on transport deregulation.
129 Duncan Kennedy, "From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's Consideration
of Form" (2000) Colum. L. Rev. 94 at 151.
130 Bardo Fassbender, "Charter as Constitution of the International Community" (1998) 36 Colum. 1. Transna'
1L. 529 at 616.
13l Walter Johnson, "Inconsistency, Contradiction and Complete Confusion: the Everyday Life of the Law of
Slavery" (1997) 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 405 at 407.
132 Catherine L. Fisk, "Lochner Redux: the Renaissance of Laissez-faire Contract in Federal Common Law of
Employee Benefits" 56 Ohio. S. L. 1. 153 at 161. In this sense, see also Denis Patterson, "Conscience and the
Constitution Constitutional Interpretation" (1993) 93 Colum. L. Rev. 270 at note 22.
l33 Catherine L. Fisk, "Lochner Redux: the Renaissance of Laissez-faire Contract in Federal Common Law of
Employee Benefits" 56 Ohio. S. L. J. 153 at 161.
134 Fuller theory as reported by Duncan Kennedy, "From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller's Consideration of Form" (2000) Col. L. Rev. 94 at 160.
135 Cohen theory as reported by ibid. See also Scanlon's version of contractualism as reported by Richard
Craswell, "Against Fuller and Perdue" (2000) 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 at 113.
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Our VIew of 'formalism' corresponds more to that of 'the notion that a
judicial decision can be deduced from a pre-existing set of rules'. In transportation
law, this would translate into the presence of statutory rules that regulate carrier
liability, leaving little margin to contractual provisions. Such is the case, for
instance, of U.S. and Canadian ocean carrier statutory prohibition of contractual
agreements that limit carrier liability below statutory limits. This view of formalism
is beneficial to shippers because regulatory provisions generally protect them against
carrier abuses (regulatory 'safety net') and the certainty they provide to carriers and
shippers as to the applicable rule reduces litigation costs136.
However, extended regulation and policies in any sector constitute
impediments to free trade and also translate into governmental costs to supervise
implementation of the applicable rules 137. This is argued to have been the case of
carrier liability rules before deregulation took place and one of the main reasons why
the U.S. and, later, Canada decided to proceed to transport deregulation138. In effect,
formalism burdens carriers with obligations (i.e. obligation to publish and get
governmental approval of terms and conditions of carriage) that entail
implementation costs and obstruct the flow of commerce.
Our view of contractualism is conform to the definition of a laissez-faire
policy (freedom of contract) derived from political intent and resulting in judge's
intervention139. Transport deregulation has given way to freedom of contract in
defining carrier liability, especially in the U.S. 140. It has brought, therefore,
contractualism in the definition of carrier liability even though the degree to which
136 Catherine L. Fisk, "Lochner Redux: the Renaissance of Laissez-faire Contract in Federal Common Law of
Employee Benefits" 56 Ohio. S. L. 1. 153 at 206. The author further notes that an additional explanation for
the presence of formalism is a hostility to overt judicial intervention. Ibid at 224.
137 Robert A. Bejesky, "Exchange Rates Stability: Domestic and International Institutions Enhancing
Credibility of Government Intervention Policy" (1999) 8 MSU-DCL J. Int'1. L. 673 at note 20.
138 Infra at Part I, Chapter II.
139 Supra at 28 and accompanying text.
140 Infra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. I(B).
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parties can contractually define latter differs from mode to mode and from country to
countryl41.
The new trend has undeniably promoted trade in liberating earners from
burdensome obligations such as tariff publication and ensuing governmental
approval of their terms and conditions of carriage. On the other hand, however, it has
produced pernicious effects on shippers, the weakest party in the transport contract.
In effect, due to deregulation shippers, especially small shippers, may easily fall pray
to non-published, non governmentally controlled carrier advantageous BOL
provisions142. Often, such cases end up before the courts where uncertainty reigns
over the presence and the amount of compensation.
Despite this fact, any harmonization initiative of present carrier liability rules
does not have a chance of survival in today's world if it does not take into account
transport deregulation and its effects on carrier liability. Transport deregulation and,
therefore, 'contractualism' in defining carrier liability is a tangible reality and it is
here to stay! There seems to be no turning back from this trend even if one may view
it as a 'necessary evil' or simply as 'necessary' in today's world. As such, and
because our analysis is based on realism, deregulation and contractualism will be
taken into account in formulating our suggestions.
What we will try to accomplish in the present study is to balance out the
forces of contractualism and formalism in order to attain the optimal degree of trade
facilitation and shipper protection, while advancing, at the same time, pragmatic
suggestions. In this sense, contractualism will correspond to the general objective of
trade facilitation we are committed to in our study, whereas formalism will reflect
more shipper protection.
141 I.e. on the basis of international conventions such as the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier
cannot contractually limit its statutory limitation of liability amount. It can only contractually increase it. This
is not the case of land transport where parties can contractually define carrier liability either by increasing or
by limiting it with the exception of the Province of Quebec. Infra at Part I, Chapter II on transport
deregulation.
142 Infra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. I(B).
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Our quest for conciliation of contractualism and formalism should not be
confused with present shipper demand for re-regulation of carrier liability l43. We are
seeking transport re-regulation, but not the type that will simply bring back some
regulatory shipper protective measures destined to put an end to shippers outcry.
What we are looking for is a well-planned transport reform that will be based on the
right dosage of shipper protective regulation without over burdening carrIers or
impeding trade 144.
In this regard, we will give contractualism the predominant role governments
intended for it in pursuing transport deregulation by making it a vital part of our
proposal even if, at times, (small) shipper interests have to be compromised. By
doing so, we do not seek to disadvantage shippers but to respond to the need of
providing flexibility in transport transactions to serve both carriers and shippers
(pragmatism). Where shipper protection has to be compromised on the altar of
pragmatism, we will try to compensate such loss by providing shipper protective
measures in other fields of carrier liability and we will also stress the importance of
the judicial 'safety net'. We refuse, however, to sacrifice shipper protection as
indifferently and carelessly as governments have done in proclaiming contractualism
as the most important vehicle of trade facilitation 145. This brings us to the discussion
of the fairness concept that, along with pragmatism, constitutes the very foundations
of our analysis and condition interested parties consent in negotiations.
Domestic or international legislation define substantive fairness in different
ways. Depending on the country, the province or state within a country, the transport
mode, legislation may be more or less shipper protective. Case law does not define
143 Infra at 122 (Part I, Chapter II) for an example of shipper demand for re-regulation.
144 Kevin P. Lane, "Hong-Kong Endgame and the Rule of Law" (1997) 18 U. Pa. 1. Int'1. Econ. L 811 at 914-
915.
145 International uniformity initiatives must reflect the standard of fairness most compatible with the
international contract or marketplace transaction in question. Boris Kozolchyk, "The UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES as a Model for the Unification of the Best Contractual Practices in the Americas" (1998) 46
Am. 1. Compo L. 151 at 155. In this respect, it has also been asserted that international conventions concerning
carriage of goods and passengers were drafted not only to balance commercial interests but also to protect
potentially weaker parties serving, in this respect, fairness. Hannu Honka, "Harmonization of Contract Law
through International Trade" (1996) 11 Tul. Euro Civ. L. For. 112 at 118-119. See also supra at 12-13.
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substantive fairness with much precision. Courts different holdings on fairness have
resulted in the presence of 'majority rulings' in practicel46. Also, judges often hold
that an agreement which makes an unequal division of income or wealth does not
render the agreement unenforceable l47.
Some commentators believe that substantive fairness 148 is "justifiable only if
it narrows, or does not widen the existing inequality of persons and/or states
entitlements"149. The presumption in favour of equalization may be rebutted only by
a showing that the rule in question will benefit the long-term expectations of the
least fortunate group in societyl50. Others, define- substantive fairness in more
absolute terms such as: i) the equal distribution of resources among all constituents;
ii) distribution of resources according to each person's merits or input and iii)
distribution of resources according to some priority principle such as each person's
needs (distribution rule)151.
Some authors have suggested that a harmonized balance should be kept
between the absolute substantive fairness and the presently dominating forces (free
market, deregulation, contractualism, globalization) that tend to disregard, if not
146 Henry H. Perritt, "Comprehensive Wrongful Dismissal Legislation: Is Legislation Needed?" JW-Employee
Dismissal L. & Prac. s. 9. 3 (1992) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
147 Gail Frommer Brod, "Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice" (1994) 6 Yale J. L. & Feminism 229 at
259-260.
148 Substantive fairness is to be opposed to procedural fairness. In evaluating procedural fairness, a court
should ordinarily look to the negotiation process in an attempt to gauge its candor, openness and bargaining
balance. Substantive fairness introduces into the equation, concepts of corrective justice and accountability: a
party should bear the cost of harm for which it is legally responsible. In more simple words, procedural
fairness requires full and fair disclosure, free and voluntary consent. Substantive fairness requires fairness to
each party. "Court Approval of Settlements" (2002) 2 RCRA and Superfund: A Prac. Guide with Forms, 2d §
13:5 (WESTLAW-Tp-all).
149 Richard W. Parker, "The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What we can
Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict" (1999) 12 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 at 80. We are merely phrasing
here some ofthe many doctrinal defmitions of substantive fairness.
150 Ibid.
151 Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler, Hans Kastenholz, "Procedural and Substantive Fairness in Landfill Siting:
A Swiss Case Study (1996) 7 Risk 145 at 146. In other words, we are reasoning in terms of 'corrective justice
and accountability'. "Court Approval of Settlements" (2002) 2 RCRA and Superfund: A Prac. Guide with
Forms, 2d § 13:5 (WESTLAW-Tp-all). The justice and fairness concepts will be used as synonymous in the
present study.
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discard it152 . We align ourselves with this approach. Deregulation, a well settled-in
trend that we do not search to undo in the present study, may favour a free market
economy. However, it leads to excesses when fairness in the relation between
carriers and shippers is not preserved.
It is the duty of jurists, lawyers, judges and legislators to preserve the
regulatory and judicial 'safety net' to protect shippers following deregulation, since
it is shippers who are the weaker party in the contract of carriage153 . It is also the
duty of the legal community to protect carrier from over-protective shipper
regulation that may be installed to counter the adverse effects of transport
deregulation towards the shipper154. In embracing the deregulatory trend it is very
important, therefore, to impede its excesses either against shippers or against carriers
and, for the rest, regulate in such a manner that will not give shippers or carriers one-
sided benefits. In so doing, it is evident that we do not seek to serve parochial
interests of shippers, carriers or insurers. Our ultimate goal is not to take sides but to
serve transport and trade155 based on pragmatism and fairness to both carriers and
shippers.
One could wonder, however, whether we actually advantage the weakest
party in the transaction (the shipper, mainly the small shipper) in perceiving fairness
as a concept intended to impede excesses or refrain to give one-sided benefits either
to carriers or to shippers. The answer is probably negative when reasoning in
absolute terms. In effect, in the present study we do not make a clear, positive
contribution to shipper protection. We simply try to impede, to the best of our
152 William Bradford, « Save the Whales v. Saving the Makah: Finding Negotiating Solutions to
Ethnodevelopmental Disputes in the New International Economic Order (2000) 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 155 at
219. This seems to correspond to the former doctrinal view on narrowing inequality of persons or states.
153 Supra note 9.
154 Even though not relevant to transport deregulation, it is said that one of the advanced reasons why the 1980
Multimodal Convention, a convention destined to govern multimodal carriage at the international level, failed
was that carriers never consented to its shipper protective provisions. For further elaboration of this
affirmation see infra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 1.
155 " •••uniformity... is not an end in itself but is dependent on a valid raison d'etre. Promoting international
trade provides the most obvious reason for harmonizing purposes'. Hannu Honka, "Harmonization of Contract
Law through International Trade: a Nordic Perspective" (1996) 11 Tul. Euro. Civ. L. F. 111 at 113.
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ability, possible carner excesses and not gIve carners one-sided benefits In
formulating our suggestions. We believe this to be a good start in a deregulatory
environment which tends to sweep away shipper protections. Later, more complete
and elaborated suggestions could advance more shipper-protective solutions.
If we were to define the essence of our study in two words, we would say that
we are pursuing harmonisation of cross-border and cross-country multimodal carrier
liability rules containing the right dosage of formalism and contractualism to
advance trade and balance shipper and carrier interests. Balancing, negotiation,
balancing! This is the bottom line of our study. Balancing different harmonization
solutions, 'contractualism' and 'formalism', shipper and carrier interests in order to
achieve universal consent of uniform proposals. To this we should add our quest for
economically cost-effective suggestions, an element that invites us to ponder over
the 'Economic Analysis of Law" doctrine or, following another denomination, the
'Law and Economics' doctrine.
'Law and Economics' does not merely regroup the branches of law that
govern economic activities: international or domestic commercial activities, banks
and currency, competition, enterprises156. It goes much further than this. It founds
various legal concepts on subtle economic givens and presents the economic
perspective of legal notions 157. In this way, legal treatments of law are seen as
particular manifestations of the interrelation between law and the economy158. This
permits the legal community to better comprehend legal notions and expand its
reasoning159. For instance, comprehending how allocation of risks works out
between carrier and shipper insurers provides a better comprehension of cargo and
156 Ejan Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 140 and at
9-10.
157 Ibid at 9-10.
158 Nancy 1. Whitmore, "The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the Rise of the 'Bottleneck
Rule' in the Turner Decisions" (2003) 8 Comm. L. & Pol'y 25 at 36.
159 Ejan Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 140 and at
9-10.
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liability insurance but also the necessary basis for making appropriate suggestions on
.~ 1· b·l· 1 160unhorm la 1Ity ru es .
The doctrine's basic assumption is that we ought to make our welfare on the
basis of efficiency, that is cost-minimizing outcomes161. Efficiency has been defined
in many scientific ways but we will herein choose the following one: "A rule is
efficient if it maximizes profits from market transactions,,162.
Following this definition it has been argued that an effective transportation
system is a vital factor in insuring the efficiency of an economic system as a
whole l63 . In effect, in economic terms, intermodal transportation may be thought of
as a process for transporting freight and passengers by means of a system of
interconnected networks involving various combinations of modes of transportation,
in which all of the components are seamlessly linked and efficiently combinedl64.
Today, governmental documents and officials mostly reason in economic terms
when referring to intermodal transportation165. In this respect, the benefits of
160 'Law and Economics' is grounded in the belief that law is a function of the economy and that the economy
is a function of law. Nancy J. Whitmore, "The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the Rise of
the 'Bottleneck Rule' in the Turner Decisions" (2003) 8 Comm. L. & Pol'y 25 at 36. For the economic
analysis of allocation of risks between carrier and cargo insurers see infra at Part I, Chapter I, Sec. III, Par.
3(C).
161 Leonard R. Jaffey, "Symposium: The Future of Law and Economics: The Trouble with Law and
Economics" (1992) 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 777 at 787 and 779. Robert F. Blomquist, "Witches Brew: Some
Synoptical Reflections on the Supreme Court's Dangerous Substance Discourse, 1790-1998" (1999) 43 St.
Louis L. J. 297 at 462. See also Jason Scott Johnston, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules" (1990) 100 Yale L. J. 615 at 615 and Chris William Sanchirico, "Deconstructing the
New Efficiency Rationale" (2001) 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003 at 1005.
162 Leonard R. Jaffey, "Symposium: The Future of Law and Economics: The Trouble with Law and
Economics" (1992) 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 777 at 779. Another definitions of efficiency refer to the Pareto
Optimum, (A state is optimum if any change would hurt at least one person, help no-one), or Pareto Superior
(A move is more efficient if it makes at least one better fixed and nobody worse oft). Ibid. This is the first and
basic theorem of welfare economics and the core of the legitimacy of the market as an allocation mechanism.
Simon Deakin, Jonathan Michie, Contracts, Co-operation and Competition (London: Oxford University Press,
1997) at 309.
163 Dr. Yuri V. Yevdokimov, "Measuring Economic Benefits ofIntermodal Transportation" (2000) 27 Transp.
L. J. 439 at 440.
164 Ibid.
165 U.S. Code states with respect to Transportation: "It is the policy of the United States Government to
develop a National Intermodal Transportation System that is economically efficient and environmentally
sound, provides the foundation for the United States to compete in the global economy and will move
individuals and property in an energy efficient way. The National Intermodal Transportation System shall
consist of all forms of transportation in a unified, interconnected manner, including the transportation systems
of the future, to reduce energy consumption and air pollution while promoting economic development and
supporting the United States' pre-eminent position in international commerce"(49 USC, Ch. 55, Sec. 5501,
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intermodal transportation are analyzed within the framework of the cost-benefit
analysis or its related techniques I66.
Contribution of intermodal transportation to the economIC growth of a
country is not economically insignificantI67. When merely calculating the effect of
improvements made to intermodal transportation we find that a one-time 10%
increase in the basic characteristics of the transportation network due to intermodal
transportation results in a permanent increase of the economy's growth rateI68. More
specifically, it was found that a simultaneous 10% increase in the frequency of
transportation and the transportation network expansion as a result of intermodal
transportation, generated 682$ billion dollars in Canadian Gross Domestic Product
over the period of 50 years (approximately 13.64 billion dollars per year)I69.
The interrelation of transport and the economy is easily explained. Transport
is not an end in itself and its benefits depend on the facilitation of the economic
activities [production, consumption, leisure (transport as a socio-economic
phenomenon), dissemination] that it is intended to serve170. Improvements in
intermodal transportation, and this is said to include improvements to liability
principles governing multimodalismI7I , lead to the fall of total production costs and
consum<;r prices (reasoning on welfare economics) with empirical analysis showing
1998). In Canada, David Collenette, Transport Minister of Canada noted in 1997: "Intermodalism today is
about safe, efficient transportation by the most appropriate combination of modes" David Collenette,
"Speaking Notes for Transport Minister David Collenette" (The Summit on North American Intermodal
Transportation, 1997). See also Anthony F. Arpaia, "A Noteworthy Drift in the Economics of Transportation -
The Implications of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. V. United States" (1953) 102 U. PA. L. R 80 at 89 stating
that the objective of national transportation policy is to promote sound, efficient transportation.
166 Dr. Yuri V. Yevdokimov, "Measuring Economic Benefits of Intermodal Transportation" (2000) 27 Transp.
L. 1. 439 at 439.
167 Ibid at 450.
168 Ibid at 449.
169 Ibid. Gross domestic product is defined as the total market value of all final goods and services produced in
a country in a given year, equal to total consumer, investment and government spending, plus the value of
exports, minus the value of imports. Gross Domestic Product includes only goods and services produced
within the geographic boundaries of a country, regardless of the producer's nationality. Gross National Product
does not include goods and services produced by foreign producers but does include goods and services
produced by U.S. firms operating in foreign countries. Gross Domestic Product (2003) online: Insurers Words
Homepage <http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?2240> (last visited: 22 Jan. 2003).
170 Dr. Yuri V. Yevdokimov, "Measuring Economic Benefits ofIntermodal Transportation" (2000) 27 Transp.
L. 1. 439 at 449.
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that eventually consumers benefit more than producers from having an effective
intermodal transportation in place l72 . This is because this type of transportation
operates an increase in the volume of transported goods l73 , a reduction in logistic
costs of current operations, an expansion of the transportation network174 and a
better accessibility to input and output markets175. Reduced transit time, reduced
vehicle maintenance, reduced pernicious environmental effects and operation costs
are other benefits of intermodal transportation one has to considerl76 . All these
features of through transport have important implications for and influences on
international trade facilitation177.
Apart from the interrelation of transport and the economy, there is the
interrelation of economics and liabilities of the parties involved in the transport
contract. It has been asserted that the economic aim of any law relating to the
contract of carriage should be to encourage custodians of goods in transit to take the
more economically productive precautions 178. However, taking precautions costs
money, which is included in the cost of transport and adds to the cost of the goods at
171 J.A. Raven "Through Transport-The Role of Trade Facilitation" Through Transport Seminar (London:
London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 4.
172 Dr. Yuri V. Yevdokimov, "Measuring Economic Benefits ofIntermodal Transportation" (2000) 27 Transp.
L. J. 439 at 441 and 449 for the details of the empirical analysis.
173 Because of the advent of containers, cargo consolidation, increase in the frequency of transportation,
transport companies mergers. Ibid at 442-443.
174 Empirical evidence shows that transportation costs increase at an increasing rate with increase in tonnage
per trip but are increasing at a decreasing rate with increase in mileage. Since expansion of the network due to
intermodal transportation is associated with an increase in the overall mileage, it eventually leads to a
decreasing average total cost of transportation by pushing the volume of transportation toward an efficient
scale. This phenomenon arises because of initial excess capacity of transportation vehicles and fixed facilities
which is due to technical requirements. Ibid at 443-444.
175 Intermodal transportation expands the market reach of businesses (accessibility to output) and permits
access to a greater variety of specialized labour skills and different inputs such as capital, labour,
transportation and natural resources (accessibility of input). Ibid at 444. For a more economical analysis of
these variables see the whole article.
176 Ibid at 440. In effect, through transport is designed and operated with a view to reducing total transport
time from origin to destination through elimination of traditional delays between transport modes. Moreover,
the opportunity for intermediate access to the transported goods is diminished through the transport of goods
by containers. J. A. Raven, "Through Transport-The Role of Trade Facilitation" Through Transport Seminar
(London: London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 4.
177 J.A. Raven "Through Transport-The Role of Trade Facilitation" Through Transport Seminar (London:
London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 4.
178 Leslie Tomasello Weitz, "International Maritime Law: the Nautical Fault Debate" (1998) 22 Mar. Law. 581
at 584.
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destination179. Economic cost created by arbitration, legal costs and burden of proof
rules produces the same effectl80 . These expenditures would be unproductive if they
exceed the cost of any loss or diminution in the value of the goods in transit which
would have occurred if the precautions had not been taken181.
Moreover, following 'Law and Economics' reasoning, freely negotiated
bargains best serve efficiency since they tend to maximize wealth doing away with
regulatory controls, restrictions and costs l82 . On the contrary, immutable legal rules
such as parties sophistication, the degree of notice, consent, public policy, justice
made to the interests involved in the transport contract are principles that create an
obstacle to achieving efficiency and against which 'Law and Economics' scholars
have fought long and hard l83 . In this way, 'Law and Economics' comes to the
defence of the structure of private power against legal alteration and postulates that
justice is what power can get in the marketl84 . This has made certain authors argue
that 'Law and Economics' central trouble is its disregard for feelings, values and
personal preferences disguising reality as an economic clockworkl85 .
One could argue that since our analysis aims at facilitating trade and
efficiency, we adopt the 'Law and Economics' theory and reject notions such as
shipper sophistication, public policy, or fairness in the relation of the parties
involved in the transport contract. We cannot deny that the ultimate goal of the
present thesis is to serve trade and efficiency and that to achieve this we do place
179 Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979) 27 Am. J. Compo L.
357 at 363.
180 Ibid. at 367.
181 Ibid.
182 Leonard R. Jaffey, "Symposium: The Future of Law and Economics: The Trouble with Law and
Economics" (1992) 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 777 at 789 and 831. Economists often assert that law serves a market
economy best when it concentrates on three principal tasks: enforcing contracts, defining property rights and
punishing fraud. Richard Shell, "Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court" (1993) 81 Calif. L. Rev. 431 at 431.
183 Richard Shell, "Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court" (1993) 81 Calif. L. Rev. 431 at 499 and Warren J.
Samuels, A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics, An Institutional Perspective (Hingham, Massachussetts:
Martinus NijhofPublishing, 1981) at 51.
184 Warren J. Samuels, A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics, An Institutional Perspective (Hingham,
Massachusetts: Martinus Nijhof Publishing, 1981) at 51.
185 Leonard R. Jaffey, "Symposium: The Future of Law and Economics: The Trouble with Law and
Economics" (1992) 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 777 at 814.
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ourselves in a market economy context. But many limits exist. We do not
uncontrollably embrace the principle of freedom of contracting and we do not run
afoul values such as fairness, parties sophistication, notice or public policy.
Our perception of serving trade and efficiency is founded on the adoption of
pragmatic uniformity suggestions many of which constitute market economy ('law
and economics') principles (for instance, deregulation) that tend to infest the
transport industry today. In this sense, market economy principles are compatible
with the concept of pragmatism herein adopted. To these principles, however, we
inject the maximum dose of justice so as to fairly balance conflicting interests
present in the transport contract. In this way, we maintain public policy
considerations, shipper sophistication, notice and generally strive to keep a fair
balance of interests involved in the transport contract without losing track of the
present economic and legal reality as well as the need to achieve uniformity.
Our hypothesis is not totally unfounded on the basis of the 'Law and
Economics' doctrine. There are 'Law and Economics' authors who have suggested
that cost-effectiveness and contractual carrier liability has to take into account
equality of bargaining power and, therefore, shipper sophistication and experience in
the transport contract186 . Transport contracts find, here, common ground with the
sales of goods contracts. In both sales and transport contracts carriers (or sellers)
may be of a superior bargaining power to shippers (or buyers), especially non-
experienced, low income ones, because of the sophistication of the former and the
frequency with which they engage in dealings with the latter187 . Moreover, carriers
186 Werner Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics (1999) 3rd ed. (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999) at
124. It has been noted that developing the economic analysis of law, we observe a surprising correspondence
between justice and efficiency. In many cases, principles we think of as just correspond fairly closely to rules
that we discover are efficient. David D. Friedman, Law's Order (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University
Press, 2000) at 22.
187 See Werner Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics (1999) 3rd ed. (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999) at
124 for a more detailed analysis of the sales contract.
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(or sellers) might be more accommodating to wealthy shippers (or buyers) from
whom they expect repeated purchases than poorer ones188.
Taking into account the balance of power between the two parties, 'Law and
Economics' authors have developed strategies destined to reduce sellers or buyers
transaction costs. Such strategies are easily transposable to the carrier-shipper
relationship. They are mostly contractual remedies consisting in adding protective
clauses such as waiver of defence clauses or termination at will clauses when such
contractual modifications are permittedl89 .
Even so, one could argue that the cost-effectiveness argument persists with
respect to our suggestions since the latter are not limited to mere consideration of
shipper sophistication. It is true that while we are trying to define pragmatic
uniformity rules we are not always considering market-oriented and, therefore, cost-
effective principles and concepts. From the analysis that will follow in the present
thesis we can overall conclude that our suggestions follow a slow, costly procedure
of harmonization of modal and domestic laws, adoption of a network system of
liability and codification of case law holdings. Moreover, we are going to adopt the
principle of carrier presumption of fault to form the basis of multimodal carrier
liability. This principle is more adapted to the nature of the multimodal carriage and
is, therefore, more pragmatic than the principle of presumption of liability. However,
it is the principle of presumption of liability that seems to be more cost-effective
than the principle of presumption of fault that we adopt l90 .
From such a perspective, our suggestions seem to lack cost-effectiveness
considerations. The reason for the choices made in this regard, is that we have seen
ambitious, presumed efficient, past uniformity initiatives to have failed to reach
industry consensus. We are of the opinion that only gradual, less ambitious
suggestions can ultimately reach uniform multimodal carrier liability rules. In other
188 Werner Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics (1999) 3rd ed. (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999) at
124.
189 Ibid at 127-129.
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words, whenever a choice has to be made between cost-effective and pragmatic
uniformity suggestions we overall opt for the latter solution, mindful of the viability
of our proposals. Of course, one could challenge the viability of costly uniform
intermodal liability suggestions arguing that costly and protracted negotiating
procedures do not favour adoption ofproposed rules.
However, and despite lack of empirical data, we believe that the end product
of uniformity efforts will largely increase economic growth and maximum
protection of contracting parties when compared to its costs. If, as we have seen, an
improvement of 10% in the frequency or network expansion of multimodal
transportation results in an increase of 13.64 billion dollars of the Canadian Gross
Domestic Product per year, facilitation of trade that will result from a uniform
multimodal carrier liability regime can only produce gains disproportionately higher
to the improvement effected. Moreover, we have seen that litigation and
transportation costs will be reduced as a result of a uniform multimodal carrier
liability regime191 . Increase of economic benefits and decrease of costs of
intermodalism make adoption of our suggestions worthwhile in the long run despite
their costly nature and implementation process. Finally, we should note that once we
sketch our 'costly' multimodal carrier liability suggestions we will advance sub-
suggestions that will take into account cost-effective considerations such as the
adoption of a contractual document instead of elaboration of a convention192 . These
tend to alleviate the overall costly nature of the general suggestions herein made.
We can, therefore, conclude that 'Law and Economics' provides an important
element to take into account when considering uniformity of multimodal carrier
liability. However, this doctrine is not the Alpha and the Omega of our reasoning.
Nuances have to be made when considering pragmatism, fairness and efficiency in
the way mentioned above.
190 Infra at Part II, Chapter II, Sec. II, Par. 1.
191 Supra at 11 commenting on the advantages ofuniformity.
192 Infra at 314-315.
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In order to be able to formulate our suggestions, we will compare the rules
and practices applicable to carriers across modes and borders as well as their
applications to multimodal carriage. In this respect, we should reiterate the
importance we attribute to the identification, the clarification of rules and practices
that govern multimodal carrIage (codification) considering the lack of
comprehensive, clear-cut laws in this field. In effect, three fourths of our study
concentrate on the presentation of rules and practices that shape today the field of
multimodal carrier liability. The first part of our two-part study will be dedicated to
analysing different aspects of multimodal carrier liability. The 1980 Multimodal
Convention, the ongoing European Union efforts to provide for uniformity of
multimodal carrier liability rules, the FIATA Bill of Lading, a document
successfully applicable today at the European and the international levels, the role of
insurance companies in multimodal transport and transport deregulation in the U.S.
and Canada. In our second part we will focus on the details and instructive
comparison of the currently applicable multimodal (or, rather, unimodal) carrier
liability rules in Canada and the U.S. (Chapter I, Part II). It is only in the last Chapter
of our study that we will advance our suggestions towards uniformity of multimodal
carrier liability (Part II, Chapter II).
Our analysis is empirical since it is based on elements that compose the
present reality to advance suggestions towards uniformity of intermodal carrier
liability. A variety of sources appear at the basis of our study: primary sources such
as international unimodal and multimodal conventions that have entered or not into
force as well as domestic transportation acts and regulations. Currently applicable
acts, regulations and conventions will help us present the legal status quo in the field
of multimodal carrier liability. Secondary sources of law are very rich, diverse and
of prime importance to our analysis. They involve case law, articles, interviews,
newsletters, journals, publications, official documents, transport compames
documentation in civil and common law jurisdictions in the U.S., Canada as well as
internationally. Secondary sources will serve two functions: they will help analyze
and complement primary sources provisions giving the most updated version of
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prevailing rules and practices in the area of unimodal or multimodal carrier liability.
They will also provide a comparative and critical view of primary sources of law
used in the present study. In brief, primary and secondary sources will help us
decompose and criticize the elements of the present multimodal carrier liability
reality (aposynthesis) upon which we will later base our suggestions on uniformity
(synthesis).
Our effort to suggest ways towards uniformity of multimodal carrier liability
In Canada and the U.S. may involve a slow, painful and complicated study.
Considering, however, the complexity of the sector, we believe that the task we are
undertaking constitutes the only guarantee of success for creating a uniform
multimodal carrier liability regime. The present analysis is divided in two parts. The
first part, intended to give the reader a global view of forces shaping intermodal
carrier liability at the international, regional and domestic (U.S./Canada) level is
entitled:
Part I: International, Regional and Domestic Views of Multimodal
Carrier Liability: Lessons to be Learnt.
Based on the analysis made in the first part of our thesis, we will proceed to
the cross-modal and cross-country comparative analysis of multimodal carrier
liability in the U.S. and Canada and the formulation of our uniformity suggestions in
the second part.
Part II: Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S. and Canada: Analysis
and Uniformity Suggestions
Part I: International, Regional and Domestic Views of Multimodal Carrier
Liability: Lessons to be Learnt
Due to the international reach of intermodalism, uniformity of
multimodal carrier liability in the U.S. and Canada does not simply entail a
comparative study of cross-modal laws between the two countries. It also involves
observing international and regional intermodal carrIer liability patterns,
understanding basic insurance mechanisms upon which multimodal carriage is
dependent for its function and transport deregulation. In this way, we will be able to
'grasp' the rhythm of the sector to be able to proceed later, more internationally and
industry conscious, to the analysis of multimodal carrier liability in Canada and the
U.S. and the formulation of our suggestions. This is why we propose focusing on the
international (1980 Multimodal Convention) and regional (European experience of
multimodal carrier liability) legal reality of intermodal carriage in the first chapter of
our analysis, Chapter I. In our second chapter, we will focus on U.S. and Canadian
transport deregulation and its effect on multimodal carrier liability, Chapter II.
Chapter I: International and Regional Multimodal Carrier Liability
Patterns: The 1980 UN Multimodal Convention and the EU Multimodal
Carrier Liability Pattern 193
Geographic barriers are unknown to intermodalism. To be able to talk
about cross modal (ocean-land) and cross country (U.S.ICanada) uniformity of
multimodal carrier liability one has to be taught from past failed and present
ongoing international or regional initiatives made towards this endl94 •
This is the objective of the present chapter! Comment, first, on past failed
international uniformity initiatives on intermodal carrier liability -1980 United
193 The abbreviations UN and EU stand for United Nations and European Union respectively.
194 UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal
Instrument (Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/l, 2003) at par. 19. The UNCTAD Report states that to
bring about change one has to understand how stakeholders perceive the status quo and why past attempts at
uniformity failed.
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Nations Multimodal Convention-, the presently applicable FIATA BOL contractual
document and the role of insurance companies in intermodal transport Section I.
Seek guidance, second, from uniform intermodal carrier liability patterns that may
exist at the regional level. The EU will retain our attention in this respect since,
because of the age and geography of the 'old continent,l95, multimodalism is more
liable of being well developed at the European level than elsewhere Section II.
Section I: From the 1980 United Nations Convention on International
Multimodal Transport Onwards
Recognizing the importance of multimodal transport for international
trade as well as the need to provide for uniformity of liability rules governing it,
three sets of model rules have been elaborated since 1975, with the 1980 United
Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport196 receiving, among
them, the greatest attention197. This Convention, intended to be a model of
195 Infra at 85-86. Europe, also known as the 'Old Continent' is the cradle of Western Culture which started
with ancient Greece and was later succeeded by the Roman Empire. Archaeological finds reveal the high level
of development of these two ancient civilizations. The latest papyrus (1C(i1CUpO~) writen in Greek language
dates 7.000 before J.C.. The Power of Greek Words (2000) online: Add GR Homepage
<http://www.addgr.com/art/grwords/power.htm> (last visited: Feb. 20, 2001). Map ofEurope (2002) online:
Map-Europe Homepage http://www.map-europe.com/#About Europe (last visited: May 2, 2002).
196 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, May 24, 1980, U.N. Doc.
TD/MT/CONF/17 [hereinafter 1980 Multimodal Convention]. This Convention was the first of its kind to be
prepared under the auspices of the United Nations Conference On Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Among its objectives appear: 'development of smooth, economic and efficient multimodal transport services',
'facilitating the orderly expansion of world trade' and 'equitable provisions concerning the liability of
multimodal transport operators' (introductory remarks (b». Annex No. II, Table No. I at cxiv for the text of
the Convention.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is a permanent organ of the General
Assembly of the U.N.. Its aim is to promote international trade and economic development, especially those
of developing countries. Although ports, maritime and connected inland transport make necessarily part of
UNCTAD general objectives, it was following decisions of various UN bodies that the whole spectrum of
multimodal transport operations was made part of UNCTAD functions. Harmonization of the legal
framework of multimodal transport are among the objectives of UNCTAD. Multimodal Transport (1995)
online: UNCTAD Organization Homepage <http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/multimod/mt2brfO.htm> (last
visited: April 28, 2001).
This international organization is perceived to be the vehicle for the attempts of the developing countries to
achieve a 'New International Economic Order'. This concept refers to the application of the principle of
equality among nations. The principle of equality under the new economic order does not apply in an absolute
way so that each country is granted exactly the same benefits as another country. Rather, equality is respected
by granting to the poorer nations more benefits than those granted to richer countries. Overall equality is,
therefore, achieved. For general information on UNCTAD see About UNCTAD (2000) online:
<http://www.unctad.org/en/aboutorg/aboutorg.htm> (last visited: April 16, 2001).
197 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage
and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Convention" (1995) 5
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unification of international multimodal transport rules 198, is not in force today since
only 10 out of the thirty countries required have signed it199. Par. 1. The 1980
Multimodal Convention not having been adopted, contractual documents, such as
the FIATA BOL, have been elaborated and are successfully used at the international
level Par. 2. Cargo and liability insurers secure the smooth operation of multimodal
carriage for carriers and shippers. Par. 3.
Par. 1: The 1980 United Nations Convention on International
Multimodal Transport. The 1980 Multimodal Convention is generally considered
to be a companion treaty of the 1978 Hamburg Rules, in force today, and applicable
solely to ocean carriers of goods or to the ocean leg of the multimodal journey (art.
1.6)200. At present, the U.S. is in the process of amending anti-quated 1936 Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)201 by adopting a hybrid regime between the Visby
and the Hamburg Rules, which will govern U.S. international ocean carriage and, to
a certain extent, intermodal carriage202. The COGSA reform is presently delayed in
1. Tnansnat' I L. & Pol'y I at 20. The three initiatives are: the 1975 International Chamber of Commerce
Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport Document, the 1990 UNCTAD/ICC Rules on Multimodal
Transport Documents and the 1980 Multimodal Convention. Ibid. We will later comment on the 1990
UNCTAD/ICC Rules when dealing with the FIATA Bill of Lading. Infra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par.
2.
198 The term 'unification' is used by Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya,
Transportation Law and Practice in North America, (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-
American Free Trade, 1996) at 77 and 82 and is compatible with our definition of the concept which proposes
a 'Iine-to-line' identity of international legal rules governing multimodal transport. Supra at 15s.
199 The ten countries that have acceded or ratified the document are: Burundi, Chile, Georgia, Lebanon,
Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia. Norway and Venezuela have simply signed the
document. Interview of the author with UNCTAD personnel (August 26, 2003). The fact that the 1980
Multimodal Convention is not likely to come into force in the near future is not unusual for private
international law conventions. For instance, the 1924 Hague Rules were not adopted by Canada and the U.S.
until 1936 and 1937 respectively. William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International
Multimodal Transport of Goods» (1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 193.
200 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods»
(1982) 57 Tul. L. R.193 at 212-213. Rolf Herber, «The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism»
(1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at 622. The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
(Hamburg Rules), March 30, 1978, A/Conf.89/l3 U.N.T.S., U.N. Doc., 1978 [hereinafter 1978 Hamburg
Rules] entered into force on November 1st, 1992 since the 20 signatures required for this purpose were
obtained on that date. Today, the 1978 Hamburg Rules have entered into force in 28 countries which are not
big seafaring nations. Status of the Hamburg Rules (March 2003) online: University of Oslo Homepage
<http://www.jus.uio.no/lmlun.conventions.membership.status/un.sea.carriage.hamburg.rules.1978.html> (last
modified: March 20,2003). 1978 Hamburg Rules are not in force in the U.S. or Canada.
201 Ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as amended at) 46 U. S. C. App. [ss] 1300-1315 (1988)
[hereinafter COGSA].
202 We are talking about draft COGSA 1998 that we will develop later in greater detail. Infra at 169s.
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Congress due to the strong opposition of foreign (including Canadian) ship owners
and renowned maritime law experts and practitioners203 .
One cannot but wonder why Canada, a shipper nation heavily dependent
on its exports204, has not ratified the 1980 Multimodal Convention orland the 1978
Hamburg Rules205 . It is said that due to the small number of countries willing to
ratify the convention and Canadian shipping industry opposition, Canada withheld
ratification206 . If the COOSA reform is finally adopted by Congress, however, it is
likely that the 1980 Multimodal Convention will follow and that, following the U.S.
initiative, other countries will do same207 . Because of the eventuality of future
adoption of the 1980 Multimodal Convention by the U.S. and Canada, of the
attention this Convention has drawn and because of the lessons we learn through its
study, we will presently examine its basic liability principles. The genesis and
Essence of the 1980 Multimodal Convention (A), the basis of M.T.O. liability
towards the shipper (B) and the limitation of M.T.O. liability towards the shipper
(C).
203 Ibid.
204 While Canada's major trading partner is the United States, its major sea-borne trade goes to non-U.S.
destinations, mainly Japan, the E.C. and the Soviet Union. Hugh M. Kindred, Ted L. McDorman, Mary R.
Brooks, Norman G. Letalik, William Tetley, Edgar Gold, The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by
Water Law (Halifax: Dalhousie University 1982) at 272. See also graphs and text in: Canada: Ministry of
Transport, Carriage of Goods by Water Act (1999) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http :www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/cargoregime/cogwareportparliament.htm> (last visited: April 4, 2001). Since the
1980 Multimodal Convention is said to favor shippers (infra at 48), the question of non adoption of the said
convention by Canada is easily raised.
205 The Marine Liability Act 2001, S. C. 2001 c. 6 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 MLA] contains, in Schedule III, a
carbon copy of the Visby Rules applicable in Canada. Marine Liability Act (2001) online: Canadian
Department of Justice <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/M-0.7/> (last modified: August 31, 2001). See also supra
note 45.
206 Interview of the author with an International Relations expert at Transport Canada (April 27, 2001). Part V
provision 44 of the 2001 MLA requires the government to decide, by Jan. 1, 2005 and every five years
afterwards, if necessary, whether the 1978 Hamburg Rules (incorporated in Schedule 4 of the act) should
come into force. This has not occurred so far since Canada would like to move in concert with the United
States, its largest trading partner. Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, «Creating Uniform Liability Standards for Sea
Carriage of Goods» (1996) 23 Transnat' 1. L. J. 471 at 492. See also Cutting the Apron Strings (2003) online:
The Maritime Advocate Homepage <www.maritimeadvocate.com/19_cana.ph> (last visited: June 18,2003).
207 «Obviously, a decision by the U.S. to ratify the Convention would change th[e] picture. As the most
significant trading nation in the world, such a decision by the United States would doubtless lead to a similar
action by other countries, developed as well as developing». Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention»
(1998) 19 1. Mar. L & Com. 231 at 244.
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A. The Genesis and Essence of the 1980 Multimodal Convention: Until
1980, international conventions and national laws were designed to regulate carriage
of goods by one particular mode of transportation (unimodal transport)208. Unimodal
laws and conventions were premised on the assumption that international carriage of
goods occurred primarily on a single mode of transportation, while the use of other
transportation modes was incidental and, therefore, involved a different and separate
legal relationship.
With the emergence of containerization in the 1950s and the common
belief that the application of various documents and liability rules to the
uninterrupted movement of goods across international borders was likely to hamper
international trade, the need for an international legal regime for intermodal
transport begun to emerge209. Especially small businesses were often overwhelmed
by the additional costs incurred to pay lawyers and/or additional insurance to resolve
complexities which often rendered the shipment uneconomicae lO.
It is not entirely clear when the first efforts to devise an intermodal legal
regime were made. The formal negotiating history of the Multimodal Convention
begun with the TCM211 Draft Convention in the early 1970s, a document voluntary
in its application, applying a 'network system' of liability in case of evident damage
and proposing a uniform limit of liability in case of concealed damage212. Because
de facto, multimodal carrier liability rules already followed a network system of
208 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L & Com. 231 at 231 and 232.
209 Ibid at 234.
210 Ibid at 223-224. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, «The Economic and
Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Convention»
(New York: 1991) at 44.
211 French acronym for Transport Combine des Marchandises (Combined Transport of Goods). The
Convention was the culmination of at least a decade of intergovernmental negotiations within the UNCTAD
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). William J. Coffey, «Multimodalism and the American
Carrier» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 574. This document is the successor of the 'Rome Draft TMC
Convention', which was elaborated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe. Nicole Lacasse, "Le Transport Multimodal International des Marchandises. Etude Comparative des
Droits Canadiens et Fran9ais" (1988) [unpublished: archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche
number: 88.57.06285/88] at 330.
212 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods»
(1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 235.
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liability, ratification of the TMC Draft Convention was not considered
worthwhile213 . Also, the voluntary nature of these rules demonstrated their weakness
In achieving the objective of uniformity and efficiency In multimodal
transportation214.
Negotiations were later continued under the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)215. Ten years after the beginning of
intergovernmental negotiations, the 1980 Multimodal Convention was adopted.
Even though the kind of transportation supplied by developed countries was taken
into account in drafting the Convention, its most significant provisions were crafted
by shipper developing countries216.
The 1980 Multimodal Convention covers exclusively international
multimodal transport of goods (art. 1.1) provided that the place of taking charge or
delivery is located in a contracting state (art. 2i1? The very essence of the
convention is that multimodal transportation is covered by one contract of carriage
with the shipper, one responsible party towards the shipper (a new entity called the
213 Ibid at 235-236.
214 Ibid at 235.
215 Ibid at 236. On UNCTAD see supra note 196 and accompanying text. On the details of the intermediary
steps in adopting the 1980 Multimodal Convention see the well documented analysis of Nicole Lacasse, "Le
Transport Multimodal International des Marchandises. Etude Comparative des Droits Canadiens et Franl;ais"
(1988) [unpublished: archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 330-
331.
216 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods»
(1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 194. Developing nation's early support of a uniform liability system reflected a
belief that the traditional principles of division of responsibility for cargo loss and damage were
disadvantageous to their essentially shipper nature. Ibid.
The significant role of these nations in drafting the Convention is noted early on, by UNCTAD's statement of
principle enunciated in its first session in 1964: «All countries should cooperate in devising measures to help
developing countries to build up maritime and other means of transport for their economic development, to
insure the unhindered use of international transport facilities, the improvement of terms of freight and
insurance for the developing countries...» Ibid at 200.
217 If multimodal transport is limited within the boundaries of one country or merely to pick-up and delivery
of cargo to be transported under a unimodal contract of carriage, the Convention does not apply. See Annex
No. II, Table No. I at cxvi for the text of the 1980 Multimodal Convention. For more details on the general
conditions of application of the 1980 Multimodal Convention see Nicole Lacasse, "Le Transport Multimodal
International des Marchandises. Etude Comparative des Droits Canadiens et Franl;ais" (1988) [unpublished:
archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 337-355.
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Multimodal Transport Operator (MTO)) and one set of MTO liability rules towards
the shipper218 .
What has been described as the great success of the 1980 Multimodal
Convention is that it divides multimodal carriage into two levels of legal
relationships: one between the shipper and the M.T.O. (freight forwarder-contracting
carrier)219 and the other between the MTO and the underlying 'actual' or performing
carrier220. The intermodal shipper deals only with the MTO who acts as a principal
towards him during the entire journey and this relationship is governed by the 1980
Multimodal Convention221 . When the MTO indemnifies the shipper, he may bring a
subrogated action against the underlying 'actual' carrier222. These are underlying
carriers to whom the MTO may have entrusted in whole, or in part, performance of
its transportation contract with the shipper223 . The relation between the MTO and the
underlying carriers will be governed by the unimodal liability regime based on what
218 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods»
(1982) 57 Tul. L. R.193 at 208. The objective to be attained, in this respect, was that of one transport
document, one liability regime and one compensation amount. Marie Tilche, Andree Chao, "Transport
Combine/Multimodal: Responsabilite de l'Operateur" (1994) 2570 Bull. Transp. Log. 430 at 438. This
concept of uniformity corresponds to our retained defmition of unification. As we are going to confirm, the
1980 Multimodal Convention comes very close to the proposed uniformity (unification) model in maintaining
one multimodal document, one basis ofMTO liability but not always one liability limitation amount.
219 The MTO is the new entity created by the 1980 Multimodal Convention, non existent in the 1978 Hamburg
Rules. According to art. 1(2) of the Convention, the MTO is any person who, on his own behalf or through
another person acting on his behalf, concludes a multimodal transport contract and acts as a principal, not as
an agent or on behalf of the consignor or of the carriers participating in the multimodal transport operations
and who assumes responsibility for the performance of the contract. For the freight forwarder as contracting
carrier see Peter Jones, Principal, Forwarder (1999) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.comlindex/princrit.htm> (last modified: July 9, 1999).
220 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 237. The term 'actual
carrier' is also used in the 1978 Hamburg Rules to designate the carrier to whom performance of the contract
of carriage has been entrusted by the (contracting) carrier (Hamburg Rules, article 1(2)). Under the 1978
Hamburg Rules the contracting carrier is liable for the whole carriage, including these portions performed by
the actual carrier. However, the shipper can hold the actual carrier liable. The same thing is provided for by
the 1980 Multimodal Convention (see i.e.art. 20.2) but the emphasis is placed on the action against the MTO.
221 Frank P. DeGiulio, "Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis" (1989) 64 Tul.
L. Rev. 281 at 353.
222 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, «International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage
and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules» (1995) 5 1.
Transnat'l. L. & Pol'y 1 at 21.
223 The MTO may also be the performing carrier. William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on
International Multimodal Transport of Goods» (1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 210. The Multimodal Transport
Contract is defined in article 1(3): it is the MTO's undertaking «to perform or to procure the performance of
international multimodal transport» from the time of receipt to the time of delivery».
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is provided for in the contracts the MTO has concluded with them224. Under the
1980 Multimodal Convention, therefore, unimodal liability regimes remain
unaffected (network system of liability), but their complexity is left in the hands of
experts who professionally engage in multimodal transport225 . This provides for a
combination of a network system of liability between the MTO and the underlying
carrieres), with a uniform set of liability rules to govern the relationship between the
MTO and the shipper.
Since it is the 1980 Multimodal Convention provisions which govern the
relation between the M.T.O. and the shipper, they will mainly draw our attention.
B. Basis ofM T 0. Liability Towards the Shipper: As we have affirmed,
the 1980 Multimodal Convention is considered to be the companion treaty to the
1978 Hamburg Rules226 . Both these sets of rules base carrier liability on the
principle of presumption of fault227 . In effect, art. 16(1) of the 1980 Multimodal
Convention provides that the M.T.O. shall be liable for loss or damage to the goods,
as well as for delay in delivery if the harm-causing event took place while the goods
were in his charge:
'unless the multimodal operator proves that he, his servants or agents ...
took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence
and its consequences' 228.
The presumption of fault is destroyed if proof is made that all measures
224 Ibid at note 73. Richard W. Palmer, Frank P. DeGiulio, «Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage»
(1989) 64 TLN. 1. R. 281 at 353. Kurosh Nasseri, The Multimodal Convention (1998) 19 J. Mar. 1. & Com.
231 at 237.
225 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L & Com. 231 at 237.
226 Supra at 45.
227 On the principle of presumption of fault when compared with that of presumption of liability see detailed
analysis infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1.
228 1980 Multimodal Convention, basic principles (in (d)) explicitly states that this set of rules is based on the
principle of presumption of fault. Annex No. II, Table No.1 at cxv. We find the exact same provision -with
minor changes in the terms used- in article 5(1) of the 1978 Hamburg Rules. According to the common
understanding contained in the Final Act ofthe United Nations Conference on the Carriage ofGoods by Sea,
(1978) art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13 Annex II, 1978, Hamburg Rules art. 5 is based on the presumption
of fault principle: «It is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier. .. is based on the principle
of presumed fault or neglect. This means that, as a rule, the burden of proof rests on the carrier but, with
respect to certain cases, the provisions of the Convention modify this rule».
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that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences were
taken by the M.T.O. (1980 Multimodal Convention or the ocean carrier for the 1978
Hamburg Rules) and his servants. Specific liability exemptions ('litany' of liability
exemptions), currently present under the Hague and the Visby Rules do not make
part of the 1980 Multimodal Convention. This is primarily and most significantly
the case of the 'nautical fault' defense, a liability exemption that has traditionally
benefited ocean carriers under the Hague and the Visby Rules, distancing ocean
carriage from land transport liability regimes229.
Certain authors argue that abolition of the list of excepted perils benefits
shippers since carriers have no longer ready-made excuses to oppose to shipper
claims23o. Others, note that the 1978 Hamburg Rules and the 1980 Multimodal
Convention principle of presumption of fault benefits carriers since the Hague and
Visby Rules 'litany' of liability exemptions favors clarity in the relation between the
carrier and the shipper and promotes, therefore, extra-judicial settlement of
d· 231Isputes .
They argue that under the principle of presumption of fault, the Hague
and the Visby Rules list of liability exceptions will still exonerate carriers since it is
doubtful that courts will not consider precedent on the excepted perils in this
regard232. However, apart from the cases where the absence of carrier fault is
229 Leslie Tomasello Weitz, «The Nautical Fault Debate» (The Hamburg Rules, the U.S. COGSA 95, the
STCW 95, and the ISM Code) (1998) 22 TLN. M. 1. 1. 581 at 591. W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed.
(Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 398 and Rene Rodiere, Emmanuel du Pontavice,
Droit Maritime 12th ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 1997) at 345-346. For a more detailed analysis of this type offault see
infra at 223s.
230 Hugh M. Kindred, Ted L. McDorman, Mary R. Brooks, Norman G. Letalik, William Tetley, Edgar Gold,
The Future ofCanadian Carriage ofGoods by Water Law (Halifax: Dalhousie University 1982) at 283.
231 George F. Chandler, «COGSA, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules» (1984) 15 1. Mar. 1. & Com. 230 at
244-245.
232 Ibid. See also infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 for additional authority on this point.
Arguments have been made, however, that the removal of the Hague Rules defenses under the 1978 Hamburg
Rules might weaken ship owner position because courts will not consider the Hague Rules liability
exceptions. Eun Sup Lee, «Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability
Insurance» 4 ILSA 1. Int'l & Compo 1. 153 at 164-165. According to the author, only speculation can be
made today as to the effects of the Hamburg Rules on carrier liability as these rules have not yet been
generally adopted. Ibid at 155. The lack of clarity and uncertainty of 1980 Multimodal Convention effects on
the basis of liability appear among convention's weaknesses. Hugh M. Kindred, Ted 1. McDorman, Mary R.
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evident, there are a number of occurrences where uncertainty reigns as to carrier
liability under the principle of presumption of fault: i.e. damage or loss due to water
damage, insufficient ventilation, overrun engines, pilferage, overheating233 . In these
instances, authors maintain that carrier will probably not be exempted under the
Visby Rules but can bring proof of his absence of fault under the Hamburg Rules and
the 1980 Multimodal Convention (carrier protective provision)234. No certainty as to
this conclusion is provided, however, by these rules.
Uncertainty is accentuated under the presumption of fault principle,
which raises, yet, another question. Under the Hague and the Visby Rules proof of a
carrier exoneration cause suffices to exempt him from liability before the burden of
proof shifts to the shipper to prove carrier negligence. On the contrary, the
presumption of fault principle may require proof of absence of any type of fault on
the part of the presumed liable party even when such absence of fault is not related
to a specifically invoked cause ofloss235 • When absence of fault has to be established
at all levels and not simply with respect to a specific cause of loss -as under the
principle of presumption of liability- before the burden of proof shifts to the shipper,
the presumption of fault principle may disadvantage carrier interests. This shipper
protective analysis of mentioned principle counters carrier protective analysis of
same as mentioned above and furthers confusion as to what the prescribed by the
1980 Multimodal Convention liability regime would give in practice.
Brooks, Norman G. Letalik, William Tetley, Edgar Gold, The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by
Water Law (Halifax: Dalhousie University 1982) at 302.
233 George F. Chandler, «COGSA, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules» (1984) 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 230 at
244-245.
234 Ibid. See also infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 for a more detailed analysis of the principle of
presumption of fault. Thesis of Nicole Lacasse, International Multimodal Transport ofGoods. Comparative
Study ofCanadian and French Laws (D. Jur. Thesis, University of Paris 1, 1988) [unpublished: archived at
the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 366-367. The negotiating history of
the Convention are demonstrative examples of the fact that developed countries interests were represented in
its provisions. Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 247-248.
235 Ryssok v. H6pital Royal Victoria (1995), A. Q. no. 1606 (S. C. Que.), Harbour Commission ofMontreal v.
Albert M Marshall (1908),2 Ex. C. R. 178 (Exc. C. C.), Nolan v. Rhodes et al. (1980),27 O. R. (2d) 609
(ant. c. A.), Boxenbaum v. Wise (1994), S. C. R. 292 (S. C. C.). On the presumption of fault principle see
also infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 and interview with Pro Yves Tassel at the Universite de
Nantes (March 28,2003) e-mail: ytassel@hotmail.com
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Strongly entrenched in their position against the 1980 Multimodal
Convention (and the 1978 Hamburg Rules), (ocean) carriers and their insurers
vehemently opposed it, attacking it on the grounds of lack of clarity, uncertainty as
to its economic effects and its being shipper-protective236 . On the other hand, the
shipping community supported if37 • Commercial interests and country delegations
also resisted 1980 Multimodal Convention mandatory character and its government
administered requirements238 (governmental consultations, custom provisions), and
236 The probable shift of commercial risks on the carrier is a consideration to take into account with respect to
this convention. Hugh M. Kindred, Ted L. McDorman, Mary R. Brooks, Norman G. Letalik, William Tetley,
Edgar Gold, The Future ofCanadian Carriage ofGoods by Water Law (Halifax: Dalhousie University 1982)
at 325. Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 243 and at 246s
for said carrier arguments. See also UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility
of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/200311, 2003) at par. 23 for the
uncertainty factor. Ocean carriers, in particular, were virtually unanimous in their opposition to its adoption.
This is normal since, in multimodal transport, the contracting carrier will, most frequently, be the ocean
carrier and, therefore, held liable to the shipper for the whole multimodal journey (under 1980 Multimodal
Convention provisions). "Liability Limbo" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). See also
"Europe's Cargo Insurance Lottery" Am. Shipper (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
An analogous argument has been made with respect to countries refusal to adopt the 1978 Hamburg Rules due
to the 'certainty' supposedly afforded by the precision and detailed enumerations of the Hague and the Visby
Rules. William Tetley, "Maritime Law as a Mixed Legal System" (1999) 23 Tul. Mar. L. J. 317 at 349. In
fact, according to the view of many respondents, (governments, intergovernmental, non-governmental
organizations and industry experts), to an UNCTAD questionnaire, it is this close association of the 1980
Multimodal Convention with the Hamburg Rules specifically concerning the basis, limitation of carrier
liability and uniform provisions that led many shipping nations to oppose former. UNCTAD, UNCTAD
Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1, 2003) at par. 25.
237 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 243.
238 William Coffey, "Multimodalism and the American Carrier" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 577. The author
believes that this is the main reason why the convention was not fmally adopted and that there is little support
for its adoption today. Ibid. See also William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, "The Convention on International
Multimodal Transport of Goods" (1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 217s for more details on public law
provisions. For instance, the 1980 Multimodal Convention invites the contracting states to align their customs
transit documents with a standard form goods declaration attached to the Convention itself. Ibid at 221-222.
Respondents, (governments, intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and industry experts),
interviewed by UNCTAD have expressed the opinion that inclusion of customs provisions in the 1980
Multimodal Convention is an inappropriate complicating factor. UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat,
Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB1200311, 2003) at par. 25. See also the interesting arguments of Rolf Herber, "The
European Legal Experience with Mulitmodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at 622. There were, and
still are, additional reasons for the lack of support for the 1980 Multimodal Convention. A number of
Convention's articles have been attacked on technical grounds, reflecting widespread differences in
approaches to liability, jurisdiction, limitation and documentation questions. Since the 1980 Multimodal
Convention and the 1978 Hamburg Rules are related treaties, major interest groups adopted the same position
with respect to both. William J. Coffey, «Multimodalism and the American Carrier» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev.
569 at 577.
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preferred resolving problems through private arrangements. U.S. authorities did not
adopt a clear position to the controversy239.
Divergence of carrier and shipper interests due to the lack of clarity as to
the effects oflatter convention's provisions and its mandatory character are elements
we need to take into account in pursuing uniformity240. This is the reason why we
believe that suggestions on uniform multimodal carrier liability rules at the
domestic, regional or international level have to be debated from a carrier and a
shipper point of view before they are finalized. It is, also, for this reason that we
consider that application of a liability regime which gradually approximates existing
rules sanctioned by practice will be necessary as a transition stage before adoption
of a regime similar to that of the 1980 Multimodal Convention.
C. Limitation of M T 0. Liability Towards the Shipper: The 1980
Multimodal Convention provides that the M.T.G. is always liable towards the
shipper for the amount established by the Convention in case of concealed damage
as well as in case of evident damage (loss, damage or delay, LDD) where another
international treaty, convention, or law provides for lower liability limits (art. 18-
19)241. This means that ifLDD occurs during a particular stage of transportation, the
applicable national rules governing that stage shall establish the limits of liability
only if they are more strict (on the carrier) than those of the 1980 Multimodal
Convention (art. 19)242.
239 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 1. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 244. The U.S.
administration has adopted the wait-and-see policy with respect to the 1980 Multimodal Convention
recommending further study of its provisions before its ratification. There is also some perception within the
U.S. Administration that the 1978 Hamburg Rules have to come into effect before the 1980 Multimodal
Convention. This, however, is neither explicitly nor implicitly provided for. Ibid at 246 and Rolf Herber, «The
European Legal Experience with Multimodalism» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at 622-623.
240 Because carrier and shipper interests are polarized with regard to adopting a uniform multimodal transport
convention on liability, it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a uniform multimodal transport
convention. Multimodal Liability: Extracts from a Statement by the CIFFA Seafreight Committee (1999)
online: Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.comlFeature/multim.htm> (last modified: Nov.
26, 1999).
241 See also Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss,
Damage and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Convention"
(1995) 5 J. Transnat' 1. L. & Pol'y 1 at 21.
242 Authors call this system modified network system. Driscoll William, Larsen Paul B., «The Convention on
International Multimodal Transport of Goods» (1982) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 at 236.
55
Art. 18 of the Convention defines M.TO. limitation of liability towards
the shipper. It uses a formula reflecting both a gross weight and a per
package/shipping unit approach (art. 18(1 ))243 and specifically recognizes containers
as packages according to their enumeration in the multimodal transport document
itself (art. 18.2(a))244. A uniform limitation amount ofM.TO. liability is established
in case of delay and equals two and a half times the freight payable but not
exceeding the total freight payable under the multimodal transport contract (art.
18(4))245. For the rest, the 1980 Multimodal Convention establishes an exception to
the principle of uniformity246. In effect, if the multimodal journey comprises an
ocean segment M.TO. liability equals the higher of 920 SDR247 per package or
other shipping unit or 2.75 SDR per kilo. However, if the multimodal journey does
not comprise an ocean segment, the recoverable amount equals 8.33 SDR per
kil0248. These provisions constitute the floor but not the ceiling ofM.TO. liability,
243 Annex No. II, Table No. I at cxxiv. We also find the limitation measures 'package or unit' in the Hague
and the Visby Rules. On the discussion of what constitutes a 'package' or a 'unit' under these sets of rules see
infra at 244s.
244 Annex No. II, Table No. I at cxxiv. See also the thesis of Nicole Lacasse, International Multimodal
transport ofGoods. Comparative Study ofCanadian and French Laws (D. Jur. Thesis, University of Paris 1,
1988) [unpublished: archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number: 88.57.06285/88] at 370.
This provision is almost identical to Visby Rules art. 4(5)(c) and William J. Coffey, "Multimodalism and the
American Carrier" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 576.
245 Annex No. II, Table No. I at cxxiv-cxxv.
246 Nicole Lacasse, "Le Transport Multimodal International des Marchandises. Etude Comparative des Droits
Canadiens et Fran<;ais" (1988) [unpublished: archived at the University of Nantes under micro-fiche number:
88.57.06285/88] at 370.
247 The acronym 'SDR' stands for Special Drawing Rights and its value, defined by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and announced almost daily, is based, for the period 2001-2005, on a basket of
currencies [U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Pounds Sterling and, effective on Jan. 1, 2001, the EURO (replacing the
Deutch mark and French franc)] representing countries with the largest exports of goods and services. SDR
appears among the most widely used currencies in international transactions. Since the SDR does not react to
inflation declining, therefore, in real terms ever since its birthday, 1979, the basket is reviewed every five
years to ensure that the component currencies are representative of those used in international transactions.
Special Drawings Rights (2001) online: International Monetary Fund
<http://www.imf.org/externaUnp/exr/facts/sdr.HTM> (last modified: continuously). SDR value seems to have
slightly fluctuated through the years. On June 11,2003 1 SDR = 1.41944 $USD and 1 SDR = 1.92036 $CAD
while on July 26,2002, 1 SDR = 1.338$USD and 1 SDR = 2. 122$CAD. On April 12,2001, the SDR value
equaled 1 SDR= 1.26563000$USD and 1 SDR=1.97425000 $CAD whereas on February 23, 1999 the value
of 1 SDR equated 1.3 $USD and 2.03 $CAN. We will herein make our calculations on the basis ofSDR value
on January 16,2002, the date of our last updating of calculations herein used. On this date, 1 SDR = 1.253610
$USD and 1 SDR = 1.999140$CAD, amounts that do not greatly vary with respect to those applicable today.
Currency Values in Terms of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (1999) online: International Monetary Fund
Homepage <http://www.imf.org/externaUnp/tre/sdr/drates/0701.htm> (last modified: continuously).
248 Annex No. II, Table No. I at cxxiv. William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International
Multimodal Transport of Goods» (1982) 57 Tul. L. R. 193 at 236-239.
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meaning that contracting parties can set higher, but not lower liability limits (art.
18(6)). The benefit of liability is extended to M.T.G. servants or agents but both the
M.T.G. and its servants will lose the limitation of liability benefit in case of damage
caused intentionally, recklessly or with knowledge that damage will probably result
for their personal acts (art. 21 )249.
Compared to the currently applicable sea and land carner rules in
Canada and the U.S., the 1980 Multimodal Convention applies the highest limits of
carrier limitation of liability:
Multimodal Convention (1980): 920 SDR250 = 1153.3$USD or 1839.2$CAD per
(not yet in force) package or other shipping unit or 2.75 SDR =
3.44$USD or 5,49$CAD per kilo
absence of sea carriage: 8.33 SDR = 10.44$USD or 16.65$CAD per kilo
The Hamburg Rules (art. 6(1)(a)) provide for the following ocean
carrier limitation of liability: 835 SDR per package or 2.75 SDR per
kilogram whichever is higher.
The Hamburg Rules (1978):
(in force today)
835 SDR = 1046.76$USD or 1669.28$CAD
per package or other shipping unit or
2.5 SDR = 3.13$USD or 4.99$CAD per
kilo
The Visby Rules (art. 4(5)(a)) provide for ocean carrier limitation of
liability: 666.67 SDR per package or 2 SDR per kilo whichever yields the
higher recovery for the shipper:
Visby Rules:
(In force in Canada)
666.67SDR = 835.7$USD or 1332.7$CAD
per package or unit or
2 SDR = 2.50$USD or 3.99$CAD per kilo
Under the Hague Rules (art. 4.(5)) the limitation of liability is 100
pounds gold sterlings per package.
The Hague Rules (1924):
(In force in the U.S.)
100£sterling = 500$USD, 500$CAD251 per
package or unit
249 This provision, that we also encounter in the Visby Rules, will make the object of a more detailed study
later. See infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 3(B).
250 For the SDR value taken into account see supra note 247.
251 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 890.
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Finally, in Canada, motor carriers limit their liability to 4.41$CAD per
kilo while their U.S. counterparts generally apply the contractually uniform amount
of 25$USD per pound, even if regulatory requirements hold them liable for the
actual loss or injury to the propertl52. Rail carriers in both the U.S. and Canada are
not subject to statutory limitations and are, thus, held liable for the whole value of
the damaged goods except if they contractually modify their liabilitl53 .
We conclude, therefore, that 1980 Multimodal Convention liability limits
are definitely greater than their Visby and Hague Rules counterparts as well as
currently applicable Canadian motor carrier liability limitations. They are also set at
about ten percent higher scale than the Hamburg Rules limits254, fueling the dispute
between shipper and ocean carrier interests.
Proposing cross-modal and cross-country M.T.O. liability limitations has
given rise to irreconcilable positions between carrier and shipper interests to a point
that one should wonder whether the task of elaborating uniform multimodal carrier
liability rules is worth considering, at least for the time being. As authors have
suggested, the possibility of producing a commonly acceptable convention depends
on how serious delegates feel the impediments to international multimodal
transportation are, and whether international legislative action is likely to remove
them255. Such an agreement was not present during 1980 Multimodal Convention
negotiations with regard to M.T.O. basis of liability, nor with regard to M.T.O.
limitation of liability.
The important question to be answered, in this respect, is whether an
252 Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T.Doyle, Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in North
America (Tuscon: National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1996) at 52. Infra at Part II, Chapter
I, Section II, Par. 1(A)(B).
253 See infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 2(A) for contractually uniform limitations applied by U.S.
and Canadian railways for container or non-container cargo and which compare, with difficulty, to ocean
carrier limitations.
254 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage
and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Convention" (1995) 5
J. Transnat'l. L. & Pol'y 1 at2!.
255 William J. Driscoll, "The Convention on International Multimodal Transport: a States Report" (1977-
1978) 9(4) J. Mar. L. & Com. 441 at458.
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international convention should maintain a practically unified mandatory liability
regime to govern multimodal transport with liability limitation amounts set higher
than those currently applicable to land or sea transport. The negotiating history of
the 1980 Multimodal Convention advises that one should refrain from making great
leaps forward due to the uncertainty the newly established reality may create in
practice and the ensuing hesitation of interests involved in negotiations to sanction
proposed measures. This does not mean to say that uniformity of multimodal carrier
liability rules is untenable. It simply suggests that until negotiating parties are ready
to consider uniformity under the model proposed by the 1980 Multimodal
Convention, a more modest approach needs to be adopted to achieve the desired
result256 . Our suggestion to maintain the status quo and work on the approximation
of already applicable unimodal liability rules may provide a useful suggestion
towards uniformity of multimodal carrier liability.
Nowadays, various countries and entities are contemplating or working on
intermodal liability rules, with no concrete or agreed upon harmonization output
made thus far257. The recently (2001) CMI released 'Model Transport Law' also
known as 'UNCITRAL Preliminary Draft Instrument on Transport Law' or
'CMIIUNCITRAL Draft Instrument' following its approval by UNCITRAL,
attempts to regulate multimodal carrier liability among other topics such as
electronic communication, freight, liens, negotiabilitl58 .
256 In this respect, Pro Jan Ramberg notes that aware that mandatory regulation would be rejected out of hand
by strong and influential business interests, a more flexible solution should be sought. Jan Ramberg,
Unification of the Law of Freight Forwarding (2001) online: UNIDROIT Organization Homepage
<http://www.unidroit.orglenglish/publications/review/articlesI1998-1.htm> (last modified: Jan. 10, 2001).
257 34 countries around the world either have or are contemplating different intermodal liability conventions
and a handful of global bodies are elaborating a single multimodal carrier liability regime. "Liability Limbo"
J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Among the international bodies appear: the UNCITRAL
(UN Commission on International Trade Law), the UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development),
the UNECE (UN Economic Commission for Europe) all being sister agencies, as well as the CMI (Comite
Maritime International) a federation of maritime lawyers. All present European Member-States as well as
Canada and the U.S. are members of the UNECE. The UNECE plan to create a uniform intermodal liability
regime was put on hold at the request of the UNCITRAL on grounds that the CMI was developing a broad
based multimodal transport convention (the 'Model Transport Law') we herein comment on.
258 On December 10,2001 the Comite Maritime International (CMI) adopted its "Final Draft Instrument on
Issues of Transport Law" after 3 ~ years of meetings, conferences, questionnaires, long drafting sessions and
international conferences. The CMI final Draft Instrument was immediately delivered to UNCITRAL that
sanctioned it. The new 'UNCITRAL Preliminary Draft Instrument on Transport Law' [hereinafter Draft
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The Draft Instrument stipulates that if damage happens between two or more
modes of transport or if damage is concealed the limitation amounts in the
instrument apply259. Limitation amounts, however, have not yet been agreed upon.
The general approach taken towards uniformity by the Draft document is the
extension of the maritime regime (i.e. liability exceptions) to the whole transport
chain260 • This, and the possibility to 'opt out' of the whole convention by any of the
parties to the contract along the route break uniformity suggested by the
convention261 • Instrument's definitions are viewed as broad or confusing, in brief,
unacceptable by doctrine. The document is under concerted attack by international
bodies and doctrine that question its intermodality, content, clarity and
harmonization of currently applicable rules262.
Pro Tetley wonders whether it is realistic to expect to draft mne or ten
international conventions (multimodal carriage, electronic commerce, freight ... ) as
the Draft Instrument intends to do when the international community has failed to
agree on the Hamburg Rules or the 1980 Multimodal Convention dealing with door-
Instrument] was dated January 8, 2002. The draft document was intended to be a multi-purpose convention,
an extremely ambitious project. William Tetley, Let's Have a Two Track Approach (2002) online: Tetley Law
Homepage <http//tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime/uncitralcomment.htm> (last modified: continuously). The
Draft Instrument can be found online: Tetley Homepage <http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/uncitral.htm> (last
modified: continuously).
259 Peter Jones, Box Score on FIATA Submissions to UNCITRAL (March 21, 2003) online: Forwarderlaw
Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/Feature/uncitra17.htm> (last modified: March 21, 2003).
260 Santanu Sanyal, "The Multimodal Debate" Business Line (The Hindu) (2003) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). Liability exceptions in the Draft Instrument have been drafted from a sea carriage point of
view. It has been argued that most issues on which there is serious disagreement become less pressing, ifnot
academic, ifUNCITRAL members decide that the convention is to apply to sea transport only. As reported by
Peter Jones, CMI Mantle is Taken Up by UNCITRAL-Another Step Closer to a New International Convention
(2002) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/Feature/fiauncit.htm> (last visited:
June 30, 2002).
261 William Tetley, Let's Have a Two Track Approach (2002) online: Tetley Law Homepage
http//tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime/uncitralcomment.htm (last modified: continuously).
262 Ibid. Santanu Sanyal, "The Multimodal Debate" Business Line (The Hindu) (2003) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters), "CMI Model Transport Law under Scrutiny" Ll. List. Int'l (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). UNECE Comments to the UNCITRAL Draft Instrument (2002) online: Tetley Law Homepage
<http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/unece.htm> (last modified: continuously) stating that the draft instrument is based
purely on maritime provisions and insisting on harmonization of North-American and European laws on the
issue. UNECE Ad-Hoc Expert Group on Civil Liability in Multimodal Transport (2002) online: UNECE
Homepage <http://www.unece.org/trans/new_tir/wp24/documents/wp24-0206e.pdf.> (last visited: March 5,
2002).
60
to-door transit?263 Our answer to this question is that we can perhaps not write nine
or ten multimodal conventions on said issues but we may endeavour to draft just one
on multimodal liability inspired by currently successfully applicable documents such
as the FIATA BOL that we will examine as follows. This seems also to be the
opinion of many of UNCTAD respondents who broadly support preparation of a
multimodal transport instrument based on rules which are currently used in
commercial contracts, such as the UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport
Documents which inspired the FIATA BOU64 •
Par. 2. The FIATA Multimodal Transport BOL (1992 MM or FBL):
Pending ratification of the 1980 Multimodal Convention, the UNCTAD elaborated
contractual multimodal documents in collaboration with commercial parties and
international bodies265. Reference is herein made to the 1992 FIATA Multimodal
Transport Bill of Lading (or MM for short)266 issued by the Multimodal Transport
263 William Tetley, Let's Have a Two Track Approach (2002) online: Tetley Law Homepage
<http//tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime/uncitralcomment.htm> (last modified: continuously).
264 UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal
Instrument (Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1, 2003) at par. 32. Virtually all (98%) respondents,
(industry representatives, experts, governmental, non-governmental, inter-governmental organizations),
would support any concerted efforts towards a new intemational instrument. For the UNCTAD/ICC Rules
being the source of inspiration of the FBL see infra at 63.
265 Tilleke & Gibbins, "Trend of Multimodal Transport Law in the ASEAN" (1997) online: Tilleke & Gibbins
Homepage <http://www.tginfo.com/publications/maritime/multimodal.htm> (last visited: March 12, 2001).
FIATA (infra note 266) considers that a mandatory convention on multimodal transport, as proposed by the
UNCITRALlCMI, is neither necessary nor appropriate at this time. Box Score on FIATA Submissions to CMI
Conference (2001) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/cmisin1.htm>
(last modified: Feb. 16,2001).
266 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc.,
1993) at 31. In the present study we will use the denomination FBL (FIATA Bill of Lading) or 1992 MM to
indicate the FIATA Bill of Lading, as both denominations are commonly used. FIATA is the International
Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations -Federation Internationale Des Associations de Transitaires et
Assimiles- which is based in Zurich. It comprises national associations of more than 100 countries
representing more than 40,000 freight forwarders. Diana Faber, "The Problems Arising from Multimodal
Transport" (1996) L. M. C. L. Q. 503 at note 2. FIATA authorizes national associations of freight forwarders,
which constitute independent entities, to print consecutively numbered FBLs to permit the identification of
the originator of the document. A freight forwarder (M.T.O. in the 1992 MM) can only issue a BOL if he is
member of the national freight forwarders organization. Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding
(Canada: International Federation of Freight Forwarders Association 1991) at 27. In Canada, CIFFA
(Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association) constitutes the national entity of freight forwarders.
Interview of the author with a CIFFA regulatory division responsible. Annex No. I, Table No.2 at xviii for the
1992 MM.
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Operator (M.T.O.), the Nor-Cargo BOL, the Capricorn Service BOL or the
CONLINE-BILL issued by the carrier267.
In this part of our study we will concentrate on the 1992 MM268 which is
currently used with great success at the international level (FBL)269. This document
greatly facilitates trade, is recognized internationally by banks and provides
certainty to shippers and carriers27o. More specifically, we will focus on its general
liability traits (A) and, later, its liability provisions (B).
A. 1992 MM (FBL) General Liability Traits: Although contractual documents
elaborated after failure of the 1980 Multimodal Convention tried to define a uniform
267 K. Bernauw, "Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading" (1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L.
145 at 147. See also Marie Tilche, Andree Chao, "Transport Combine/Multimodal: Responsabilite de
l'Operateur" (1994) 2570 Bull. Transp. Log. 430 at 439-440.
268 Annex No. I, Table No. 2at xviii. The 1992 FBL finds its origins in the 1960 UNIDROIT Draft
Convention that held liable, for the first time at the international level, the freight forwarder as a carrier when
he acted as a cargo consolidator (assembly of a number of cargo from different shippers and distribution to
different consignees), charged a fixed price for the transport or issued a so-called 'titre de commission'.
However, the draft convention never materialized. FIATA later put in practice contractual documents such as
the 1971 FIATA Combined Transport Bill of Lading, the predecessor of the 1992 MM and was fiercely
opposed by risk distribution and insurance companies that worked satisfactorily on the European continent.
But a choice had to be made whether the freight forwarder really should join the family of carriers in order to
market his services efficiently or remain in the category of intermediaries. The choice has been made with the
introduction and wide acceptance of the 1992 MM and, nowadays, no one would suggest that the choice was
unwise. Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 40-41.
Relatively recently, the 1996 FIATA Model Rules for Freight Forwarding Services (Annex No. I, Table 2(bis)
at xix), influenced by the 1990 UNCTADIICC Rules, were elaborated in order to bridge the different views of
the freight forwarder as a principal and as an intermediary for services other than the carriage of goods:
storage, packing, handling, distribution, services (art. 2.1) for which the freight forwarder is responsible but
which were subject to national laws, leading to a proliferation of national legal rules applicable on the issue.
When adhered to by the parties, these rules supercede contractual documents (art. 1.2.). Since the 1996
FIATA Model Rules are voluntary, it remains to be seen to what extent they will be used in national freight
forwarding conditions. Jan Ramberg, International Commercial Transactions (Stockholm: Kluwer Law
International, 2000) at 189 and 190. Jan Ramberg, The FIATA Model Rules on Freight Forwarding Services
(2000) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg3.html> (last
modified: Dec. 3, 2001). In the present study, we will mainly refer to the 1992 MM provisions that concern
multimodal carriage.
269 Most of the roughly 600.000 sets issued a year are issued in industry countries. Interview of the author
with CIFFA personnel (forwarded document from FIATA) (April 3, 2003). Even if the MM is the world's
most frequently used combined transport document (used in more than 60 countries) it is not used in Canada
mainly because of the onerous liability terms FBL contains. In effect, the FBL 8.33 SDR per kilo land carrier
liability limitation amount corresponds to 16.6$CAD per kilo, much higher than the currently applicable
Canadian 4.41 $CAD per kilo motor carrier liability limitation. Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on
Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc., 1993) at 30, Aviva Freudmann, "Divergent
Paths Taken to Unify Cargo Liability Rules" J Com. (1999) online: LEXIS (1. Com).
270 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Rep. Communications Inc., 1993) at
32 and Shipping (2002) online: Schenker Stinnes Logistics Homepage
<http://www.schenker.co.th/faqtext.htm#forwarder>(last modified: continuously).
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multimodal carrier liability regime, they essentially maintained a 'network' system
of liabilitl71 . Moreover, they all contain different combinations of the principles of
presumption of fault and presumption of liability and also apply different liability
limitation amounts272. Finally, these are documents of voluntary application but
mandatory in their provisions273 . In other words, they offer a minimum set of liability
rules that the contracting parties cannot modify once they decide to adhere to them.
This may not characterize uniformity of liability laws ("Au royaume du contractuel
on trouve peu d'uniformite,,)274. As we are going to confirm, however, these
documents provide a first step towards uniformity of multimodal carrier liability
regIme.
The 1992 MM (FBL) is a BOL issued by the M.T.O. (freight forwarder-
contracting carrier) in negotiable or non-negotiable form275 . Although the FBL may,
under certain conditions, also be used for combined land transport, it was primarily
designed for transport operations with ocean transport as their core segment276• In
issuing this document, the M.T.O. becomes the contracting carrier who uses the
services of unimodal carriers (actual or performing carriers) to effectuate the
multimodal journel77 • In this way, the 1992 MM forms the contract of carriage and
the M.T.O. becomes responsible as a carrier towards the shipper278 . This translates
271 Marie Tilche, Andree Chao, "Transport Combine!Multimodal: Responsabilite de l'Operateur" (1994) 2570
Bull. Transp. Log. 430 at 438-440.
272 Ibid at 440. See table of the author at 439 for illustrative examples.
273 Aviva Freudman, "No easy answer" J Com (2000) online:. WESTLAW (Newsletters).
274 Marie Tilche and Andre Chao, "Transport Multimodal: Responsabilite de l'Operateur" (1994) 2570 Bull.
Transp. Log. 430 at 438.
275 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Rep. Communications Inc., 1993) at
37. The FBL is negotiable unless it specifically states that it is non-negotiable. What Makes a BOL Negotiable
(1998) online: Forwarderlaw.com Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ucpnegot.htm> (last
visited: March 23,2001). Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 52.
On the M.T.O. as contracting carrier see supra at 49. A marked 'non-negotiable' FBL must be presented to
the carrier for delivery of the goods at destination. Interview of the author with CIFFA personnel (April 3,
2003).
276 Interview of the author with CIFFA personnel (forwarded document from FIATA) (April 3, 2003).
277 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc.,
1993) at 29. However, Clause 1 of the 1992 MM (Annex No. I, Table No. 2 at xviii) provides that,
notwithstanding its heading, the document can apply to the unimodal transport of goods. This is because
adoption of the 1992 MM rests upon a voluntary agreement between the parties and not upon international or
national law provisions. Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 50.
278 See comments of Pr. Jan Ramberg on 1992 MM Clause 2.2 on the liability of the freight forwarder as a
principal. Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 51. Under the 1996
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into liability of a principal not an agent and, as such, the 1992 MM presents great
interest for our studl79 . It also gives shippers a considerable advantage since use of
only one document of carriage with only one person being held liable towards the
shipper for the whole multimodal journey provide for shipper certainty and signal
uniformitl80. In tum, the M.T.O. may recover from the 'actual' carriers whatever
amount he paid to the claimant-shipper, based on the documents issued to him by
each one ofthem281 .
B. 1992 MM (FBL) Liability Provisions: 1992 MM proposes a set of liability
rules that incorporates 1990 UNCTADI/CC Rules which are, in tum, based on the
Visby Rulei82 . Anything in the FBL which is contrary to the afore-mentioned Rules
should be null and void283 . The main characteristics of the 1992 MM is that, first, it
gives priority to mandatory domestic legislation and second, it provides for a
combination of a 'uniform' and a 'network' system of liabilitl84 . More specifically,
the 1992 MM maintains:
FIATA Model Rules (art. 6-8), however, the freight forwarder may be responsible as a principal or as an
agent. He acts as a principal not only when he is the performing carrier but also when there is an express or
implied undertaking to assume carrier liability (art. 7.1). Annex No. I, Table No.2 at xviii. Freight forwarders
can generally act as principals or as agents. Supra note 25. The interest in making this distinction is that as
principal, the freight forwarder is in breach of contract despite making all reasonable efforts to provide the
requested service, 'reasonable efforts' being the only obligation of an agent. Peter Jones, FIATA Legal
Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc., 1993) at 22. For the criteria to be
taken into account in determining whether a freight forwarder acts as a principal or an agent see ibid at 22-23
and William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 694-695.
See also the Canadian case Bertex Fashions Inc. v. Cargonaut Canada Inc. (1995), F. C. 1. No. 827 (F. C. C.)
a~plying these criteria.
2 9 We have already stated that the present study only focuses on carrier liability rules. Supra at 7.
280 Multimodal Transport (1995) online: UNCTAD Organization Homepage
<http://www.unctad.orglenisubsites/multimod/mt2brfO.htm> (last visited: April 2, 2001).
281 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Rep. Com/tions Inc., 1993) at 40-45.
282 Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 61. The 1990 UNCTADIICC
Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents presently represent world commercial practice in the field of
multimodal transport. These rules replace their predecessor, the 1973 UNCTADIICC Rules for Multimodal
Transport Documents. See UNCTAD RULESfor Multimodal Transport (1999) online: International Chamber
of Commerce Homepage
<http://www.iccwbo.be/Le_President/Publications/Rapports_annuels/Rapport_Int_99/bodYJapport_int_99.ht
ml>(last visited: March 8, 2001).
283 Jan Ramberg, The FIATA Model Rules on Freight Forwarding Services (2000) online: Forwarderlaw
Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg3.html> (last visited: Dec. 3,2001).
284 K. Bernauw, "Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading" (1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L.
145 at 147 and Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 42. Box Score
on FIATA Submissions to CMI Conference (2001) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/cmisin1.htm> (last modified: Feb. 16,2001).
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i) carrier liability rules compulsorily applicable at the domestic level in case
of localized and concealed damage (Clause 7.1-paramount clause285 and Clause
8.6(a)). This means that unimodal mandatory conventions or laws enacted at the
domestic level supersede 1992 MM clauses and apply to a particular stage of the
multimodal journey in case of damage286. In their absence, 1992 MM Rules appll87.
This is an important observation considering that over 85% of damages in
multimodal transport occur at an unknown place288.
Considering the fact that the CMR, ClM and the Visby Rules are enacted at
the national level by the majority of the ED Member-States, these conventions
supersede 1992 MM clauses in case of localized LDD (loss-damage-delay)289. This
denotes a network system of liability. If the place of damage is not known, (i.e.
concealed damage), then no convention or mandatory law applies to the M. T. 0.29°.
It should be apparent, therefore, that in the case of concealed damage it is logically
impossible for national legislation to override FBL documents principles291 .
285 Annex No. I, Table No.2 at xviii for the 1992 MM provisions. Jan Ramberg, The Law of Freight
Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 60-65. Specific reference is made in the 1992 MM to the Hague,
Visby Rules and the U.S. COGSA (Clauses 7.2 and 7.3 and 8. 6(b) respectively). According to Pr. Jan
Ramberg this is because there are countries that require parties to make specific reference to these rules in
their contractual documents before putting them into effect. Ibid at 42.
286 On the contrary, 1980 Multimodal Convention art. 19 sanctions mandatory domestic legislation only with
respect to more strict domestic limitation of liability amounts. Supra at 49-50 and at 54. The 1992 MM
follows the 1990 UNCTADIICC Rules and, thus, maintains a network system of liability in principal and a
more uniform liability regime by way of exception. Jan Ramberg, The Law of Freight Forwarding
(Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 42 and Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto:
Republic Communications Inc., 1993) at 31.
287 Ibid.
288 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
626.
289 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc.,
1993) at 30-31 and 41-42 and Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at
58-59 on delay. Delay damages are limited, under 1992 MM art. 8.7, to twice the amount of the freight, as is
the case of 1990 UNCTADIICC Rules.
290 Interview of the author with a transportation attorney authority on the issue, (April 2, 2003).
291 Ibid. The transportation attorney interviewed notes that there is one possible exception to this conclusion:
certain Forwarding Codes may be applicable to concealed damage and override FBL provisions. The freight
forwarder cannot derogate from its responsibilities under the code because he has issued a transport
document. Ibid.
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ii) a network system of liability when domestic mandatory laws do not take
effect292 . This network system is based on the principle of presumption of fault
('reasonable diligence'-Clause 6. 2) accompanied by a set of liability exemptions
applicable throughout the modes (Clause 6. 5) and which are similar, not identical, to
the ones of the COTIF/CIM, CMR and the Visby Rulei93 . The additional liability
exemptions of 'fire' and 'nautical fault' apply in case of sea carriage or inland
navigation portion of the multimodal journey (Clause 6.6)294. They signify respect of
cross modal diversities that we do not find in the 1980 Multimodal Convention295 .
Liability limitation amounts under the network system of liability equal
(CMR) 8.33 SDR per kilo when no sea or inland waterways segment is included in
the multimodal journey (clause 8.5). Otherwise, Visby Rules limitations of 2 SDR
per kilo or 666.67 SDR per package or unit apply (Clause 8.3)296. We find the same
respect for modal diversities in defining MTO limitation of liability in the 1980
Multimodal Convention (art. 18(1)(3))297. In all cases where the shipper has declared
292 Box Score on FIATA Submissions to CMI Coriference (2000) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/cmisinl.htm> (last modified: Oct. 24, 2000).
293 Annex No. I, Table No.2 at xviii for the 1992 MM provisions and Annex No. III, Table No.4 at clxxxvi for
our comparative table of liability exceptions at the European level. From a comparison of CMR art. 17,
COTIFICIM art. 36, Visby Rules art. 4 and 1992 MM art. 6(5) we conclude that all liability exemptions contained
in the 1992 MM are present in mentioned conventions except for 1992 MM art. 6(5)(e) exemption 'strikes and
lock-outs' that we fmd in the Visby Rules but not in the CMR or the COTIFICIM. This exemption, however, could
easily fall under the two conventions general principle of presumption offault (art. 17(2) and 36(2) respectively).
Note also that there are several Visby Rules liability exemptions which make not part of the 1992 MM list of sea
carrier liability exemptions: saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, perils of the sea, quarantine
restrictions.
294 Annex No. I, Table No.2 at xviii.
295 In effect, in proclaiming the principle of presumption of fault (art. 16), the 1980 Multimodal Convention
does not contain specific sea carrier liability exemptions or any list of carrier liability exemptions for that
matter. On the contrary, the 1992 MM retains ocean specific carrier liability exemptions.
296 Annex No. I, Table No. 2 at xviii. Same compensation provisions are provided for by the 1990
UNCTADIICC Rules, Annex No. III, Table No.4 at clxxxvi. See table of Marie Tilche and Andre Chao,
"Transport Multimodal: Responsabilite de l'Operateur" (1994) 2570 Bull. Transp. Log. 430 at 439 on the
approximation.
297 Both the 1980 Multimodal Convention [art. 18(3), see supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, par. 1] and the
1992 MM maintain a specific limitation (8.33 SDR) in case damage occurs during a multimodal journey that
does not contain an ocean segment. This is perhaps one of the reasons why it is argued that many of the
provisions of the 1980 Multimodal Convention are applied in practice. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Multimodal
Carriage ofGoods 3d ed. (U.S.: West Group, 2002) at par. 10-4. On this point see also UNCTAD, UNCTAD
Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/20031l, 2003) at par. 19.
66
the value of its goods, he can recover for actual damages up to the amount of the
declared value (Clause 8.3 injine)298.
Finally, 1992 MM Clause 8.9 denies the benefit of statutory limitation of
liability in case of 'personal act or omission of the freight forwarder done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage will probably
result'. Proof of ordinary negligence by the claimant will not suffice in this
respect299 . Rather, intentional or willful misconduct attributed to the freight
forwarder itself or at the managerial level and not to other servants or agents will
operate loss of his limitation benefit30o.
Overall, one should refrain from viewing the 1992 MM as a uniform set of
rules. This document is really based on a 'network system' of liability and is less
ambitious than the regime proposed by the 1980 Multimodal Convention30I . In this
way, 1992 MM provisions do not comfort shipper uncertainty on the amount of
compensation he may receive.
Moreover, 1992 MM liability provisions have not always worked smoothly in
practice302. In effect, based on the document's provisions, freight forwarders may
escape liability absent shipper objection. For instance, the 1992 MM provides that
298 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2st ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc.,
1993) at 41. Pro Jan Ramberg states that declarations of value are rare because of the presence of cargo
insurance and because cargo insurers seldom insist on shippers making declarations of value. Jan Ramberg,
The Law of Freight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 64. See also infra at 240 on declaration of
value.
299 Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 66. See also infra at Part II,
Chapter I, Section II, Par. 3(B) for Visby Rules identical provision. The similarity of provisions may be
attributed to the fact that the 1992 MM is, in reality, based on the Visby Rules. Supra at 63. No decisions have
been found on the 1992 MM on this point. Generally, case law on the 1992 MM is very scarce.
300 Ibid and infra at 249s.
301 In effect, contrary to the 1992 MM, the 1980 Multimodal Convention gives preponderance only to more
strict, than conventions provisions, domestic laws. 1992 MM voluntary nature opposes 1980 Multimodal
Convention mandatory character and brings the 1992 MM closer to the TCM draft, the predecessor of the
1980 Multimodal Convention. Supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 1. As we have affIrmed, the draft
convention was never adopted because its voluntary nature was viewed as a weakness and because it did not
really distance itself from the practice which was already based on a network system of liability. Ibid. This
contrasts the huge success the 1992 MM has known in practice and affrrms our conviction that multimodal
carrier liability rules should stem from the practice before being sanctioned by an international convention.
302 Aviva Freudmann, "Divergent Paths Taken to UnifY Cargo Liability Rules" (1999) J Com. online: LEXIS
(News). The author refers to FIATA obscure law with respect to multimodal carrier liability rules it
prescribes.
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absent shipper special declaration for timely delivery of goods, the freight forwarder
will not be liable (Clause 6.2). According to Pro Jan Ramberg, this clause is
equivalent to a full disclaimer of liability for delay303. However, courts may interpret
the requirement for special declaration informally so that shippers may, in the end,
recover for damages from delay304. Also, the principle of presumption of fault
delineating the basis of carrier liability is not always clear on specific events that do
not fall under the list of specific liability exemptions305. Finally, 1992 MM
jurisdiction clause may also be disputed in court as to whether it will be given
effect306. The need for alert shippers becomes, therefore, evident. It is probably
based upon this fact that national and supra-national authorities envisage, today,
reform of underlying liability regimes in multimodal transport307.
Despite the lack of clarity and contractual nature of 1992 MM, we have
affirmed that, contrary to the 1980 Multimodal Convention, this document
successfully applies today to the international multimodal carriage of goods308. This
can be attributed to the fact that the 1992 MM is a document that derives from, and
is sanctioned by, currently applicable rules and practices keeping sight, at the same
303 Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 58.
304 Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook on Forwarding 2nd ed (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc.,
1993) at 42. See also Delay, Generally (1999) online: Forwarderlaw.com Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/indexldelay.htm> (last modified: July 8, 1999).
305 Supra at 50s. Subjectivity of judicial consideration is possible i.e. in case of theft. Peter Jones,
Impossibility of Performance (2000) online: Forwarderlaw.com Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/indexlimposs.htm> (last modified: April 2, 2001). Richards Butler, "Trade
Law Uniformity Remains Out of Reach" Ll. List. Int'l (1999) online: LEXIS (Transp. News) noting that a
judge has noted that FBL provisions are not as illuminating as one would think. When a container is missing
there may appear to be about five parties sparring about who is to blame.
306 1992 MM Clause 19 (and 1996 Model Rule 19) maintains that parties are free to provide for jurisdiction
clauses, absent which, suit will be brought before the courts of the freight forwarder principal place of
business and the law of that place will apply to decide the case. Pro Jan Ramberg and attorney Mr. Peter Jones
argue that most transportation documents contain jurisdiction clauses and that clauses of this kind are usually
upheld by national courts. However, there are different factors that may lead to uncertainty as to the 1992
MM jurisdiction clause. There are some countries where there is legislation that denies efficiency to
jurisdiction clauses. In effect, courts generally have discretion to ignore a jurisdiction clause that would result
to the detriment of the claimant. There are jurisdictions that will apply law different from their own, in such a
manner that a choice of law clause in the 1992 MM would be useful. Peter Jones, Jurisdiction (2003) online:
Forwarderlaw.com Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/indexljuris.htm> (last visited: June 29, 2003)
and Jan Ramberg, The Law ofFreight Forwarding (Switzerland: FIATA, 1994) at 76.
307 Aviva Freudmann, "Divergent Paths Taken to Unify Cargo Liability Rules" J Com. (1999) online: LEXIS
(1. Com.).
308 Supra at 61 for the document's successful implementation.
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time, of the ultimate goal, namely, uniformity of legal terms and conditions of
multimodal transport. In this respect, cautious steps towards uniformity are taken by
this document in respecting cross-modal (ocean specific liability exceptions) and
cross-country (preponderance of domestic legislation) diversities.
Because of its successful implementation and its modest approach, 1992
MM will be taken into account in contemplating uniformity of multimodal carrier
liability in the present study309. Lack of clarity of 1992 MM clauses and the
document's voluntary nature constituting its greatest weaknesses are simply topics
that should trigger further elaboration.
Par. 3: The 'Provisional Remedy' of Insurance Companies in
Multimodal Transport: Despite the absence of a uniform intermodal carrier
liability regime, transport deregulation and the impossibility, at times, to forecast the
presence and/or amount of shipper compensation, intermodalism flourishes today.
This is attributed to the presence of insurance companies310.
Making suggestions on uniformity of multimodal carrier liability without
understanding insurance mechanisms and the economics of insurance is the
equivalent of determining chess moves by rolling dice311 . The economics of
insurance make reference to the 'Law and Economics' doctrine.
According to 'Law and Economics' principles, when risk prevention
measures are less costly than the reduction of risk their adoption operates, one
should adopt them312. When there is no means to prevent risk of loss or damage to
the transported goods, one should either assume the risk, transfer it to a third party
309 Authors suggest that 1992 MM use should be promoted in practice. Peter Jones, FIATA Legal Handbook
on Forwarding 2nd ed. (Toronto: Republic Communications Inc., 1993) at 48.
310 William 1. Coffey, «Multimodalism and the American Carrier» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 578. William
Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods» (1982) 57 Tul.
L. Rev. 193 at 198-199. The author maintains that cargo and liability insurance are key factors in maintaining
a workable system in intermodal transport.
311 Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, "Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie is not Big Enough Who Eats Last?"
(1997) 64 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 1337 at 1355.
312 Ejan Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 173.
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or insure it313 . The primary function of insurance is not to prevent the happening but
to indemnify the party whose property is at risk so that he will suffer no financial
loss if his goods are destroyed or damaged314. It is this insurance option which, as
applicable to carrier liability and cargo insurance, we will herein develop.
Transportation of cargo involves risk. Theoretically, the entire risk of loss or
damage could be assigned either to the carrier or to the shipper315 . Risk is, in
practice, allocated between them, with the possibility for each party to purchase
insurance to cover its portion of the risk316. Today, it is carrier and shipper insurers
that will, most often, take over settling of claims in case of damage to or loss of the
goods in multimodal transport31 ? By acting as a means of risk-shifting, insurance
companies represent a form of indemnification that provides security against loss to
the insured. We frequently refer to three types of insurance when commenting on the
transport of goods: cargo insurance, liability insurance and self-insurance that we
will examine as followS318(A). We will later ponder over the questions whether
insurance companies render obsolete uniformity initiatives of multimodal carrier
liability (B) to finally focus on the interplay of regulatory policies on carrier liability
and insurance premiums (C).
A. Cargo, Liability and Self-Insurance: These three types of insurance are
similar in that they all cover risks of loss or damage of the same goods. They differ
in the identification of the contracting parties and of the covered risks319. Liability
insurance covers carrier liability for loss or damage during carriage while cargo
insurance covers economic loss resulting from loss or damage to the goods. Self-
313 We assume the risk when there is no other solution we can adopt. An example that illustrates deviation of
risks to a third party is that of the inability of Canadian fishermen to fish because of exhaustion of stocks of
fish in the oceans which is reflected on the community as a whole by means of governmental allocations to
fishermen. Ibid.
314 John Isaacs, "Cargo Insurance in Relation to Through Transport" Through Transport Seminar (London:
London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 1.
315 On this possibility see infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section III, Par. 3(B).
316 Stephen G. Wood, «Multimodal Transportation: an American Perspective on Carrier Liability and Bill of
Lading Issues» (1998) 46 Am. 1. Compo L. 403 at note 13.
317 Ronald Gift Mullins, "Insurance" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
318 Ibid.
319 Eun Sup Lee, "Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability Insurance" (1997)
4 ILSA J. Int'I & Compo L. 153 at 156.
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insurance has developed in recent years and provides carriers and shippers with an
alternative risk financing strategy that involves carriers or shipper's own assumption
of risks in an attempt to lower insurance costs320.
To overcome the complexities of international multimodal transport, shippers
may need to have recourse to a lawyer or to purchase additional cargo insurance
(shipper's option)321. Cargo insurance is typical in multimodal transport and
constitutes a form of property insurance ordinarily paid promptly on proof of loss
without regard to liabilities which may be the subject of later disputed claims among
insurers322. It can be purchased through an insurance broker that provides truck
or/and marine cargo insurance323 . This type of insurance is said to be provided by
the shipper and the premiums the latter pays are based on a multiplicity of factors
such as individual shipper's losses and claims, method of shipment, type of packing,
nature of cargo, the physical characteristics of the undertaken journey, carrier
increase or decrease of liability limitations and the 'pool' of catastrophe losses324•
Cargo insurance may also be provided by the carrier if the shipper chooses to pay
higher freight or purchases excess cargo insurance in return for full recovery
guaranteed from the carrier in case of damage325.
Most cargo insurance policies cover goods for 'all risks' during the entire
door-to-door transport326. Despite its name, this 'all risks' policy may not provide
320 U.s. D.D.T., Cargo Liability Study (August 1998) online: U.S. Department of Transportation Homepage
<ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/carmack/cgolia.pdf> at (Chapter 3) (last visited: June 23, 2001).
321 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L & Com. 231 at 234.
322 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of
Goods" (1996) 23 Transp. L. J. 471 at 502. A cargo policy has been described as "fundamentally an
agreement to pay a sum on the happening of an event; when that event has defmitely taken place in
accordance with the terms of the contract, the payment becomes due." Raymond P. Hayden, Sanford E.
Balick, «Marine Insurance: Variety Combination and Coverages» (1991) 66 Tul. L. Rev. 311 at 319.
323 "Valuable Lessons in Insuring Costly Cargo" Bus. Times (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
324 Henry Samuel, "Right Insurance Policy Vital to Protect your Exported Goods" J. Com. (1994) online:
LEXIS (1. Com.) and Eun Sup Lee, "Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability
Insurance" (1997) 4 ILSA 1. Int'l & Compo L. 153 at 155 and note 5.
325 Eun Sup Lee, «Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability Insurance» (1997)
4 ILSA J. Int'l & Compo L. 153 at 161-162.
326 Henry Samuel, "Right Insurance Policy Vital to Protect your Exported Goods" J. Com. (1994) online:
LEXIS (1. Com.).
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full coverage of shipper's goods327. Limits exist as to the duration and extent of the
insurance coverage. Consequently, shippers are rarely fully compensated in case of
damage328. Because of cargo insurance, shippers in multimodal transport can collect
immediately from cargo underwriters even when the ship that caused the loss has no
defense329. Cargo insurers will then bring a subrogated claim against the liability
insurer33o.
Carrier liability coverage differs from mode to mode and country to country
but it is always limited to the extent of carrier 'legal liability')3!. Cargo insurance
will respond for the rest332. Liability insurance will always compensate a shipper in
case carrier liability is clear333 . In case of dispute or uncertainty, the resolution of
financial responsibility for loss generally becomes a matter for negotiation and
settlement between the insurance companies involved in the particular occurrence334.
Liability insurance is mandatory for U.S. and Canadian motor carriers in
order to obtain their operating license335. Contracting liability insurance may be a
327 Defining the precise coverage afforded under a typical cargo policy is a three dimensional process. First,
the policy perils clause will define the breadth of coverage in terms of fortuities insured. Second, the temporal
aspect of coverage (for what duration of transit does coverage apply). Third, the financial extent of recovery
may be determined not only by the policy's limit but also by its average terms as well. Raymond P. Hayden,
Sanford E. Balick, «Marine Insurance: Variety Combination and Coverages» (1991) 66 Tul. L. Rev. 311 at
320-321.
328 "Europe's Cargo Insurance Lottery" Am. Shipper (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
329 M.E. de Orchis, "Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal Muddle" (1982) 17 Eur. Transp. L. 691 at 704.
330 Ibid.
331 "India: Mumbai Customs Notification Contrary to Trade Logic" Bus. Line (1999) (Hindu) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters). Lee R. Russ, Couch on Insurance 3d. ed (U.S.: Thomson Information Services.
1998) at note 8. 5.
332 Ibid. See also William 1. Coffey, «Multimodalism and the American Carrier» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569
at 574.
333 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen, «The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods»
(1982) 57 Tul. L. R. 193 at 198-199.
334 Ibid.
335 U.S. 1980 Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.c. 13906. The minimum insured liability amount for U.S. motor
carriers equals 750.000$USD even though, in practice, most carriers exceed this coverage by buying I$USD
million liability insurance. Benjamin Armistead, "Working with Underwriters on Trucking Accounts" Am.
Ag. & Broker (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). The reason for the additional insurance is that the
minimum required insurance limits often constitute insufficient protection for carriers and expose them to
catastrophic losses. U.S. D.O.T., Cargo Liability Study (August 1998) online: U.S. Department of
Transportation Homepage <ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/carmack/cgolia.pdf> at (Chapter 4) (last visited: April
28,2001). For Canada see Sec. 9(1)(g) and 9(2) of the Motor Vehicle Transport Act. In Canada, motor carrier
minimum liability insurance differs from province to province. On the insurance requirement in Quebec see
Reglement sur les Exigences Applicables aux Documents d' Expedition et aux Contrats de Location et de
Services (200 I) online: Quebec Government Homepage
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time-consuming, fastidious procedure involving filing of various documents and
careful assessment of motor carrier history of losses upon which the amount of the
premiums will be based336. Even if disparities between the U.S. and Canadian
insurance systems still exist33?, Canadian and U.S. truckers can freely cross each
other's borders thanks to a mutually agreed upon insurance system338 . This translates
into the presentation of a 'yellow card' by both U.S. and Canadian truckers at the
border, which guarantees free access to the neighboring countries territories339 .
Canadian and U.S. railways must carry liability insurance in order to obtain a
certificate of fitness to operate in their respective countries340 . U.S. and Canadian
railways are self-insured up to a certain amount beyond which (valuable goods) they
contract liability insurance341 . Both U.S. and Canada have held that self-insurance
<http://www2.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/marchandises/camionnage/lourds/reglement_documents.pdf.> (last visited: June
18,2003) implementing the Loi sur les Transports L. R. Q. c. T - 12 a. 5 par. n and r.
336 See the enlightening article of Benjamin Armistead, "Working with Underwriters on Trucking Accounts"
Am. Agent & Broker (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) on computerized data available or needed to
determine carrier situation before contracting liability insurance.
337 I.e., while U.S. insurers are regulated by State governments, Canadian insurers are subject to both federal
and provincial authorities. The Federal government regulates Mexican insurers. Insurance Coverage Mires
"Three Nation Truck Traffic: But Canada, U.S. and Mexico Seek Solutions" J Com. (1997) online: LEXIS
(World, ALLWLD).
338 "Insurers Join Mexican Border Traffic Snarl" J Com. (1999) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
To gain entry into the United States, a Canadian, as well as a Mexican motor carrier must file certificates of
financial responsibility and have proof of liability insurance. To provide these, a Canadian insurer typically
enters into an agreement with an American insurer under which the U.S. firm does the necessary filings for
the Canadian company and provides proof of insurance. "Insurance Coverage Mires Three-Nation Truck
Traffic; but Canada, U.S. and Mexico Seek Solutions" J Com. (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
"NAFTA Officials, Insurers Drive to Resolve Truck Cover Disparity" J Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World,
ALLWLD).
339 The 'yellow card' is a document that guarantees liability coverage on each side of the border. "NAFTA
Officials, Insurers Drive to Resolve Truck Cover Disparity" J Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World,
ALLWLD), Jennifer Rossi Auwarter, «A New Era of Motor Carrier Regulation: Open Borders and New
Liabilities» National Confectioners Logistics Council Summer Conference (San Diego: National
Confectioners Logistics Council, 2002).
340 Canada: Sec. 92 of the 1996 Canada Transportation Act. U.S.: Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
requirement Thomas Gale Moore, Clearing the Track (1996) The Cato Review of Business & Government
Homepage <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regI8n2f.html> (last visited: April 11, 2001).
341 U.S.: Interview of the author with a Railway Economy Expert (April 7, 2001). On the contrary, motor
carriers usually do not have the asset base to self-insure. Ibid. See also Margo D. Beller, "Deregulation
Hightens Competition" J Com. (1993) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Canada: Interview of the author
with a Railway expert at the Canadian Transportation Agency (April 9,2001). According to the information
advanced the amount of self-insurance greatly varies from mode to mode and company to company,
depending on the amount the company wants to set aside and the risks it wants to cover-, and always needs to
be approved by the Canadian Transportation Agency. We will further comment on self-insurance as follows.
The CTA expert also notes that in the U.S., railway liability insurance policies can easily reach 300 million
$USD dollars whereas in Canada these policies approximate, on average, 100$CAD million for passenger
transport and 50 million $CAD for cargo transport.
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qualifies, in legal terms, as adequate insurance in the field of transportation342.
Thanks to mergers and agreements between U.S. and Canadian railways, cargo
transported by rail goes through the border without any delays343.
Self-insurance is used by large carriers and shippers in order to respond to
liability and cargo claims respectively and reduce the costs associated with
contracting cargo or liability insurance344. Small companies will not easily self-
insure because they do not have significant amounts of cash available345 . Despite its
name and the frequent use of the terms 'insure(d)' or 'insurance' with respect to it, -
terms used mainly for convenience purposes-, self-insurance does not involve
insuring carriers or anyone, for that matter346. It, actually, refers to internal funding
of potential risks by a carrier or group of carriers whereby reserves are set aside to
indemnify shippers in case ofpotential claims347. There is no contract between the
342 U.S. U.S. D.O.T., Cargo Liability Study (August 1998) online: U.S. Department of Transportation
Homepage <ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/carmack/cgolia.pdf> at (Chapter 3) (last visited: April 28, 2001) on the
conditions upon which carriers can self-insure (mainly proof of financial condition). Canada: interview of the
author with a railway expert at the Canadian Transportation Agency (April 9, 2001).
343 Interview of the author with an Expert on Shipments of Dangerous Goods at Transport Canada (April 9,
2001). On the increase of rail way crossings see "In Good Shape" Trib. Bus. News (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). For motor and rail transport, this always presupposes that there is no problem with customs at
the border. Customs seem not to care about carrier liability insurance documentation but, rather, about
whether the goods described in the BOL are conform with the Manifest of Shipment and whether the Carrier
is recognized (known). Interview of the author with the customs personnel in Montreal for the transport of
goods between the U.S. and Canada (April 9, 2001).
344 Shippers can self-insure freely whereas carrier liability insurance and, therefore, self-insurance, if they
choose to self-insure for liability, is mandatory. Self-insurance is not specific to the field of transportation.
Giant corporations have traditionally used self-insurance or self-insurance pools to avoid the existing
marketplace. Truckers Struggle as Insurance Costs Near Crisis Level (2000) online: Truckings Electronic
Newspaper Homepage <www.ttnews.com> (last modified: May 31, 2000). For the reasons why businesses
have recourse to self-insurance see "Hard Market may Set Off Captive Explosion" The National (2001)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
345 Even though there is no link between self-insurance and prosperity, one could argue that self-insurance is a
sign of prosperity in the sense that a considerable amount of money is needed to pay claims. Interview of a
self-insurance expert at Indiana University (April 5, 2001). However, ideas that promote self-insurance of
middle-size businesses exist. "Beef Up Image" J Com. (1986) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Insurance
Carriers Seek Liability (2002) Superior Bulk Logistics Homepage online:
superiorbulklogistics.com/DrivingForce 12002/June /page2.html (last visited: June 18, 2003).
346 Self Insurance (2003) online: Indiana University-Office of Risk Management Homepage
<http:www.Indiana.edu/~riskmgmt/Selflnsurance.htm> (last visited June 26, 2003). The majority of U.S.
courts have held that self-insurance is not insurance at all. Lawrence 1. Brandes, "Several Special Problems of
Self-Insurance" (1987) 439 PU/Comm 345 (WESTLAW-Tp-all).
347 Ibid. See also Lawrence Brandes, "Techniques of Self-Insurance 1987" (1987) 439 PU/Comm 345
(WESTLAW-Tp-All) and U.S. D.O.T., Cargo Liability Study (August 1998) online: U.S. D.O.T. Homepage
<ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/carrnack/cgolia.pdf.> at (Chapter 3) (last visited: April 28, 2001).
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carrier or shipper and the insurance company but, rather, a policy to set aside funds
owned by them, that remain their property, without need to have recourse to
outsiders348. The amount to be set aside will mainly depend on the history and
anticipation of c1aims349.
Self-insurance presents the great advantage of cost-effective management of
risks350: first, it avoids administrative overheads and underwriting profits that
Insurance companies habitually carry. Second, it permits direct access to re-
Insurance markets and lucrative returns from the investment of 'premiums' that,
otherwise, an insurance company would have retained. Finally, it leaves carriers free
to manuscript their own policy to cover their potential liability. One could also
validly argue that since the carrier in question sets aside its own money to indemnifY
shippers, it has more interest in that there will be no damage to its cargo than if it
had contracted liability insurance with a third-party351.
Ship owner liability insurance is mandatory in Canada and the U.S. only in
case of pollution352. However, the great risks associated with ocean carriage have
rendered ocean carrier liability insurance necessary for all types of damage353.
Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs)354 cover the majority of ocean carriers
worldwide (ship owner or charterer) to the extent of their 'legal liability' , in return
348 Interview of the author with a self-insurance expert at Indiana University (April 5, 200 I).
349 SelfInsurance Can Cut Health Care Costs-If you can Handle the Risk (1999) online: Business Week
Homepage <http:www.businessweek.com:/smallbiz/news/date/9909/f990903c.htm?scriptFrame> (last visited:
(April 4, 2001). Other factors, such as the domestic or international nature of the transportation or the nature
of goods habitually transported, will also determine the amount to be set aside and will condition
governmental (national agencies) approval of the carrier self-insurance plan (when insurance is a mandatory
requirement for carriers).
350 Sam Friedman, "Hard Market May Set Off Captive Explosion" The National (2001) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). In certain cases, self-insurance may also offer tax advantages. Captive Insurance Defined
(1998) online: Insurance Bermuda Homepage online: <http:www.Bermuda-
insurance.orglbim/home.nsf/pages/Define.htm> (last visited: Feb. 4, 2001).
351 Ibid and "Iowa Train Derailment" Gannett News Service (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
352 Canada: Sec. 684(1) of the 1996 Canada Shipping Act. U.S.: Sec. 33 USC 2716 of the Oil Pollution Act.
353 F.N. Hopkins, Business and Law (Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson Ltd. 1989) at 640.
354 P&I Club insurance is widespread among ship owners. Approximately nine out of ten ocean-going ships
are currently entered in a P&I Club. This type of insurance covers third party liabilities and expenses arising
from owning ships or operating ships as principals. The major P&I Clubs belong to the International Group of
P&I Clubs which exists to arrange collective insurance and reinsurance for them. About the UK P & I Club
(1999) online: UK P & I Club Homepage <http://www.ukpandLcom/> (last visited: March 25, 2001).
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for premiums paid by the carrier and which are usually based on a member's 'loss
ratio', i.e. his statistical results reflecting loss experience over a given number of
years355. Insured's 'loss ratio' is, therefore, a factor both cargo and liability insurers
take into account in determining the amount ofpremiums356.
In effect, cargo and liability insurers divide potential purchasers (shippers and
carriers respectively) into groups, classifying them according to their probability of
loss (expected losses) and the magnitude of losses they may occur357. Insureds with
similar expected losses are placed in the same risk class so that each may be charged
the same rate (premium)358. Expected losses are a prediction of insured's actual
losses359. However, actual losses vary from expected losses because calculations of
the latter normally do not, and cannot be based on all relevant variables and because
expected losses are only the predictable component of any individual's or
enterprise's actualloss36o. Random losses -losses occurring by chance- are taken into
account by insurance companies but are only imperfectly predicted361 . All insureds
share the risk of random losses but pay premiums on an individual basis for
355 M. E. de Orchis, "Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal Muddle" (1982) 17 Eur. Transp. L. 691 at 704.
In case of ship owners or other carriers starting a multimodal service and assuming liability door-to-door, P &
I underwriters have difficulty in calculating insurance premiums since there is no loss experience to cite. One
underwriter who was asked how the rate for multimodal transport was determined said: "I look out the
window". Ibid at 707.
356 See supra at 70 for cargo insurance.
357 Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy (United States: Yale
University Press, 1946) at 67. John Isaacs, "Cargo Insurance in Relation to Through Transport" Through
Transport Seminar (London: London Press Center) 1 at 5 for cargo insurance. See also W. Kip Viscusi, "The
Economics of Insurance Law" (1988) Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 871 at 872-873. State laws limit
distinctions insurance companies may draw in categorizing policyholders (Le. distinctions based on race). It is
generally argued that classification of insurance policyholders on immutable characteristics such as age, race
and sex are particularly controversial and do not promote risk-averse behavior. Ibid.
358 Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy (United States: Yale
University Press, 1946) at 68. For further details on how insurers determine the premium rates see Ejan
Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 177-178 and 180-
181. The more narrowly insurers can define risk pools, the more efficient the insurance is. To earn higher
profits, insurers have an incentive to classify insureds according to their expected accident costs and to adjust
premiums accordingly. By doing so, the insurer can offer low-damage insureds lower premiums, while
charging high-damage insureds higher premiums. Avery Wiener Katz, Foundations of the Economic
Approach to Law (New York: Oxford University, 1998) at 198.
359 Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy (United States: Yale
University Press, 1946) at 69.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
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expected losses362. In this way, the carrier and shipper are really protected against
unusually large losses such as those arising out of a sinking or other serious marine
casualty363.
Risk spreading of independent risks on a pool of insured persons is the
principal characteristic of cargo and liability insurance as of insurance in generat364.
In this manner, insurance substitutes a reduced and certain cost for an important but
uncertain one365 . It is generally conceded today that such loss spreading by
insurance is socially beneficial and does not undermine any remaining deterrence or
penal aspects of liability law366. The premium of insurance enters into the final cost
of the goods at the point of delivery367.
In multimodal transport, liability Insurance follows the principles of the
fragmented carrier liability regime. If a freight forwarder is used by the shipper,
freight forwarders mandatory liability insurance does not always provide adequate
coverage in case of damage368. If it is an ocean carrier who provides the intermodal
journey, P&I Clubs generally cover door-to-door shipments up to the limits
provided in the Hague and the Visby Rules or certain other standard terms under
362 Ibid at 77.
363 Ibid at 74.
364 Ejan Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 174 and
179.
365 Ibid.
366 James M. Fischer, "The Presence of Insurance and the Legal Allocation of Risk" (1996) 5 Conn. Ins. L. 1.
I at 6.
367 John Isaacs, "Cargo Insurance in Relation to Through Transport" Through Transport Seminar (London:
London Press Center, 1978) I at I.
368 Ian Putzger, Forwarders Urged to Provide Enough Cover (1997) online: CAN Homepage
<http://web3.asial.com.sgitimesnet/data/cna/docs/cna2394.html> (last visited: 04/06/01). In Canada i.e. only
recently did the Canadian International Freight Forwarder Association (CIFFA) raise member requirement to
carry liability insurance from 100.000$CAD to 250.000$CAD. Qualifications (2003) online: CIFFA
Homepage <www.ciffa.com/become_qualifications.asp> (last visited: June 20, 2003). The same obligation to
provide for liability insurance up to the amount of 750.000$USD exists in the U.S. (same as mandatory
requirement for motor carriers). James Giermanski, David Neipert, Jeffrey Kinsler, «The Re-regulation of
Freight Forwarders in the U.S.A. and its Impact on the U.S.A.-Mexico Border» (2000) 9-WTR Currents: Int'l
Trade L. J. II (LEXIS-Newsletters) (no pages). The insurance requirement is stated in U.S.c. Title 49,
Subtitle 4, Part B, Chapter 139, Sec. 13906 as reported by Us. Code Collection (2003) online: Cornell
University-Legal Information Institute Homepage <http://www4.law.comell.edu/uscode/49/l3906.html> (last
visited: Feb. 8, 2003).
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international conventions or national laws369. In case the ship owner wishes to
contract more onerous terms or stricter liability he must seek cover for the excess
elsewhere37o. Because shippers do not frequently know who is to blame (concealed
damage) or the amount of compensation in case of loss or damage occurring during
the multimodal journey, they are better off buying cargo insurance for their goods to
compensate for the inadequacy of carrier liability insurance371 .
The need for cargo insurance in multimodal transport becomes imperative
following transport deregulation because of the intensification of competition among
carriers and between carriers and transport intermediairies over providing liability
insurance for the whole multimodal journey372. In effect, under the heat of
competition for cheaper freight charges and absent governmental control, some U.S.
motor carriers 'neglect' safety standards and liability coverage373 . To be certain
against the eventuality of loss, shippers are strongly recommended to contract cargo
insurance for their goods.
B. Do Insurance Companies Render Obsolete Uniformity Initiatives of
Multimodal Carrier Liability? Authors argue that because of the presence of
insurance companies, parties in multimodal transport have moved well beyond the
need for a mandatory international convention374. The fact that carrier liability is not
only doubly but also triply insured by the forwarder, the agent and the carrier is a
bonanza for the insurance industry and a quite securing fact for shippers (dual, triple
369 Liability coverage for door-to-door shipments is a policy P&I Clubs have adopted since 1973. A.M.
Stirling, "Insurance for Through Transport Operators" Through Transport Seminar (London: London Press
Center, 1978) 1 at 3.
370 Ibid.
371 "New Cargo Pact with CAN Maritime Spices through Transport" Ll. List. Int'!. (2000) online: LEXIS
(Transp. News) and Henry Samuel, "The Right Insurance Policy Vital to Protect your Exported Goods" J
Com. (1994) online: LEXIS (J. Com.).
372 Margo D. Beller, "Deregulation Hightens Competition" J Com. (1993) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
373 Ibid. The author asserts that, in California, 25% of liability insurance companies for truckers are
fraudulent. Other carriers buy out-of-shore liability insurance that is cheaper and hard to punish. Ibid. While
competition is fierce and profits are slim or non-existent, concerns intensify that spending on safety will be
the first item reduced. U.S., U.S. DOT-Federal Highway Administration, Key Freight Transportation
Challenges-Safety (2003) online: Department of Transportation Homepage
<ops.thwa.dot.gov/freight/publications/freight%20story/safety.htm> (last modified: Feb. 13, 2003).
374 William J. Coffey, «Multimodalism and the American Carrier» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 569 at 578.
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or overlapping insurance)375. Moreover, with carner and shipper consolidation,
carriers and shippers can benefit from advantageous insurance terms and premiums
following deregulation376.
However, double or triple Insurance to cover the same risk (overlapping
insurance) increases transportation costs. Further, purchase of additional cargo
insurance by shippers -if they have been wise enough to take out cargo insurance- or
use of a lawyer to overcome the complexities of multimodal carrier liability regime,
may cost enough to make the shipment uneconomicaI377 . Shippers, particularly small
shippers, may be overwhelmed by the additional cost378 . It was probably for this
reason that the then Chief of UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Section, Mr. Hans Carl,
affirmed that shippers, particularly the smaller ones who lack the necessary
sophistication to protect themselves, require introduction of a single and uniform
multimodal transport liability regime which will eliminate these variances379.
The present system is not only burdensome on shippers but also on carriers
and cargo/liability insurers. Because cargo insurance does not cover all risks38o, or in
case of suspicion of carrier negligence, shippers, or rather, their insurers have to deal
with the multiplicity of legal regimes governing multimodal transport in settling or
375 Richards Butler, "Trade Law Uniformity Remains out of Reach" L!. List. Int'! (1999) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). It is often the case that there is an overlap in the insurance coverage of goods in intermodal
transport: four different persons may insure the same risk to the goods for a specific stage of a multimodal
journey. Margo D. Beller, "Deregulation Hightens Competition" J. Com. (1993) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
376 I.e., small shippers within a shippers association can take advantage of value-added services such as cargo
insurance and inland transport provisions. "Save on Freight, Gain on Services with a Shippers Association"
Mang. Exp. (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
377 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 234. "U.S., EU Seek
Harmony in Transport Rules" J. Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
378 Ibid. From an insurance point of view, therefore, small shippers are disfavored by the current regime. See
also infra at 159 (deregulation).
379 Interview of the author with Hans Carl, President, at the time, of the International Multimodal Transport
Association (IMMTA) Trade Facilitation Section (March 26, 2001) e-mail: hans.carl@infonie.fr. See also
"Liability Limbo" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) and Sandra Speares, "Law: Plea for
Implementation of Global Legislation on Multimodal Transport: Marine Insurance" Ll. List. Int'! (1999)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
380 What is certain is that risks which arise from international transportation are not at the present time
covered clearly or completely. C. W. G. Wilson, "Through Transport: The Role of the Freight Forwarder"
Through Transport Seminar (London: London Press Center, 1978) 1 at 9. Supra at 70-71.
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litigating their claims381 . Even though litigation on Insurance coverage and
settlement of transport claims is generally settled, insurance companies can get
entangled in very expensive disputes before the courts382 . Courts are, therefore, left
to resolve the legal complexities of multimodal transport and carrier liability
insurance regimes383 . To cover for the uncertainty of recovery, cargo and liability
insurers raise insurance premiums384.
Moreover, it is recommended to insurers to reinsure their risks with a super-
insurer like Lloyd's (reinsurance) whose risks are more diversified than theirs, or to
form a consortium with other insurers so as to form a more diversified pool of
risks385 . Since cargo and liability insurers use one or several other insurers very
often, they are burdened with additional costs, which add to the complexity of the
applicable rules386. This is claimed to be definitely better than have gaps in the
insurance coverage provided387 . However, the unnecessary costs associated with the
present system inevitably burden insurers and carriers, obstruct trade and are finally
borne by consumers who purchase transported goods388 .
381 It should be noted, however, that the situation may not be qualified as tragic since carrier liability
insurance is handled by legal experts who will, generally, not face extraordinary difficulties in dealing with
claims and identifying the applicable legal regime. It is still, however, a rather complicated affair to deal with
cargo and liability insurance claims in multimodal transport. "Chequered History of a Legal System
Bedeviled by Political Confrontation" (2000) Ll. List. Int'I. Sp. Rep. 19 (WESTLAW-Newsletters).
According to Pr. Ramberg, an overriding common carrier regime could solve this problem. Jan Ramberg,
Unification of the Law of International Freight Forwarding (1998) online: UNIDROIT Homepage http:
<www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/l998-l.html> (last visited: Mars 19, 200 I).
382 Michael F. Sturley, "Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: a Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat
Problem" (1998) 1. Mar. L. & Com. 41 at 45. "Europe's Cargo Insurance Lottery" Am. Ship. (1997) online:
LEXIS (World, ALLWLD). See also Jan Ramberg, Unification of the Law of International Freight
Forwarding (1998) online: <http: www.unidroit.orglenglish/publications/review/articles/l998-1.htm> (last
visited: March 19, 200 I). See also "Liability Limbo" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
383 Jan Ramberg, Unification of the Law of International Freight Forwarding (1998) online: <http:
www.unidroit.orglenglish/publications/review/articles/l998-l.htm> (last visited: March 19, 200 I).
384 "Liability Limbo" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Michael F. Sturley, "Restating the
Law of Marine Insurance: a Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem" (1998) 1. Mar. L. & Com. 41 at
45.
385 Ejan Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 179.
386 "Europe's Cargo Insurance Lottery" Am. Ship. (1997) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
387 Ibid.
388 Michael F. Sturley, "Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: a Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat
Problem" (1998) 1. Mar. L. & Com. 41 at 45.
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Consequently, even if the status quo is said to benefit insurance companies,
the granted advantage is not absolute389. The currently applicable insurance system
burdens multimodal transport with unnecessary costs that uniformity of carrier
liability regimes would, in all likelihood, avoid. Thus, the argument of efficiency in
the rules of international trade and protection of small businesses, the raison d' etre
ofthe Multimodal Convention, persists, today, and is world wide in its reach39o.
Chester Hooper reinforces this view by suggesting that all multimodal
carriage should be governed by one set of laws391 . The author argues that the
uniformity and predictability that would flow from such a system "would encourage
quicker settlements and more efficient insurance placement»392. In more economic
terms, uniform intermodal carrier liability and proper allocation of risks between
carriers and shippers, the latter to be examined as follows, reduce the risk born by
the insureds and permit use of assets otherwise reserved to offset potential losses393 .
Hence, proper allocation of risks between carriers and shippers within a uniform
setting of multimodal carrier liability rules will produce the optimal effect on a legal
-because of the simplicity of applicable rules- and economic -because of cost-
effectiveness (efficiency)- basis.
Constant pressure put on legislators and international organizations to adopt a
uniform liability regime to apply to intermodal carriers and numerous efforts
undertaken towards this direction, make present insurance mechanisms a
'provisional remedy' in securing the success of multimodalism. However, the
security of the present reality and the uncertainty as to the effects of proposed
changes sanction the saying: 'there is nothing more permanent than a provisional
389 Kurosh Nasseri, «The Multimodal Convention» (1998) 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 231 at 233.
390 "U.S., EU Seek Harmony in Transport Rules" J. Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD). See also
"Liability Limbo" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
391 Chester D. Hooper, «Legal Relationships: Terminal Owners, Operators and Users» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev.
595 at 595.
392 Ibid.
393 Avery Wiener Katz, Foundations ofthe Economic Approach to Law (New York: Oxford University, 1998)
at 196.
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measure'. A permanent remedy is needed, nonetheless, to put an end to the legal
complexities of the sector.
C. Interplay of Regulatory Policies on Carrier Liability and Insurance
Premiums: Having addressed the question of whether uniformity initiatives merit
consideration despite the presence of insurance companies, we now tum our
attention to the effects of regulatory carrier liability policies on Insurance
premiums394. Addressing this issue will give us more insight on the effects of
different regulatory policies on insurance companies, their expected reaction to such
policies and the right approach to adopt in formulating suggestions on multimodal
carrier liability.
One may reasonably ask why insurers, carrIers and shippers should argue
about whom will an eventual reform favor since, whatever the change may be, the
cost of insurance will be passed on from carriers to shippers or vice-versa and will
be spread among policyholders395 . Through such a system of allocation of risks the
overall cost of insurance remains same whatever the change in the liability pattern
may be.
In effect, if multimodal carrier liability was to increase, liability insurance
premiums would naturally increase and cargo insurance premiums would decrease
as cargo insurer would experience a higher level of recovery from the carrier396.
Carriers would, then, seek to offset such additional expense by a raise of freight
394 Authors have raised the question of division of risks between carriers and shippers with respect to the
multimodal carriage but also that of complete coverage of cargo owners risks. C. W. G. Wilson, "Through
Transport: The Role of the Freight Forwarder" Through Transport Seminar (London: London Press Center,
1978) 1 at 9.
395 Opinion of maritime lawyer as reported by Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "Creating Uniform Worldwide
Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods" (1996) 23 Transp. L. 1. 471 at note 225. On the spreading of
risk among policyholders see Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, "Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie is not Big
Enough Who Eats Last?" (1997) 64 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 1337 at 1355-1356.
396 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of
Goods" (1996) 23 Transp. L. 1. 471 at note 225 and David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of
Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 102.
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charges397 . This would lead, in turn, to a raise of cargo insurance premiums since
carrier liability is an element that composes cargo insurance premiums. Such a raise
would, ultimately, burden the consumer since transport costs are integrated in the
price of the good398 . Inversely, (de)regulatory decrease of carrier liability would
inevitably lead to an increase in use of cargo insurance and, therefore, of cargo
insurance premiums. More cargo policies would, then, be sold because of the low
liability limits and courts would probably not have to deal with interminable
litigation since claims not clearly attributed to the carrier would not be worth
pursuing399. Overall, whatever the shift in the carrier liability, liability and cargo
insurance premiums will balance out one another.
Insurance mechanisms, however, do not always reflect the mathematical
accuracy of the above-described allocation of risks mechanism because of the
characteristics of cargo and liability insurers. In effect, liability insurers, mainly P&I
clubs, are said to operate more cost-effectively, therefore, more easily absorbing
losses than cargo insurers400. So, in case of increase of carrier liability from current
levels, liability insurers, especially maritime insurers, may fear that the entire cost of
insurance may not be passed on to shippers4ol . At the same time, many shippers,
especially large shippers who insure under favorable cargo insurance terms, may
397 M.E. de Orchis, "Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal Muddle" (1982) 17 Eur. Transp. L. 691 at 706.
Carrier insurance premiums are part of the freight structure. Brien D. Ward, "Admiralty: Failure to Deliver
Cargo Does Not Constitute Unreasonable Deviation Under COGSA" (1986) 60 Tul. L. Rev. 849 at note 10.
398 See Robert Force, "A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules: Much Ado about it?"
70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051 at 2087 for this argument with respect to the Hamburg Rules. See also supra at 70 for
carrier liability being an element of cargo insurance premiums.
399 Interview of the author with CIFFA personnel (April 10, 2001). Transportation costs include: freight,
additional services (charge/discharge, declaration of value, weighing, cleaning and disinfecting the vehicle),
expenses related to the contract of transport such as crew, repairs, provisions, bunkers, insurance premiums
and taxes. Change of the itinerary, immobilization of the vehicle for reasons non-imputed on the carrier lead
to a readjustment of the transport price. Marie Tilche, "Prix de Transport: Delais et Incidents" (1999) 2814
Bull. Transp. L. 622 at 626.
400 Eun Sup Lee, "Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability Insurance" (1997)
J. Int'l & Compo L. 153 at note 2 and Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in
International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J. Compo L. 391 at 394-395. The authors admit, however, that in the
absence of sufficient empirical data, this conclusion cannot be confirmed with certainty. Ibid.
401 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23
Am. J. Compo L. 391 at 394-395. See also David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability
for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 102 where the author notes
that in case of carrier liability increase, increased freight rates mayor may not offset reduced cargo insurance
rates.
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fear that the consolidation of risk onto carriers may provide latter with an excuse to
inflate rates402.
On the other hand, limiting carrIer liability (i.e. deregulation) will not
necessarily result in a corresponding increase of cargo insurance premiums in the
short or the long run. In effect, defining cargo insurance premiums is not an exact
science and its cost is far from being low. Cargo insurers do not have reliable
statistics available so that premiums are set according to the account (whether it is a
large or small policy, whether the insured is a new client etc.) as well as intuition403 .
What's more, carrier and cargo insurance are typically underwritten at different
places and may respond to market pressures differentll04 . Consequently, whatever
the change in the liability pattern may be, it is not certain that allocation of risks
mechanisms will work at the benefit of liability or cargo insurers.
Yes, but one could argue that individual insurers and, thus, carners and
shippers are not interested in the above described overall picture of risk allocation in
order to adopt a proposed change in the liability pattern but, rather, in how such a
change will affect their individual situation. Even on this level, however, there is no
uniform answer. Each insurer may react differently to a shift in the carrier liability.
In effect, there are authors who argue that even though it is probable that, for
instance, P&I clubs will raise their premiums and cargo insurers will lower them as
a result of an increase in ocean carrier liability, it is uncertain whether the former
will raise their freight rates consequentll05 . Freight raise depends on the
competitive situation of each carrier406 . It may be that there are many cases where
402 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23
Am. J. Compo L. 391 at 394-395.
403 Ibid at 394. Supra at 70 on the 'objective' factors influencing insurance premiums.
404 Unlike P&I coverage, cargo insurance is normally underwritten at the place of the origin of the goods and,
therefore, most of the time there are two different markets involved. James H. Holenstein, "The Allocation of
the Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases" (1983) 50 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 1146 at 1168 and note
138.
405 Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979) 27 Am. 1. Compo L.
357 at 366.
406 Ibid at 363.
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earners will not raise their rates to recapture their entire Increase of Insurer
premiums407 . Thus, one cannot generalize on this issue.
Overall, shifting liabilities will not necessarily shift costs correspondingly
between carriers and shippers. Above-mentioned highly subjective elements vitiate
supposedly absolute repercussion of carrier liability mechanisms and obstruct
predictability of effects of a uniform multimodal carrier liability regime on
. .Insurance premIUms.
It is normal, therefore, that Insurers oppose change of the current liability
pattern as was the case of the 1980 Multimodal Convention, especially when the
status quo is workable and profitable408 . Uncertainty of the consequences of such
changes on the insurance companies at the individual as well as at the industry level
coupled with the accommodating present reality, with(e)old consideration of such
initiatives409.
407 Ibid at 366-367.
408 Authors further state that these and other efforts to restructure distribution of risks between cargo and
liability insurance have not gained momentum presumably because the insurance market is not yet prepared
for such restructuring as these initiatives seem to suggest. Jan Ramberg, "Freedom of Contract in Maritime
Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 178 at 186.
409 Insurers are also skeptical about changing their business practices following a reform. Hugh M. Kindred,
Ted L. McDorman, Mary R. Brooks, Norman G. Letalik, William Tetley, Edgar Gold, The Future of
Canadian Carriage ofGoods by Water Law (Halifax: Dalhousie University 1982) at 302.
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Section II: The European Union (ED) Multimodal Carrier Liability
Pattern
The European Union (EU)410 constitutes, today, the largest single market in
the world411 . With the current increase of trading activities, transport services in
Europe are predicted to increase by 2.3% and 1.6% for the periods 2000-2005 and
2005-2010 respectivell12.
European geography demands multimodal transport413 . In effect, a glance at
the map of Europe shows that some countries are islands, like England, Ireland and
Malta. Some countries, like Scandinavia, are divided by straits from the rest of the
continent or have river boundaries414. Very often, therefore, road carriers have to use
other modes of transport such as ferries to cross bodies of water or railways in case
i.e. of railway tunnels415 . Time saving,416 and beneficial environmental effects417 are
410 The E. U. -previously known as the European Economic Community (E. C. C.) (infra note 422)- is an
institutional framework for the construction of a united Europe. It comprises three separate communities: the
European Coal and Steel Community (established in 1951); the European Atomic Energy Community (EUR.
ATOM) and the European Economic Community (E. E. C.), both established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.
The objective was to unite the nations of Europe economically after the World War II so that another war
among them would be unthinkable. Fifteen European countries are currently members of the E. u.: United
Kingdom, France, Greece, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Spain, Ireland,
Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Denmark. EU in Brief (2002) online: E. U. Homepage
<http://www.eurunion.org/profile/EnlargementMap.jpg> (last modified: continuously). The European Union
is now preparing its largest enlargement from 15 to 25 countries, the 10 additional countries are set to join on
May IS" 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. Enlargement (2003) online: Europa Homepage
<www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm> (last modified: continuously).
411 Alex Orr, "It's Time to Fly the Flag for Europe" Evening News-Scotland (2002) online: WESTLAW
(News).
412 Alfred Erdlinger, The Choice of Transport System in Today's Liberalized Road/Rail Environment (1999)
online: UIRR Homepage (Issues) <http://www.uirr.com/english/english.htm> (last visited: May 7, 1999).
413 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
611. U.S., Department of Transportation, Towards Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the
United States (1998) online: U.S. DOT Homepage
<http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/institut/inter/eu_us2. pdf> (last visited: July II, 200 I) indicates that due
to European geography it is easier to efficiently combine different modes in the U.S. rather than in Europe
where distances are shorter.
414 With the programmed enlargement of the EU to 10 new Central and Eastern European countries (supra
note 410) multimodal transport will greatly increase as six out of the ten multimodal transport corridors
service the region. John E. Thompson, Eddy DeClerq, Katsuhide Nagayama, "International Intermodality
Aspects of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Transport Master Plan" ITE J 2430 (2002) online: WESTLAW
(All-News).
415 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Mulitmodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
615.
416 M. Burkhardt, Combined Perspectives for Road and Rail (1999) online: U. I. R. R. Homepage
<http://www.uirr.com/englishlenglish.htm> (last visited: May 9, 2001).
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the mam factors that contribute to the mcrease of combined transport at the
European level.
Because of Europe's geographical features, the legal problems that inherently
arise from the use of intermodalism were discovered earlier in the 'old continent'
than elsewhere418 . One would think, therefore, that European multimodal transport
law could provide a sample guide for development of multimodal transportation law
elsewhere419. This is not, however, the case, Europe today is in search of multimodal
carrier legislation.
In this part of our study, we will comment on the Common European
Transportation Policy focus on liberalization of transport services Par. 1 before
concentrating on multimodal carrier liability in Europe Par. 2.
Par. 1. The Focus of the Common European Transportation Policy on
Liberalization of Transport Services: While much of the international traffic today
remains regulated by bilateral or multilateral agreements, the ED constitutes an
exception by providing a single, liberalized motor transport sector and partially
liberalized air and maritime transport industries42o • European transportation
regulation mainly concentrates on liberalization of transport services and its
corollaries, competition and anti-trust laws, are formulated and apply, for the most
part, separately to air, maritime, rail and inland waterways rather than
intermodalll21 .
417 Combined transport is environmental friendly entailing a 90% decrease in atmospheric emissions, a 95%
decrease in casualties from accidents and a substantial contribution to noise reduction compared with road
transport. At the time of the political crisis and war in the former Yugoslavia it was stated that countries on
the periphery of Europe understood that they could not afford to build their transport systems on only one or
two modes, especially on road transport. In other words, political instability contributed to the development of
the multimodal transport in Europe. Ibid.
418 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
611.
419 Ibid at 611.
420 Arbault Marie Laurence, Transport Multimodal en Droit Communautaire (D. Jur. Thesis, Lille III, 1996)
[unpublished: archived at Lille III ISSN: 0294-176796fPAO 1/0311 Fiche 3851.24931198] at 162.
421 Ibid at 247-249. Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul.
L. Rev. 611 at 611. Politique de Transport: L 'Europe en Retard (1999) online: French Senat Homepage
<http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-300.html> (last visited: Dec.12, 2001).
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One of the four freedoms provided by the Treaty ofRome (EC Treaty)422 and
constituting the pillars of the ED, is that nationals of each Member-State are legally
entitled to provide (transport) services in other Member States in the same
conditions as nationals of these States do423 . Consequently, transportation services at
the ED level must obey the general provisions of the Treaty of Rome, i.e.
competition (articles 81 to 86) and state aid provisions (articles 87 to 89)424. Title V
(art. 70-80) of the same Treaty, sets out the general objectives of a Common
European Transportation Policy and invites the European Council to define this
policy so as to ensure competition in the common market425. It took European
422 Treaty for the Establishment of the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957 298 V.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter E. E. C. Treaty] amended by the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.
J. (C 224) 1. The 1957 Treaty of Rome -signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg- established the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). It constitutes one of the foundation
stones of the E. V.. The Treaty has been amended numerous times and its 1992 amendment though the
Maastricht Treaty transformed the E. E. C. to the E. V.. We will herein comment on the consolidated text of
the 1957 E. C. Treaty as established through its last amendment taking place in 2001 with the Treaty ofNice
that advanced EV integration. As a result, reference herein made to the EC Treaty or Treaty of Rome directs
to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Consolidated EC Treaty
articles referred to herein have not really changed in content through E. C. Treaty's various amendments. For
the consolidated text of the 1957 Treaty of Rome under its last amendment see Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (26 Feb. 2001),
online: EV Homepage <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties> (last modified: continuously) [hereinafter EC
Treaty or Treaty of Rome]. The consolidated text entered into force on Feb. 1,2003 and can also be found in
the Official Journal of the EV OJ C325, 24 Dec. 2002.
423 Mario Riccomagno, "The Liberalization in Access to Maritime Transport Markets in the European Vnion"
(1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L. 537 at 538. The four freedoms are: the freedom of movement of persons, of goods,
of capital and of services.
424 Alain Alexis, "Transports Ferroviaires et Concurrence: Les Principaux Apports de la Directive No.
91/440" (1993) 28 Eur. Transp. L. 499 at 499. State aid provisions are intended to promote competition as
regulated by said articles. Articles 87s concern state aids applicable to maritime and air transport. Land
transport aids are concerned with article 77. Francis Lefebvre, Memento Pratique: Communaute Europeenne
1998-1999 (Montreal: Editions Francis Lefevbre, 1997). The articles refer to the consolidated version of the
Treaty of Rome.
425 Article 3 (t)(g) of the Treaty ofRome provides that: " ... [t]he activities of the Community shall include: ..(t)
the adoption of a common policy in the field of transport; (and) (g) the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted".
A common European policy is a policy defmed by European institutions [European Council with the support
(co-decision) of the European Parliament]. Regulations, Directives and Decisions, the classical vehicles of
European Council decision making are used in this respect. These acts are directly applicable at the national
level and take priority over national law. More than proposing inter-state rules, these acts defme a structured
supra-national set of rules that supercede national laws. Jean-Lous Bergel, "Methodes de Coordination des
Textes et Droit des Transports" (1995) 30 Eur. Transp. L. 13 at 17-18. For regulations and Directives see
supra note 90,91 and accompanying text.
A common European policy exists in the fields of transport, agriculture and commerce. The founders of the
European Community realized that economic development would give way to an increase in transportation
services throughout Europe that would present a potential obstacle to the liberalization of commerce.
Moreover, transport, as agriculture, is characterized by a number of inevitable governmental interventions
which impose limits on certain community policies and require, therefore, the establishment of specific rules.
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institutions some time to launch a Common European Transportation policy but this
finally occurred in the mid-eighty's following two European Court of Justice
decisions426.
Because of the general provisions of the Treaty ofRome and ED regulation in
the area of transport a sound and effective competition policy based on liberalization
of transport services is pursued at the European level427 . Tariffication of transport
services, vehicle (technical) standards, minimum duty on fuel, access to the
profession, are all regulated at the European level428 . We are talking today about an
almost total liberalization of transport services of goods429. We will herein comment
on motor (A), rail (B), and ocean (C) transport liberalization at the European level.
A. Motor Transport: At present, motor carriage is still the dominant mode of
transportation in Western Europe43o while in Central and Eastern Europe the road
mode is shortly going to become dominant431 .
Motor transport at the European level has been totally liberalized, more so
than sea and rail carriage and is subject, therefore, to minimal Member-States
restrictions432 . To facilitate internal traffic of goods and avoid congestion following
This is why agriculture and transport are the only areas intended to be subject to common European policies.
Mario Riccomagno, "The Liberalization in Access to Maritime Transport Markets in the European Union"
(1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L. 537 at 538.
426 The Common European Transport Policy was developed due to a European Court of Justice decision that
condemned the Council under art. 232 (former article 175) of the E. C. Treaty for having failed, in breach of
article 7I(1)(a) and (b) (former art. 75(1)(a) and (b)) to provide for freedom to supply services in inland
navigation. Jill Aussant, "Cabotage and the Liberalization of the Maritime Services Sector" (1993) 28 Eur.
Transp. L. 347 at 347-348. In 1985, another European Court of Justice decision on the free circulation of
goods and persons within the EC constituted the driving force for European Council to proclaim, the same
year, the free access to the motor transport market of goods at the E.C. level. La Difficile Naissance de fa
Politique Commune des Transports (1999) online: French Senat Homepage <http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-
300/rOO-300 l.htrnl#toc9> (last visited: Oct. 30, 2000).
427 Nick Maltby, "Multimodal Transport and E.C. Competition Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 79 at 80 at 87 and
thesis of Arbault Marie Laurence, Transport Muftimodaf en Droit Communautaire (D. Jur. Thesis, Lille III,
1996) [unpublished: archived at Lille III ISSN: 0294-176796/PAO 1/0311 Fiche 3851.24931198] at 162.
428 Speech of Alain Rathery La Politique Commune des Transports: Situation Actuelle et Perspectives (30
Mars 1997) online: ECTM Homepage (Speeches) <http://www.oecd.fr/cem/online/speeches/arclti.pdf> (last
visited: March 3, 2000).
429 Nick Maltby, "Multimodal Transport and E.C. Competition Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 79 at 80.
430 Jack Short, Road Freight Transport in Europe: Small Policy Concerns and Challenges (1999) online:
ECMT Homepage (Speeches) <http://www.oecd.fr/cem/online/speeches/Jsver99.pdf> (last visited: April 4,
2001). See also "EU Ministers Meet" Austria Today (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-news).
431 Ibid.
432 Progressive liberalization of the motor carrier industry started in the 1980's. Today, admission to the
profession is only subject to qualitative criteria by E.U. Member States so that once a motor freight carrier is
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liberalization of motor carriage, different approaches have been taken by different
Member States433 . However, these measures have not been sufficient to address
traffic bottlenecks, congestion, delays in the delivery of goods, increase in freight
and environmental damage at the European level434 . Transport networks at the
European level face chronic congestion with 10% of the road network affected every
day by traffic jams and 20% of the rail network experiencing bottlenecks435 .
B. Rail Transport: Rail transport of goods is much more developed In
Western than in Eastern Europe436. With the programmed enlargement of the EU to
10 Eastern European countries, rail will raise in importance since forty per cent, a
percentage almost equal to that of the U.S., of the freight market in the Central and
Eastern Europe moves by rail as compared with eight per cent within the EU437 . This
established in one Member State, it enjoys free access to the road freight transport markets throughout the
E.U.. Quantitative restrictions imposed by Member States are temporary restrictions present in case of crisis,
when there is overcapacity in supply for a long period, a great number of carriers suffer from financial
imbalances or their survival is endangered and no market improvement is expected in the short or medium
term. EC Legislation on Road Transport in Accession Candidate Countries (2001) online: World Bank
Homepage <http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rdt_docs/annex9.pdt> (last visited: Oct. 22, 2001).
433 France, for instance, has opted for urban planning, and the new law (Plans de Deplacements Urbains:
PDU) requires cities to draw up a plan for urban movement where they should include freight movements.
Other countries have opted for urban distribution centers to undertake urban freight delivery. Germany
follows a model based on the initiative of private transport companies where all operators deliver to a central
depot with the final distribution being done by one particular company. Denmark has combined public and
private initiative in its distribution model based on licenses given by authorities to transporters that meet
certain criteria. Finally, Monaco's model is based on a concession of internal traffic services by the town to
one transport company responsible for the movement ofgoods within the city. The cost of the concession was
supposed to be born by the municipality and the traders but the latter never contributed their part of the share.
Jack Short, Freight Transport in Cities (1998) online: ECMT Homepage, (Speeches)
<http://www.oecd.org/cem/online/speeches/JSamst98.pdt> (last visited: April 15,2001).
434 Congestion should also be attributed to the fact that a non-negligible part of European motor carriage takes
place in towns. According to a 1998 report, 10-12% of vehicle traffic occurs in towns and up to 70% of all
trucks are situated in towns. At the European level, traffic of goods concerns mostly movements within the
city (internal movement of goods) at daytime. Jack Short, Freight Transport in Cities (1998) online: ECMT
Homepage, (Speeches) <http://www.oecd.org/cem/online/speeches/JSamst98.pdt> (last visited: April 11,
2001). "Europe View: Transport Key to EU Expansion" J Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Congestion is hitting all modes and affects intermodalism. "Intermodalism: Rail Freight Terms see Light at
the End of the Tunnel" LI. List. Int'l (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). "European Diary" Transport
Europe (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). This seems also to be the case with the programmed
enlargement of the EU to 10 new countries. Enlargement (2001) online Europa Homepage
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_140901.htm (last visited: June 16, 2003).
435 "EU Freight Shake" Ll. List. Int'l (2001) online: LEXIS (Transp. News) and John E. Thompson, Eddy
DeClerq, Katsuhide Nagayama, "International Intermodality Aspects of the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Transport Master Plan" ITE J (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
436 Newsletter (1998) online: ECMT Homepage <http://www.oecd.org/cem/events/letter6e.pdt> (last visited:
April 11,2001).
437 White Paper "European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide" (2001) online: Europa Homepage
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lb_en.html> (last modified: Aug. 9, 2002) and Enlargement
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mode of transport has special features that distinguish it from road and air transport:
mode-specific technical standards, dominant monopoly market, strong national
budget contributions and undeniable security constraints438 .
Despite these constraints, liberalization of rail transport came about with the
Council's Directive 91/440/E.E.C. of July 29,1991 439 . This Directive established the
premises for transposing the rail transport sector, which is organized along national
lines, is hyper regulated and dominated by state-owned companies, to a European
market focusing on competition. The main purpose of the Directive 91/440/E.E.C.
was to set up the conditions for the liberalization and competition between rail
companies providing for total opening of national networks in 200844°.
Recently, the first package of rail liberalization measures came into force on
May 15, 2003 at the European level441 . We refer to directive 2001/12/EC on
liberalization of international freight services, directive 2001/13/EC on rail company
licenses and directive 2001/14/EC on allocation of rail infrastructure capacities, rail
infrastructure charges and safety certification442. The first directive, of greatest
(2001) online: Europa Homepage <europa.eu.int/commlenlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_14090 l.htm>
(last visited: June 16, 2003). A White Paper announces the intention of the Commission, which is at the
source of the European legislative process, to come forward with a series of measures proposed on this issue.
This is the last of a series of White Papers that the European Commission has adopted in the field of transport.
It is for the first time in history that the EU places, with the present White Paper, customer's demands at the
heart of its transport strategy. For the implementation of this paper the European Commission is proposing 60
or so measures. Ibid and La DifJicile Naissance de la Politique Commune des Transports (1999) online:
French Senat Homepage <http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-3001.html#toc9> (last visited: Oct. 30, 2000).
438 "Europe des Transports: Liberalization et Harmonization" (1999) 2810 Bull. Transp. Log. 538 at 541.
439 OJL237, 24.08.1991. It can also be found on the web under
<www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/91/237-en.htm/> (last visited: April 19, 2002).
440 The Directive is characterized by four fundamental principles: management which is independent from the
State; financial rationalization; the separation between infrastructure and operation (similar to road and air
transportation); and free access, by at least two associated rail companies, to rail infrastructure of other
Member States (article 2). Alain Alexis, "Transports Ferroviaires et Concurrence: Les Principaux Apports de
la Directive No. 91/440" (1998) 28 Eur. Transp. L. 499 at 507. Later, amendments to the said Directive and
other directives followed, further liberalizing E. U. railways. "Commission to Push for Further Harmonization
and Liberalization" Eur. Report (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
441 "Transport Council-Agreement on Rail Liberalization" Eur. Report (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-
News).
442 Said directives can be found in the Official Journal of the European Communities: OJL75/1 15.3.2001,
OJL75/26 15.3.2001, and OJL75/29 15.3.2001 respectively. These can also be found on the web. Transport
Division, UNECE Trans-European Railway Project (2003) online: UNECE Homepage
<www.unece.org/trans/main/ter/tereu.html> (last modified: Jan. 16, 2003) and under General Report 2001,
Annexes (2001) online: European Union Homepage
<www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/en/2001/cod0406.htm#pt06950> (last modified: March 28, 2003). See
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interest to the present study, amended above-mentioned 91/4401E.E.C. III
liberalizing international freight services and proposed that rail companies issued
with a E.U. license should enjoy access to the trans-European rail freight network
which handles 79-80% ofEU rail freight traffic443 .
Presently, the European Commission is proposing a new (second) rail
package, modifying existing European regulation on the issue and primarily aiming
at completing the opening of the rail freight market by extending access rights to all
national and international traffic444. A proposal for a recommendation concerning
the EU accession to the International Freight Transport Convention (COTIF) IS
therein contained445 .
Despite railway 'liberalization,446, the sector IS still under market-entry
barriers, is subject to state aids that do not foster intermodal competition and there
also "Rail Transport-International Freight Sector Open to Competition from March IS" Eur. Rep. (2003)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletter).
443 The second directive extends European licensing rules to all EU-based rail companies and not only to
those offering international transport services or international combined goods transport activities. The third
directive offers a precise defmition of the entitlements of rail companies and infrastructure managers and
provides for other infrastructure related measures. Ibid and "Clear Tracks Ahead for EU Rail Freight" Agence
France-Presse (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News). European Commission has stressed the fact that it will
take required action to ensure Member States compliance and on July 10, 2003 it sent reasoned opinions to
ten Member-States which have not complied with said directive. "Reasoned Opinion Against Ten Member
States Concerning Rail Package on Infrastructure" Agence Europe (2003) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters),
"Tracks Clear for Freight Rail Transport in Europe" (2003) Sweet & Maxwell Ltd online: LEXIS (LRDI).
The trans-European rail freight network is an agreed upon rail network comprising key corridors (summing up
to 50.000 kilometers of tracks) along the European continent -either within one country or internationally- to
which licensed rail operators meeting safety standards are granted access to run. Operators must also be
allowed to extend services along branch lines linking the main network to ports or important terminals within
a certain distance. Neil Buckley, "EU-Wide Boost for Rail Freight" Fin. Times (1999) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters), "Proposals for Infrastructure and Safety" European Voice (2003) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
444 The Council of the EU Transport Ministers also secured a political agreement on a common position on the
second European railway package dealing mainly with railway opening of international freight competition
and cabotage by 2006 and 2008 respectively. "Commission to Push for Further Harmonization and
Liberalization" Eur. Report (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). France opposed the second package of
rail liberalization and with Belgium and Luxemburg it voted down the text. Ibid and "Cross-Border
Liberalization is on Track" Lloyd's List International (2003) online: Westlaw (Newsletters). Marion Monti,
"Building Up Steam" Daily Deal (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
445 "Transport Council Progress Expected on Maritime Safety and Railways" Eur. Report (2003) online:
LEXIS (News) and "Transport Council-Agreement on Rail Liberalization" Eur. Report (2003) online:
WESTLAW (All-News).
446 At the insistence mainly of France, least enthusiastic about the new series of measures, the use of the term
'liberalization' is frequently avoided. Neil Buckley, "EU-Wide Boost for Rail Freight" Fin. Times (1999)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
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are Member States with severe structural problems in this sector447 . In combined
transport, motor traffic congestion and rail carrier tariffs have given the impression that
combined rail-road transport is economically inefficient at the European level448 .
The present reality should not be viewed as discouraging. A key element of
European transport policy is to foster the growth of shipping and intermodal
transport in a bid to shift cargo off the continent's congested roads449 . Moreover,
although it is certain that the Commission will continue to take into account the
specifics of the railway sector in considering further liberalization of the industry,
regulatory reform through injection of competition measures at the European level is
an on-going process450. Finally, Member-State laws seem to consider more and more
rail liberalization. In Germany, for instance, over 90% of rail freight is carried by
companies other than Deutsche Bahn451 while other European Member States are
continuously introducing competition rules in their railway sector452 . Railway
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions furthers competition and invites
European legislation on the issue453.
C. International Ocean Carriage: International ocean carriage of goods at the
European level involves foreign trade of the ED Member States (representing 90% of
447 "Europe View: Transport Key to EU Expansion" J Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) stating
that the EU under performing state railways is the main reason why rail's share of the freight market has
crushed, allowing trucking to climb at 70%. For state aids see U.S., Department of Transportation Report,
Toward Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the United States (1998) online: U. S. DOT
Homepage <http://www.ops.thwa.dot.gov/freight/institut/inter/eu_us2.pdf.> (last visited: July 11,2001) at 12.
See however, reduction of state aids in 12 out of the 15 European Member States as reported by "Latest
ScoreBoard Shows Falling Subsidies Levels" Eur. Rep. (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News). See also
supra at 90.
448 The modal shift is not occurring. Marion Monti, "Building Up Steam" Daily Deal (2002) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
449 "Financial Incentives Loom for Port Customers in Move to Boost Volumes" Ll. List Int'l (2002) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
450 Marion Monti, "Building Up Steam" Daily Deal (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
451 "Rail Transport-International Freight Sector Open to Competition from March 15" Eur. Rep. (2003)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletter).
452 Jack Short and Stephen Perkins, Transport Policy in Europe (1997) online: ECMT Homepage (Articles)
<http://www.oecd.orgicem/online/articles/jschina.pdf.> (last visited: April 21, 2001), Marion Monti, "Building
Up Steam" Daily Deal (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) and "Keep out of Logistics" LI. List Int'l
(2003) online: WESTLAW (All-news).
453 Marion Monti, "Building Up Steam" Daily Deal (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
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the EU international trade) as well as ocean trade among Member-States454. A noted
neglect to regulate ocean shipping was observed at first on the part of the European
institutions since it took them approximately 25 years to draft and enforce
competition rules in the maritime sector. The delay may be attributed to the fact that
until 1973, the European Community was a continental block of countries with
about 90% of transport carried by road, railway or inland waterways455. Since 1973,
the accession of seafaring countries to the European Community has transformed its
geography in a way that, after said year, nearly 90% of trade between the Member
States was sea borne with almost no competitive land transport alternative456. The
programmed enlargement of the E.U. to 10 new countries, among which appear
Cyprus and Malta, is foreseen to step up shipping and maritime regulation on
safety457.
Four regulations constitute the pillars of European shipping legislation and
are mostly concerned with competition and antitrust ocean carriage legislation458.
454 Mario Riccomagno, "The Liberalization in Access to Maritime transport Markets in European Union"
(1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L. 539 at note 2. Overall, the opportunities for ocean shipping in Europe are much
greater than in NAFTA where land transport reigns. The European Commission has stated: "As the largest
world trading entity, the Community should not be excessively dependent on third country fleets for its
imports and exports, losing control and influence on the price and quality of transport to and from its
territory". As reported by Vincent J. G. Power, "EC Maritime Policy" (1996) 31 Eur. Transp. L. 179 at 185.
455 Helmut Kreis, "European Community Competition Policy and International Shipping" (1992) 27 Eur.
Transp. L. 155 at 157. The Treaty ofRome has dedicated only one provision on the issue inviting the Council
of Ministers to decide 'whether and to what extent rules for sea and air transport will be adopted' (article 80).
Mario Riccomagno, "The Liberalization in Access to Maritime Transport Markets in the European Union"
(1997) 32 Eur. Transp. L. 537 at 538.
456 Helmut Kreis, "European Community Competition Policy and International Shipping" (1992) 27 Eur.
Transp. L. 155 at 156-157. Until 1973 and the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, the
EU was a continental block. After 1973, however, 90% of all export/import between old and new Member-
States (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark acceded to the E. C. in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Austria,
Finland and Sweden in 1995), became sea borne with almost no competition from land transport services.
Thus, trade shipping became considerably more important than it was before 1973. Ibid and see History ofthe
European Union (2003) online: European Union Homepage europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm (last
modified: April 2003).
457 White Paper "European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide" (2001) online: Europa Homepage
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lb_en.html> (last modified: Aug. 9, 2002) and Enlargement
(2001) online Europa Homepage europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_140901.htm (last
visited: June 16,2003). With the enlargement, the EU shipping fleet is to increase substantially since the flags
of Cyprus and Malta represent a tonnage almost equivalent to that of the current ED fleet. Ibid. See supra
note 437 on the White Paper on Transport Issues.
458 Unfair pricing practices in maritime transport are concerned by European Regulation 4057/87 OJ.
L378/14 31.12.86. Co-ordinated action to safeguard free access to cargo in ocean trades by European
Regulation 4058/86 O.J. L378/21 31.12.86. Freedom to provide international maritime services ('liner' and
'tramp' shipping of passengers or goods) is concerned by European Regulation 4955/86 OJ. L378/1 31.12.86.
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One of them concerns competition rules and liner conferences459 and subjects
conference price fixing agreements to article 81 (3) of the Treaty ofRome, exempting
them from the prohibitive principle of article 81 (1 )(Prohibition of horizontal price
fixing) and according them anti-trust immunitl60.
However, and contrary to U.S. law, the European Commission and European
Council have taken the view that multimodal transport price fixing between the
conference or members of the conference (acting individually or jointly) and inland
carriers is not permitted under existing law because the block exemption for liner
conferences does not cover it461 • Commission's decision was meant to protect
shippers since the Commission is not known to sympathise with horizontal price
fixing which the above-mentioned proposal entails462• Proponents of the
Commission's view suggest that shipping regulations were intended to apply 'only
to international maritime services from or to one Community ports' (art. 1.2t63 .
Opponents of the Commission's decision argue that multimodal transport operations
Competition rules and liner conferences are subject to a 4056/86 European Regulation (OJ. L378/4
31.12.86.).
459 For conferences see infra at 147s. According to European regulation 4056/86 art. l.3(b) a liner conference
is defined as: "a group of two or more vessel-operating carriers which provides international liner services for
the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes within specified geographical limits and which has an
agreement or arrangement, whatever its nature, within the framework of which they operate under uniform or
common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provision of liner services". For the
European regulation see Index Page (1986) online: Europa Homepage <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/consleg/index_1986.html> (last modified: continuously).
460 European Regulation 4056/86 OJ. 1378/4 31.12.86, Index Page (1986) online: Europa Homepage
<http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/conslegiindex_1986.html> (last modified: continuously). Helmut Kreis,
"European Community Competition Policy and International Shipping" (1992) 27 Eur. Transp. 1. 155 at 157.
See also infra at 147s.
461 European Commission Decision, 1999/243/EC, OJ L 095 09.04.1999 rendered on Sep. 16, 1998 and
relating to the application of art. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to the Trans-Atlantic Conference. Found also
under Commission Decision, Case No IV/35. I34, (1998) online: Europa Homepage <http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/reg/enJegister_082010.html> (last visited: Sept. 6, 2003). Hoffa James P., "Shipping and Anti-
trust" Cong. Testimony (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). See also Philippe Rutley, "Les Transports
Multimodaux it l'Epreuve des Regles Communautaires de la Concurrence" (1995) 47 Droit Marit. Fr. 868s.
As a result, art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibiting collective agreements remains the rule with respect to
multimodal carriage. William Hathaway, "Toward a Greater Regulatory Harmony" (1995) 30 Eur. Transp. 1.
729 at 731s.
462 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the E. E. C. and the U.
S.: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major Issues" (1999) 26 Transp. 1. 1. 141 at
183-184.
463 Helmut Kreis, "European Community Competition Policy and International Shipping" (1992) 27 Eur.
Transp.1. 155 at 167. Nick Maltby, "Multimodal Transport and E.C. Competition Law" (1993) 1. M. C. 1.
Q. 79 at 83.
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and through-rate fixing are integral part of the conferences activities and cannot be
dissociated from the Regulation464. In effect, 'through rates' applied by conference
members cover the cost of inland transport, terminal handling, warehousing and
customs clearance, as well as the blue water leg465.
Today, the European Commission is considering reviewing the regulation on
the conference's exemption from Europe's competition rules to see whether its
benefits are justified, also with regard to Europe's major trading partner's legislation
such as the U.S.466.
Apart from modal European competition and anti-trust regulation incidentally
affecting intermodal transport, as this is the case of conference (members) price
fixing of inland rates, European institutions confirm, today, their traditional support
to developing multimodalism at the regionallevel467. Their actions, however, do not
reveal presence of an embracing and dynamic European intermodal policy but,
rather, modest, area-specific initiatives in this field468. Indicative of the modesty of
European intermodal initiatives, in this regard, is the fact that the central comment
on the EU internet page entitled 'Intermodal Transport Policy' is the Marco Polo
464 Helmut Kreis, "European Community Competition Policy and International Shipping" (1992) 27 Eur.
Transp. L. 155 at 167.
465 Nick Maltby, "Multimodal Transport and E.C. Competition Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 79 at 83.
466 Janet Porter, Roger Hailey, "Shippers Vow no Let-up in War Against Cartels" Ll. List. (2002) online:
LEXIS (Transp. News). Hoffa James, "Shipping and Anti-Trust" Congr. Test. (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). Infra at 149s for U.S. laws.
467 «European Parliament Approves Four Reports» Eur. Rep. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Supra
at 92.
468 Examples of fragmented E.U. initiatives that have already taken place in the field of intermodalism are:
European Directive 92/l06/C.E., OJL368 17.12.1992 that establishes common European rules for certain
types of intermodal transport among Member States and liberalized access (only) to all intermodal carriage at
the European level from July I, 1993. Un Souci Afjirme de Reequilibrage entre les Modes (1999) online:
French Senat Homepage <http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-3005.html#toc24> (last visited: Dec. 12,
2001). For the Directive 92/106/CE see Council Directive 92/J06/CE (1992) online: Europa Homepage
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/main/I992/en_1992LOlO6_index.html> (last modified: June 3, 2003).
Currently, European institutions are envisaging amending said directive in order to enhance multimodal
transport. Combined Transport ofGoods between Member States (2003) online: European Union Homepage
<europa.eu.int/scadplus/legien/lvb/124089.htm> (last modified: daily).
On EU financial aid to intermodalism that only Italy massively makes use of and an infrastructure policy
which is not really developed today see Marie Laurence Arbault, 'Transport Multimodal en Droit
Communautaire" (1996) [unpublished: archived at Lille III ISSN: 0294-176796/PAOl/03ll Fiche
3851.24931198] at 162 and 171.
469
96
program469. This program was created to fund innovative multimodal projects
offering alternatives to road haulage, whether rail, short sea shipping or inland
waterway in order to reduce road congestion and improve the environmental
performance of the whole transport system470. The Marco Polo project carries a
budget of 75 million Euros over the period 2003-2006, (an 'absolute minimum' to
yield anticipated results according to the Transport Commissioner), and is currently
going through the co-decision adoption process with project selection beginning in
the second half of 2003 continuing during 2004471 .
Moreover, European Commission's White Paper entitled 'European transport
policy for 2010 : time to decide', makes integration and revitalization of all modes
of transport great objectives for the next ten years to come472. This, along with the
Marco Polo Calls for Proposals (2002) online: Europa Homepage
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/intermodaVminibudget2002en.htm (last modified: daily). Marco Polo
replaces its predecessor, the more modest PACT program which ended in the year 2001, had lasted for the
nine years, had been granted a more modest budget of 53 million Euro and had had a more modest approach
than Marco Polo. In effect, the Marco Polo intends to effectuate a modal shift (that PACT did not really
tackle), to overcome structural barriers and to develop learning programs. Ibid.
Current European intermodal transport policy focuses on the Marco Polo project, directives found in supra
note 468 and Carrier Liability Study. Overall, a fragmented and relatively 'young' policy considering the
history and age of the continent. Combined Transports (Sept. 6, 2003) online: Europa Homepage
<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s13000.htm#COMBINEMARCH> (last modified: daily).
470 The Marco Polo Program, Executive Summary, (2003) online: Europa Homepage
<europa.eu.int/comm.ltransport/marcopolo/summary_en.htm> (last modified: May 23, 2003). "Regulation
(EC) No 1382/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 on the granting of
Community financial assistance to improve the environmental performance of the freight transport system
(Marco Polo Program)" Celex (Aug. 2, 2003) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
471 "Transport Council Common Position on Marco Polo Program" Eur. Rep. (2003) online: WESTLAW
(All-News) and The Marco Polo Program (2003) online: Europa Homepage
europa.eu.int/comm.ltransport/marcopolo/index_en.htm (last modified: continuously). "Transport Council-
Ministers Agree on a Mini-Budget on Marco Polo" Eur. Report (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-news),
"Marco Polo Embarks on a Long Journey" Ll. List Int'l (2002) online: LEXIS (Transp. News) and "Ministers
Debate White Paper and Trans-European Networks" Eur. Report (2002) online: LEXIS (Transp. News). For
projects retained recently under the Marco Polo program see "Marco Polo, La Commission Financera Trois
Projets sur Dix" (Feb. 21, 2003) JMM 3 at 14.
472 White Paper "European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide" (2001) online: Europa Homepage
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lb_en.html> (last modified: Aug. 9, 2002). See supra note
437) on the White Paper on Transport Issues. In this respect, the development of Trans-European networks
(connection of cross-modal and cross-country transport network to serve the European continent) is an
important part of the implementation of the ED Common Transportation Policy and should be made gradually
by the year 2010, especially considering the enlargement of the ED. John E. Thompson, Eddy DeClerq,
Katsuhide Nagayama, "International Intermodality Aspects of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Transport Master
Plan" ITE J (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News) and Revision of the Trans-European Transportation
Networks TEN-T Community Guidelines (2003) online: Europa Homepage
europa.eu.int/comm.ltransport/themes/network/English/len.ten.htm (last modified: May 25, 2003), "European
Commission Welcomes the Naples Charter" Eur. Union Press Releases (2003) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
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plethora of European Commission, Council and Parliament recommendations,
communications, proposals, incentives or even 'demands and conditions' on
developing intermodalism, are all located on the right track but do not have binding
force473. For all these reasons, the 'common' intermodal European transport 'policy'
has been qualified as a 'politique embryonnaire,474. As a result, intermodalism in
Europe today is a complicated business governed in part by the rules of the fifteen
Member States, the European Union and international conventions475 .
Overall, authors argue that the common European transport policy has
developed disproportionately to the transport growth level476 and that latter is
unsustainable so that, in some years, Europe will not be able to cope if regional
institutions do not intervene477.
Par. 2. Absence of a Uniform European Multimodal Carrier Liability
Regime: Multimodal transport in the EU has been defined as 'the door-to-door
transport of goods effectuated on two or different modes oftransport,478. According
473 "European Parliament Approves Four Reports" Eur. Rep. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) on
Parliament's outlined 'demands and conditions'. Combined Transport: Intermodality ofGoods (1997) online:
European Union Homepage <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124179.htm> (last modified: July 5,
2000) on European Commission communication on the need to develop specific aspects of intermodal
carriage. "Shipping Without Borders" Log. Mgmt & Distr. Rep. (1998) online: LEXIS (Transp. News) on
European Transport Directorate to develop incentives so as to promote intermodal carriage. Politique de
Transport: L 'Europe en Retard (1999) online: French Senat Homepage <http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-
300.html> (last modified: Dec. 12, 2001). In the summary of EU transport regulation on this internet page,
only liberalization of transport services indicates presence of EU regulation in this field. On EU
intermodalism, harmonization in this field, transport security and infrastructure we find words as regulatory
'encouragement', 'modesty', 'preoccupation', 'deficiency' respectively. Ibid.
474 Un Souci Affirme de Reequilibrage entre les Modes (1999) online: French Senat Homepage
<http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-3005.html#toc24>(lastmodified:Dec.12.2001).Itis only with the
enlargement of the European Union that a work group was formed to identify the priority projects of the
transport network to serve the European Union. "Un Groupe de Travail va Identifier les Projets Prioritaires du
reseau de transport dans l' Union Elargie » (Jan. 17,2003) JMM 3 at 11.
475 U.S., Department of Transportation, Toward Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the
United States (1998) online: U. S. DOT Homepage
http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/institut/inter/eu_us2.pdf (last modified: July 11, 2001). E.U. law is
superior to Member-States law and it is only international law that overpowers it.
47 "Logistics and Freight in Crisis as EU still Grappling with Intermodalism" Ll. List. Int'l (2000) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters) and "Politique de Transport: L 'Europe en Retard (1999) online: French Senat
Homepage <http://www.senat.fr/rap/rOO-300/rOO-300.html> (last modified: Dec. 12, 2001). Arbault Marie
Laurence, Transport Multimodal en Droit Communautaire (D. Jur. Thesis, Lille III, 1996) [unpublished:
archived at Lille III ISSN: 0294-176796/PAOll0311 Fiche 3851.24931198] at 251.
477 Ibid.
478 As reported by Dominique Malecot, "Transport Intermodal: Les Avis se Suivent les Problemes
Demeurent" (1997) 2724 Bull. Transp. Log. 710 at 719.
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to authors, this definition implies that a uniform multimodal carrier liability regime
does not exist at the regional level479. In effect, if such a regime existed, the
definition would contain additional terms that would refer to the liability of the
operator for the entire transport480. In reality, following reports made at the
European level on the importance of creation of a uniform multimodal carrIer
liability regime, the European Commission examined the costs of absence of such a
regime and economic benefits of implementing a voluntary intermodal liability
pattern481. In 2001, the Commission concluded that a harmonized multimodal carrier
liability regime would reduce costs and facilitate trade at the European level and
internationalll82. The European Energy and Transport Directorate staff informs us,
however, that the EC has not foreseen at the moment any concrete action as follow
up of Commission report but will attentively follow the work and the initiatives
performed at the internationallevel483 .
As with every intermodal transaction, sea, air, road and rail carriage in the ED
Member States are subject, each, to mandatory liability regimes (network system)484.
479 Hans Carl, "Future Developments in the Regulatory Aspects of International Multimodal Transport of
Goods" (IUMI 125th Anniversary Conference in Berlin, 17 September 1999) [unpublished].
480 Ibid.
481 "Trade Law Uniformity Remains out of Reach" Ll. List Int'l (1999) online: LEXIS (Transp. News). The
European Commission set up, in 1995, a task force on intermodality which carried out consultations with the
industry and, as a result of the report which it produced, intermodal liability had been earmarked by the
Commission as an area which needed further examination. This was followed up by Commission's appointing
a group of legal experts from European universities that produced a draft report dated July 1998. E. C. (Eur.
Com.) Asariotis, Bull, Clarke, Herber, Kiantou-Pampouki, Morun-Bovio, Ramberg, de Wit, Zunarelli,
"Intermodal Transportation and Carrier Liability", [mal report, June 1999 (European Commission financed
study; E. C. Contract NR. EI-B97-B27040-SIN6954-SUB). The Commission then invited representatives of
various organizations to a 'hearing' on intermodal liability and the draft report was circulated with the papers
for this hearing. In the minutes of the hearing was declared European Commission's commitment on this
issue. Ibid.
482 European Commission Report, The Economic Impact ofCarrier Liability on Intermodal Freight Transport
(2001) online: Europa Homepage <http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/library/finalJeport.pdf.> (last visited:
May 12,2001). The report made a detailed economic analysis of costs due to the absence of a harmonized
liability regime. It recognized the weaknesses of the present multimodal carrier liability regime, namely,
uncertainty of the amount of compensation or identity of the responsible carrier and proposed harmonization
of existing european laws on the issue. Ibid.
483 Interview of the author with the European Energy and Transport Directorate, Intermodality and Logistics
Section staff (July 18,2002).
484 U.S., Department of Transportation, Towards Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the
United States (1998) online: U.S. DOT Homepage
<http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/institut/inter/eu_us2.pdf.> (last visited: July 11,2001) at 8-9 and at 37-
39.
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Because of this and the fact that most transportation in Europe is international, we
will take a look at international unimodal conventions to determine the legal rules
applicable to multimodal carriage485 . In this respect, we will concentrate on
international land carriage (A) and then on international ocean carriage (B).
A. International Land Carriage in EU Member States (CMR and COTIFICIM):
In Europe, motor carriage between two different countries of which at least one is a
contracting party, is governed by the CMR486 or national legislation closely modelled
on it487 . Rail transport of goods over the territories of at least two countries and
exclusively over state operated lines (art. 1.1), is subject to the CIM, known as
COTIFICIM under its current version488. COTIFICIM is in force in all fifteen
485 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
614.
486 CMR: La Convention Relative au Contrat de Transport International des Marchandises par Route (the
Convention on the International Carriage ofGoods by Road), 19 May 1956, online: Excite.com Homepage
<http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.cmr.road.carriage.contract.convention.1956/doc.html> (last modified: Feb. 20,
1990) [hereinafter CMR].
487 This is the case of Spain, the Netherlands and Germany. Germany adopted, in 1998, a CMR-based transport
law applicable to all -not only motor- modes of transport (multimodal). Belgium applies the CMR not only to the
international transport of goods by road but also to the national road transport of goods. E. C. (Eur. Com.),
Asariotis, Bull, Clarke, Herber, Kiantou-Pampouki, Morun-Bovio, Ramberg, de Wit, Zunarelli, "Intermodal
Transportation and Carrier Liability" final report, June 1999 (European Commission financed study; EC
Contract NR. EI-B97-B27040-SIN6954-SUB).
488 COTIF: Convention Relative aux Transports Internationaux Ferroviairies (Convention Concerning
International Carriage by Rail, May 9 1980, (last version-entered into force: May 1, 1985) online: Excite.com
database <http://www.unece.orgitrade/cotif/Welcome.html> (last visited: Sept. 28, 2002) [hereinafter
COTIF/CIM]. The first step towards this act was made with the 1890 International Convention Concerning
the Carriage of Goods by Rail, abbreviated in its French heading, CIM. The Convention has been revised
repeatedly ever since with its last version, COTIF/CIM, being adopted in 1980. In reality, it is COTIF that
comprises CIM and CIV provisions in two appendices so that the name of the convention was later changed to
COTIF: Appendix A governs international rail transport of passengers (CIV) and Appendix B contains provisions
on international rail transport of goods (CIM). Uniform Rules concerning the Contract for International
Carriage ofPassengers and Luggage by Rail (CIV). Uniform Rules concerning the Contract for International
Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM). Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism"
(1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at 612. In Cour de Cassation, Dec. 9 1997, Ste Transfesa v. Ste Socodis
Conditionnement et a. 2733 Bull. Transp. Log. 887 (1997) the French Supreme Court held that before
applying national laws to international rail carriage ofgoods we should first determine ifthe CIM applies.
COTIF was amended in 1999 in Vilnius, after several years of negotiations and the new convention is
expected to come into force in 2004. The revisions extent convention's objectives, widen membership criteria
and, for rail carriage of goods, (CIM) remove the obligation to file tariffs and permit greater contractual
freedom. CIM amendments do not directly affect liability issues. Revision of COTIF (1999) online: Comite
International des Transports <http://www.cit.ch/e/FR_Comm02_99b.htm> (last modified: Oct. 29, 1999). The
revised texts can be found in: Protocole de Vilnius (1999) online: OTIF Homepage
<http://www.otif.org/f/publyrvil.htm> (last modified: Sept. 4,2001).
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European Member States as well as other countries of the European continent489. All
fifteen European Member-States have also acceded to the CMR and almost all have
ratified it49o.
The CMR was modelled, to some extent, after the COTIFICIM but the two
conventions are not identical491 . In case ofmultimodal transport, the CMR will apply to
the road stage of the multimodal journey except if the goods are not unloaded from the
vehicle during the non-road leg of the voyage, in which case, the CMR will govern the
whole journey (CMR article 2). COTIFICIM does not contain a provision comparable
to CMR art. 2 so that this convention is not applicable to multimodal transport492 . For
the rest, both conventions define a formalist regime coupled with vague provisions.
a) Formalist Regime: The CMR is mandatory in all its elements. Contracting
parties cannot "directly or indirectly derogate from the provisions of the
Convention" (article 41). Consequently, parties cannot contractually limit or
increase motor carrier liability which equals 8.33 SDR per kilo (art. 23(3))493. In
other words, the CMR advances a formalist liability pattern and is, thus, classified
among the international formalist liability regimes which constitute the exception,
rather than the rule494. However, as majestic as the CMR may seem, it leaves room
489 Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), May 9 1980, online: COTIF Homepage
<http://www.unece.orgltrade/cotif/> (last visited: Sept. 6, 2003). ED is now considering ratifying the COTIF
as part of the second railway liberalization package. Supra note 445 and accompanying text.
490 CMR Convention, 19 May 1956, online: CMR Convention Homepage,
<http://www.un.orgiDepts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xi_b-boo/xi_b_ll.html> (last modified: in
1998). As we have seen, however, some European countries, i.e. Germany and Spain have adopted legislation
closely modeled on the CMR. Supra note 487 and accompanying text.
491 Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with Multimodalism" (1989-1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at
613.
492 Ibid at 613 and at 619-620. For CMR art. 2 see Annex No. III, Table No.4 at clxxxviii.
493 The convention prevents any departure from its stipulations. Jan Ramberg, The Future of International
Unification of Transport Law (1998) online: Forwarderlaw.com Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg2.htm> (last modified: March 6, 2001). According to Pr. Jan
Ramberg, this CMR article is intended to protect small or medium sized trucking companies against excessive
claims from their customers. Jan Ramberg, International Commercial Transactions 2nd ed. (Stockholm:
Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 181. Purchase of increased carrier liability through declaration of value is,
however, permitted (art. 23, 24, 26). Saul Sorkin, "Changing Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at
715. For the SDR international measure unit see supra note 247.
494 In this way, the convention makes part of the international 'ordre public' which, contrary to its domestic
level counterpart, constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Marie Tilche, "Droit Routier et Ordre
Publique" (1994) 2562 Bull. Transp. Log. 286 at 297. According to a European transportation law professor
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to parties freedom of contracting in several areas495 : fill in the gaps of the
convention496; provide for jurisdiction clauses as long as they refer to associated -to
the convention- countries jurisdictions; contractually modify the provisions of art.
37-38 on the attribution of liability and contribution among carriers (for the latter,
see CMR art. 40).
The regime followed by the COTlFIClM is also formalist, thus, 'not. ..subject
of derogations' [COTlFIClM art. 3.3 (General Provisions)]. This means that shipper
protective rail carrier liability limitation amount of 17 SDR per kilo of gross weight
cannot be tampered with by carrier and shipper (art. 40(2)). Formalism under the ClM
is justified by the fact that European countries railways are state owned and the
monopole of railway services they largely enjoy is counterbalanced by their obligation
to carry merchandise subject to the conditions of the COTlFIClJvt97. COTlFIClM,
however, is more lenient than the CMR since it permits contractual modifications that
lead to an increase or reduction of railway tariff charges under certain conditions
(article 6.7 and 6.4 respectivelyt98 . For the rest, parties can contractually fill in the
gaps of the convention and provide for jurisdiction clauses499 •
CMR art. 41 'is exceptional and contrary to competition law'. Interview of the author with a European
transportation law professor (April 5, 2001).
495 For all the following see Marie Tilche, "Droit Routier et Ordre Public" (1994) 2562 Bull. Transp. Log. 286
at 298-299.
496 Ibid. On this see also Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of
Uniform Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 64 andinfra at 102s on CMR gaps.
497 Ibid. For more details on the raison d'etre of formalism and contractualism see Josef Wick, John Favre, Le
Droit International des Transports par Chemins de Fer (Neuchatel, Suisse: Imprimerie Nouvelle E.G. Chave
SA 1975) at 108.
498 Article 6.4 provides that reductions in charges or other concessions may be granted for the purpose of
railway or public services, or for charitable purposes and on the condition that comparable conditions are
granted to users in comparable circumstances. In practical terms, this provision concerns tariff reductions for
the transport of military, postal, municipal or administration material. Josef Wick, John Favre, Le Droit
International des Transports par Chemins de Fer (Neuchatel, Suisse: Imprimerie Nouvelle E.G. Chave S.A.
1975) at 109. From the very first draft, the COTIFICIM provided that all agreements between railways and
users that provided for reduced rates were 'null and void' and, therefore, prohibited. Ibid at 108. The 'more
strict' CMR does not permit any derogation from convention's provisions in the relation between the carrier
and the shipper but only in the attribution of liability and contribution among carriers. Supra at 101.
499 Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L.
M. C. L. Q. 36 at 64. Even though jurisdiction clauses should apply uniformly, a practical difference may
exist because these conventions provisions may be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions. Ibid.
Cargo and Transit Newsletter (1999) online: Hilldickinson Homepage
<http://www.hilldickinson.com/marine&transit/cargo_news_letters/CARGNEWS2.htm> (last visited: April
141999).
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b) Vague Provisions: Both the CMR and the COTIFICIM do not escape
divergent court interpretations. An example is provided by the general CMR and
COTIFICIM liability exemption "circumstances which the railway could not avoid
and the consequences of which it was unable to prevent" (Sections 17.2 and 36.2
respectively)500.
In Belgium and France, some courts have equated this CMR and COTIFICIM
defence to the concepts of 'force majeure' or 'cas fortuit,501 and are, therefore, very
strict on the carrier502. In England, on the other hand, courts interpretation of the said
defence has evolved over time. Where it initially implied a duty of reasonable care on
the part of the carrier, in Silber (JJ) Ltd v. Islander Trucking Ltel°3 the court adopted
the position that the expression 'could not avoid' means 'could not avoid even with the
utmost care'. This degree of care is situated between the common law standard of
reasonable care that England otherwise adopts and the French requirement of force
majeure504. This decision also echoes the view of the Austrian Supreme Court (OOH)
which requires 'the utmost reasonable care compatible with good sense' and to which
the English court referred in rendering its decision505 . As a result, the degree of care
imposed on the motor and rail carrier by French courts under the COTIFICIM and the
500 Along with this provision both conventions contain specific carrier liability exceptions in said articles.
501 In civil law systems, the concepts of force majeure and fortuitous event are used interchangeably. Boris
Kozolchyk, Martin L. Ziontz , «A Negligence Action in Mexico: an Introduction of the Application of
Mexican Law in the United States» (1989) 7 Ariz. J. Int' 1. & Com. L. 1 at 28. A subtle distinction of no great
practical importance exists, however, between the two terms. Infra note 991.
502 Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L.
M. C. L. Q. 36 at 61-62. Author notes that CMR wording copied COTlFICIMart. 27.2 of 1952 that replaced
previous COTIFICIM reference to force majeure to avoid use of national terms. This fact reveals drafters
intention to avoid the 'force majeure' term. Ibid. While absence ofcarrier fault requires proof of reasonable care
on his part, 'force majeure' sets a higher standard of care and requires proof that a prudent person (carrier) is
found in the impossibility to act in another way. Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations: Actes et Responsabilites,
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1997) at 409. In the present part of our study, France (civil law) and
England (common law) will be the European countries we will mostly refer to. Very frequently, however, the
laws of other European jurisdictions will come into play to support our analysis.
503 (1985), 2 Ll. Rep. 243 (Q. B. D.)(Comm. C.).
504 In Silber (J.J.) Ltdv.Islander Trucking Ltd (1985),2 Ll. Rep. 243 (Q. B. D.)(Comm. C.) the English court
rejected the French standard of 'force majeure' and the common law requirement of 'due diligence' on the
grounds that the COTIFICIM and CMR do not use national law concepts since both conventions draftsmen
wanted to avoid them. Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of
Uniform Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 62-63.
505 Silber (J.J.) Ltd v. Islander Trucking Ltd (1985), 2 Ll. Rep. 243 at 247. German courts have also made
similar statements. Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform
Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 63.
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CMR is greater than its English and Austrian counterparts. Lack of uniform judicial
interpretation ensues.
The CMR has been described in France as a product of Switzerland (the
convention was drafted in Geneva) which, like a celebrated Swiss cheese, is full of
holesso6. This is not only apparent from divergent case law holdings on the degree of
carrier liability but also from CMR article 23.4 which provides that the responsible
carrier must pay, in addition to carriage charges, 'other charges incurred in respect
of the carriage of the goods,so7. There have been reported to be 12 judicial
interpretations of this provision at the European levelso8. This has made authors
note: "he who knows CMR of only one country does not know CMR"s09.
B. International Ocean Carriage in EU Member States (Visby Rules): Most ED
Member-States have adopted the Visby RulesSlO • Although it is certain that these rules
can apply to the sea leg of multimodal transport, there is no provision that governs the
interaction between sea carriage and other modes as is the case of the CMR art. 2S11 •
The Visby Rules define a formalist regime coupled with several vague provisions.
506 Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L.
M. C. L. Q. 36 at 64. Vague provisions also exist in COTIFICIM and the Visby Rules but the said
denomination was used for the CMR.
507 COTIFICIM article 40.3 contains an analogous, although more precise, provision: "The railway shall in
addition refund carriage charges, customs duties and other amounts incurred in connection with carriage of
the lost goods". See also our table at Annex No. III, Table No.4 at clxxxix. Selected examples are herein taken
to demonstrate both conventions vague provisions.
508 In the English case James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK.) (1978), A. C. 141 (H.
L.) the court held that there is no gap in the legislation and that a duty paid by the plaintiff-shipper was part of
'other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods'. Authors argue that it is typical of English
courts to be reluctant to detect gaps in the legislation because they do not want to enter into the alien waters of
teleological interpretations that their European neighbors invariably use in case of gaps. Malcolm Clarke,
"The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 64.
Instead, they complement the conventions provisions by national legislation. In this respect, English courts
have earned the more demeaning title of 'emus' because 'there is none so blind as will not see'. On the
contrary, Austrian and certain German courts have been described as 'eagles' in spotting cracks and crevices
in the domain of the CMR. Ibid.
509 R. Wijffels, "Legal Interpretations of the CMR: the Continental Viewpoint" (1976) 11 Eur. Transp. L.
461at 494.
510 For the Visby Rules see supra note 44. The Visby Rules have, so far, been ratified by eleven European
Member-States: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom. Germany applies a national law based on the Visby Rules even though it has
not ratified them. However, Ireland and Portugal apply the 1924 Hague Rules whereas Austria has ratified the
Hamburg Rules. International Conventions (2003) online: Infomare Homepage
<http://www.informare.itJdbase/convuk.htm> (last modified: July 17,2003).
511 Supra at 100-101.
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a) Formalist Regime: article 3.8 of the Visby Rules declares 'null and void' any
clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship
from liability. This provision was intended to eliminate former sea carrier practices to
contractually limit or exclude their liability and is narrowly construed to permit
contractual increase, but not limitation of carrier liability. Despite this fact, the Visby
Rules are said to favour carriers, mainly because of the 'litany' of liability exceptions
and relatively low liability limitation amounts they provide512.
b) Vague Provisions: Contrary to the CMR and the COTIF/CIM, the Visby
Rules apply, overall, uniformly in the countries that have given them effect, even
though their provisions are not immune to court interpretations513 . The Visby Rules
maintain the principle of presumption of liability (presomption de responsabilite) to
hold the carrier liable for LDD (loss-damage-delay) to the goods while in its
charge514 . National courts have transposed convention wording of specific liability
exceptions accompanying this principle into national language and concepts. The
prominent Visby liability defence 'perils of the sea' provides an illustrative example.
Contrary to the U.S. courts that regard 'perils of the sea' as events of
extraordinary nature that cannot been foreseen or guarded against515 , the Anglo-
512 Saul Sorkin, "Changing Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at 714. While COTIFICIMlimits
rail carrier liability to 17 SDR per kilo of gross weight, CMR maintains half this limitation amount (8,33
SDR) to benefit motor carriers and the Visby Rules provide for a 2 SDR limitation amount per kilo of gross
weight or 666.67 SDR per package. With the exception of COTIFICIM, therefore, the amounts of carrier
liability are very low with ocean carriers benefiting from the lowest limitation. The shipper protective rail
carriage limitation amount is said to pertain to the fact that European railways are run by governments, less
worried about economic profit than private businesses. Rolf Herber, "The European Legal Experience with
Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 611 at 621.
513 William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disentegration of Uniform International
Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 620. We should note, in this
regard, that the Visby Rules were intended to overcome interpretative differences in the Hague Rules by
several specific amendments. Jurgen Basedow, "Common Carriers Continuity and Disintegration in U.S.
Transportation Law" (1983) 13 Transp. L. J. 1 at 34.
514 Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L.
M. C. L. Q. 36 at 47. Also Marie Tilche, "Conventions Terrestres: Comparaison CMR/CIM" (1995) 2617
Bull. Transp. Log. 421 at 421; (accompanying table at 423). For more details on this principle and our
perception of it see infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1. Annex No. III, Table No. 4 at clxxxvi for a
comparative table made by the author ofCMR, COTIFICIM, and Visby Rules liability exceptions.
515 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 438 and
infra at 197s.
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Australian516 approach is that a sea peril may not be of extraordinary nature517•
Moreover, English courts have generally been reluctant to tie this defense to the
foreseeability of the peril518 so that a carrier who is not negligent in the precautions
it takes to meet a foreseeable peril-cause of damage, will probably be exculpated519.
French courts have traditionally been very strict on the carrier in maintaining
that 'perils of the sea' cannot benefit him except if they constitute 'force majeure'
incidents, that is to say, external events (to the carrier), unforeseeable and
insurmountable52o, though not of extraordinary nature (as in the U.Sl21 .
516 Australia gave effect to the Visby Rules in 1991 by repealing the Sea Carriage ofGoods Act of 1924 and
replacing it by the Sea Carriage of Goods Act of 1991 ("COGSA"). This Act contained two Schedules:
Schedule 1 contained the Hague-Visby Rules and Schedule 2 the Hamburg Rules to replace the Visby Rules,
in late 1994, unless steps were taken to delay their entry into force. In 1994, the entry into force of the
Hamburg Rules was delayed for three years. On July 1, 1998, the Carriage ofGoods by Sea Regulations 1998
(the "Regulations") came into force, amending the 1991 Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act and the Visby Rules.
The new rules constitute a hybrid version of the Hague, Visby and the Hamburg Rules.
517 Great China Metal Industries C. Ltd. v. Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad 1998
(1999), 1 Ll. Rep. 512 at 519 (H. C. Australia) on Anglo-Australian case law. English courts follow the
statutory definition of 'perils of the sea': 'fortuitous accidents or casualties of the seas'. The 'Marel' (1992), 1
Lloyd's Rep. 402 (Q. B. D.) (Comm Ct). For a comparison of the U.S. and English case law on interesting
issues of proof of the 'perils of the sea' see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, "Warranties in the Law of Marine
Insurance" (1999) 23 Tul. L. 1. 267 at 306.
518 Harry Apostolakopoulos, Perils of the Sea (1999) online: South Texas Law Review Homepage
<http://www.stcl.edu/lawrev/Articles/Peril_oCthe_Sea/peril_oCthe_sea.html> (last modified: Jan. 25, 2000)
referring to English authority cases on the issue like The Xantho (1887), 12 App. Cas. 503 and the recent
Australian case Great China Metal Industries C. Ltd. v. Malaysian International Shipping Corporation
Berhad 1998 (1999), 1 Ll. Rep. 512 at 529 (H. C. of Australia). See also John Levingston, Peril of the Sea
(1999) online: International Commercial Law Homepage
<http://www.anu.edu.au/law/pub/icl/transcon/PeriloftheSea.htm> (last visited: March 31, 2001). However,
some English courts have held that foreseeability of the weather is a factor to be considered when deciding a
peril of the sea case. See i.e. W Angliss & Co. v. P.G. Steam Navigation Co. (1927),28 Ll. L. Rep. 202 at 204
and few other cases in the same sense as reported by the said article.
519 Ibid. In Great China Metal Industries C. Ltd. v. Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad
1998 (1999), 1 Ll. Rep. 512 at 529 (H. C. Austr.) the court refers to the Titanic -when commenting on the
Anglo-Australian view of the 'perils of the sea-', which was surIk by a sea peril even though the presence of
icebergs in the relevant latitude was reasonably foreseeable and the collision could have been avoided by
reducing the speed of the ship. Ibid. See also infra at 198s.
520 «00 .cause etrangere: ce fait doit etre exterieur al'auteur allegue du dommage et non a la chose dont il est
cense avoir la garde». Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations: Actes et Responsabilites, (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur Ltee, 1997) at 408s. Also see infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 2(B)(b). On the traditional
view of French courts see Paul Chauveau, «Retrospective d'actualites» (1977) 29 Droit. Marit. Fr. 3 at 9. See
also Pierre Bonassies, "Droit Positif Franl;ais en 1986" Droit Marit. Fr. (1987) at note 51 and C. Bordeaux,
Oct. 91985, Ste Rhein Mass v. Cie Camat, 2201 Bull. Transp. Log. 410 (1986) at 410.
521 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 439s.
106
Unforeseeability, therefore, has traditionally been taken into account in concluding on
the presence of 'force majeure'522.
However, French case law on this point may be changing influencing, in this
way, solutions that may be adopted at the international or at the domestic level. The
traditional stance of French courts insisting on the unforeseeability element of the
sea peril is less obvious today since, some French courts have argued that a 'peril of
the sea' does not need to be unforeseeable (English case law) and insurmountable as
long as it is extra-ordinary in nature (U.S. case law) and there is absence of fault of
the carrier (U.S./England)523. According to this view, foreseeable events may not
render the carrier liable except if there is another fault on his part (Anglo-Australian
view). In other words, there are French cases that seem to approximate common law
case law by borrowing elements from English and U.S. cases being, at the same
time, more lenient on the carrier than before524.
To the more apparent and divergent court interpretations of 'perils of the sea',
we can add the more subtle case law distinctions of the Visby Rules art. 4.5(e), CMR
art. 29 and COTIFICIM art. 44525 conditioning carrier loss of the limitation of liability
benefit. The Visby Rules and the COTIFICIM waive carrier right to limitative
conditions when he acts 'with intent to cause such loss or damage, or recklessly and
with knowledge that such loss or damage will probably result,526. In French civil law
tradition, this expression generally translates into 'dol' and an 'inexcusable fault'
522 Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations: Actes et Responsabilites, (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1997) at
408.
523 The new defmition of 'perils of the sea' is said to constitute a variation of the 'force majeure' concept:
Cour d' Appel, Aix, May 9 1973, Koudekerk 25 Droit Marit. Fr. 654 (1973); Cour d' Appel, Aix, Feb. 27
1985, Liberty 39 Droit Marit. Fr. 147 (1987); Cour d' Appel, Aix, June 11 1974, Esbern Snare 27 Droit Marit.
Fr. 720 (1975); Cour d' Appel, Aix, Feb. 23 1993 Saint-Louis 46 Droit Marit. Fr. 370 (1994). In the above-
mentioned cases unforeseeability is not considered to be a fault. These cases explain that it was not the
intention of the drafters of the Visby Rules to be so strict on the carrier as to subject liability exceptions to the
concept of 'force majeure'. Cour d' Appel, Paris, Feb. 2 1971, Armorique 23 Droit Marit. Fr. 222 (1971) on
the traditional 'peril of the sea' 'force majeure' view of French courts.
524 See the interesting opinion of Paul Chauveau, «Retrospective d'actualites» (1977) 29 Droit Marit. Fr. 3 at
9.
525 The revision of the COTlFlClM to conform the loss of the limitation of liability provision with the
majority of the international transport conventions came into force on June 1, 1991. After the 1999 COTlF
revision (supra note 488), COTlFIClM art. 44 has become art. 36. ClM (1999) online: OTIF Homepage
<http://www.oti£org/£.pd£.ru-cim-1999-f.pdf> (last visited: Sept. 5,2001).
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respectively527. Common law courts reason on the basis of willful misconduct528.
CMR art. 29 denies carrier the benefit of statutory limitations in case of 'willful
misconduct or default equivalent to willful misconduct'. This expression is less
descriptive than COTIFICIM art. 44 and Visby Rules art. 4.5(e). Civil law systems are
not familiar with the concept of willful misconduct and translate CMR expression into
'dol' or 'faute equivalente au dol,529. As we are going to confirm, the discrepancy in
the legal terms used and judicial interpretations add to the complexity of the applicable
concepts.
The French concept of 'dol' used by courts under the CMR, COTIFICIM and
the Visby Rules derives from the Latin word 'dolus' and implies an act or omission
. . 11 . d h 530 G .c: 11 h . . 1 531mtentlOna y commItte to cause arm . ermany 10 ows t e same pnnclp e .
526 The same analytical description is found in the French version of these conventions. Ibid.
527 The civil law concept of 'inexcusable fault' summarizes the descriptive Visby Rules provision 'recklessly
and with knowledge that damage will probably result'. 'Dol' is surely considered as a form of intentional fault
within both sets of rules. Rene Rodiere, Emmanuel du Pontavice, Droit Maritime 3d ed. (Paris: Editions
Dalloz, 1997) at 124 and 359. Switzerland, for instance, explicitly refers to 'dol ou faute lourde' in its
domestic federal law implementing COTIF/CIM art. 44. CIM (2000) online: Confederatio Helvetica
Homepage <http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/0_742_403_l/ta44.html#fnl> (last visited: June 16, 2002). In the
present part of our study, reference to civil law will mainly involve French law unless otherwise provided.
528 This is certainly the case of common law courts with respect to all these conventions. Saul Sorkin,
"Changing Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at 714-715 and note 28. The author refers to the
COTIFICIM, CMR and art. 25 Warsaw Convention (as amended by its 1995 Protocol). Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 12 October 1929, 261 D.N.T.S. 423
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
529 The French version of the CMR can be found in CMR (2000) online: Lucien Peczynski Attorney
Homepage http://www.peczynski.com/TXT/tp/txt/I956_05_19_cmr.htm> (last visited: Jan. 16,2000).
One could argue that civil law 'dol' translates into common law 'fraud'. However, 'fraud' is considered
comprised in the concept of 'dol' which includes both devious intent and the scheme or material means
through which that intent is carried out. Saul Litvinoff, "Vices of Concent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an
Epilogue on Lesion (1989) 50 La. L. Rev. 1 at 50. In effect, in the Anglo-American legal terminology the
word "fraud" refers to the devious or malicious intent -which is usually more clearly signified in the
expression "fraudulent intent"-, while the word "misrepresentation" is used to allude to the material means
through which the "fraud" is implemented. France Ferrari, "Comparative Remarks on Liability for Ones Own
Acts" (1993) Loy. L. A. Int'I. L. J. 813 at 824. Since 'dol' does not amount exactly to common law 'fraud',
the concept of willful misconduct is used to describe the former.
530 Tribunal de Grande Instance, 1954, Gallais v. Aero Maritime 1954 R. F. D. A. 184. As reported by Loryn
B. Zerner, " Tseng v. El al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention: A Cloud left Uncharted"
(1999) 14 Am. U. Int'I. L. Rev. 1245 at note 30. In certain cases, however, French courts have adopted an
extensive interpretation of the element of intent denoting intent to commit an act, not necessarily intent to injure.
French Supreme Court decisions: Cour de Cassation, Casso civ. 1, Feb. 4, 1969, 1969 D. S. Jur. 601 note 1.
Mazeaud and Cour de Cassation, Casso civ. 2, Oct. 22,1975,1976 D. S. Jur. 151 note 1. Mazeaud as reported
by Pierre Legrand, "Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: a Case Study" (1988) 62 TuI. L. Rev. 963
at 1012-1013. See also France Ferrari, "Comparative Remarks on Liability for Ones Own Acts" (1993) Loy.
L. A. Int'!. L. 1. 813 at 824 and note 92.
In the Canadian province of Quebec that follows civil law tradition, the concept of 'dol' exists and denotes
presence of an intentional fault. Case law and doctrine, however, are not clear on whether it is intent to cause
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Wanton or willful misconduct, common law terms that substitute for the French
term 'dol', is thought to involve either deliberate intention to injure or action in
reckless disregard of the consequences532. In other words, the CMR, COTIFICIM
and the Visby Rules, they all operate loss of carrier limitation benefit in common and
civil law in case of intentional fault (translated into 'dol' in French).
However, willful misconduct reference to 'reckless acts' places the concept
between the concepts of simple negligence and 'dol,533. It is probably to reconcile
this conceptual discrepancy (dol-willful misconduct) that the COTIFICIM and the
Visby Rules refer to acting 'recklessly and with knowledge that such loss or damage
will probably result' and the expression 'faute equivalente au dol' (default equivalent
to willful misconduct) is used by the CMR534 . The question rises, however, whether
the concepts of 'faute equivalente au dol' and 'recklessly and with knowledge that
the harm or intent to proceed to the act that really counts for intentional fault to exist. Caisse Populaire
Desjardins Belvedere v. Assurance Generale des Caisses Desjardins (1998), A. Q. no.1476 (C. Sup. Que.),
Chamberland v. Masse (1999), J. Q. no. 6019 (Que. S. C.) refer to an intent to cause damage. 'Dol' is defined
with respect to the concept of intentional fault by Quebec courts and denotes a clear intention to harm by act
or omission destined to defraud. Ste de Fiducie de la Banque Hong-Kong v. Dubord Construction Inc. (1998),
A. Q. no.492 (C. Sup. Que.). However, Jean Pineau, Danielle Burman, Serge Gaudet, Theorie des Obligations
(Montreal: Editions Themis 1996) at par. 459 indicates that 'intentional fault 'exists when there is a 'dishonest
act'.
531 France Ferrari, "Comparative Remarks on Liability for Ones Own Acts" (1993) Loy. L. A. Int'!. L. J. 813
at 824 and at note 92. Reference is made, by the author, to the German Civil Code. Ibid.
532 England: The vast majority of cases examined on this issue conclude in the same way. The Thomas Cook
Group Ltd and Others v. Air Malta Co. Ltd (Trading AS Air Malta) [1997], 2 Ll. Rep. 399 (Q. B. D.) Bin
Cheng, "Willful Misconduct from Warsaw to Hague and from Brussels to Paris" (1977) Annals. Air & Space
L. 55 at 64-65, Craig A. Morgan, "Legitimate Responses to Aerial Intrusion in Time of Peace" (1984) 78 Am.
Soc'y. Int'!. L. Proc. 15 at 22. U.S.: The elements of "wanton or willful misconduct" are that the defendant
consciously or intentionally performs an act or omission ("willful") knowing or, with reckless indifference
("wanton") as to the probable injury. James Fisher, Debra Miller, "Personal Injury Law" (1997) Ind. Prac.,
Personal Injury Law & Practice § 3.68 online: WESTLAW (Tp-all). However, authors note that willful
misconduct does not involve intent to injure but intent to do the act and under conditions that a reasonable
man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in
substantial harm to another. "Wanton, Willful or Reckless Misconduct" (2001) 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §
267 at note 79 (WESTLAW-Tp-all). See also infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 1(C), Par. 2(B) and
Par. 3(B) for Canada and the U.S. on intentional fault. Supra note 530 for the concept of intentional fault in
the Province of Quebec.
533 "Wanton, Willful or Reckless Misconduct" (2001) 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §267 at note 79
(WESTLAW-Tp-all).
534 Reasoning by analogy to the Warsaw Convention art. 25 debate before adoption of this provision
containing same conditions on carrier loss of the limitation benefit. Randi Lynn Rubin, "The Warsaw
Convention: Capping the Value or Life?" Tern. Int'l & Compo L. J. 189 at 198 and Barbara Buono, "The
Recoverability of Punitive Damages under the Warsaw Convention in Cases of Willful Misconduct: is the
Sky the Limit?" (1989-1990) 13 Fordham Int'l L. J. 570 at note 51. In the English cases Gefco Ltd v. Mason
(2000),2 Ll. L. Rep. 555 (Q. B. D.) and Thomas Group Ltd v. Air Malta Co.Ltd (1997),2 Ll. Rep. 399 (Q. B.
D.) the court stated that CMR art. 29 is probably derived from the Warsaw Convention.
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such loss or damage will probably result' (default equivalent to willful misconduct) are
given the same meaning by national courts in Europe.
French courts have baptised the Visby Rules provision 'recklessly, with
knowledge that damage will probably result' (common law willful misconduct)
'faute inexcusable,535. This is a well-known concept in France536. It exists when
there is dolus eventualis537, that is to say 'conscience (not intent) of the probability
of damage and its acceptance without justifiable reason'. By definition, a 'faute
inexcusable' is situated in between the civil law concepts of 'dol' and 'faute lourde,538
and operates loss of Visby Rules limitation benefit.
535 Cour de Cassation, Casso Com., Jan. 4 2000, "GIE Scadoa et a. V. Ste Navigation et Transports" 2830
Bull. Transp. Log. 32 (2000) for an inexcusable fault within the Visby Rules. (air carriage) Cour de Paris,
Paris, March 222000, SA Cie Helvetia V. Sti Finnair 2849 Bull. Transp. Log. 410-411 (2000).
536 'La Loi Badinter' (Badinter Act) on traffic accidents uses victim's 'inexcusable fault' exclusive cause of
damage to exonerate the defendant-driver. On July 5, 1985 the French Supreme Court quashed 11 Court of
Appeals decisions holding in favor of the defendant driver and defining inexcusable fault as: 'a voluntary
fault of exceptional gravity, exposing its author, without valid reason, to danger of which he should have been
aware'. Cour de Cassation, Casso civ. July 2, 20, 1987 (11 cases), BULL. CIV. II, No. 160, 161. These
decisions stressed the fact that an inexcusable fault should be narrowly construed as the exception to the rule
of defendant's liability. Andre Tunc, '''Loi Badinter'-On Traffic Accidents and Beyond" (1991-1992) Tul.
Civ. L. Forum 27 at 35-36. See also Laurie Kazan-Allen "Asbestos Compensation in Europe" (2000) 15 NO.
10 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: 38 at 38 on the concept of 'inexcusable fault' as applied to employment contracts in
France.
537 Pro Yves Tassel, "Le Dommage Element de la Faute" (La Responsabilite en Droit Maritime Hellenique et
International, Piraeus, Greece, June 6-9, 2001) (2001) Antonios N. Sakkoulas Publishers. See also France
Ferrari, "Comparative Remarks on Liability for Ones Own Acts" (1993) Loyola L. A. Int' 1. L. 1. 813 at 824.
Along with the element of conscience, authors explain that there should be very serious misconduct of the
carrier where the standard of care is defined by regulation or, otherwise, based on the reasonableness
standard. Ibid.
Quebec law puts in practice the 'inexcusable fault' concept on the basis of the Visby Rules. French 'faute
inexcusable' can be said to correspond to the Quebec concept of 'faute intentionnelle' that denotes intent to
cause harm but also an 'outrageous misconduct with perfect conscience, or at least extreme probability, of the
probable harmful consequences'. See Chamberland V. Masse (1999), 1. Q. no. 6019 (C. Sup. Que.). and
Caisse Populaire Desjardins Belvedere v. Assurance Generales des Caisses Desjardins Inc. (1998), A. Q.
no.1476 (C. Sup. Que.). In the same sense for Canada: Ontario Bus Industries Inc. v. Federal Calumet (1991),
A. C. F. No. 535 (F. C. C.) (Visby Rules). Air carriage case law seems to use the denomination 'faute
inexcusable': Swiss Bank v. Air Canada, Swissair and Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. (1982), 1 C. F. 756 (F. C.
C.) (Warsaw Convention).
538 Louis Segur, La Notion de la Faute Contractuelle en Droit Civil Fram;ais (Bordeaux: 1954) at 149.
Common law presents a more practical view of things. For example, when damage to the goods is caused
because the driver fell asleep on the wheel in broad daylight, that alone is insufficient to constitute willful
misconduct because of the absence of proof of actual awareness by the driver that he needed rest. It would be
sufficient, however, to constitute 'faute lourde' (gross negligence). Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in
Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 60. We will later examine the
concept of faute lourde.
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Even though COTIFICIM art. 44 uses the same analytical definition of 'faute
inexcusable' we find in the Visby Rules, French case law only interprets it as 'faute
lourde equivalente au dol' and not as a 'faute inexcusable,539. In other words, for the
same Visby and COTIFICIM provision, French courts give different interpretations,
namely, 'faute inexcusable' for the former act and 'faute lourde' for the latter act.
French version of CMR art. 29, on the other hand, refers to a 'faute equivalente
au dol' to disallow carrier the benefit of statutory limitations. In this respect, French,
as well as German, Austrian and Greek courts, apply the maxim culpa lata (faute
lourde) dolo aequiparatur ('faute lourde equivalente to dol')54o. Because of court
interpretations of COTIFICIM and CMR provisions, definition of 'faute lourde'
becomes of essence. In effect, the more liberal its definition, the less frequently will
the carrier be able to benefit from statutory limitations541 .
As in the case of 'faute inexcusable', a 'faute lourde' (or gross negligence, its
common law version)542 lacks the element of intent. On the other hand, however,
French 'faute lourde' does not require consciousness of the eventual damage but,
rather, outrageous or highly reckless misconduct that approximates 'dol,543. The
539 «Transport Ferroviaire et Faute Lourde» (1995) 2596 Bull. Transp. Log. 34. Cour d' Appel, Amiens,
March 12 1996, Ste Sernam v. Ste Doneco 2671 Bull. Transp. Log. 558-559 (1996). Cour de Paris, Paris,
Oct. 25 2000, Cie GAN et a. v. Generali Transports 2881 Bull. Transp. Log. 131 (2001). For the defmition of
'faute lourde' in France see infra note 543. The situation seems to be the same in case of rail transport of
passengers. See <<10 Questions sur Ie Retard Ferroviaire » (1997) 2689 Bull. Transp. Log. 38.
540 Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform Law" (1999) L.
M. C. L. Q. 36 at 60. This maxim is not country specific but is commonly used in civil law jurisdictions. This
is the case of the Canadian province of Quebec where courts frequently refer, in this sense, to French cases or
doctrine: Industries Js.P. v. Bois Franc Royal (1988), A. Q. No 1430 (C. A. Que). See Canadian case Swiss
Bank v. Air Canada, Swissair and Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. (1982), I C. F. 756 (F. C. C.) and its very
enlightening comment on civil and common law concepts on the issue. See also infra note 543 and at 237.
541 Pierre Legrand, "Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: a Case Study" (1988) 62 Tul. L. Rev. 963
at 1014.
542 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 126.
543 French case law has defined faute lourde as: 'une negligence d'une extreme gravite, conjinant au dol et
denotant l'inaptitude du transporteur, maitre de son action, al'accomplissement de l'action contractuelle qu'il avait
acceptee'. Cour de Cassation, Casso com., Feb. 26 1985, Ste Soditrans c. Groupe des Assurances Nationales
2149 Bull. Transp. Log. 270 (1985); see also case law in 2449 Bull. Transp. Log. (1991) 674 at 688; 2507
Bull. Transp. Log. 86 (1993) at 88s (table of risks and French case law after 1985). For the French concept of
'faute lourde' see also Louis Segur, La Notion de la Faute Contractuelle en Droit Civil Francais (Bordeaux:
1954) at 149. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime et Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions
Themis 1986 at 319). The French definition of 'faute lourde' should be opposed to the new definition of
'faute lourde' adopted by the Code Civil of Quebec that does not refer any more to 'dol' but to outrageous
misconduct or high degree of negligence. See Cie de Volailles Maxi Ltee V. Empire Cold Storage Co. (1995),
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apparently clear theoretical definition of 'faute lourde' and 'faute inexcusable'
poses problems in practice.
It is not only that French cases reason on a 'faute lourde equivalante au dol', -
within the COTIFICIM-, and 'faute inexcusable', -within the Visby Rules-, to
operate loss of carrier statutory limitations even though both acts use the same
analytical description of carrier fault on this point. It is also that in describing CMR
'faute equivalante au dol' (faute lourde), French cases refer to carrier consciousness
of damage or carrier deliberate acts while conscious of probable risks, and
occasionally use the term 'inexcusable negligence,544. These definitions
approximate the 'faute lourde' concept to the concept of 'faute inexcusable'. We
should also note that, contrary to what CMR and COTIFICIMFrench case law seems
to indicate, there is a tendency in France to confine faute lourde within well-defined
limits545 . It ensues that, even though COTIFICIM and the Visby Rules describe an
inexcusable fault, French courts reason on the basis of a 'faute lourde' within the
COTIFICIM matching, in theory, though not always in case law, CMR prescriptions.
Overall, the concepts used in the different acts are similar but not identical. A
'faute inexcusable' (willful misconduct) is considered to be an extreme form of, or
an aggravated 'faute lourde' (gross negligence)546 where the element of intent is
A Q. no. 731 (C. A Que.) defining 'faute lourde' as 'unefaute particulierement grossiere, inexcusable et qui
denote un complet mepris des interets d'autrui'. See also supra note 540 and infra at 235.
544 In Cour de Cassation, Casso Com., March 28 2000, Cie Reunion Europeenne et a. v. Ste Danzas et a. 2845
Bull. Transp. Log. 332 (2000) the French Supreme Court decided that the carrier 'could not have ignored the
risk of damage' (consciousness). In the same sense, see TC Paris, Paris, Sept. 18 2000, Axa Global Risks v.
Ste Le Transalpin 2881 Bull. Transp. Log. 131 (2001). In Cour de Paris, Paris, Sept. 5 2000, Cie GAN et a. v.
Generali Transports 2871 Bull. Transp. Log. 837 (2000), the trial court in Paris defined 'faute lourde' as a
'fault referring to inexcusable negligence'; in Tribunal de Grande Instance, Nancy, May 5 1999, Cie Helvetia
v. Cilomate Transports et a. (1999) 2831 Bull. Transp. Log. 50 (2000) the trial court of Nancy referred to
carrier 'deliberate (thus, conscious ifnot intentional) acts'.
545 Reference made to French law by the Canadian case Swiss Bank Corp. v. Air Canada, Swiss Air & Swiss
Air Transport (1982), 1 C. F. 756 (F. C. C.).
546 Matthew R. Pickelman, "Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air: The Warsaw Convention Revisited for the Last Time?" (1998) 64 J. Air L. & Com. 273 at note 39.
The same conclusion with respect to willful misconduct and gross negligence is reached by English courts on
the basis of CMR provisions: Graham v. Belfast and Northern Counties Railway Co. (1901) 2 1. R. 13 as
reported by Laceys Footwear Ltd. V. Bowler In!'l Freight Ltd. (1997),2 Ll. Rep. 369 (C. A).
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slightly more increased than in case of gross negligence547. Still, the two concepts do
exist independently.
French courts strict stance towards the carner In denying him CMR or
COTIFICIM statutory limitations by mere proof of 'faute lourde' is followed by
other European Member-States548 and leads to lack of uniformity. In effect, Anglo-
American case law may be familiar with the concept of 'faute lourde' (gross
negligence) and define it in a similar way to civil law courts549. However, common
law jurisdictions do not use the concept of gross negligence within the context of
mentioned acts and are not, for the rest, familiar with the maxim culpa lata dolo
aequiparatur equating gross negligence to 'dol'. Contrary to French and other civil
law European countries complicated case law principles on the issue, common law
applies the same substantive conditions to carrier loss of liability limitations under the
COTIFICIM, CMR and the Visby Rules: willful misconduct.
Informal Gudicial) harmonization of conditions for carrier loss of statutory
limitations is imperative in order to provide security to both carriers and shippers as
547 Jeanine Feriancek, "Liability for Negligence?" (1996) II-SUM Nat. Resources & Env't 58 at 60. Also,
reference made to French law by the Canadian case Swiss Bank Corp. v. Air Canada, Swiss Air & Swiss Air
Transport (1982), I C. F. 756 (F. C. C.) on this issue.
548 Greek courts i.e. apply the maxim 'culpa lata dolo aequiparatur' and have, therefore, decided that CMR art.
29 refers to 'faute lourde', conduct less serious than willful misconduct. Supreme Court ofGreece, March 12,
1998, Ethniki Ltd Liability Insurance Co. v. Proodos Ltd (1998) 34(1) Eur. Transp. L 100 (1999). Since
1993, German courts follow the same principle on the basis of the CMR. Alex Mittelstaedt, "CMR-Faute
Lourde du Transporteur Allemand" (1997) 2706 Bull. Transp. Log. 360. However, Belgian courts have
eliminated defaults 'equivalentes au dol' and consider only 'dol' as valid grounds for denying carrier statutory
limitation of liability provisions. Hof Van Cassatie Van Belgie (Belgium Supreme Court), Mars 30, 2000, Cigna
Insurance Co. ofEurope v. Transport Nijs bvba 35(3) Eur. Transp. L. 392 (2000). Hof Van Beroep Te Gent
(Gent Court ofAppeal), March 3, 1992, N. V. Transport Maenhout v. 10 Raemaekers Chr. 20 N. V. Belgalco.
27 Eur. Transp. L. 847 (1992). Malcolm Clarke, "The Transport of Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems
of Uniform Law" (1999) L. M. C. L. Q. 36 at 59.
549 In the U.S., gross negligence has been defined as: 'the entire want of care or extreme degree of risk
amounting to a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of a person'. Transportation Insurance Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S. W. 2d 10 (Tex. S. C. 1994). Although different state courts define gross negligence differently,
this Texan case is very frequently cited. On the issue of contractual exculpatory clauses, gross negligence has
been defined as 'reckless disregard for the rights of others or 'smacks' of intentional wrongdoing'. Red Sea
Tankers Ltd v. Papachristidis (1997), 2 Ll. Rep. 547 (Q. B. D.). Note that in this definition gross negligence
comprises the element of intentional acts (not damage). On this point, see also the U. S. case Stump v.
Commercial Union, 601 N. E. 2d 327 (Indiana S. C. 1992).
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to the applicable rules in this area550. This is not only necessary between civil and
common-law jurisdictions but is also true for courts within one legal system.
Although it is certain that even if uniformity is attained judges will always enjoy a
non-negligible margin of freedom in defining the conditions determinative of the
presence or absence of carrier liability, these conditions will, at least, converge. We
believe that the existing divergence in case law is not irremediable since all
jurisdictions are familiar with the concepts used by mentioned acts and apply them
even though they interpret them differently. What is needed is guidance of the path
European courts should follow towards uniformity of multimodal carrier liability
conditions. This guidance cannot derive from within a country or country's
traditions or historical antecedents but, rather, from supra-national regulatory or
judicial entities.
Conclusion
To make a synopsis of the very essence of the diverse topics we have treated
in the present chapter, we conclude that: first, uniformity of multimodal carrier
liability rules at the international and regional level is needed in order to remedy the
weaknesses of the multimodal carrier liability regime. Various conventions and
court interpretations create serious gaps in the applicable 'network' system of
liability, something that furthers the already existing uncertainty in the relation
between shippers and carriers. Second, the 1980 Multimodal Convention teaches us
that approximation, rather than unification of multimodal rules, has to be taken into
account in considering uniformity. This process has to take place at a slow pace and
cautiously balance shipper and carrier interests. In this respect, the 1992 MM can
provide useful lessons in contemplating uniformity of multimodal carrier liability
without distancing ourselves from currently applicable unimodal rules.
550 E. C. (Eur. Com.) Asariotis, Bull, Clarke, Herber, Kiantou-Pampouki, Morun-Bovio, Ramberg, de Wit,
Zunarelli, "Intermodal Transportation and Carrier Liability", final report, June 1999 (European Commission
financed study; EC Contract NR. EI-B97-B27040-SIN6954-SUB)).
Chapter II: U.S. and Canadian Transport Deregulation and its Effect on
Multimodal Carrier Liability
We are living in an era where promotion of international competition and
facilitation of trade constitute the cornerstones of governmental policies throughout
the industrialized world. Increase of trade implies development of multimodal
transport, a common objective of European, u.s. and Canadian authorities551 .
However, European countries insist on political considerations in promoting
multimodalism whereas the North-American transport market is more motivated by
economic considerations552. In effect, in Canada and the U.S., it is shippers that
determine transport conditions and the transport market is forced to follow the
demand (consumer market). On the contrary, European transport policy may oppose
shipper demand to favor long standing economic convictions553.
Despite this fact, shippers, carriers and insurers in both North America and
Europe are all concerned with the cost of transportation services554. In this respect,
U.S. and Canadian transport 'deregulation,555 have enhanced competition bringing
55\ It is imperative that the evolution of intermodal transport in North America positions the economy of the
continent so that it is capable of meeting the increasing competition from Europe and Asia. Although efforts
have been made in this regard by governments and private initiatives, the increase in volume of freight traffic
may well overtake the scale of past accomplishments. Joseph Szyliowicz, Andrew R. Goetz, Paul S. Dempsey,
"The Vision, the Trends and the Issues" (1998) Transp. L. J. 255 at 257. For Europe see supra at 85. See also
U.S. D. O. T. Report, Toward Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the United States
(1998) online: U.S. DOT Homepage (last visited: July 11,2001).
552 Dominique Malecot, "Transport Combine: Les Vertus du Dialogue" (1997) 2700 Bull. Transp. Log. 246 at
258". The author notes that, compared with the U.S., Europe is a 'Boeing 747' facing 'Concord'. Ibid.
553 Ibid. See infra at 149s and supra at 94 on the European prohibition of agreements between conference
members and inland carriers, which are allowed in the U.S. and subject to judicial scrutiny in Canada.
554 Mary R. Brooks, "The Ocean Container Carrier Market: Is it Segmentable?" (Center for International
Business Studies Dalhousie University, 1993).
555 Although not found in all dictionaries, the term 'deregulation' can be defined as 'the act or process of
removing restrictions and regulations'. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (Thos. Allen & Son
Limited, 1987) s. v. "Deregulation"). Some authors suggest that this definition is not very accurate because
deregulation does not imply removal of regulation but merely a change in style: deregulation, they argue, is
not anarchy it is the best form of regulation. Canada, Canadian Transport Commission, T.H.N. Welbum,
"Deregulation Good or Bad" (Ottawa: Canadian Transport Commission Press, 1980) Volume 4 at 17. See
also Mariel Zuniga and Martha Trejo, "Desregulacion no es Anarquia" Reforma (1997) online: WESTLAW
(Int'l Mat.-Mex.). Deregulation can be opposed to regulation which aims to control prices and entry into
markets. J. Luis Guasch, Robert W. Hahn, "The Costs and Benefits of Deregulation: Implications for
Developing Countries" World Bank Res. Observer (1999) online: \yESTLAW (Newsletters).
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about lower rates and, consequently, lower transportation costs. Deregulation has
also largely contributed to increase door-to-door service in the transport of freight in
the two countries, with cargo and liability insurers adapting to the new status qu0556.
The beneficial effects of the new trend have made deregulation very popular In
almost all parts of the world557.
Our deregulation analysis will focus on U.S. and Canadian modal
deregulation, specifically land (motor, rail) (Section I) and ocean (Section II)
deregulation and its effects on carrier liability558.
Despite our limited focus to U.S. and Canadian ocean and land transport
deregulation, there are several lessons to be learned from U.S. air cargo transport
deregulation (1978) that preceded its land and ocean counterparts in the U.S. and
Canada. As predicted by its proponents, the initial years of air carriage deregulation
brought an influx of new carriers driving prices down and forcing older established
carriers to match the lower rates of new carriers559. Several air carriers were forced
out of business and mergers were indispensable to strengthen the position of others
in the competitive market56o. The recent trend towards concentration of major air
carriers at selected U.S. airports has resulted in an airline exercising market power,
limiting competition, imposing conditions of carriage such as fares and reducing the
level of service561 .
Air transport deregulation has led to the conclusion that, although
indispensable, transport 'laissez-faire' policies cannot be absolute562. Some aspects
556 "Mergers Yield Improved Service" World Trade (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
557 This is true for the NAFTA and the European countries. It is also true for Asian countries. "Malaysia Calls
for Rules Change to Ease Cross Border Trade" Asian Pulse (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
558 Mention of deregulation effects on the 'door-to-door' transport and specific regulation or case law
applicable, in this respect, will always be made within each mode of transport.
559 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports" (1999) 26 Transp.
L. 1. 205 at 208.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid at 207. On relatively recent air freight high rates see Tom Stundza, "Surcharges, Surcharges"
Purchasing (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
562 Federico Videla Escalada & Hector A. Perucchi, "Les Problemes Juridiques et Administratifs de la
Dereglementation du Transport Aerien" (1994) 19 Ann. Air & Space. L. 633 at 647.
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of transport (such as security, technical standards or carriers large-scale vertical
integration) have to be regulated to permit reliable transport services and extended,
healthy competition among carriers563 . Transport competition in air carriage has to
be governed by reasonable tariffs, prohibition of abusive agreements between air
companies and prohibition of monopolies564.
Section I: U.S. and Canadian Land Transport Deregulation and its Effect
on Carrier Liability
Today, 80 to 90% of trade between the U.S. and Canada takes place by rail
and truck transportation. Trucking, however, forms the basic form of freight
transportation among the NAFTA parties565 . Because of the importance of land
carriage of goods in the U.S. and Canada we will now concentrate on the U.S. land
transport deregulation and its effects on carrier liability (Par. 1) before examining its
Canadian counterpart (Par. 2).
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid. The defmition of the term 'tariffs' will prove useful to the present study: tariffs are the rules and rates
pursuant to which a carrier is engaged to carry freight. They classify cargo according to commodity and
establish rates for freight charges (tariff-rates) for those commodities according to distances, weight, size and
other factors. Almost every form of BOL 'incorporates by reference' applicable tariffs. Rates can be tariff or
non-tariff, the latter being enforceable in case tariffs do not exist, case that constitutes the exception to the
rule. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 38 and 202.
565 Kenneth D. Boyer, "American Trucking, NAFTA and the Cost of Distance" (1997) 53 Ann. Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 55 at 55-56. A comprehensive range of goods are shipped by road (refrigerated cargo, small,
less-than-truck-Ioad shipments ofgeneral merchandise), with only large quantities of bulk commodities mainly
reserved to rail. Canadian Transportation Law Reporter, Canada-US.-Mexico (Toronto: CCH Canadian Ltd.
1997) at 100-405. U.S., USDA, Rural Transportation: Services and Deregulation (2003) online: United
States Department of Agriculture <www.ers.usda.gov/Briefmg/Transport/Transdereg.htm> (last modified:
May 27,2003). Every year, roughly ten million trucks cross the United States-Canadian border carrying about
70 percent of the total value of all U.S.-Canada trade in goods. U.S. Embassy in Canada, Economic Section,
Economic Trends and Outlook (1999) online: Transport Homepage
<http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/canada/trends.html> (last visited: May 21,2001). From 1992 to 1999,
exports of goods by road from Canada to the U.S. has increased from 57.9 to 62.7 billion dollars whereas
imports of goods by truck has fallen from 80.8 to 80.0 billions dollars. Rail corresponding numbers have
fallen. Canada, Department of Transportation, Transportation in Canada 1999 (Annual Report) (Ottawa:
Transport Canada, 1999). Within the NAFTA region, truck traffic has increased approximately 10% per year
since 1991 and rail service has expanded at almost twice that rate. Susan L Bradbury, "Planning Transporation
Corridors in post-NAFTA North America" (2002) 4/1/02 J. Am. Plan. A. 137 (WESTLAW-Newsletters).
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Par. 1. U.S.: In the U.S., motor carner deregulation began with the 1980
MCA 566 and rail carrier deregulation commenced with the 1980 Staggers Act567 .
Unlike trucking, rail deregulation took place not so much to encourage more
competition, as to reduce governmental expenses given the former dependence of
rail transport on the public sector568. For the rest, U.S. rail and motor deregulation
have had, with some variances, similar general effects.
We will, therefore, examine the general effects of U.S. motor and rail
transport deregulation (A) before focusing on land carrier liability following
deregulation (B) and the 'fair opportunity' doctrine (C).
A. General Effects of u.s. Motor and Rail Transport Deregulation: a) The
rules: The 1980 MCA did not abolish the publication requirement of motor carrier
tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC now STB)569 but dispensed
with regulatory control of motor carrier applicable tariffs as to the reasonableness of
rates570. The U.S. 1980 Staggers Act had the same effect57!. Later acts also abolished
566 Transport deregulation in the U.S. began in 1970 with rail passenger services and airlines. Motor transport
deregulation followed in 1980 with the adoption of the 1980 Motor Carrier Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (amending various portions of the Interstate Commerce Act) [hereinafter MCA]. Its
amendments, the 1994 Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act Pub. L. No. 96-296, 108 Stat. 803 (1994)
(amending various portions of the Interstate Commerce Act) [hereinafter TIRRA] and the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1995) [hereinafter
ICCTA], followed.
567 Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) [hereinafter Staggers Act] (amending various portions of the
Interstate Commerce Act). This act was later amended by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1995) [hereinafter ICCTA] (amending various portions of the
Interstate Commerce Act), also applicable to motor transport.
568 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned
from Airline Deregulation" (1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 205 at 208. To this, we should add economic
considerations such as governments need to resolve chronic cash shortages, inefficient operations and
substandard service, and aging equipment and infrastructure.
569 The ICC was created by the Interstate Commerce Act (lCA) to implement its provisions. The 1887 ICA
codified common law principles applicable to land transport. The Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) abolished the ICC and replaced it by the Surface Transportation Board
(STB) that came into being in 1996. The Board's primary goal is to facilitate commerce by providing an
effective forum for dispute resolution and facilitation of appropriate business transactions. Contracting with
the United States Department of Transportation (2003) online: Surface Transportation Board Homepage
<http://osdbuweb.dot.gov/MP/contractI3.htm> (last visited: April 21, 2003).
570 Christopher P. Chilstrom, "The Negotiated Rates Doctrine" (1990) 16 Wm. Mitchell. L. Rev. 743 at 768.
571 U.S., D. O. T. Cargo Liability Study, online: U.S. DOT Homepage < http://ostpxweb.dot.gov> (last visited:
January 2000).
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land carner publication requirement of applicable rates572. Absence of carrier
obligation to inform their customers is said to be one of the most onerous results of
deregulation573.
Still, today, U.S. motor and railway rates must be reasonable but proof of lack
of reasonableness, burdening the shipper, is a hard one to make574. Prior to these
acts, land carriers were obliged to file their tariffs with the ICC, which had the
authority to examine their reasonableness575. The filing requirement facilitated
shippers in anticipating applicable rates whereas regulatory control guaranteed
stability of rates.
Although absence of governmental control over U.S. land carrIer rates
following deregulation may fuel ardent discussions, it is of little practical value to
those involved in intermodal carriage because inland portions of most intermodal
movements have long been exempted from governmental (ICC today STB)
regulation (filing of rates or governmental control)576. As such, they remain purely
contractual and are not, therefore, affected by (de) regulatory changes577.
572 The 1995 ICCTA (supra note 569) also abolished motor and rail tariff filing requirement. U.S. D. O. T.
Cargo Liability Study, online: U.S., DOT Homepage <http://ostpxweb.dot.gov> (last visited: January 2000)
and Russell G. Donaldson, "Notice Requirements" (1979) (current through 2000) 45 A. L. R. Fed. 12
(WESTLAW-Newsletters).
573 William Augello, Logistics Issues Your Providers Usually Don't Talk About (1999) online: Supply Chain
& Logistics Journal Homepage <http://www.infochain.org/quarterly/Nov99/Augello.html> (last modified:
April 25, 2000).
574 Rail: 49 U.S.C. 1070l(a) (Staggers Act). Under this act, a shipper may file a complaint with the Surface
Transportation Board (STB) but it must prove unreasonableness of rates on the basis of "'market dominance
over the transportation to which the rate applies". This is a difficult proof to make because it requires proof of
no effective rail, truck or barge alternative, known as intermodal competition. Also, the railroad may counter
that there is product or geographic competition. Finally, this is an expensive and time consuming process
reserved to very sophisticated, 'committed' shippers. Frank Wilner, "A Slight Setback" Traffic World (2001)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, " United States Statutory
Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 548. Staggers Rail Act (Rate Reasonableness)
online: C.U.R.E. Homepage <http://www.railcure.orglstag7.htm> (last visited: Nov. 2000). Motor: 49
U.S.C.A. § l4706.c.(1 )(A). Reasonableness of rates is not statutorily defined so that courts occupy the field.
Stephen Wood, "Multimodal Transportation: an American Perspective on Bill of Lading Issues and Carrier
Liability" (1998) 46 Am. J. Compo L. 403 at 411.
575 Saul Sorkin, "Limited Liability in Multimodal Transport and the Effect of Deregulation" (1989) 13 Tul.
Mar. L. 1. 285 at 286-287 and 288.
576 Knebel Denise Savoie Blocker, "U.S. Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543
at 548. From 1989 until today, the Interstate Commerce Commission (LC.C., now Surface Transportation
Board (S.T.B.», has exempted almost all inland intermodal transportation provided by rail and truck from
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Because of land transport deregulation, U.S. land carriers and shippers can
also bargain for rates with contract terms remaining absolutely confidential, not
available to the public lacking, therefore, transparencl78. Today, nearly all railway
contracts for the transport of goods are confidential579.
b) The practice: Following U.S. motor deregulation, a number of older
carrIers either merged with competitors or were forced out of business58o. Rates
initially declined from 15% to 25% in the early years of deregulation to increase later
once deregulation had taken full effect581 . Motor carrier deregulation seems to have
followed the effects of U.S. air deregulation, (increased tariffs-high
concentration)582. However, the trucking industry has different characteristics from
air and sea carriage.
governmental regulation. The tenn intennodal is defined as "of or relating to the connection between rail
service and other modes of transportation, including all parts of facilities at which such connection is made".
A "railroad" is defined to include intennodal equipment used by or in connection with it. The transportation of
empty intennodal cargo containers is specifically exempted from regulation. Ibid at 550, Paul Stephen
Dempsey, "The Law of Intennodal Transportation: What it Was, What it Is, What it Should Be" (2000) 27
Transp. L. J. 367 at 406-407 and Saul Sorkin, "Limited Liability in Multimodal Transport and the Effect of
Deregulation" (1989) 13 Tul. Mar. L. J. 285 at 289.
577 Interview of the author with a regulation expert in the u.S. Office ofIntennodalism (Nov. 5,2001). Even
before their exemption from governmental regulation, no significant rate regulatory jurisdiction was exercised
over the rail portion of through rates by the government. Knebel Denise Savoie Blocker, "U.S. Statutory
Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 548-549.
578 This seems to be the practice of mentioned transport companies. Motor: Interview of the author with
American Freightways Tariff personnel (May 23, 2002) asserting that liability tenns can be negotiated within
confidential contracts. Motor Carrier Liability (1999) online: Augello, Pezold & Hirchman P.C. Homepage
<http://www.transportlaw.com/aphlindexbar.jpg> (last visited: June 3, 2000) on the presence of confidential
contracts on u.S. motor carrier industry. Rail: 49 U.S.C. § 10713 (Staggers Act). Following the Staggers Act,
a railroad carrier has to file only two documents with the STB: the confidential contract and a contract
summary. The summary, but not the contract, is made available to the public. Rene Sacasas, "The Filed Tariff
Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of Deregulation?" (1990) 29 Duq. L. Rev. 1 at note 30.
579 Michael F. McBride, "Statutory Authority For Railroad Transportation Contracts in the Staggers Rail Act
of 1980" (1997) 18 E. Min. L. Found s 7.02. Michael F. McBride, "The Nuts and Bolts of Railroad
Transportation Contracts" 18 EMLF s 7. 02 (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). "Railway Users Want
End to 'Illegal' Billing System" The Hamilton Spectator (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
580 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports" (1999) 26 Transp.
L. J. 205 at 208. Concentration also occurred between U.S. and Canadian trucking companies. A good
example of this is the 1997 15$USD million purchase of Reimer Express Lines (Winnipeg, Manitoba) by
Roadway Express (Akron, Ohio). "Canada: Services Trucking Market Indus. Sect. Anal." (1998) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters). Ibid.
581 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports" (1999) 26 Transp.
L. J. 205 at 208 commenting on truck and rail transport.
582 Supra at 115-116.
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Contrary to the airline deregulation, high competition and the resulting
low motor carrier tariffs are the distinctive traits of motor carrier post-deregulation
period583 . In effect, today, the motor carrier industry is an extremely competitive
sector in the U.S. and Canada584, with carriers operating on razor thin margins of
profit or loss since they are competing on service rather than on price585 . The stiff
competition has driven prices down and has resulted in almost negligible (0.3
percent) price increases since 1990586 . It is true that the lower value of the Canadian
dollar when compared with the U.S. dollar gives Canadian truckers a competitive
pricing advantage over U.S. firms587.
However, the ability of U.S. trucking services to leverage their size and fleet
management capabilities help to level the playing field in this expanding services
sector588 . In this sense, strong competition among U.S. and U.S.-Canadian motor
carriers as well as competition from railways have resulted in the application of very
low tariffs in the U.S. motor sector589. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the
motor carrier industry will grow highly concentrated in the future. According to
commentators this depends on different factors such as trucking compames
sophistication, managing techniques and not merely on their capital59o.
583 Interview of the author with a transportation journalist, (Nov. 9, 1999).
584 Canada: "Services Trucking Market" Indus. Sector Analysis (1998) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Only the U.S. counts with 400.000 trucking companies. Interview of the author with a regulation expert at the
American Trucking Association, (ATA) (November 8, 1999) and U.S., DOT-FHWA, Key Freight
Transportation Challenge-Safety (2003) online: U.S. Department of Transportation Homepage
<ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/publications/freight%20story/safety.htm> (last modified: Feb. 13, 2003) stating that
in 1990 there were 216.000 interstate motor carriers operating in the U.S. whereas in 1999 the number
increased to 517.000.
585 Interview of the author with a transportation journalist, (Nov. 9, 1999).
586 "Canada: Services Trucking Market" Indus. Sector Analysis (1998) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
587 Ibid.
588 Ibid.
589 Interview of the author with a transportation journalist, (Nov. 9, 1999). Studies undertaken before motor
deregulation in Canada showed that trucking rates were 9 to 12% lower in provinces without regulation than in
provinces with regulation.
590 Interview of the author with a regulation expert at the American Trucking Association (ATA) (November
8, 1999).
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u.s. Congress was anticipating consolidation of U.S. rail carriers because of
bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions591 . It did not, however, foresee that from 66
major railways in 1980, the provider pool would shrink to seven with only four of
these serving most of the market after deregulation592. These major U.S. rail carriers
abandoned unprofitable lines that were destined to serve small shippers in remote
areas, with the objective to handle the largest shippers593 . Small shippers were then
forced to shift to trucks to transport their goods to major rail pick-up points594. With
the shift, shippers had to adapt to the specifications of the mode and this was causing
additional costs apart from being time consuming595.
To avoid shipper frustration and competition from the trucking industry,
commentators argue that railways and truckers should work together to provide
intermodal transport596. The 'intermodallunacy', as it is called, will lower costs and
increase profitability597. Even though the two sectors seem, so far, unwilling to
cooperate, the fact that some motor carriers use intermodal rail service proves that
the two modes could work together to benefit shippers598.
591 Ronald N. Cobert, Esq. Senior Partner Grove, Jasliewisz and Cobert, Ocean Shipping Reform: What It
Means for Shippers' Associations (August 19, 1998), online: Ocean Shipping Reform Homepage
<http://www.gjcobert.com/cobert898.html> (last visited: 24 August 1998).
592 "The Americas: U.S. regulators jolt a U.S. Canadian Rail Merger off Track" Wall Str. J (2000) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Today, the NAFTA railway corridor comprises U.S., Canadian and Mexican companies that control the region
through mergers, associations and acquisitions: Through acquisitions Kansas City Southern Rail has created a
rail line that runs from Canada to Mexico. Canadian National acquisition of the Illinois Central Corp. has
created a rail network that will cross the United States from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico and
cross Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific (rail giant). The Union Pacific and the Tex-Mex (Ferro-Sur)
share the huge gateway to Mexico at Laredo, which alone accounts for about eighty percent of rail shipments
between Texas and Mexico. See also NAFTA Railway Map (1999) online: NAFTA Railway Map Homepage <
http://www.kcsi.com/cor_m.html> (last visited: 23 July 1999). For herein examined rail companies
geographical reach see Annex No. III, Table No. J at clxxviii-clxxxi.
593 U.S., Congressional Record (Senate) "Opening of Session 132" Cong. Rec. SJ6957-0J (1986).
594 Ken Cottrill, "Temperature Rising" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
595 Ibid. Theodore Prince, "Don't Expect Less Transport Trauma in 2000" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
596 John Gallagher, "Holding Pattern" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
597 Ibid.
598 Ibid and Charles T. Connors, James G. Cunnigham, 1. B. Hunt, Robert H. Maisch, "Motor Carrier Panel"
(2001) Transp. L. 1. 473 at 473 and "Barriers to Intermodal System" (1998) Transp. L. 1. 245 at 247.
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Rail deregulation brought about competition in pnces that were formerly
maintained artificially low, with subsequent increase of the volume of transported
goods by rail and by a combination ofmodes599. In effect, rail rates are, overall, very
competitive to, albeit lower than, motor rates600. Since railways are more efficient
than trucks in terms of energy, handling and space capacity, rail rates have to be
lower than motor's, considering also that rail service is slower and not provided
door-to-door601 . Although very competitive with motor rates, U.S. rail rates have
considerably increased after deregulation and, for a long time, shipper frustration
due to high applicable rates and poor service was unprecedented and attributed to
railway consolidation and their apathy stance towards shipper regarding rates and
improvement of service602 . The situation on U.S. railway rates and service seems to
have much improved todalo3. Despite this fact, some shippers still believe the rails
are using 'oligopolistic' or 'monopolistic' positioning to pass through excessive rate
increases and perceive the rail's service gap to trucking competitors as too great604.
High rates and carrier concentration have left many shippers wondering if
they were really better off than before the Staggers Act605 . Even though
599 John Jinkner, "The Staggers Act Introducing competition to the railroads: A timeline of deregulation's
impact" (1998) online: Staggers Act Homepage <http://www.altavista.com/cgi-
bin/query?q=staggers+act&kl=XX&pg=q> (last visited: April 3, 2000).
600 Interview of the author with a transportation journalist (Dec. 10, 2001). Rail rates are 20-30% lower than
motor rates. Interview of the author with CN Rates personnel, (Dec. 3, 2001).
601 Interview of the author with a transportation journalist (Dec. 10,2001).
602 Michael W. Blaszak, "Boost Rail Competition or Preserve it?" Trains Magazine (2001) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters). John Gallagher, "The Merger Question" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). On average, shippers are ready to pay higher rates if this corresponds to improved service. John
Gallagher, "It's the Service Stupid" J. Com. (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
603 Deregulation works. U.S. railroads now produce more service more efficiently than ever before and at
lower average rates than ever before. Larry Kaufman, "Let's Remember why the Railroads were Deregulated"
Trains Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News). "Are Shippers Using More or less Rail?" Trains
Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters), "Intermodal Transportation Systems" Congr. Test.
(2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
604 "Are Shippers Using More or less Rail?" Trains Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) on
railroads oligopoly due to shrinkage of the sector. Monopoly of a railway company exists in certain segments
of the haul, called the bottlenecks. "Check for Weapons" Traffic World (2001) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
605 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned
from Airline Deregulation" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 205 at 208. With a monopoly hold on so many customers
the railroads can get away with doing this. "Weary and Wary Captive Rail Shippers View Railroad Olive-
Branch Bids with Suspicion" Traffic World (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
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recent railway rates and servIce improvements seem to have quelled the fire of
deregulation, there are shipper associations that argue that STB must re-regulate the
sector to insure competition606. Shippers intention does not seem to be shared by
u.S. governmental authorities since there seems to be no traction on the Capitol Hill
for reregulation, or, at least, not as ominous as certain shippers would like to
portrait607.
B. Contractual Uniformity of us. Land Carrier Liability following
Deregulation: Despite deregulation, all U.S. land carriers, including those involved
in intermodal carriage, must still offer liability terms consistent with the Carmack
Amendment608 common law provisions and the fair opportunity doctrine609.
The Carmack Amendment holds land carriers absolutely liable for property
loss or damage unless there is shipper 'written consent' to limit their liability61o.
606 Neil Franz, Esther d' Amico, "Shippers Call for Stricter STB Rules" Chem. Week Ass. (2000) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
607 Clayton Boyce, "Back to the Fight" Traffic World (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). On the need
for reregulation, Rail Privatization Spreading (1999) online: National Center or Policy Analysis Homepage
<http://www.ncpa.org/pi/internat/pd040899h.htm> (last visited: April 7, 2000). There are authors who argue
that rail 're-regulation' would put the industry back into an environment that nearly resulted in the destruction
of the industry. "Are Shippers Using More or less Rail?" Trains Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
608 The 1906 Carmack Amendment [34 STAT. 595 (1906) codified as amended at 49 U. S. C. par. 14706,
10730 and 11707] is applicable today to land transport (motor and rail) along with the 1995 Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act (lCCTA). Both these acts constitute modifications of the 1887
Interstate Commerce Act (lCA) that initially codified common law land transport rules in the U.S.. Supra note
569.
609 Jack G. Knebel Denise Savoie Blocker, "U.S. Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L.
Rev. 543 at 549.
610 49 U.S.C. par. 14706 (c)(1)(A)(Carmack Amendment). See also S. 49 para. 11700(c)(3) of the 1980
Staggers Act (rail). The Carmack Amendment uses the expression 'express agreement' which means a written
or electronic declaration of the shipper to accept carrier limitation of liability or written agreement between
the carrier and the shipper. "Inadvertence Clauses: Another View" J Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World
ALLWLD). Before this statute, motor and rail carriers were held absolutely liable even in the presence of
contractual limitation of their liability. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 (U. S. Pa. 1903)
as reported by Hubbard v. AllStates Relocation Services Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S. D. Ga. 2000).
Pro Augello explains that the roots of common carrier liability have been found in early roman transportation
contracts about A. D. 150. Carrier liability is a form of the law ofbailments under which the carrier is held to
strict liability because it has complete knowledge and control of the goods during transit. U.S. law adopted
these concepts of strict liability when Congress provided for federal preemption of state laws governing
interstate railroads in the 1906 Hepburn Act, which included the Carmack Amendment. In 1916, Congress
required the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve released rates which allowed carriers to reduce their
liability in return for lower rates on the condition that the rates differentials were reasonable. William J.
Augello, "The Evolution of Liability Limitations" Log. Man. & Distr. Rep. (2001) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
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Since land carrier deregulation abolished governmental control over land carrIer
applicable tariffs, land carriers and shippers can contractually define liability terms
in those tariffs without having to worry about governmental control.
One would think that absent governmental control over land carrier tariffs
following U.S. motor and rail deregulation, motor and rail carriers would apply
liability limitations and provisions that would differ from one company to the other
on the basis of transported goods. This is, however, not so and virtually all motor
carriers today apply a maximum limitation of 25$USD 'per pound, per piece lost or
damaged' or lOO.OOO$USD 'per shipment' whichever is lower (contractual
uniformity)61l. The two major U.S. railway companies we will herein examine,
(BNSF and NS)612, maintain intermodal tariff limitations rising to 250.000$USD
'per shipment' or actual value of the goods contained in containers, whichever is
lower. These limitations are indicative of the multimodal rail limitations generally
applicable by U.S. railways (contractual uniformity)613. They are usually contained
in carrier tariffs, are incorporated in the BOL and are available only upon shipper
request since, following deregulation, there is no mandatory requirement for U.S.
land tariffpublication614.
Exceptions to these uniform contractual provisions (contractual uniformity)
exist and differ according to the commodity and the carrier so that shippers should
always consult carrier tariffs when they decide to ship goodS615 . For instance, U.S.
motor carriers may limit their liability to the lowest released value amount stated in
the carrier tariff when the shipper fails to declare goods value on the bill of lading
611 William 1. Augello, Logistics Issues Your Providers Usually do not Talk About (1999) online: Supply
Chain & Logistics Journal <http://www.infochain.orglquarterlylNov99/Augello.html> (last modified: April
25, 2000). See also Annex No. I, Table No.4 at I-Iv for BsOL provisions and tariffs and infra at Part II,
Chapter I, Section II, Par. l(A). This is the informal harmonization we have talked about, supra at 20s.
612 For the BNSF and NS railways see infra note 856 and accompanying text and Part II, Chapter I, Section II,
Par. 2.
613 Annex No. I, Table No.6 at lxvi-lxxxviii for U.S. tariffs and infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 2 for
further details.
614 Supra at 118-119 on absence of necessary publication of U.S. land tariffs.
615 William Augello, "Avoid the Liability-Limitation Trap" Log. Man. & Distr. Rep. (2001) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
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(inadvertence clause)616 circumventing, in this way, the statutorily required express
(written) consent in contracting carrier liability617. Despite Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC, now STB) and some case law affirmations that inadvertence
clauses are lawful beyond the shadow of a doubt618, there are cases that reject
inadvertence clauses when the carrier does not bring the limitation to shipper
attention619.
Carrier limitation of liability without shipper knowledge or consent, the
exception to the principle of contractual uniformity62o, and rate increase, are the two
thorns in U.S. motor deregulation621 . They may lead to a BOL being only used to
acknowledge receipt of the freight and identify the entity for delivery622. The new
era of transport deregulation demands, therefore, alert shippers who will ask for
616 According to the 1980 Motor Carrier Act, carrier offers "released value rate" when it charges shipper
discounted rate in exchange for limitation on carrier's liability in event of loss or damage. 49 U.S.C.A. §
10706(b)(3)(C). A typical inadvertence clause reads: "If the shipper fails or declines to execute the above
statement or designates a value exceeding 25.00$USD per pound, shipment will not be accepted, but if the
shipment is inadvertedly accepted, it will be considered as being released to a value of 5.00$USD (or of
2.50$USD) per pound and the shipment will move subject to such limitation of liability". Dr. Boris
Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lic. Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in North
America, (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1996) at 17. In this respect,
see the interesting provision in the American Freightways tariff herein annexed Annex No. I, Table No.4 at 1.
Inadvertence clauses are, most of the time, selectively applicable to specific high value commodities and are
intended to protect the carrier. This is probably because most shippers are reluctant to agree to liability
limitations out of fear that this will encourage carriers to be careless with their cargo. Interview of the author
with a Traffic World journal analyst (Sept. 14, 2000). See also Colin Barrett, "Inadvertence Clauses in
Canada?" Traffic World (2000) online: LEXIS (Transp. News).
617 "ICC Rejects Complaint on Freight Liability" J. Com. (1989) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD). On
Carmack 'express' (written) agreement see supra at 123-124. We have not encountered inadvertence clauses
in U.S. rail carriage.
618 "ICC Rejects Complaint on Freight Liability" J. Com. (1989) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD), Colin
Barrett, "Questions and Answers" Distribution (1997) online: WESTLAW (All-News) for the ICC and
Mechanical Technology v. Ryder Truck Lines, 776 F. 2d 1085 (2nd Cir. 1985) for case law.
619 This is done on the basis of the fair opportunity doctrine (infra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. I(C)).
Toledo Ticket Co. v. Roadway Express Inc. (1998) 133 F. 3d 439 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Travelers Property
and Cas .Co. v. Interstate Heavy Hauling Co. Inc., 2000 WL 900482 (D. C. Or 2000). Both cases concern
inadvertence clauses incorporated by reference in the BOL. On this point, interview of the author with a
Traffic World analyst (Sept. 14,2000).
620 Inadvertence clauses are rather the exception than the rule. Interview of the author with a Traffic World
analyst (September 14, 2000) who noted that contractual uniformity is the principle and inadvertence clauses
the exception but people tend to make a big fuss about exceptions to the rule when they are shipper abusive
creating, thus, news. See also Colin Barrett, "Inadvertence Clauses in Canada?" Traffic World (2000) online:
LEXIS (Transp. News).
621 Ann Saccomano, "Liability Back and Forth" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
622 Ibid.
623
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copies of their contract with the carrier so that they be aware of the conditions of
carriage therein provided623 :
[a]sk for copies of the tariffs. It is tedious, slow, painful and not a lot of fun, but
the alternative of finding that you have cost your company one big bunch of money
because you didn't check out a tariff provision is most likely going to be a lot less
enjoyable.
Large shippers in motor and multimodal transport have the negotiating skills
and clout to negotiate contractual terms and deal with carrier contractual practices as
they frequently deal with them624. It is mainly small, unsophisticated shippers who
lack the leverage and/or sophistication to negotiate with the carrier that run the risk
of being ruined by liability losses in the present deregulation era625 . Although it is
usually shipper's responsibility to identify acceptable multimodal transport terms and
conditions through issuance of his own BOL, many do so by identifying proposed
carrier terms and conditions of carriage626. Overall, following deregulation, the
transport contract remams a contract of adhesion favouring carrier because of
Motor Carrier Bill Of Lading: Contract Or Receipt? (1998) online:
<http://www.allenlund.com/article8.htm> (last visited: 24 February 1998). "Beware of Changing Coverages:
Shippers must Read Fine Print on Bill of Lading, Contracts and Rules Tariffs" J. Com. (1998) at 4 in fine
online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
624 Hugh M. Kindred and Mary R. Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Massachussetts: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) at 24. Freedom of contract may well lead carriers to dislike non-mandatory rules, as it
would allow more sophisticated competitors to take the upper hand. Jan Ramberg, The Future ofInternational
Unification of Transport Law (1998) online: Forwarder Law Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg2.html> (last modified: March 6, 2001). Deregulation can
result in large shippers negotiating on an equal basis with or being more powerful than carriers. David S. Peck,
"Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or is it?" 73 at
76-77.
625 William J. Augello, Pres. Of the Shippers National freight Claims Council as reported by "TCPC
Celebrates" 25 Traffic World (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Norfolk Southern Railroad v.
Chatman, 244 U.S. 276 (S. C. 1917) stating that tariffs must not be cunningly made to entangle small,
unsuspicious, inexperienced shippers. There is a tendency among cargo owners to rely on the word of, and
personal relationship with, the multimodal operator's sales personnel that the terms of the carriage are
standard in the industry. Small shippers and consignees correctly believe that they have little clout in altering
the standard business practices of large multimational companies like shipping lines and insurance providers.
This results in cargo owners being poorly positioned in case of dispute. Hugh M. Kindred and Mary R.
Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Massachussetts: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 18. On
sophistication and equal bargaining power see infra notes 641, 685, 812 and 714 and accompanying text.
Small shippers represent 70% of U.S. exports and are distinguished from large shippers on the basis of the
volume of the shipment. Interview of the author with a Traffic World analyst (September 14, 2000).
626 Shippers seldom visit the offices of carriers or multimodal operators to examine their terms and conditions
of liability. The first time a cargo owner examines in detail the full details of the transport contract may be
when there is a claim for loss or damage. Hugh M. Kindred and Mary R. Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules
(Massachussetts: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 19-20.
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shippers inadvertence or lack of equal bargaining power with the carrier to negotiate
alternate terms627.
Shipper protective mechanisms (i.e. shipper alliances, shipper-carrier
alliances, and shipper information guides) have been put into place to provide for
shipper protection628. These, however, do not provide shippers with a well-rounded
'safety net' since unanticipated charges, penalties or unrecoverable transit losses can
still surprise them629:
It would be more advisable to consult a transportation consultant or attorney for a
review of product classification, packaging, rates and routings....
As with railway deregulation, commentators suggest that re-regulation IS
needed to put an end to the current situation630.
C. The Fair Opportunity Doctrine: We have noted that there are U.S.
cases that reject inadvertence, but also carrier limitative, clauses on the basis of the
'fair opportunity' doctrine631 , a judicial creation whose origins are found in railway
cases
632
.
The Carmack Amendment imposes absolute liability upon carriers for the
actual loss or damage to property unless there is shipper express (written) consent to
limit carrier liability633. In the absence of shipper written agreement to carrier
liability limitations, courts may conclude that shipper express consent is not present
627 Ibid at 21 and supra note 9.
628 Ibid at 19-20. Shippers National Freight Claim Council, an entity composed of shippers that banded
together to provide shippers with guidance to shipping goods. Also, Road Express has published a "Guide to
the Basics of Shipping and Receiving" destined to shippers.
629 The Transportation Consumer Protection Council, Inc., (1998) online: The Transportation Law Center
Homepage <http://www.transportlaw.com/current/td13.htm> (last visited: September 2, 1998).
630 "TCPC Celebrates 25" Traffic World (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Supra at 122-123 for rail
re-regulation.
631 Supra note 619 and accompanying text.
632 New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Nothnagle, 421 F. Supp. 249 (D. C. Conn. 1976). Richard W. Palmer
Frank P. DeGiulio, "Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis (1989) 64 Tu!. L.
Rev. 281 at 295-296.
633 Supra at 123s.
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and 'fair opportunity' to agree on the terms and conditions of carriage is not given to
him634.
The 'fair opportunity' doctrine translates into a two-prong test for the
carrier: first, the carrier must provide shipper with notice of his limitative conditions.
Second, the carrier must provide shipper with opportunity to declare value so that the
shipper makes 'an absolute, deliberate and well-informed choice' in agreeing to limit
carrier liability635. Before deregulation took place, the statutory requirement of tariff
filing and publication was deemed to charge all shippers with notice of carrier
limitative conditions therein contained636. Shipper failure to declare value was
presumed to be deliberate acceptance of the filed released value637. Following
deregulation, publication of rates is no longer required and the shipper is not,
therefore, charged with notice of the rate structure638. Ever since, the judicial 'fair
opportunity' doctrine has gained in importance and whether the shipper has notice or
not of carrier limitative conditions depends upon the facts of the case and not upon
the presence of regulation639. It also depends on the jurisdiction before which the
case is presented since 'fair opportunity' does not enjoy uniformity of judicial
consideration in the application of its composing elements.
Certain courts will give effect to non-conspicuous ('buried') BOL
limitation clauses (i.e. inadvertence clauses) and/or absence of declaration of value
634 Motor: Anton v. Greyhound Van Lines Inc., 591 F. 2d 103 (lst Cir. 1978) (authority case). Rail: Yamazen
US.A. v. Chicago and Northwestern Transp., 790 F. 2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Union Pacific
R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317 (U. S. S. C. 1921) and Mitchell v. Union Pacific Railroad, 242 F. 2d 598 (9th
Cir. 1957).
635 Motor: Bio-Lab Inc. v. Pony Express Courier Corp., 911 F. 2d 1580 (lIth Cir. 1990) citing Anton v.
Greyhound Van Lines 591 F. 2d 103 (lst Cir. 1978). Rail: Quasar Co. v. Atchison, 632 F. Supp. 1106 (N. D.
Ill. 1986). In reality, four are the requirements of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine: first, maintain a tariff that
complies with prescribed federal guidelines (substantial compliance), second, obtain shipper consent as to the
choice of liability, third, give shipper 'fair opportunity' to choose between two or more levels of liability and
fourth, issue a BOL prior to shipment. Hughes v. United Van Lines, 829 F. 2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987) the
authority case on this doctrine. In the present part, issuance of a BOL as part of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine
will not retain our attention.
636 This was valid for all modes of transport. For motor see Norpin Mfg. Co. v. CTS Con-Way Transp., 68 F.
Supp. 2d 19 (D. Mass. 1999).
637 Ibid.
638 Ibid.
639 Ibid.
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In the presence of sophisticated shippers ('constructive notice')64o. 'Constructive
notice' is measured by what a reasonably prudent person should or could have
reasonably anticipated based on its particular experience in the industry641. Other
courts, will require 'express' notice to be given to sophisticated shippers in the
presence of non-conspicuous BOL limitation clauses and/or absence of declaration
640 Motor: Mechanical Technology v. Ryder Truck Lines, 776 F. 2d 1085 (2nd Cir. 1985) stated that
sophisticated shippers are charged with notice of inadvertence clauses incorporated by reference in the BOL
(non-conspicuous clause). Rohner Gehrig Co. v. Tri-State Motor, 923 F. 2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1991). Carmana
Designs v. North American Van Lines, 943 F. 2d 316 (3rd Cir. 1991). Rail: Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. C. 1999) where the court recognized the constructive
notice test but did not apply it in the presence of a conspicuous BOL limitation clause. The case is based on
motor cases such as Mechanical Technology.
'Constructive notice' jurisdictions are the Fifth, Second, Eleventh and Fourth Circuits that have adopted
similar positions but a different gloss. Daniel A Tadros, "COGSA Section 4(5) 'Fair Opportunity'
Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and Lack of International Uniformity: Will the United States
Supreme Court ever Provide Guidance?" (1992) Tul. Mar. L. Rev. 18 at 33. For the geographical areas of the
U.S. Circuits see Annex No. III, Table No. I (bis) at clxxxii.
641 Comsource Independent Foodservice Companies, Inc. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 102 F. 3d 438 (9th Cir.
1996) holding that shipper had extensive prior dealings with Union Pacific. Sorensen Christian Industries v.
Railway Exp. Agency Inc., 434 F. 2d 867 (4th Cir. 1970) stating that Sorensen is a sophisticated shipper having
made an identical shipment with the same company some years ago. Co-Operative Shippers, Inc. v. Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 840 F. 2d 447 (7th Cir. 1988) stating that the shipper was holding himself out as
a sophisticated shipper of at least equal commercial awareness with the carrier. See also (non-transport) Lee
R. Russ, "Couch on Insurance" (3d. ed.) (US) par. 162:24 (2000) online: WESTLAW (TP-ALL).
We should note, in this respect, that the terms sophisticated, experienced, knowledgeable shippers and parties
of equal bargaining power (EBP) (for this see also infra notes 685, 812, 714) are often used in Canada and
the U.S. with respect to (motor, rail and ocean) carrier liability. Both these terms involve equity considerations
and are dependent on subjective judicial interpretations. U.S.: Going through approximatively 250 cases on
this question we have seen courts referring to 'abundant shipping experience' (in the presence of fifty, one
hundred, two thousand prior shipping transactions); or even once before on the condition that it concerned an
'identical shipment for the same purpose': Sorensen-Christian Industries Inc. v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc.,
434 F. 2d 867 (C. A 1970). Yang Machinery Tool Co. v. Sea-Land Service Inc., 58 F. 3d 1350 (9th Cir. 1995)
held that the shipper was knowledgeable because it had contracted with the carrier over 100 times, Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Vessel Sam Houston, 26 F. 3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) referred to 1 previous shipment with same
carrier. In ZYX-Ware Intern. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 1994 WL 904684 (N. D. Cal. 1994) the court concluded
that the shipper in question was experienced even though it had never shipped with the specific carrier.
Canada: Canadian case law refers to a '60 year dealing with the specific carrier' or 'many prior shipments'
without further precision. N.s. Tractors & Equipment Ltd. v. Tarros Gage [1986], F. C. J. No. 127 (F. C. C.),
Alberta Garment Manufacturing Co. v. Purolator Courier Ltd (2000), A J. No. 317 (Alta. Pr. C.).
Experience in shipping should not be confounded with experience in commercial transactions in general.
Canada: Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559 (Ont. C. A) and U.S.: Rohner
Gehrig Co. v. Tri-State Motor, 923 F. 2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1991). Proof of shipper sophistication in Canada and
the U.S. constitutes the fact of shipper contracting its own insurance, negotiating rates with the carrier, issuing
its own BOL or customarily limiting carrier liability. U.S.: Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Vessel Sam Houston, 26
F. 3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) and Norton v. Jim Phillips Horse Transp. Inc., 901 F. 2d 821 (1oth Cir. 1989). For
Canada see Alberta Garment Manufacturing Co. v. Purolator Courier Ltd (2000), A J. No. 317 (Alta. Pro C.)
on the possibility to contract insurance and Bombardier V. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559
(Ont. C. A) for the possibility to limit carrier liability.
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of value ('actual notice,)642. Recently, however, 'actual notice' jurisdictions seem to
have narrowed the gap present with' constructive notice' jurisdictions in holding that
shipper sophistication weakens the argument that carrier fails to provide express
notice and/or declare value643. This judicial effort towards uniformity of u.s. case
law may be attributed to shipper sophistication and the fact that carriers and shippers
often deal with each other on a regular basis644. Courts effort to harmonize case law
on the 'fair opportunity' doctrine 'constructive' and 'actual' notice test is also
present in 'through' shipments645.
From the stated above, it seems that we are heading towards uniform U.S.
'fair opportunity' holdings on the basis of shipper sophistication. As judge Wiener
noted in his dissent in Rohner Gehrig Co. Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit646, shipper
sophistication is based on commercial awareness and is, therefore, subject to court
subjective appreciation647. This creates uncertainty to shippers who, on the basis of
the specific facts of each case and judges opinion, mayor may not be viewed as
sophisticated shippers. Because of this and the judicial transition we seem to be
currently going through on the basis of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine, codification
642 Motor: Hughes v. United Van Lines, 829 F. 2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987), Toledo Ticket Co. v. Roadway Express
Inc., 133 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 1998) and Travelers Property and Cas. Co. v. Interstate Heavy Hauling Co. Inc.
(2000), 2000 WL 900482 (D. C. Or.). Rail: Comsource Independent Food Servo Co. Inc. v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 102 F. 3d 438 (9th Cir. 1996). The court argues that while Comsource was a sophisticated
shipper the limitation of liability did not make part of the BOL and UP did not bring the limitation to shipper's
attention. 'Actual notice' jurisdictions are the Ninth, Seventh and Sixth Circuits. For the geographical areas of
the U.S. Circuits see Annex No. III, Table No. I (bis) at clxxxii.
643 Co-op Shippers Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 840 F. 2d 447 (7th Cir. 1988). In this
case, the court referred to decisions of the Fifth Circuit (constructive notice) such as Mechanical Technology
supra note 640. For the shift of case law (informal uniformity) see also infra Part I, Chapter II, Sec. II, Par. 2.
644 Mary L. Moreland, "COGSA Section 1304(5): 'Fair Opportunity Update" (1996) Tul. Mar. L. J. 423 at
439 on ocean carrier cases. Infra at 162-163.
645 Tempel Steel Corp. v. Landstar Inway Inc., 211 F. 3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) held that sophisticated shippers
cannot be held to 'through' (U.S.-Mexico) motor BOL limitation clauses of which they have no 'actual
notice'. The court further noticed that even if the court was to apply 'constructive notice' principles, the
Carmack Amendment prohibits limitation of liability to 0$ even in the presence of sophisticated shippers.
646 Rohner Gehrig Co. v. Tri-State Motor, 923 F. 2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1991)(dissent).
647 Mechanical Technology Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines Inc, 776 F. 2d 1085 (2nd Cir. 1985), Toledo Ticket Co.
v. Roadway Express Inc., 133 F. 3d 439 (6th Cir. 1990); ZYX-Ware Intern. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276 (U. S.
N. C. 1917); Carmara Designs Ltd. v. North American Van Lines Inc., 943 F. 2d 316 (3rd Cir. 1991); Camar
Corp. V. Preston Trucking Co., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998). See supra note 641 on rail case law
conclusions on shipper sophistication.
131
of future case law holdings on this doctrine and the need for shipper alertness will
play an important role hereinafter in the intermodal shipment of goods648.
Following the 'fair opportunity' doctrine, carrier tariffs must also be
incorporated in the BOL649. Both' actual' and' constructive' notice jurisdictions have
concluded that substantial, rather than strict, compliance suffices in this respect650.
Although incorporation by reference of carrier limitative conditions has been held to
satisfy the 'substantial compliance' standard, judicial consideration of shipper
sophistication will playa role in this regard651 .
Actual notice jurisdictions require BOL express indication (actual notice) of
the rules incorporated by reference, without regard to shipper sophistication652.
Constructive notice jurisdictions have held that in case of shipper actual notice of the
rules incorporated by reference, consideration of shipper sophistication is not
necessary653. When inconspicuous BOL clauses incorporate tariffs by reference,
shipper sophistication is a factor to consider in determining substantial
648 Arik A. Helman, "Limitation of Liability under COGSA: In the Wake of the 'Fair Opportunity' Doctrine"
(2000) 25 Tul. L. 1. 299 at 326 notes that, with respect to this doctrine, only a carefully phrased bill of lading
can completely secure a carrier's right under COGSA.
649 For substantial compliance as part of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine see supra at 128 and at note 635. Even
though the doctrine requires substantial compliance with federal regulations, absence of latter following
deregulation does not eliminate the doctrine's prerequisite that now applies with respect to carrier tariffs.
Norpin Mfg. Co. v. CTS Con-Way Transp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Mass. 1999). In Norpin the court
disaffirmed the railway case Quasar Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rwy Co., 632 F. Supp. 640 (N. D.
Ill. 1986) in that following deregulation the need for substantial compliance does not exist since tariffs are no
longer filed with the government.
650 Motor: Hughes v. United Van Lines Inc, 829 F. 2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987) (authority case), Phoner Gehrig
Co. v. Tri-State Motor Transit, 950 F. 2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1992) Banos v. Eckerd Corp., 997 F. Supp. 756 (E. D.
La 1998). Norton v. Jim Phillips Horse Transp. Inc., 910 F. 2d 821 (loth Cir. 1989). The carrier has the
burden of proving that the bill is in substantial compliance. Robinson v. Ralph G. Smith Inc., 735 F. 2d 186
(6th Cir. 1984). Rail: Comsource Independent Food Servo Co. Inc. v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 102 F. 3d
438 (9th Cir. 1996).
651 Motor: Banos v. Eckerd Corp., 997 F. Supp. 756 (E. D. La. 1998). Rail: Comsource Independent Food
Servo Co. Inc. V. Union Pacific Railway Co., 102 F. 3d 438 (9th Cir. 1996), Canon U.S.A. Inc. v. Norfolk
Southern Railway Co., 936 F. Supp. 968 (N. D. Ga. 1997). Cases on incorporation by reference of tariffs in
the BOL are much less frequently encountered in U.S. rail than in motor cases. Incorporation by reference is
important because, today, BsOL may incorporate by reference applicable (intermodal) tariffs.
652 Comsource Independent Foodservice Companies Inc. V. Union Pacific R. Co.
102 F. 3d 438 (9th Cir. 1996), Esprit de Corp. v. Victory Exp. Inc., (1999) WL 9939 (N. D. Cal., 1999)
California makes part of the 9th Circuit in the U.S. Annex No. III, Table No.1 (bis) at clxxxii.
653 Rohner Gehrig Co. Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit, 950 F. 2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1992), Swift Textiles Inc. v.
Watkins Motor Lines Inc., 799 F. 2d 697 (11th Cir. 1986).
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compliance654 . Overall, the general case law principles followed by courts in case of
shipper notice of land carrier limitative provisions are also applicable in case of
incorporation by reference within the frame of the fair opportunity doctrine.
We affirm, therefore, that there is courts division in considering shipper
sophistication as part of the substantial compliance test and, more broadly, of the
'fair opportunity' doctrine. We have also affirmed that judicial consideration of
shipper sophistication to establish presence of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine is
continuously rising in importance in both 'actual' and 'constructive' notice
jurisdictions as a result of transport deregulation.
Par. 2. Canada: In Canada, motor and rail deregulation succeeded U.S. land
carrier deregulation.
Canadian motor and rail transport deregulation started with the Motor Vehicle
Transport Act 1987 (MVTA)655 and National Transportation Act 198f56 respectively
and is still ongoing. The MVTA delegated to the provinces the authority to regulate
interstate motor carriage657. This is why Canadian trucker liability provisions for
cargo originating in or having both its origins and destination within Canada, are
654 "Rights and Remedies Common to Seller and Buyer" 67A Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 904 (2002) WESTLAW
(Tp-all) and the air case Sam 1. Majors Jewellers v. ABXInc., 117 F. 3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997).
655 R.S. 1985, c. 29 (3rd Supp.) [hereinafter MVTA]. Recent amendments and announcements of amendments
to the MVTA focuse(d) on motor carrier safety performance. Transport Minister Tables Amendments to the
MVTA, 1987 (2001) online: Transportation Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h009e.htm> (last visited: January 31, 2001). Motor Vehicle Transport
Act 1987 (2001) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/enimediaroom/backgrounders/mvta.htm> (last visited: Jan. 2001) and Transport
Minister Announces Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (2003) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2003/03-h040e.htm> (last modified: March 5, 2003).
656 R S. 1985 c. 28 (3rd Supp.) [Repealed 1996, c. 10 s. 183]. The act imposed strict railway abandonment
requirements which were lifted with the passage of the 1996 Canada Transportation Act, RS.C. 1985, c. 17
(3rd Supp.).
657 Amendments to the MVTA (2001) online: Canadian Ministry of Transport Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/enimediaroom/backgrounders/mvta.htm> (last visited: May 25, 2001). For background
information on Canada's provinces regulation of the trucking industry see F.P. Nix, R K. House & Associates
Ltd., A.M. Clayton, Clayton, Sparks & Associates Ltd., Motor Carrier Regulation: Institutions and Practices
(Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1980) at 16.
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provided for by the 'Canadian Uniform Highway Bill of Lading' (CUBOL) the
result of an inter-provincial agreement658.
Deregulation of rail carner liability took place with the Canada
Transportation Act 199rJ59 . Before deregulation took place in Canada, railroads
were not as heavily regulated as their U.S. counterparts660. This is why authors
argued that, following deregulation, private industries would not be able to do better
than Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP), Canada's major railway
lines661 . Critics warned that deregulation was "one more step in the Americanization
of Canada,662.
As in the case of the U.S. we will first concentrate on the general effects of
Canadian land transport deregulation (A) before pondering over its effects on land
carrier liability (B).
A. General Effects of Canadian Motor and Rail Transport Deregulation: a)
Rail: As in the U.S., deregulation of Canada's railway system permitted application
of railway tariffs in the absence of governmental control or publication663 by the
658 CUBOL was elaborated in 1977 by the Inter-Governmental Canadian Conference of Motor Transport
Administrators composed of the federal Minister of Transport and the provincial Ministers responsible for
Motor Vehicle Administration. It was published in Canadian Manufacturer's Association Transportation
Circular 4654 of September 23, 1977. Canada, Canadian Manufacturer's Association, The Bill of Lading:
What is Behind the Fine Print (Canada: Canadian Manufacturer's Association, 1979) at 11. All inbound
freight originating in the U.S. will be carried pursuant to the form of the BOL approved by the ICC (now
STB) and all Canadian interprovincial freight will be covered by the form of the BOL prescribed by the
province. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 28-29.
659 S.c. 1996, c. 10. In July 2001, Canada Transportation Act Review Panel in charge of a comprehensive
review of the act (every) four years after its entry into force (1996), made recommendations on competition,
mergers, commercial operations, e-business... rather than liability or insurance issues. Final Report Released
on Canada Transportation Act Review (2001) online: Transportation Canada Homepage
<http :www.reviewcta-examenltc.gc.ca/english/pages/whatsnew.htm> (last visited: July 18,2001). In response
to many of the Panel's recommendations, Canada's transport Minister, David Collenette, introduced
amendments to the Canada Transportation Act on February 25,2003. Transport Minister Releases Vision for
Future of Canada's Transportation System (2003) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2003/03-hOI3e.htm> (last modified: May 3,2003).
660 1. Luis Guasch, Robert W Hahn, "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing
Countries" World Bank Research Observer (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
661 Dan Lett, "Steel Life Line" Can. Geographic (1998) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
662 Ibid.
663 Sec. 117 of the Canada Transportation Act on the absence of tariff mandatory publication with the
government. On the presence of governmental control over rail carrier tariffs in the pre-deregulation era and
its absence in the post-deregulation era see Promech Sorting Systems B. V v. Bronco Rentals & Leasing Ltd.
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Canadian Transportation Agencl64. It also opened the way for CN and CP railways
to sell unprofitable lines to short line operators665 . These two major Canadian
railways, however, have been reluctant to give up their near monopoly over the
rails666 . Short-liners, being dependent for their existence on the large railway lines,
have hesitated to challenge the CN and CP monopoly before the courts, even if they
are given the right to do so under the Canada Transportation Act 199rf67 . In other
words, Canadian railway deregulation did not lead to vertical integration of the
sector, the duopoly or monopolistic situation was already in place before
deregulation and remained practically unchanged after it668 .
This does not mean that Canadian railways are not competitive. On the
contrary, once deregulation took place, Canadian railway freight rates remained very
competitive669. This is probably due to the 1995 CN privatization that made it the
most efficient railway company in North America and also due to the company's
expansion through mergers and acquisitions67o• Even though it is said that lower
shipping costs and good service have made Canadian railways more competitive and
(1994), M. J. No. 93 (Man. C. Q. B.). For the pre-deregulation period (in Quebec) see Les Tricots En Cell
Ltee v. CNR (1966), C. S. 561 (S. C. Que.) at 566 where the court decided that railway contractual limitation
could not take effect absent Commission approval. The much more recent case Royal Insurance Co. of
Canada v. Canadian National Railway Co. (1999), B. E. 99BE-416 (C. Que), however, applies the 1996
Canada Transportation Act art. 137 in deciding that rail carrier limitation of liability should be given effect in
the absence of governmental control over a contractual agreement.
664 On this agency see infra note 746. However, in case of complaint, there will be a CTA arbitration
procedure set in place. Interview of the author with Canadian Transportation Agency personnel (July 2,2002).
665 Dan Lett, "Steel Life Line" Can. Geographic (1998) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
666 Dan Lett, "Strategic Rail Abandonment Short-line Operators Kept at Bay" Winnipeg Free Press (1998)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Under the Canada Transportation Act railways are not obliged to sell their
lines. Ibid.
667 Ibid and Lawrence Kaufinan, "Some Rail Officials are Starting to Ask the Right Questions" (2000) online:
LEXIS (Transp. News).
668 "Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd.-Globe Says Shippers Cheer Changes as CNR, CPR Complain" Canada
Stockwatch (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
669 Peter Holle, "The Americas: U.S. Regulators jolt a U.S.-Canadian Rail Merger off Track" Wall. St. J
(2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). In 2002, it was noted that Canadian railways have benefited
shippers substantially, providing them better service, lower rates and competitively strong rail industry.
670 We refer to the CN 1998 acquisition of Illinois Central that expanded the company's southern focus.
Contrary to the U.S. railway mergers that did not go too well, CN mergers and acquisitions went quite
smoothly and service has stayed the same. Ibid. See also supra note 592 and accompanying text for railway
mergers and acquisitions within NAFTA.
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prosperous than their U.S. counterparts671, Canadian shippers have long complained
about railways poor rail service and rates672. Recently, the federal government
proposed amendments to the Canada Transportation Act intended to 'manage the
monopoly' to allow free market discipline to take prominence, promoting
competition among Canadian and U.S. railways673. Amendments are viewed by
railways as re-regulation of the industry while shippers argue that their choices will
expand in what is often a rail service monopoll74.
b) Motor: In Canadian motor transport, governmental control over carner
tariffs during the pre-deregulation period varied from province to province675 . It is
the Motor Vehicle Transport Act 1987 (MVTA) that deregulated motor transport so
that, today, motor carriers in Canada do not publish their tariffs with the provincial
governments nor are they obliged to publish them at their place of business676. This,
671 "CN to Challenge CTA Decision in Ferroequus Application" Canada Stockwatch (2002) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters), the very interesting article of Tom Murray, "The Secret to CN's Success" Trains
Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News) and "Crown Corporation v. Private Company CNR"
Winnipeg Free Press (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). This is despite the fact that the former pay
40% more taxes than the latter. Alex Binkley, "Needed Transport Policy" J Com. (1999) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). See supra at 122s for U.S. rail concentration.
672 Courtney Tower, "Canada Plan Divides Shippers, Railroads" J Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-
News). Tom Murray, "The Secret to CN's Success" Trains Magazine (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
As a Canadian Transportation Agency member of personnel suggests, shippers today insist on service and
rates rather than negotiation of carrier liability. Interview of the author with a Canadian Transportation
Agency member of personnel (May 22, 2001). Negotiation of rail carrier liability is a secondary issue.
Interview of the author with a Canadian Pacific Contracts Responsible (May 22, 2001) attributing this also to
the fact that railways have much less accidents than motor carriers so that shippers are more concerned with
rates and service rather than liability.
673 "Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd.-Globe Says Shippers Cheer Changes as CNR, CPR Complain" Canada
Stockwatch (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News) and Courtney Tower, "Canada Plan Divides Shippers,
Railroads" J Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News). The government amendments are expected to give
more discretion to the Canadian Transportation Agency to rule on shipper complaints against the railroads.
Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 F.P. Nix, R.K. House & Associates Ltd., Mississauga A.M. Clayton, Clayton, Sparks & Associates Ltd.,
Regina "Motor Carrier Regulation: Institutions and Practices" (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada Working
Paper, 1980) at 85.
676 Motor Vehicle Transport Act 1987, R.S. 1985 c. 29 (3rd Supp.) and supra note 655. It is this act that
abolished the publication requirement of Canadian motor carrier tariffs. Interview of the author with the
Department of Federal Motor Carriers personnel (May 31, 2001). The province of Quebec abolished
publication of tariff requirement with the January 13, 1988 decree No. 5088 modifying the Loi sur Ie
Transport to conform it with federal standards. Interview of the author with a Quebec Ministry of Transport-
Motor Carrier Section member of personnel (May 31, 2001). Prior to the federal act, provincial requirements
existed for the publication of tariffs with provincial governmental authorities. See i.e. John S. McNeil, Motor
Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 38 for the pre-deregulation period.
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however, did not affect CUBOL provisions that still remain in place677. The presence
of a uniform BOL has not left Canadian carriers great margins of manreuvre on
contractual modification of Canadian motor carrier liability.
B. Contractual or Statutory Uniformity of Canadian Land Carrier Liability
Provisions? Canadian rail carriage follows U.S. pattern of contractual uniformity of
rail carrier liability provisions. Canadian motor carriers, on the other hand, oppose
statutorily uniform liability provisions to U.S. contractually uniform ones.
a) Rail Carriers-Contractual Uniformity: The National Transportation Act
198r78 and its successor, the Canada Transportation Act 1996, applicable today,
maintain the principle of freedom of contracting in delineating carrier liability679.
This is conform with the U.S Staggers Act that follows the same principle of
freedom of contracting.
What's more, rail carrIers III Canada can, and in most cases do, enter in
confidential contracts with shippers pursuant to deregulation680. As is the case in the
U.S., the terms of these contracts are confidential and, therefore, not made available
for inspection to the public681 . Finally, when a carrier does not enter into a
677 The 1987 legislation deregulates motor transport in other areas, such as motor carrier licensing or tariff
publication but not in the area of carrier liability. On motor carrier licensing nation-wide procedures under the
MVTA see Canada, Ministry of Transport, Freedom to Move in Canada's New Transportation Environment,
(Ottawa: Ministry of Transport, 1988) at 8.
678 R.S.C. 1987, c. 28 s. 335.
679 S.C. 1996 c. 10, Subsec. 137(1) provides: "A railway company shall not limit or restrict its liability to a
shipper for the movement of traffic except by means of a written agreement signed by the shipper or by an
association or other body representing shippers". The Act is accompanied by a regulation implementing it:
Railway Traffic Liability Regulation SOR/91-488 [subsequent amendments (1993 and 1998)] available online:
Canadian Department of Transportation <http://www.tc.gc.caJActsregs/ct-ltc/ct6.html> (last modified: April 4,
2003). Lufty Ltd. v. C.P.R (1973), F. C. 1115 (F. C. C.) for the formerly applicable rules to railway carriage
and Promech Sorting Systems B. V. v. Bronco Rentals & Leasing Ltd. (1994), DRS 94-12120 (Man. C. Q. 8.)
for the passage from regulation of rail carrier liability to deregulation. On recent amendments of the act see
supra note 659.
680 See s. 116(2) and s. 120 of the 1996 Canada Transportation Act on confidential contracting. Today, in
Canada, three fourths of all railway contracts for the transport of goods are confidential contracts. Canadian
legislation on confidential contracting resulted from competition with U.S. rail carriers who, following the
Staggers Act, were entering into confidential contracts putting at a disadvantage Canadian railway carriers.
Interview of the author with a Quebec Ministry of Transport analyst (Nov. 24, 2000). "Railway Users Want
End to Illegal Billing System" The Hamilton Spectator (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
681 Ibid. Supra at 119.
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confidential contract with the shipper and decides to issue a tariff, this tariff must be
made available for public inspection but it is not subject to governmental control682.
In all cases, rail carriers in Canada can contractually limit their liability683. In
this way, the two major Canadian railways CN (Canadian National) and CP
(Canadian Pacific) apply the same liability limitation amounts for the contents of
their international intermodal container shipments. 10.000$CAD for a container
under 40 feet, 20.000$CAD for a container over 40 feet or ocean carrier liability
under the ocean BOL684. Application of these limitations depends on whether
'sufficient notice' of these is given by the carrier to the shipper on the basis of
latter's sophistication, equal bargaining power with the carrier and parties intention,
all these being interrelated concepts685. In this way, knowledgeable shippers are
deemed to have notice of BOL limitations and possibility to declare value even
682 Richard Lande, Railway Law and the National Transportation Act (Ontario: Butterworths Canada Ltd.,
1989) at 85.
683 Section 137 of the 1996 Canada Transportation Act. Interview of the author with CP Legal Section (May
23,2001).
684 Annex No. I, Tables No.7, 8 at xc-xci and xcvi and infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 2(A) for CN
and CP tariffs. The two railway provisions are similar but not identical. This is contractual uniformity
(informal harmonization). Supra at 20.
685 Spencer v. CPR (1913), 13 D. L. R. 836 (Ont. S. C.), (multirnodal) Promech Sorting Systems B. V v.
Bronco Rentals & Leasing Ltd. (1995), DRS 95-10083 (Man. C. A.), Quebec Liquor Corp. v. Dart Europe
(1979), F. C. J. No. 518 (F. C. C.) par. 32-33 the latter deciding on parties intention. Parties' intent and
sophistication are interrelated concepts. Supra note 641 and infra notes 685, 714, 812 for parties intention.
Shippers with 'equal' or 'relatively equal' bargaining power (EBP) to the carrier are negotiating on an equal
footing with him. This is opposed to an 'extreme' disparity of bargaining power between carriers and shippers.
U.S.: Automobile Logistics Productivity Import Systems Inc. v. Burlington Motor Carriers Inc., 906 F. Supp.
446 (E. D. Tenn. 1997). In Canada the term is also used in commercial and transport cases: Alberta Garment
Manufacturing Co. v. Purolator Courier Ltd (2000), A. J. No. 317 (Alta. Pro C.). EBP shippers are large
shippers who overcome the inequality of bargaining power inherent to a contract of adhesion (transport
contract) because of the volume of their shipments and nature of their cargo rather than their sophistication.
Mary R. Brooks, "International Competitiveness Assessing and Exploiting Competitive Advantage by Ocean
Container Carriers" Discussion Papers in International Business No 105, Dalhousie University, Halifax
(1992). Theoretically, therefore, shipper sophistication contributes but is not synonymous to EBP. See, in this
respect, U.S. Mechanical Technology Inc. V. Ryder Trucks Lines Inc., 776 F. 2d 1085 (2nd Cir. 1985) holding
that shipper sophistication is based on commercial awareness and should be distinguished from EBP. Canada:
interview with Smith Stephen (Professor of contract law, McGill University) tel: 514-395-6635. In practice,
however, case law in the neighbouring countries uses these terms interchangeably. U.S.: Marvin Lumber and
Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, (1998) WL 1056973 (D. Minn. 1998) using the frequently employed expression
'knowledgeable parties of EBP'. Canada: interview with Smith Stephen (Professor of contract law, McGill
University) 27 September 2000, tel: 514-395-6635. Alberta Garment Manufacturing Co. v. Purolator Courier
Ltd (2000), A. J. No. 317 (Alta. Pro C.) stating that the parties had EBP since the shipper was sophisticated.
138
though they have not directly dealt with the carrier686. This test approximates U.S.
'constructive notice' test applicable within the context of the fair opportunity
doctrine for contractual limitation ofcarrier liability687.
b) Motor Carriers-Statutory Uniformity: CUBOL provisions are much more
clearly defined than their U.S. counterparts688 . In effect, whereas U.S. motor carriers
apply today contractually uniform liability limitations, their Canadian counterparts
maintain statutorily uniform liability limitations, 4.41$CAD per kilo or 2.00$CAD
per pound, incorporated in the CUBOL (statutory uniformity)689. It is not only that
Canadian motor limitations are lower and more clearly defined than their U.S.
counterpart (25.00$USD per pound)69o. It is also that U.S. motor carriers make use,
today, of the same BOL as before deregulation making reference to 'filed rates'
despite abolition of the latter691 . This makes U.S. BsOL less shipper appealing.
We have seen that contractual limitation of U.S. land carrier liability can work
at shipper detriment in the post-deregulation period (i.e. inadvertence clauses). We
have also seen that validity of contractual limitative clauses depends upon court
willingness to consider or not shipper sophistication, whether this concerns the
substantial compliance test or, generally, the 'fair opportunity' doctrine692. In
Canada, uniform CUBOL provisions give rise to the following two questions: first,
we wonder whether CUBOL provisions are mandatory or whether they can be
contractually modified by agreement between the carrier and the shipper. We
686 (intermodal) Promech Sorting Systems B. V. v. Bronco Rentals & Leasing Ltd. (1995), DRS 95-10083
(Man. C. A.), Aims International Freight Inc. v. Burlington Northern Customs Brokerage Inc. (1989), B. C.
1. No. 1034 (B. C. S. C.).
687 Supra at 128s.
688 Interview of the author with a transportation law attorney in Montreal (Dec. 6, 1999).
689 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 29. While it is true that
departures from CUBOL provisions exist from one province to the other, terms and conditions of motor
carriage in Canada are 'essentially the same'. Ibid at 12 and Canada, Canadian Manufactuer's Association,
The Bill ofLading: What is behind the Fine Print (Canada: Canadian Manufacturer's Association, 1979) at
11. Annex No. I, Table No.5 at lv-lxv and supra note 658 and accompanying text for CUBOL and infra at
Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. I(B) for further analysis. Statutory uniformity corresponds more to 'formal'
harmonization as herein presented, supra at 20.
690 Infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. I(B) for further details.
691 Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in North
America, (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1996) at 51.
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wonder, more specifically, whether 'inadvertence clauses' or, generally, limitation of
liability clauses may be encountered in the Canadian BOL. Second, if contractual
limitation of Canadian motor carrier liability is possible, under what conditions does
it take effect? In other words, do we apply the U.S. 'fair opportunity' doctrine and
'substantial compliance' test in Canadian motor carriage?
Since CUBOL provisions were intended to create uniform inter-provincial
liability terms and conditions of motor carriage, contractual limitation of carrier
liability should normally not be permitted since it would put in danger the uniformity
the document was intended to advance. However, CUBOL clause 18 provides that:
Subject to article 19 any alteration, or addition, or erasure in the bill of
lading shall be signed or initialled by the consignor or his agent and the
originating carrier or his agent and unless so acknowledged shall be
without effect693 .
The word 'alteration' could be interpreted as contractual limitation or increase
of carrier liability. John S. McNeil argues, in this respect, that there is no prohibition
in the legislation against the carrier negotiating special terms and' bargain either by
way of addition to or deletion of the statutorily prescribed conditions ,694. He adds
that 'it would require strong legislative language in order to arrive at the conclusion
that the freedom of contract that exists at common law has been removed'
(contractualist document)695.
In this sense, common law provinces case law frequently mentions the
possibility of contractual limitation of carrier liability, often citing McNeil on this
issue. For instance, in Nova Scotia Supreme Court case Chet's Transport Inc. v.
692 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. l(C).
693 Clause 19 provides that in case of difference between the actual weight of the shipment and the weight
mentioned on the BOL, the carrier can modify the weight shown on the BOL. This modification of the BOL
provisions does not need shipper consent since it is based on a matter of pure fact rather than being dependent
on shipper agreement. See Annex No. I, Table No.5 at lv-lxv.
694 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1997) at 59. The author makes
specific reference to contractual limitation of carrier liability. Ibid at 60. Also interview of the author with a
transportation attorney in Montreal (Dec. 6, 1999).
695 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 60.
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Seaway Distributors Ltd. and Alberta provincial court case Banks v. Budget Transfer
Ltd. 696, the courts cite verbatim McNeil and state: 'where a carrier has negotiated a
contract reducing his liability ... he has the onus probandi... '. Without specifically
citing McNeil, another case states that 'any limitation ofthe motor carrier's liability
... could only be made by an agreement (between the carrier and the shipper)'697. The
court refers to the landmark case Belbin at al. v. S.M T (Eastern Ltd/98 that,
following English and Canadian railway cases on the issue, held that the carrier did
not give shipper sufficient notice and shipper had no actual or constructive
knowledge of carrier limitative conditions699. In the absence of shipper actual
knowledge of limitative conditions (communication given to shipper by the carrier),
shipper constructive knowledge was examined by the court on the basis of his
physical condition (defective eyesight), his ability to read and understand English
and his (lack oj) experience in transporting goods700. This leads to the conclusion
that contractual limitation of CUBOL liability provisions is possible in Canadian
common law provinces and its implementation is based on the 'sufficient notice' test
which depends, among other things, on shipper experience (prior dealings) with the
. 701
carrIer .
696 (1987), N. S. J. No. 368 (N. Sc. S. C.) and (1986), A J. No. 1367 (Alta. Pro C.) respectively.
697 Clark v. Sameday Courier (1992), 126 N. B. R. (2d) 330 (Q. B.). More recently, Rinehart V. United Parcel
Services of Canada Ltd (1997), A N.-B. no. 224 (N. Br. P. C.) cited Clark on the same issue. Bank of
Montreal V. Over land Freight Lines Ltd [1989], B. C. J. No. 572 (B. C. S. C.) held that contractual
limitations will be taken into account by courts.
698 (1947), 21 M. P. R. 105 (N. B. S. C.). The case was later cited by Clark V. Sameday Courier and Rinehart
V. United Parcel Services ofCanada (1992), 126 N. B. R. (2d) 330 (Q. B.) already mentioned herein.
699 The New Brunswick court referred to Spencer v. Canadian Pacific Railways (1913), 13 D. 1. R. 836 (ant.
S. C.)(headnote).
700 Belbin at at. V. S.MT. (Eastern Ltd) (1947), 21 M. P. R. 105 (S. C. N. B.) at 110 and at 124-125 (in
concreto examination). In this respect, the court cited numerous English cases such as Parker v. Southeastern
Railway Co. (1877),1. R. 2 C. P. D. 416 (C. A) (ibid at 114) and Marriott V. Yeoward Brothers (1909), 791.
J. K. B. 114 at 118 (K. B. D.) referring to the Parker case (ibid at 115). On shipper's sophistication in Canada
and the U.S. see supra notes 641,685 and infra notes 714,812.
701 Pro Smith Stephen adds that presence of sufficient notice also depends on how unusual or onerous the
clause in question is. In this respect, see Tilden Rent-a-Car V. Clendenning (1978), 18 O. R. 2d 601 (ant. C.
A) where in the presence of sophisticated contracting parties but very onerous clauses the court invalidated
these clauses. See also Nor-Tee Electric Ltd v. EJB Holdings Inc. (1998), DRS 98-17447 (Man. Q. B.) where
in a commercial contract sophisticated parties are not found to have notice of substantial liability provisions
typed in small print. Eagle Dancer Enterprises Ltd V. Southman Printing Ltd (1992),6 B. 1. R. 2d 45 (B. C.
S. C.) for sufficient notice in general. Pr. Stephen notes, however, that courts will frequently conclude that
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The 'sufficient notice' test is not far from the u.s. 'constructive notice' test
used in relation with land carrier contractual limitation of liability (fair opportunity
doctrine). In effect, both 'sufficient notice' and 'constructive notice' tests are based
on shipper sophistication to determine shipper notice of carrier limitative conditions,
thus, their applicability to the shipper702 •
Article 8 of the 1999 regulation governing motor BsOL in the province of
Quebec provides that BOL clauses therein mentioned are the minimal clauses that a
BOL may contain703, said to be d'ordre public704 . In this respect, the prevailing view
seems to indicate that 'minimal' (d'ordre public) BOL clauses prevent parties from
going below the statutorily defined limitation of 4.41 $CAD per kilo, although
sophisticated shippers are deemed to have knowledge of onerous contractual clauses. Interview of the author
with Professor Smith Stephen Professor at Mcgill University (Sept. 28, 2000) tel: (514) 398-6635.
702 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. l(C) for the constructive notice test of the fair opportunity
doctrine. Note that U.S. doctrine and case law will sometimes use the terms sufficient notice and fair
opportunity as mutually explanatory. Michael Sturley, "An overview of the considerations involved in
handling the cargo case" (1997) Tul. Mar. L. I. 263 at 344-345. See also "Cases: COGSA" (1994) Mar. L.
Pract. 720 at 730.
703 Reglement sur les Exigences Applicables aux Connaissements, Nov. 3, 1999 online: Institut Canadien d'
Information Juridique Homepage <http://www.iijcan.org/qc/regl/rcqc/20030530/r.q.t-12r.6/tout.html>.This
regulation implements the Loi sur les Transports (1998) L. R. Q. c. T-12, a. 5(n) and contains, in Annex II,
the minimal provisions of the motor BOL. Annex II of said regulation reproducing BOL Model provisions be
found in Annex No. I, Table No.5 at lxiii. It is the Loi sur Ie Camionage (1998) L. R. Q. C-5.1 s. 80(7.1) that
originally provided for the content of the BOL. This act, however, was abolished by the Loi Concernant les
Proprietaires et Exploitants des Vehicules Lourds (1998) L.R.Q. c. 40 and its BOL provisions were only
revived by the above-mentioned Loi sur les Transports. See also case law: Les Agences de Kamouraska Inc.
v. Speedway Express Ltd. (1983), C. P. 206 (C. P.); Cigna Assurance Cie du Canada v. Catlen Transport
(1998), A. Q. no. 2924 (C. S. Que.); Hydro-Quebec v. Grant Float Services Inc. (1987), I. E. 87-1018 (C. S.-
Montreal).
704 Transport Brazeau Inc. v. Mometal Inc. (1985), I.E. 85-497 (C.P.) held that, generally, transport laws
serve general welfare and are, therefore, 'd' 'ordre public'. As it was stated in Mongrain v. Auger et autres
(1967), B.R. 332 at 334, the concept of 'ordre public' is varied and relative. In effect, it may be very difficult
to determine if the legislator intended a specific rule to serve public welfare, in which case it would be
'd'ordre public', or private interests, in which case it would not be 'd'ordre public'. The case further states
that when doubt exists, it is wiser to say that the rules are not 'd'ordre public'. Ibid.
There seem to be two views of what the consequences of non-compliance with statutory 'ordre public' BOL
clauses may be. According to the first one, the contract will be null and void as contrary to the 'ordre public'.
Following the second one, the contract will be given effect but the carrier who will not respect its statutory
obligations will not be able to benefit from the statutorily protective provisions. In trying to avoid nullity of
the document (adherence to the first version of 'ordre public') certain Quebec courts declare BOL clauses not
d' 'ordre public' deciding, however, in the end, that non-compliance with BOL clauses (not 'd'ordre public')
will deprive carrier from the limitation of liability benefit. Les Agences de Kamouraska Inc. v. Speedway
Express Ltd. (1983), C. P. 206 (C. P.) where the BOL did not contain the statutory limitation of liability
amount. Based on the Kamouraska holding the same conclusion was reached in Hydro-Quebec v. Grant Float
Services Inc. (1987), J. E. 87-1018 (C. S.-Montreal).
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contractual increase of carrier liability is not prohibited705. However, in sanctioning
regulatory reference to 'minimal' provisions, Les Agences de Kamouraska Inc. v.
Speedway Express Ltd. stated that BOL Clause 18 allows contractual modifications
(i.e. limitations or increases) of carrier liability, such modifications also constituting
'minimal' provisions706. This holding leaves judges a great margin of appreciation in
considering contractual increase as well as limitation of carrier liability707.
The more recent case Trafi-Tech Inc. v. Transport All Type/Division de Jerry
Cohen Forwarders Ltd708 sets aside the Kamouraska holding on the grounds that the
latter referred to legislation not in force at the time of the Trafi-Tech decision. The
court explained that the 1999 Quebec regulation on motor carriers and art. 2034 of
the 1994 Quebec Civil Code (stating that a motor carrier can limit its liability only
within the conditions prescribed by law), were not in force at the time of the
Kamouraska holding that based its decision on interpretation of prior regulations.
The court finally found that it is courts that should interpret legal provisions and,
therefore, art. 10 of the BOL and the said regulation. It concluded that shipper
705 The concept 'minimal provisions' accompanied by the 'ordre public' concept appear very frequently in
case law in the province of Quebec and prohibit going below (or beyond -depending on the context-) the
'minimal' regulatory provisions. For transport cases referring to minimal provisions and the 'ordre public'
concept as applied by case law see supra notes 703, 704. (non-transport case) Comitli Paritaire de I' Industrie
du Meuble v. A.JS.L.M Corp. (1991),1. E. 91-1552 (c. A. Que.) held that the employer cannot increase the
minimum work hours provided for in governmental decrees since these provisions are d' ordre public and they
establish minimal provisions. Habitations Desjardins du Centre-Ville v. Lamontage (1996), J. E. 96-2060 (C.
Que.) held that tacit renunciation of 'ordre public' provisions is not possible. Reasoning by way of analogy,
inadvertence clauses would probably be prohibited in the province of Quebec. Libarian v. Goulet (1995),1. E.
95-1078 (c. S. Que.) held that minimal insurance coverage provided for by legislation is 'd'ordre public' and
every contract must contain provisions at least equal to the ones provided by legislation. Also, interview of the
author with Pro Lefebvre, Professor at the University of Montreal (May 15, 2001) tel: (514) 343-7202.
706 (1983), C. P. 206 (c. P.) at 209-210. We remind the reader that BOL clause 18 is entitled Alterations and
governs modification of the BOL by the carrier and the shipper. Supra at 139.
707 Mr. Fran«ois Rouette, the attorney that pleaded the Kamouraska case defending the carrier, affirms that
there is no doubt, in private law practice, that contractual limitation of motor carrier liability may be given
effect in the province of Quebec. Interview of the author with Fran«ois Rouette, transportation law attorney in
Quebec City and Montreal, Flynn Rivard & Associates (Nov. 27,2000) tel: (514) 288-7156 and (418) 692
3751.
708 (1999),1. Q. no. 2571 (c. Q.). This is the only case that refers to the Kamouraska holding.
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compensation should be based on the weight of the lost items and not on the weight
of the total shipment as BOL clause 10 states709 •
On the basis of the Trafi-Tech holding we opme that the latter did not
overrule Kamouraska in its substance. On the contrary, each one of these two cases
complements the other. Trafi-Tech merely made explicit the legal limits of motor
carrier liability (1999 regulation, BOL clauses) and invited courts to interpret their
provisions, something that both Trafi-Tech and Kamouraska decisions do for BOL
Clauses 10 and 18 ('legal limits of carrier liability') respectively. Both courts
interpretations of said clauses should be considered valid under the present state of
case law in the Province of Quebec. We disagree with Trafi-Tech conclusion that
Kamouraska referred to outdated legislation, at least as far as the issue of contractual
limitation of carrier liability is concerned, simply because the same principles on the
issue (concept d'ordre public, minimal provisions) were in force at the time of both
cases holdings even though contained in different enactments. The Kamouraska
holding concluded that contractual limitation of carrier liability is possible whereas
the Trafi-Tech holding did not reason on this precise issue but, rather, interpreted
clause 10. It did not consider the Kamouraska holding simply because it was based
on laws not applicable at the time and did not go further to consider the substance of
applicable laws at the time of the Kamouraska case as far as liability limitation is
concerned, or otherwise.
In reasoning this way, we understand and should make clear that even if we
admit the validity of the Kamouraska holding, this case represents the minority view
in Quebec case law which, generally, does not sanction contractual limitation of
carrier liability clauses. The fact that we have found no Quebec cases sanctioning
contractual limitation of carrier liability is proof that in Quebec, as in Canada for that
709 Ibid. Clause 10 of the BOL states motor carrier liability limitation amounts and does not comment on
modification of carrier liability except for shipper declaration of value.
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matter, contractual modification of motor carner liability is not often used71O•
However, permissive language in the Kamouraska holding may lead, one day, to
sanctioning contractual limitation of carrier liability in Quebec as this is currently
done before the courts of Canadian common law provinces711. If courts sanctioned
contractual limitation, shipper sophistication would undoubtedly be considered in
giving them effece12.
Overall, Canadian and U.S. courts seem to sanction contractual limitation of
motor carrier liability, with the exception of the Canadian province of Quebec that
excludes this possibility despite permissive case law language existing in this
respect. U.S. and Canadian common law jurisdictions take into account shipper
sophistication in determining notice the latter has of contractual liability provisions.
This is especially true considering the recent shift of U.S. 'actual' notice
jurisdictions towards 'constructive' notice jurisdictions. We cannot but encourage,
once again, the initiative of the Ninth Circuit to provide uniformity, not only at the
domestic level but, also, with respect to the Canadian common law case law in
adopting the constructive notice test.
For the sake of uniformity one could argue that Quebec courts should align
their case law with common law principles of contractual limitation of carrier
liability. Such a suggestion, however, would increase uncertainty in the relation
between motor carriers and shippers since, as we have seen, the latter may easily be
'trapped' in carrier advantageous BOL contractual limitations. This is not to say that
generalization of Quebec courts traditional view of prohibition of contractual
limitation of carrier liability should be considered. The deregulation trend seems to
710 Interview of the author with Canadian Transportation Agency personnel (Nov. 29 and Dec. 1, 2000) and
Colin Barrett, "Inadvertence Clauses in Canada?" Traffic World (2000) online: LEXIS (Transp. News). The
author attributes the absence of inadvertence clauses in Canada to the fact that Canadian motor carrier liability
limits are lower than U.S. ones and that in the U.S. there has been no inter-state agreement on application of
uniform liability provisions as it is the case in Canada. Ibid. See also infra note 1155 and accompanying text.
7ll Supra at 139s.
712 Interview ofthe author with a transportation attorney in Montreal (Nov. 27,2000).
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have been well anchored in common law legislation and practices. Undoing this
trend would go beyond the reach of what would be realistically feasible.
c) Incorporation by Reference: Contrary to U.s. courts, Canadian courts do
not refer to motor or rail BOL 'substantial compliance' with regulatory provisions or
tariffs. They regard, however, 'incorporation by reference' as a valid way to stipulate
regulatory provisions or tariffs in a BOL provided that parties have reasonable
opportunity to consider the referenced terms and to object. In this sense, courts apply
the 'sufficient notice' test before sanctioning clauses incorporating by reference
motor regulatory provisions or rail tariffs in the BOL, making shipper sophistication
or contracting parties intent the corollary of 'incorporation by reference'713. Case law
advises that parties intent and shipper sophistication in applying regulatory
provisions are interrelated concepts714.
It is evident, therefore, that Canadian courts will take into account shipper
sophistication in giving effect to contractual limitation of land carrier liability and
incorporation by reference of regulatory provisions or tariffs into a BOL. This is to
be contrasted to U.s. cases which are divided between 'actual' and 'constructive'
notice jurisdictions on the basis of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine with respect to
contractual limitation of land carrier liability and 'substantial compliance'. However,
we can detect a developing tendency of U.S. courts to adopt the 'constructive' notice
713 (intermodal) Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559 (Ont. C. A.) indicating
that both carriers and shippers were sophisticated. (Motor): Aurora TV and Radio Ltd v. Gelco Express Ltd.
(1990),65 Man. R. (2d) 145 (Man. Q. B.), M A. N.-B. WDiesel v. Kingsway Transports Ltd. (1993), 15 O.
R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.) and (non transport case) G &W Electric Ltd. v. Commission Hydro-electrique du
Quebec (1995), A. Q. no. 694 (C. A Que.) on shipper sophistication. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo
Claims 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 29-30 and at 32. In Cornwall Gravel Company Ltd. v. Purolator
Courier Ltd. (1978), 18 O. R. (2d) 551 (Ont. S. C.) and JWI Jewellery World International Ltd. v. Jarret
Quinn Jewellers Ltd. (1989), B. C. J. No. 2312 (B. C. S. C.) the court referred to parties intent and not shipper
sophistication. For U.S. 'substantial compliance' test see supra at 131s.
714 Parties' sophistication is a variable to consider in determining their intent to include a specific provision in
a contract. This is the case for the U.S. and Canada. Canada: Bills Investments Ltd. v. First Investors Corp.
(1990), 72 D. L. R. (4th) 32 (Sask. C. A). In the field of transportation see Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian
Pacific Ltd. (1988), O. J. No. 1807 (S. C. Ont.) and N.s. Tractors & Equipment Ltd. v. Tarros Gage (1986) F.
C. J. No. 127 (F. C. C.). U.S.: New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 1992 WL 33861 (D. C.
Flda. 1992).
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test and, therefore, converge with Canadian case law III considering shipper
sophistication.
Conclusion
Canadian motor and rail deregulation seems to have evolved more smoothly
than its U.S. counterparts. In both countries, however, land (with the exception of
Quebec motor) carrier liability provisions can be subject to contractual limitation
even though parties do not have frequently recourse to it since they have attained
either contractual or statutory uniformity of carrier liability provisions. BOL
'incorporation by reference' of or 'substantial compliance' with land carrier tariffs or
regulatory provisions is also possible in the U.S. and Canada.
Although U.S. land case law seems to be divided on the issue of
considering or not shipper sophistication before giving effect to contractual liability
limitations or provisions 'substantially complying' with tariffs or regulations, we
note case law shifting towards consideration of shipper sophistication. Consideration
of shipper sophistication is the rule in Canadian land cases in putting into effect
contractual limitation of carrier liability provisions and incorporation by reference
clauses. It is more than evident, therefore, that following land carrier deregulation in
the U.S. and Canada the 'judicial safety net' based on shipper sophistication is
increasingly rising in importance. Along with it, rise uncertainty of judges
conclusions and the necessity of case law codification to increase clarity, stability in
trade and shipper reliance on transportation services.
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Section II: U.S. and Canadian Ocean Carrier Deregulation and its Effect
on Carrier Liability
Ocean carnage IS the main component of intermodal transportation and
currently subject to international conventions governing terms and conditions of
carriage. Even though not as popular and expedient means of transportation as trucks
and rails, vessels are highly suitable for particularly large shipments and overall
maintain very competitive rates with rail and motor carriers at the NAFTA level715 .
International ocean carriers in the NAFTA countries operate, since the 1870s,
under a system of price-fixing cartels known as conferences716. Member carriers of
these conferences must adhere to a common tariff applicable by all members of the
conference717.
Conference Immunity-Intermodalism: Price-fixing conference agreements in
the U.S., Canada, Mexico and Europe benefit from antitrust immunity718. This is
explained by conference's high investments in vessels, the need for regular prices at
standard rates (economic reasonsf19 and the fact that most jurisdictions for which
715 Canada, Canadian Transportation Law Reporter, Canada-U.S.-Mexico (Toronto: CCH International Press
Ltd. 1997) at 100-425. To take probably an extreme example, for general cargo entering Mexico by sea
exporters can expect a 4-5 day delay in addition to transit ties of 10-20 days as goods are custom-cleared and
move to importers warehouse. Ibid.
716 Andrew M. Danas, Globalization and the Future of the Federal Maritime Commission, (1997) online:
Grove, Jaskiewics and Cobert Homepage <http://www.gjcobert.comlamdtli97.html> (last visited: May 23,
2001).
717 "A key feature of conference operations is the control of price competition; member lines must adhere to a
common tariff'. Canada, Ministry of Transport, Freedom to Move Act-A Framework for Transportation
Reform (Ottawa: Ministry of Transport, 1985) at 43-44.
718 For Europe see (article 81(3) of the Treaty of Rome) and supra at 93s. Canada: Shipping Conferences
Exemption Act, (1987) R. S. 1985, c. 17 (3d Supp.) Sec. 4. 1(a) maintained by the Canada Shipping Act 2001.
U.S.: Sec. 7 of the 1994 Shipping Act as amended by the 1998 Ocean Shipping Reform Act online: Am.
Shipper Homepage <http://www.americanshipper.comlShipping_Act_1998.htm#section7> (last visited: May
24,2001). For a more detailed analysis of the Canadian, U.S. and EEC legislation on conferences price fixing
see Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European
Economic Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major
Issues" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 141 s. Antitrust laws prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade, such as
price-fixing conspiracies, corporate mergers likely to reduce the competitive vigor of particular markets and
predatory acts designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power. Overview (Antitrust Division) (2002) online:
U.S. Department of Justice <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/overview.html> (last modified: daily).
719 European Commission, "Interim Report of the Multimodal Group" (Brussels, March 1996) at 11. The
emergence of conferences was made in the hopes that they may prevent cut throat competition among
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international ocean transportation is a vital link to other countries, have sanctioned
conferences (political reason)720. Stability of rates for scheduled services enables
shippers to know reasonably far in advance the cost of transporting their products
and, therefore, their selling price on the market of destination whatever the time,
vessel or conference ship owner involved721 .
Today, Canada, the U.S. and Europe are gravitating towards introducing more
competition in conferences either through adopting more competitive provisions or
through consideration of removing the anti-trust immunity that the conferences
enjoy722. The introduction of competition rules in the conference structure threatens
their influence and existence723. The cautious approach taken today towards removal
of the antitrust immunity is justified by avoidance of trade disputes, costly
international litigation, service disruptions, financial uncertainty for shipping lines
and ensuing costs that would ultimately be born by the consumer724.
Opponents of the collective ratemaking practices suggest that ocean rates are
kept artificially high by conferences allowing, thereby, inefficient carriers to remain
in business725. They are quick to point out that many conference members are
already offering independent rate actions, service contracts to large or key customers
and preferential treatment at key ports to differentiate their organisation on the basis
of price and service726. Shipping lines and proponents of conferences argue that
steamship lines. Left unchecked, this destructive competition would lead to many maritime company failures
and irregularities in shipping schedules. Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and
Maritime Ports" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 205 at 209.
720 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major Issues"
(1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 141 at 164.
72l Ibid.
722 Ibid at 187.
723 Harold 1. Creel, "Shipping Antitrust Law" Congr. Testimony (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
724 Ibid.
725 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned
from Airline Deregulation" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 205 at 210. Opponents are mainly shippers or shipper
associations. In effect, in many cases, conferences have been protecting carriers by flexing their muscles and
increasing rates even when there is no shortage of container slots. Clayton Boyce, "What Goes Down" J Com.
(1999) online: WESTLAW (Newspapers).
726 Christopher Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned
from Airline Deregulation" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 205 at 210.
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conferences stabilize rates, control capacity and maintain adequate profit levels for
the ocean carrier industry. They add that bankruptcies caused by a free market
pricing system would cause major disruptions in the timely movement of
international commerce727.
Under the present state of affairs, antitrust immunity in the U.S. is granted in
case of price-fixing agreements between two conferences or between a conference
and an independent liner728. It also takes effect in the presence of international
intermodal rates set by conference members individually or jointly (consortium
acting as a single entity)729. This promotes the already present horizontal integration
among sea and inland carriers in the NAFTA region73o. However, agreements
between 'the conference' and 'another mode' are not covered by the immunity731.
In Europe, the European Commission has refused to extent conference's
antitrust immunity to any type of price-fixing agreement with inland carriage except
in case of an exemption732. Agreements between independent liners and
conferences733, inland carriers and conferences or inland carriers and conference
members acting jointly (the latter permitted in the U.S.) are illegal in the EU that
does not favour horizontal integration734. The EC exemption is granted only to
agreements between conferences. In concluding in this way, the Commission has
727 Ibid at 209.
728 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major Issues"
(1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 141 at 187.
729 Ibid at note 173. The conference exemption does not apply to through carriage within the U.S.. Christopher
Clott, Gary S. Wilson, "Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports" (1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 205 at 207.
730 For instance, the joint venture called Maersk-Rail Van LLC will strengthen the ocean shipping of the
former company (Maersk) with the inland capacities of the latter (Rail Van LLC) throughout the NAFTA
countries. John Mclaughlin, "International: United States, Sea-Land and Maersk set for Intermodal Odyssey"
Lloyd's List. Int'!. (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
731 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major Issues"
(1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 141 at 182 and at note 173 and Shashikumar N., Shatz G. L., "The Impact of U.S.
Deregulatory Changes on International Intermodal Movements" (2000) Transp. J. 514.
732 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few major Issues"
(1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 141 at 182 and at note 173.
733 This is the case most often present. Ibid at 189.
734 Ibid at 187. Supra at 94s.
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considered that price stability that would result from intermodal price-fixing is not a
sufficient argument for such a serious restriction on competition735.
Like the U.S., Canada provides for antitrust immunity of price-fixing
agreements between conferences736. Price-fixing agreements between the conference
and inland carriers are not covered by the immunity so that the matter is left in the
hands of the courts to decide737. Likewise, agreements between independent liners
and conferences are not within the scope of the immunity738. As in the U.S.,
however, agreements between inland carriers and conference members acting
individually or jointly (consortium) are allowed in Canada739.
The variable scope of the ocean carriage antitrust immunity III the U.S.,
Canada and Europe has rendered contentious its very existence740. U.S. and
Canadian ocean shipping deregulation Par. 1 confirms the dismantling of
conferences and the rising in importance of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine (U.S.) and
the 'sufficient notice' test (Canada) Par. 2.
Par. 1. U.S. and Canada: To enhance competition of the already expanded
shipping industry, the U.S. 1984 Shipping Act commenced ocean carrier deregulation
that continued with 1998 OSRA (Ocean Shipping Reform Act-former Senate Bill S-
414f41, an act that did away with the remaining 1984 Shipping Act shipper
735 Ibid at 19. James P. Hoffa, "Shipping and Anti-trust" Cong. Testimony (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters) noted that the European Commission held and a European Court affirmed that the members of a
conference had infringed upon their ocean carrier antitrust exemption by "agreeing on prices for inland
transport services as part of a multimoda1 transport operation for the carriage of containerized cargo between
northern Europe and the Far East". See also supra at 94s.
736 Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major Issues"
(1999) 26 Transp. L. J. 141 at 187.
737 Ibid at note 173.
738 Ibid at 183.
739 Ibid at 183.
740 Ibid at 187.
741 Shipping Act 46 U.S.c. ss 1701-1721 (1984) and Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) Pub. L. 105-258 (46
U. S. C. ss 1701-18) (1998). The legislative procedure for the adoption of the OSRA 1998 started in 1995
with adoption of the OSRA 1995 by the House of Representatives. The legislation was stalled in the Senate
that finally adopted an amended version of the act on October 9, 1998. The text finally adopted by the House
of Representatives and the Senate is known as the OSRA 1998.
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protections. Under the 1984 Shipping Act and until May 1, 1999 (entering into effect
of 1998 OSRA), U.S. shipping conferences were operating under the control of the
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)742. The FMC standard of review of
conference agreements and tariffs was that they must not produce a reduction in
competition, an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an unreasonable
increase in transportation costs743. OSRA changed the rules of the game.
In Canada, it is the Shipping Conference Exemption Act 1987 (SCEA)744 that
deregulated ocean transport. This act was intended to follow the U.S. 1984 Shipping
Act and provide, therefore, for shipper protection745 and conferences control by the
Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA)746. In 1995, when suggestions were made in
the U.S. to revise the 1984 Shipping Act, Ottawa proceeded to an extensive review of
the SCEA and decided to leave things alone, at least for the time being747. Canadian
authorities argued that if U.S. OSRA became law, it would be likely that Canada
would follow. It would not, however, take the lead748. In the post-OSRA period, Bill
C_14749 amending the SCEA 1987 to inject more competition to ocean transport and
Bill C-14 (2001) online: Canadian Parliament Homepage
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-14/C-14_3/C-14TOCE.html> (last
visited: Nov. 5, 2001). Part 15 of the Bill contains the amendments to the 1987 SCEA. Ibid. See also Review
of the SCEA (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/scea/default.htm> (last
742 On the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) see Globalization and the Future of the Federal Maritime
Commission, (1997) online: Grove, Jaskiewics and Cobert Homepage
<http://www.gjcobert.com/amdtli97.html> (last visited: August 24, 1998). "The FMC is an independent
watchdog agency. Its primary mission is to regulate international container shipping in and out of the U.S.
ports". "Clinton Picks Ex-Governor to fill 5th FMC spot" J. Com. (1999) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
743 Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, "United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64
Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 554-555. "Before disapproving controlled carrier's rate ... Commission will examine
whether market penetration or other injury to trade has resulted from rate, particularly if differential in total
charges is not extreme". "American Jurisprudence" 70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping s 716 (1987) at 755 online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters).
744 R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (3rd Supp.).
745 Canada, Ministry of Transport, Freedom to Move: A Framework for Transportation Reform (Ottawa:
Ministry of Transport, 1985) at 44.
746 The CTA is an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal that makes decisions on a wide range of economic
matters involving federally-regulated modes of transportation (air, rail and marine), and has the powers, rights
and privileges of a superior court to exercise its authority. Along with its roles as an economic regulator and
an aeronautical authority, the Agency works to facilitate accessible transportation, and serves as a dispute
resolution authority over certain transportation rate and service complaints. Role and Structure ofthe Agency
(2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.cta.gc.ca/about-nous/role_and_structure_e.html>
(last modified: continuously).
747 "Canadians Catch Deregulatory Fever" Am. Shipper (1995) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
748 Ibid.
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overhauling the Canada Shipping Act (now called CSA 2001)750 received Royal
Assent and entered into force on January 30, 2002751 . Bill's amendments of the 1987
SCEA closely mirror those of the U.S. OSRA752 .
We will presently comment on the general effects of U.S. and Canadian ocean
transport deregulation (A) before focusing on the statutory uniformity of U.S. and
Canadian ocean carrier liability following ocean deregulation (B).
A. General Effects of us. and Canadian Ocean Transport Deregulation: On
May 1, 1999 the U.S. OSRA came into force, saluted by carriers and high-volume
shippers. The Canadian CSA followed in 2002, aligning Canadian law with the
legislation of its major trading partner. Both U.S. and Canadian acts restrict
governmental powers and diminish the importance of conferences by permitting
electronic posting of ocean carrier tariffs, furthering confidential contracting and
shortening notice period for conference members independent action753.
modified: June 13, 2002) and SCEA 1987 (including amendments) (2002) online: Transport Canada
Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-Idcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24,2002).
750 Canada Shipping Act 2001, 2001 S. C., c.26 [hereinafter CSA]. The CSA is a voluminous act that was
used as a 'piggy bag' or 'convenience piece' to bring about SCEA 1987 amendments. Interview of the author
with a regulatory expert at the Canadian Transportation Agency (June 28,2002).
751 Review of the SCEA (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/scea/default.htm> (last visited: June 13, 2002) and SCEA 1987 (including
amendments) (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-
ldcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24, 2002). Even though the Act has received Royal Assent, most of its
provisions will not come into force until later date, when the regulations which will implement it will be
prepared. Richard F. Southcott, Kimberly A. Walsh, "Canadian Maritime Law Update" (2002) 33 J. Mar. L.
& Com. 293 at 293 and Canada Shipping Act 2002 (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/Report/anre2002/8A_e.htm< (last visited: June 19, 2003). However, Act's provisions
herein commented on (electronic filing, confidential contracts and 'independent action') are now 'in force'.
Richard F. Southcott, Kimberly A. Walsh, "Canadian Maritime Law Update" (2002) 33 J. Mar. L. & Com.
293 at 296.
Even though the Canadian government was considering inclusion of a five-year 'sunset' provision of
conferences antitrust immunity that would withdraw at the end of the fifth year, this provision was finally not
included in the bill. Representatives of the Canadian Shippers Council (CSC) are concerned about the absence
of a 'sunset' provision.
752 SCEA 1987 (including amendments) (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-Idcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24, 2002) and "Liner Shipping Canada
Spares the Conferences" LI. List. 1nt'l (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
753 "Liner Shipping Canada Spares the Conferences" LI. List. In!'/. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters)
and Constantine G. Papavizas, Lawrence I. Kiern, "1997-1998 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments"
(1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 487 at 489-490.
153
First, replacing the requirement "to file" ocean international transportation
tariffs with the FMC by a new requirement "to electronically post" the said tariffs
was intended to avoid delays, bureaucracy and governmental expenses754.
Conferences today must publish their tariffs in automated systems of their choice
and only inform the FMC and CTA of their location in order to facilitate publication
of the list of locations on the web755. The governmental agencies retain jurisdiction
to ensure that the tariff format and its accessibility and accuracy are reasonable and
maintain their authority to enforce tariffs if necessary756. Canadian and U.S.
intermodal tariffs do not have to be filed with the government following
deregulation757. In other words, federal guidelines regarding rates still exist
754 u.s.: "STB's Closes Option of Filing U.S. Tariffs on FMC's System", J. Com. (1999) online: LEXIS
(World, ALLWLD). See also Patricia L. Snyder, "The Proposed Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1995: An
Interim Report" (1995) 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 545 at 546. Canada: SCEA Amendments (2001) online:
Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h033e.htm> (last visited: June 3, 2002),
SCEA 1987 (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-ldcm/scea.html>
(last visited: June 24, 2002), "Border Lines" Log. Mgt & Distr. Rep. (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). We have to note, in this respect, that 60% of Canada's liner trade moves on non-conference
ships and, thus, outside a published tariff structure. "Canadians Catch Deregulatory Fever" Am. Shipper
(1995) online: LEXIS (World, ALLWLD).
755 U.S.: Lisa H. Harrington, "Musing on the New Year" Transp. and Distrib. (1999) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). Canada: SCEA 1987 (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-ldcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24, 2002).
756 U.S.: Mary Kay Reynolds, Ocean Shipping Reform Act Becomes Law (2000) online: National Unaffiliated
Shippers Association Homepage <http://www.nusa.net/nusaact.htm> (last modified: Dec. 8, 2000). Canada:
SCEA 1987 (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-ldcm/scea.html>
(last visited: June 24, 2002).
757 Canada: Interview of the author with a Canadian Transportation Agency tariff responsible (July 2, 2002).
Although there is no legislation or regulatory framework in Canada specifically dealing with intermodal
transportation, unimodal laws have provided support for certain intermodal operations as: presence of
'through' charges, ownership of trucking firms by railways and quoting on intermodal traffic by marine
carriers. Canada, Department of Transportation, Transportation in Canada, Annual Report (1996) online:
Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/anreI996/tc96_chapter_12.htm> (last visited: Nov.
6, 1996). U.S.: Charles A. James, "Shipping and Anti-trust" Congr. Test. (2002) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). Before the 1998 OSRA, ocean carriers engaging in 'through' carriage had to file their 'through'
rates with the FMC even though the inland division of through rates needed not to be stated and over which
the Commission has no regulatory authority (supra at 118-119 on inland carrier exemption). It was the ICC
(today Surface Transportation Board-STB) that retained jurisdiction over inland carrier portion of through
rates. Joseph Monteiro, Gerald Robertson, "Shipping Conference Legislation in Canada, the European
Economic Community and the United States: Background, Emerging Developments, Trends and a Few Major
Issues" (1999) 26 Transp. L. 1. 141 at 160. Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, "United States Statutory
Regulation of Multimodalism" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 549 and 553.
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following deregulation but governmental control IS put III the backseat behind
private marketplace758.
Second, maintaining and furthering confidential contracting of the 1984
Shipping Act and 1987 SCEA respectively, also applicable to intermodal
shipments759. Before the advent of these acts, volume discount arrangements, known
as service contracts, had to be made public and were not, therefore, confidential76o.
As a result, other shippers with the same shipment volume could claim the same
rates and terms of service. This does not mean that confidential contracts did not
exist prior to said acts. They did exist, they were filed confidentially with the FMC
(U.S.) and the CTA (Canada) but their essential terms, including rates, were made
available to other similarly situated shippers761.
Today, the essential terms of service contracts are kept absolutely
confidential, allowing carriers to offer customers special discounts762. On August 11,
758 Austin P. Olney, "A Report from the Marine Regulatory Front: Partly Cloudy with a Chance of
Thunderstorm" (2001) 13 U. S. F. Mar. L. J. 91 at 98-99.
759 U.S.: Shashikumar Schatz, "The Impact of U.S. Regulatory Changes on International Intermodal
Movements" Transp. J (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Canada: SCEA Amendments (2001) online:
Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h033e.htm> (last visited: June 3, 2002).
For the SCEA amendments see SCEA 1987 (2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-Idcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24, 2002), "Border Lines" Log. Mgt &
Distr. Rep. (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
760 U.S.: "Deregulation Approaches; Shippers Try to Find Niche" J Com. (1999) online: LEXIS (World
ALLWLD). Canada: SCEA Amendments (2001) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h033e.htm> (last visited: June 3, 2002).
761 U.S.: Andrew M. Danas, "Do Changing World Trade Patterns Require Changing of the World Trade
Laws?" (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat' I L. 1035 at note 105. Canada: The 1987 SCEA provided in Section
22(2) on confidentiality: "... the information shall not be made public in such a manner as to be made available
for the use of any business competitor of the persons to which the information relates". On the resemblances
between the 1984 Shipping Act and 1987 SCEA provisions on this point see Mary R. Brooks, Monitoring
Transportation Regulatory Reform (Canada: Ocean Institute of Canada, 1989) at 23-24.
762 U.S.: "Deregulation Approaches; Shippers Try to Find Niche" J Com. (1999) online: LEXIS (World
ALLWLD). The one exception to this new confidentiality requirement are provisions of the bill which provide
that organized labour would still be entitled to disclosure of all such information for purposes of monitoring
their collective bargaining agreements with ocean common carriers. This was a concession granted by the bill's
sponsors to remove the opposition of organized labour to the legislation". Ronald N. Cobert, Esq. Senior
Partner Grove, Jasliewisz and Cobert, Ocean Shipping Reform: What It Means for Shippers' Associations,
(August 19, 1998), online: Ocean Shipping Reform Homepage <http://www.gjcobert.com/cobert898.html>
(last visited: 24 August 1998). Canada: SCEA Amendments (2001) online: Transport Canada Homepage
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h033e.htm> (last visited: June 3, 2002) and SCEA 1987 (2002) online:
Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-Idcm/scea.html> (last visited: June 24,
2002).
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1999, a little bit after the coming into effect of the 1998 OSRA, the FMC chair noted
that the industry was inundated by confidential contracts, changing the competitive
environment in ocean carriage763 . This confirms the saying that the 1998 OSRA and
the CSA 200 1 bargain between carriers and shippers translates into antitrust
immunity for carriers in exchange for confidential service contracts for shippers764.
Third, maintaining 1984 Shipping Act and SCEA 1987 ocean liner
independent action765, shortening the required notice period given to the conference
before proceeding to the independent action and prohibiting conferences from
disallowing its members to proceed to it766. New independent action provisions have
been described as the 'death knell' of the traditional concept of conferences because
they further conference members ability to individually negotiate with shippers and
establish their own rates767.
In summary, it is argued that the new regime under the OSRA and the CSA
200 1 "combines the freedom to establish rates without prior regulatory approval with
the ability to make such arrangements confidential,,768. In so doing, these acts
diminish the influence of rate-setting conferences and mark the next step of ocean
763 u.S.: From 3.400 confidential contracts during May and June 1998 we passed to 15.000 such contracts in
1999 during the same months. The Reform ofCanadian Law Applying to Ocean Shipping Conferences (1999)
online: Forwarderlaw Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/SCEA2.htm> (last visited: Feb. 8,
2000). Bill Mongelluzzo, "With Albert A. Pierce, Executive Director of TSA and WTSA" J. Com. (2003)
online: WESTLAW (All- News). Canada: "Federal Maritime Commission Says ... " J. Com. (2003) online:
WESTLAW (All-News).
764 Peter M. Tirchwell, "Shipping Regulation" J. Com. (1999) online WESTLAW (Newspapers).
765 Independent action permits an individual carrier or a group of carriers to sign a service contract with one or
more shippers without the need to obtain conference permission 'to provide specified services under specified
terms and conditions'. Allen Evans Jackson, "In Support of Exempting Non-Vessel Operating Common
Carriers from Tariff Filing" (1993) 1 Geo. Mason. Indep. L. R. 289 at 297 and at note 30.
766 U.S.: The notice requirement for independent action was shortened from 10 to 5 days. Ron Jacobsen,
"Shipping Antitrust Law" (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Canada: The notice requirement for
independent action was shortened from 15 to 5 days. SCEA Amendments (2001) online: Transport Canada
Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/Ol_h033e.htm> (last visited: June 3, 2002) and SCEA J987
(2002) online: Transport Canada Homepage <http://www.tc.gc.ca/Actsregs/scea-ldcm/scea.htm1> (last visited:
June 24, 2002).
767 Charles A. James, "Shipping and Antitrust" Cong. Testimony (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Today, discussion agreements with nonbinding rate-making authority have essentially replaced traditional
conferences. Before OSRA and CSA 2001, ocean conferences had notice well in advance of their members
independent action and exercised pressure on them to abort the action. Ron Jacobsen, "Shipping Antitrust
Law" (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
768 "Missing Marketing" J. Com. (1998) online: LEXIS (World ALLWLD).
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and intermodal transport769. Because of the new provIsIOns on confidential
contracting and independent action, conference members have stopped setting rates
through conferences and have switched to individual contracts with shippers770.
Competition is, therefore, gradually eroding the conference structure which
constitutes carriers and shippers 'safety net'. The new status quo favours the stronger
of each group, carriers and shippers.
What's more, the U.S. Congress is considering, some years now, passage of
the Fair Market Antitrust Immunity Reform Act, (the FAIR Act), which would
repeal the anti-trust immunity ocean carriers have enjoyed so far77!. Supporters of
the Act argue that the anti-trust immunity allows ship lines to establish land-water
rates for containers and dictate 'take-it-or-Ieave-it' rates for harbour truckers772.
While there is no industry unanimity on the issue, chances that Congress would re-
open the 1998 OSRA to repeal the anti-trust immunity are rated slim to non-
existent773.
Before enactment of the 1998 OSRA, the system of antitrust immunity and
governmental oversight over conference practices avoided the sort of excessive
concentration encountered in railway transport774 . Ocean deregulation led to a surge
of mergers, alliances and acquisitions over the last years775 . Unlike railway vertical
integration and despite recent consolidations, however, the liner shipping industry
remains highly fragmented and competitive like the U.S. motor carrier sector years
after deregulation took place776.
769 Abdul Latiff Abdullah, "A Strong Wind Needed for Reform" Bus. Times (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
770 The Inter-American Freight Association's membership has dwindled eight lines, about half the number the
conference had nine months ago. Terry Brennan, "Another Shipping Conference Disbands" J Com. (1999)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
771 R. G. Edmonson, "It's not Going Away" J Com. (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News), R. G.
Edmonson, "Familiar Tune at Anti-Trust Hearing" J Com. (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
772 Ibid.
773 Ibid.
774 Harold J. Creel, "Shipping Antitrust Law" Congr. Testimony (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
775 u.S.: Harold Creel, "Federal Maritime Commission" J Com. (2002) online: LEXIS (Transp. News).
"Ocean Shipping Surprises Dead Ahead" Log. Man. Distr. Rep. (2000) online: LEXIS (Trans. News).
776 Philip Damas, "Who's making money?" Am. Shipper. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). See supra
at 120s. for motor transport.
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One would hope that ocean shipping deregulation would follow motor carrier
'rate wars' offering shippers the lowest rates possible777 . This, however, did not
occur. U.S. rates were overall stabilized during the year 1999 by imposing hefty rate
increases on the large import volumes which were offset by low export volumes and
correspondingly low export rates778 . For the year 2000 ocean rates seem to have
risen779 while in 2003 carriers seem to be taking a hard line on rates with shippers
seeking to minimize costs780. If carriers continue with rate increases shippers will be
left wondering why they have anti-trust immunity that is supposed to stabilize
rates781.
Commentators argue that, eventually, ocean carriers will be under tremendous
pressure to give below market sweetheart deals to their largest shippers782. In this
case, ocean carriers may want to recover their lost profits on large shippers from
small shippers783 . If this occurs, deregulation's primary effect will be to eliminate
protections for small and medium-sized shippers contained in 1984 Shipping Act and
SCEA 1987784. Small and middle-size shippers will then become the victims of such
deregulation785.
777 Supra at 120 for motor carriage.
778 Theodore Prince, "Don't Expect Less Transport Trauma in 2000" J Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters) and Philip Damas, "Who's making money?" Am. Shipper. (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
779 Overall, it seems that in the first years after OSRA both carriers and shippers are content with profits and
rates respectively "Hitting the Sweet Spot?" Traffic World (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
780 Bill Mongeluzzo, "Rates Going UP" J Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
781 "Radar Screen" J Com. (2002) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
782 We have to note that shippers number one worry (at 31%) in ocean shipping is price. Time-on performance
comes second (with 22%) followed by quality and service. Jack Lucentini, "Secrets Unlikely, Survey
Suggests" J Com. (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
783 "It is safe to say that our ocean shipping industry affects all of us in the United States as currently 96% of
our international trade is carried on board ships ... (the need) to protect in the global commerce of the 21st
Century the 70% of U.S. exports that small shippers produce". U.S., Senate Proceedings and Debates of the
105th Congress, Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1997 (April 21, 1998) 144 Congo Rec. S3306-01 at 10 and
29.
784 The 1984 Shipping Act took a number of years to draft and represents a delicate balance between all
segments of the international shipping industry, large shippers, small shippers, ports, U.S. and foreign carriers,
labour and transportation intermediaries. Unlike 1984 act, the OSRA was drafted by large shippers and large
carriers without any input by those who will be the most affected by the bill: small shippers and their
representatives. The leaders of the United States Congress have acknowledged that the bill is not good for
small to medium-sized shippers. Ronald N. Cobert, Esq. Senior Partner Grove, Jasliewisz and Cobert, Ocean
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B. Statutory Uniformity ofus. and Canadian Ocean Carrier Liability: Under
Hague and Visby Rules article 3(8) enacted through U.S. COGSA786 and Canadian
Marine Liability Act (MLA)(Schedule IIIf87 respectively, ocean carriers cannot
contractually limit their liability beyond the statutorily provided 500$USD per
package or ('customary freight' (COOSA)) unit (COOSA/Hague), or 666.67 SDR
per package or unit or 2 SDR per kilo of gross weight of goods lost, whichever is
higher (MLAIVisby)788. These acts provide for statutory uniformity of ocean carrier
liability at the domestic level, as is the case with Quebec motor carrier liability. They
also mark the particularity of ocean carriage with respect to U.S. and Canadian land
transport where contractual limitation of carrier liability is sanctioned by statutes
and/or courts (with the exception of Quebec motor carrier (case) law).
U.S. OSRA confidential contracting provisions resulted in large shippers
benefiting from contractual increases of carrier liability saddling small shippers, who
lack the leverage vis-a.-vis carriers, with the more carrier-caring statutory
limitations789. Worst, because of 1998 OSRA and CSA 2001 confidential contracting
Shipping Reform: What It Means for Shippers' Associations, (August 19, 1998), online: Ocean Shipping
Reform Homepage <http://www.gjcobert.com/cobert898.html> (last visited: 24 Aug. 1998).
785 Ibid. For these reasons, small shippers opposed U.S. OSRA. Robert W. Kasteloot, "E! Nino, Y2K, and
Other Cyclical Phenomena" Sea Power (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletter).
786 Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act, Ch. 229, ss 1-16,49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at 46 U.s.C. app. ss 1300-
1315 (1995). Supra note 47. We find the same provision in art. III(8) of the Hague-Visby Rules and art. 28(1)
of the Multimodal Convention.
787 The Canadian Marine Liability Act 2001, S. C. 2001, c. 6. [hereinafter MLA] contains, in Schedule III, a
carbon copy of the Visby Rules applicable in Canada. These rules were enacted by the Carriage ofGoods by
Water Act 1993, S. C. 1993, ch. 21 [hereinafter COGWA] in Canada between 1993-2001. Supra notes 45,46.
788 (art. 4(5)(a)) of MLA (Schedule III), the Hague and the Visby Rules and COGSA 46 U.S.C. par. 1304(5),
the latter adding the prefix 'cutomary freight' to the Hague limitation measure 'unit'. For more details on the
U.S. and Canadian limitations see infra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II. For the SDR unit see supra note 247.
For some of these limitations see Annex No. II, Table No.2, 3, 4 at cxlii-clxvi.
789 Joseph Bonney, "Always Something New" J. Com. (2001) online: WESTLAW (All-News). "No Longer a
Little Bill" (COGSA) Am. Shipper (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). I.e. large shippers can
contractually agree to hold ocean carrier liable for 1.200$USD whereas small shippers are imprisoned in the
COGSA 500$USD carrier limitation. Ibid. Joseph Bonney, "Time for the Ship to Sail" J. Com. (2001) online:
LEXIS (Transp. News). Although in 2001 there had been reports that big shippers are using confidential
contracts to force carriers to shoulder liability that goes beyond regular carriage, insurance representatives
have responded that insurers have not seen the impact of such an incident. Joseph Bonney, "Always
Something New" J. Com. (2001) online: LEXIS (Major Newspapers).
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provisions, ocean carriers today can do away with their statutory limitations, putting
at danger small shippers79o.
The current situation calls for governmental intervention in the formulation of
a uniform international legal regime that will address cargo shipment and liability
issues791 . At present, however, there seems to be little incentive towards this end792.
U.S. governmental authorities are merely contemplating revision of the already
antiquated COGSA to cover intermodal transportation and "provide an important
baseline for individual negotiations and an important protection for small
shippers,,793.
We have seen that the trend following transport (land-ocean) deregulation has
been undeniably the one of "get big or get out" for carriers794. Absent a satisfactory
regulatory 'safety net' to protect small ocean shippers, the latter have recourse to
shipper associations. These entities are membership associations that were formed in
the 1960's in order to inform small shippers and act as a lobby to enhance reforms in
the legislation. Deregulation has made regulatory issues less significant and
associations capability to provide small shippers greater bargaining power very
importane95. Through these associations small shippers insure favourable rates that
790 U.S. OSRA theoretically permits parties to a confidential contract 'to agree to a greater or lesser amount as
the maximum liability of those parties'. Authors note that this OSRA provision essentially exempts carriers
from COGSA itself, permitting shippers to negotiate away the law despite prohibition of private acts contrary
to public policy. CIFFA Position Paper on u.s. COGSA (1999) online CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.comlfeature/cifcogsa.htm> (last visited: Feb. 20, 1999). "Panel Discussion of
Carriage of Goods and Charter Parties" (1999) Tul. Mar. L. J. at 365 at 367. On this question see opposing
opinion of Michael F. Sturley, "Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act" (2000-2001) 18
U. S. F. Marit L. 1. 1 at 22 and infra at 262-263. We have perceived no such practice so far.
791 Ibid.
792 "Little U.S. Appetite for Anti-trust Debate" Ll. List (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
793 "No Longer a Little Bill" (COGSA) Am. Shipper (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Infra at Part
II, Chapter I, Section I.
794 Transport is not the only area affected by the trend of the present governrnentallaissez-faire policies. We
find the expression 'get big or get out' in U.S. agricultural law. Small farmers have formed agricultural
cooperatives in order to be able to negotiate on equal terms with big integrators. Hamilton Neil,
"Industrialization of Agriculture", (University of Arkansas School of Law [non-published], 1997-1998).
795 Canada.: "Shippers Groups Hit Carrier Antitrustm Surcharges" 1. Com. (2002) online: WESTLAW (J.
Com.) and "Rail Mergers, Trade and Federal Regulation in the U.S. and Canada" Publius (2002) online:
WESTLAW (All-News). U.S.: "Save on Freight, Gain Services With a Shipper's Association" Managing
Exports (2002) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Within shippers associations confidentiality of rates and
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they would not have achieved otherwise had they negotiated on their own796. What's
more, several shippers associations today are expanding beyond basic rate
negotiation into value-added services such as consolidation and insurance, and into
negotiation of contracts with customized provisions for space, equipment and inland
transportation797 . However, because shipper associations and intermediaries do not
guarantee space798 and continue to face rate discrimination by carriers (i.e. refusal to
deal or negotiate on confidentiality, voiding service contracts)799, most shippers
today negotiate one-on-one with carriers for contract terms800 .
Par. 2. Fair Opportunity Doctrine (U.S.) and Sufficient Notice Test
(Canada): U.S. shipper judicial 'safety net' in ocean carriage is based on the 'fair
opportunity' doctrine. This doctrine, the 'brain child' of U.S. courts, is the condition
precedent to land and ocean carriers benefiting from statutory or contractual
limitations801 . This does not necessarily mean that courts view uniformly what
constitutes 'fair opportunity' in ocean carriage802 .
The Ninth Circuit requires ocean carriers to give shippers (sophisticated and
non-sophisticated) 'actual notice' of the Hague Rules limitative conditions and the
terms of carriage is maintained. Bill Mongelluzzo, "Shippers Association Prospers on OSRA" 1. Com. (2000)
online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
796 Albert Pierce, "New Pact means Less Red Tape" Bus. Times (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
797 Joseph Bonney, "Strength in Numbers" 1. Com. (2001) online: LEXIS (Transp. News).
798 "If I'm going to fight for space I'd like to deal directly with [the carrier]". Chris Gillis, Gordon Forsyth,
"Ocean v. Air" 1. Com. (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
799 "Little Appetite for Anti-trust Debate" Ll. List (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). For specific
examples see Ron Jacobsen, "Shipping Antitrust Law" (1999) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
800 U.S.: U.S., Federal Maritime Commission, The Ocean Shipping Reform Act-An Interim Status Report
(2000) online: U.S. Department of Transportation Homepage
<www.fmc.gov/OSRA%20INTERIM%20STATUSUS%> (last visited: June 19, 2003). James Calderwood,
"Happy Anniversary OSRA" Transp. & Distribution. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) and Paul
Spillenger, "No Surprises on OSRA" 1. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Large shippers are
also negotiating one-to-one with carriers and they get better service this way. David Hannon, "Small Maritime
Shippers Seek Volume Leverage" Purchasing (2002) online: LEXIS (Transp. News). Canada: "Canadian
Shippers Council" 1. Com. (2003) online: WESTLAW (All-News).
801 Daniel A. Tadros, "COGSA Section 4(5) 'Fair Opportunity' Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and
Lack ofIntemational Uniformity: Will the United States Supreme Court ever Provide Guidance?" (1992) Tul.
Mar. L. Rev. 18 at 34. Laurence B. Alexander, "Containerization, the per Package Limitation, and the Concept
of Fair Opportunity" (1986) Mar. Law. 124 at 134. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Marine Ltd, (1992)
WL 33861 (S. D. Flda. 1992). Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 1(C).
802 Laurence B. Alexander, "Containerization, the per Package Limitation, and the Concept of Fair
Opportunity" (1986) Mar. Law. 124 at 134.
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possibility to declare higher value803 . In other words, the BOL must contain 'express
(written) notice' to all shippers that they may avoid the statutory 500$USD package
limitation by declaring higher value804 . In this respect, incorporation by reference of
COGSA limitations in a BOL does not provide 'fair opportunity' in 'actual notice'
jurisdictions because recitation of statutory provisions is lacking805 .
In recent years, the Ninth Circuit has been more lenient on its stance holding
that required language needs not be present on the front of the BOL, may appear in
fine print and a space for declaring value on the BOL may not be provided806.
Moreover, clauses incorporating by reference statutory limitative provisions have
also been sanctioned by 'actual notice' jurisdictions in certain cases807 .
The most representative case on the new Ninth Circuit's position is Carman
Tool & Abrasives Inc. v. Evergreen808 where the court refused to expand the 'fair
opportunity' doctrine to a shipper who had not seen carrier BOL until the shipment
was gone. The court reasoned that, first, it would be unduly burdensome on the
carrier to give 'actual notice' of BOL conditions to all shippers because of time
803 Ibid at 137. Supra at 129s. for the basics of the fair opportunity doctrine and the division of U.S. courts in
'actual' and 'constructive' notice jurisdictions in land carriage.
804 In this respect, an explicit BOL clause indicating that the shipper can avoid carrier limitation of liability by
declaring higher value or incorporation of COGSA limitation of liability provisions has been held valid. Daniel
A. Tadros, "COGSA Section 4(5) 'Fair Opportunity' Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and Lack of
International Uniformity: Will the United States Supreme Court ever Provide Guidance?" (1992) Tul. Mar. 1.
Rev. 18 at 27. In Gamma-JO Plastic Inc. American President Lines Ltd, 32 F. 3d 1244 (8th Cir. 1995) it was
indicated that 'fair opportunity' exists iflanguage 'to the same effect' as the statute is included in the BOL. In
the same sense, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vessel Sam Houston, 26 F. 3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994).
805 Royal Ins. Co. v. Sea-Land Service Inc., 50 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Travelers Indem.Co. v.
Vessel Sam Houston, 26 F. 3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, the court referred to a Clause Paramount
incorporating by reference COGSA provisions. On the same position for U.S. land carriage see supra at 129s.
806 As reported by Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo
Case" (1997) Tul. Mar. 1. J. 263 at 341 and Mori Seiki USA Inc. v. M/V Alligator Triumph, 990 F. 2d 444
(9th Cir. 1993) and M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F. 2d 939 (11 th Cir. 1990). Former case law requiring space for
declaration: General Elec. Co. v. M V Nedlloyd Rouen, 618 F. Supp. 62 (S. D. N. Y. 1985) affIrmed on
appeal by General Elec. Co. v. M/V Nedlloyd, 817 F. 2d 1022 (2nd Cir. 1987). See also Vegas v. Delta
Steamship Line Inc., 1982 A. M. C. 595 (S. D. Fla. 1980).
807 I.e. in Royal Insurance Co. v. Sea-Land Service Inc., 50 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995) the court held that a BOL
clause Paramount and a clause extending ocean carrier liability to stevedores suffIce to provide 'actual notice'
to shipper that COGSA applies to the ocean carrier and the stevedores. This was not the case before as it is
evidenced by Pan Am. World Airways Inc. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559 F. 2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1978).
808 871 F. 2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989).
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constraints and distance (public policy considerations). Second, shippers were
sophisticated and had, or should have had, precise knowledge of the BOL
limitation809 . The Carman case has been consistently, albeit not exclusively,
followed by the Ninth Circuit even in the case of a 'through' BOL extending ocean
carrier limitations to land carriers81O•
Authors attribute 'actual notice' jurisdiction lenience to shipper sophistication
and they observe that the Ninth Circuit seems to be moving towards Fifth Circuit
standards811 . In effect, the Fifth Circuit has held that any BOL reference to COGSA
creates 'fair opportunity' to declare higher value (constructive notice) in the
presence of sophisticated shippers812. In concluding this way, certain courts refer to
809 Ibid.
810 Through bills: Bordeaux Wine Locators Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 185 F. (3d) 865 (9th Cir. 1999)
held that fair opportunity exists in the presence of experienced shippers where the ocean carrier fails to issue a
BOL before shipment, that bill applying ocean liability limitations to the motor leg of the journey. In Russell
Stover Candies Inc. v. Double VV Inc., 1997 WL 809205 (D. Kan. 1997) a 'through' BOL was issued and fair
opportunity to declare value was held to exist in the presence of sophisticated shippers. Both cases referred to
the Carman case.
811 Chester D. Hooper, "Carriage of Goods and Charter Parties" (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1697 at 1725. Mary L.
Moreland, "COGSA Section 1394(5): 'Fair Opportunity' Update" (1996) Tul. Mar. L. J. 423 at 439 and at
note 51.
To counter this authors argument, International Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Silver Star Shipping America
Inc., 951 F. Supp. 913 (D. C. 1997) explains that the Carman holding focal point is that notice, whether actual
or constructive, is not dependent on BOL physical delivery. This case stated that there is no Ninth Circuit
pronounced intention to abandon the 'actual notice' requirement but merely to dictate whether 'fair
opportunity' exists in the absence of a BOL. This case simply shifts away, refuses to expand application of the
'fair opportunity' doctrine in case of absence of a BOL. As reported by Arik A. Helman, "Limitation of
Liability under COGSA: In the Wake of the 'Fair Opportunity' Doctrine" (2000) 25 Tul. L. J. 299 at 323.
812 General Elec.Co. v. MlV Nedlloyd, 817 F. 2d 1022 at 1029 (2nd Cir. 1987), Neiman Marcus Group Inc. v.
Quast Transfer Inc. No. 98-C-3122 (U. S. D. C. 1999), N.D. III E. D. Pearson v. LeifHoegh & Co. 953 F. 2d
638 (4th Cir. 1992), Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee 36 F. 3d 143 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Daniel A. Tadros,
"COGSA Section 4(5) 'Fair Opportunity' Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and Lack of International
Uniformity: Will the United States Supreme Court ever Provide Guidance?" (1992) Tul. Mar. L. Rev. 18 at
33. This includes incorporation by reference. See the interesting observation of Arik A. Helman, "Limitation
of Liability under COGSA: In the Wake of the 'Fair Opportunity' Doctrine" (2000) 25 Tul. L. J. 299 at 324
that, although arguments can be made to the contrary, 'constructive notice' jurisdictions will not consider
shipper sophistication if, first, inspection of the bill of lading by the court is not deemed to provide 'fair
opportunity' to the shipper.
On shipper's sophistication see supra notes 641, 685, 714. We have to note here that in ocean carriage judges
have also held that experienced shippers who have never shipped under COGSA may not be considered
sophisticated. Pan American World Airaways Inc. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co. 559 F. 2d 1173 (c.
A. 1977), Tampella Ltd. Boiler Div. v. MlV Norlandia WL 149627 (S. D. 1988).
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the Ninth Circuit Carman case813 . 'Through' BsOL are not an exception to
'constructive notice' holdings and will also refer to the Carman case814.
According to commentators, the inter-circuit conflict undermines domestic
and international uniformity815. This denotes the weakness of the judicial 'safety
net'. They content that it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to intervene and
provide uniformity as well as align the U.S. judicial system with foreign judicial
systems816. Up to now, the Supreme Court refuses to address the inter-circuit conflict
by denying certiorari in cases brought before it817. Considering, however, the shift of
the Ninth Circuit towards the Fifth Circuit, Supreme Court intervention may be
rendered superfluous.
Canadian courts will validate contractual extension of ocean carrier liability if
this is conform with the intent of the parties, the latter being dependent, in tum, on
shipper sophistication and equal bargaining power818. Where a BOL is issued and no
clear reference is therein made to international conventions or the shipper fails to
declare value, shipper sophistication will always be taken into account in
determining sufficient notice given to him of applicable limitations and of his right to
declare value819. This is also the case in the presence of a 'through' BOL where
shippers fail to declare value or to notice liability provisions therein provided820.
813 Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F. 3d 143 (l'1 Cir. 1994).
814 Tamrock U.SA. Inc. v. M V Maren Maersk, (1995) WL 459254 (D. C. N. Y. 1995) concluded that ocean
carrier limitations on a BOL were applicable to the motor segment of the journey in the presence of
experienced shippers.
815 Daniel A. Tadros, "COGSA Section 4(5) 'Fair Opportunity' Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and
Lack ofIntemational Uniformity: Will the United States Supreme Court ever Provide Guidance?" (1992) Tul.
Mar. L. Rev. 18 at 35. See also Tampella Ltd, Boiler Div. v. MlV Norlandia, (1988) WL 149627 (S. D. 1988).
816 Ibid.
817 Howard M. McCormack, "Uniformity of Maritime Law: History and Perspective from a U.S. Point" (1999)
73 Tul. L. Rev. 1481 at 1529. Arik A. Helman, "Limitation of Liability under COGSA: In the Wake ofthe
'Fair Opportunity' Doctrine" (2000) 25 Tul. L. J. 299 at 301.
818 NS Tractors & Equipment Ltd. v. Tarros Gage (1986), F. C. J. No. 127 (F. C. C.). On the correlation of
shipper sophistication, parties intention and equal bargaining power see supra notes 641, 685,812, 714.
819 Consumers Glass Co. et at. v. Farrell Lines Inc. et al. (1985), 53 O. R. (2d) 230 (Ont. H. C.) where the
court concluded that incorporation by reference of a long form BOL in a short form BOL in the presence of
shippers of equal bargaining power to the carrier, effectively incorporated statutory limitations contained in
the long form bill. On Canadian equal bargaining power and sufficient notice test see supra notes 641, 685,
812,714. Failure to declare: NS Tractors & Equipment Ltd. v. Tarros Gage (1986), F. C. J. No. 127 (F. C.
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Very close to the U.S. Carman case factual scenario and revelatory of
Canadian applicable case law on the issue, is Canadian ocean landmark case
Anticosti Shipping Co. v. St. Amancf'21. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada
applied the statutory liability limitations in the absence of issuance of a BOL prior to
shipment. The court argued that there is no ground for implying a duty of sufficient
notice on the part of the carrier even though the shipper never saw the BOL. It
explained that parties contemplated, intended the issuance of a BOL and this was the
main criterion to take into account in giving effect to ocean carrier limitations. Based
on the facts of the case and shipper 'familiar[ity] with [carrier's] customary mode of
undertaking transportation' the court concluded on the presence of parties intent to
issue a BOL822.
In conformity with this holding, it has also been held that when a BOL is not
issued or contemplated by the parties and language on shipping receipt does not
show intent to limit carrier liability, international convention limitations do not
appll23. Parties intent is an element based upon shipper 'familiarity' with BOL
terms, in brief, his experience, sophistication in shipping. This conforms to our prior
conclusion that parties sophistication and intent are interrelated concepts824 .
When compared with U.S. case law on this point we note, once more, the
division of U.S. courts on the basis of the 'fair opportunity' doctrine and the
similarity of the Canadian 'sufficient notice' and the U.S. 'constructive notice' tests.
C.) where, in the presence of a BOL, the court applied statutory limitation of liability in the absence of value
declaration by sophisticated shippers. In NS. Tractor & Equipment Ltd et a. v. Coastal Shipping Ltd et al.
(1986), 1 F. T. R. 243 (F. C. C.) sophisticated shippers failed to declare value on the issued BOL and the court
applied statutory limitation provisions.
820 See Bombardier and Promech supra notes 685, 641. Also, in Marubeni America Corporation v. Mitsui
o.S.K. Lines (1979), 2 F. C. 283 (F. C. C.) the Federal Court of Canada held that the inclusion of a Himalaya
clause in the through BOL was applicable to the motor part of the journey in the presence of knowledgeable
shippers.
821 (1959), 19 D. L. R. 2d 472 (S. C. C.) an authority case cited by N.s. Tractors & Equipment Ltd v. The
Tarros Gage (1986), F. C. 1. No. 127 (F. C. C) and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd v. Chimo Shipping Ltd
(1974), S. C. R. 933 (S. C. C.).
822 The court specifically stated that given the facts of the case, when the shipper asked carrier to ship his
goods he could not possibly have had other terms in mind than those customarily used by the carrier company.
823 R.K. Beattie Ltd v. CN Marine Inc. (1986), N. B. 1. No. 897 (N. B. Q. B.).
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The Carman case creates hopes of harmonization not only between the Ninth and the
Fifth Circuit but also between the U.S. 'fair opportunity' doctrine and the Canadian
'sufficient notice' test.
In effect, in taking into account shipper sophistication to decide shipper notice
of carrier limitation of liability, the Ninth Circuit ('actual' notice) shifted towards
Fifth Circuit ('constructive' notice) standards. The 'constructive' (U.S.) and
'sufficient' (Canada) notice tests not being substantially different, they lead to the
conclusion that U.S. and Canadian cases tend to have shipper sophistication as
common denominator in considering shipper notice of carrier limitative provisions.
As in the case of land carriage we confirm here, once more, the rising in importance
of shipper sophistication taken into account by courts following deregulation.
Conclusion
Breezing through the 1980 Multlimodal Convention, the EU multimodal
carrier liability rules, U.S. and Canadian transport deregulation and cargo/liability
insurance, we arrive at a common conclusion for all these highly diverse topics: for
carriers, shippers and insurers worldwide, uncertainty reigns as to the applicable
intermodal carrier liability rules and the effects of uniformity proposals so far made
on this issue. This uncertainty, which may be attributed to the absence of uniform
liability rules in multimodal carriage but also to the absence of globally accepted
uniformity proposals, persists at the expense of shippers, particularly smaller ones.
Under such a turbulent climate, the judicial safety net and its mechanisms providing
for shipper protection rise in importance and call for cross-modal and cross-country
uniformity of case law holdings.
Despite the 1980 Multimodal Convention ambitious uniformity approach of
'one multimodalliability regime and one person liable towards the shipper', it is the
824 We remind the reader that contracting parties sophistication and intent are interconnected equity concepts
in both Canadian and U.S. case law. See supra note 714.
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FBL much more modest network system of liability with preponderance given to
mandatory national laws that seems to have gained acceptance on the ground. This is
an element to take into account in formulating our suggestions.
Part II: Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S. and Canada: Analysis
and Uniformity Suggestions
u
Cruising through international and regional multimodal carrier liability rules
and delving into the more deep waters of transport economics influencing
multimodal carrier liability, gave us a more spherical view of the forces shaping
intermodalism worldwide. Our reasoning has matured through this international
marine-land adventure and we are ready now to focus on the more painful but
revealing comparative study of U.S. and Canadian multimodal carrier liability rules
(Chapter I). This comparative study, materially supported by a plethora of cases
and statutory provisions, constitutes the necessary condition precedent to our
formulating uniformity suggestions on U.S. and Canadian multimodal carrIer
liability (Chapter II). Our suggestions are not merely based on cross-modal and
cross-country (U.S./Canada) multimodal carrier liability analysis but are also
founded on useful conclusions drawn from the first part of our study on
international, regional and economical aspects of intermodalism.
Chapter I: Analysis of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S. and
Canada
Intermodalism in the U.S. and Canada follows the same general principles of
fragmented legal rules, predominance of insurance companies and transport
deregulation we encounter at the international and the regional level. Because of the
two countries geographic proximity, one would think that at least unimodal carrier
liability provisions would be similar cross-country, in the same way this is done in
Europe through adoption of international conventions (i.e. CIM, CMR). As we are
going to confirm this is not so in the U.S. and Canada! Strong differences but also
remarkable resemblances exist cross-country when comparing unimodal carrier
liability exceptions (Section I) and liability limitation provisions (Section II).
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Section I: Basis of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S. and Canada
In 1989, authors noted that multimodalism would continue to have profound
effects on all segments of transportation and regional economies of scale as long as
it is the perception of policymakers that its benefits outweigh alleged economic
harm825 . Fifteen years later, intensification of intermodal transport demonstrates the
profitability and political preference given to multimodalism826 . What's more,
projections of intensification of trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico are
made for the future827 . Still, lack of cooperation between the modes and denial of
governmental bodies and their agencies to reason on intermodal, rather than on
modal, terms are very much present at the North American leve1828 . This does not
match the need for faster, better, smarter and more profitable intermodal services829.
The September 11, 2001 New York air tragedy turned the focus of the
American government towards a safer and more efficient transportation system for
passengers and freight. Thereby, the U.S. and Canadian governments have increased
spending on and safety measures of intermodal passenger and freight movements830.
825 Richard W. Palmer, Frank P. DeGiulio, «Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage» (1989) 64 Tul. L.
Rev. 281 at 358-359.
826 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Andrew R. Goetz, Paul S. Dempsey, «The Vision, the Trends, the Issues» (1998) 25
Transp. L. J. 255 at 255. Growth in Rail Intermodal Traffic Continues Throughout 2000 (2000) online:
lANA Homepage-Press Releases <www.intermodal.orglpr/pr-R4900.html> (last visited: September 19,
2000). Transportation in Canada-2000 Report-Freight Transportation-Rail Transportation (2000) online:
Transport Canada Homepage <www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/report/anre2000/cOOI2ae.htm> (last modified: May 3,
2003). Interview of the author with the Intermodal Transportation Institute personnel of the University of
Denver (Sept. 20,2001) for intermodal rail transport.
827 U.S. Federal Highway Administration projects that between 1998-2020 freight moving between the U.S.
and Canada will increase by 3.1%, 3.5% between the U.S. and Mexico and 3.4% internationally for the U.S.
(excepting Canada). Look also at the graphical representation of projected U.S.-Canada truck traffic for 2020
as well as projected U.S. inland trade for 2020 at Annex No. III, Table No.2 at clxxxiii. For Canada, the
overall projected increase in truck, rail and marine (domestic) transportation measured in tonnes-kilometres
for 1995-2020 is 1.9%, 1.3% and 0% in tonne-kilometres respectively. Annex No. III, Table No.3 at clxxxiv-
clxxxv.
828 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, «The North American Intermodal Transportation Summit in Perspective» (2000) 25
Transp. L. J. 344 at 346. In the U.S., the barriers to intermodalism start at the top. The executive and
administrative functions of the federal government are organized principally by mode and are supported by a
small but important office ofintermodalism. «The Proceedings» (1998) 25 Transp. L. J. 261 at 291.
829 In effect, in the absence of an efficient intermodal system in the two countries, transportation costs rise and
such inefficiencies could potentially cripple ability to compete at the international level. Christopher
McMahon, "Challenges Facing America's Maritime and Intermodal Transportation" Logistics Spectrum
(2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
830 U.S.: Interview of the author with the Intermodal Transportation Institute personnel at the University of
Denver (Sept. 20, 2001). Canada: Actions Taken in Response to September 11,2001 (2003) online: Transport
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It is ironic how multimodal transport is gracefully benefiting from the disgraceful
terrorist attacks recently plaguing the American nation.
Intermodal shipments in Canada and the U.S. as well as internationally
from/to the two countries, are most frequently subject to 'through' BsOL. 'Through'
BsOL, as 'non-through' BsOL for that matter, subject multimodal shipments to a
network system of carrier liability, an element that increases parties uncertainty831.
This uncertainty may be reduced if parties to the transport contract provide for a
single law to govern all stages of transport (choice of law clause)832.
us. Multimodal Uniformity Initiative (The draft COGSA 1998): Due to the
uncertainty on the existence and amount of compensation, it is commonly agreed
that it is of utmost importance to develop a uniform liability regime833. Recognizing
several problem areas in the Hague Rules, -i.e. the outdated 500$USD limitation,
the U.S. specific 'customary freight unit' limitation measure- as well as the high
improbability to enact the Visby or the Hamburg Rules due to the strong carrier
opposition834, the U.S. drafted a document that adopts a hybrid regime between the
two sets of rules reflecting the desire to arrive at a commercial compromise between
Canada Homepage <www.tc.gc.ca/majorissues/transportationsecurity/Actions.htm> (last modified: April 4,
2003).
831 U.S.: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd. 224 N. Y. L. 1. No. 92
(2nd Cir. 2000) vacating District court decision that apply U.S. COGSA to the whole multimodal journey ex
proprio vigore. See also the Canadian case General Motors v. Cast (1983) Ltd. (1994), 1994 F. C. 1. No. 225
(F. C. J.) and William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications,
1988) at 936. Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation .of
Multimodalism» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 565. Supra at 3s.
832 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 224 N. Y. L. 1. No. 92 (2nd
Cir. 2000) mentioned Stiegmeier v. Northwestern Growth Corp., WL 1670931 (S. D. N. Y. 2000) permitting
a choice of law clause to stand so long as the law chosen has "sufficient contacts" with the transaction and
assuming that the contract is not fraudulent and does not violate public policy. In the Canadian case
Canastrand Industries Ltd. v. Lara S (1993),2 F. C. 553 (F. C. C.) the issue was whether U.S. COGSA or the
CMR would apply to the inland portion of the journey.
833 Leslie Tomasello Weitz, «The Nautical Fault Debate» (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 581 at 594.
834 The Maritime Law Association has long advocated for the adoption of the Visby Rules while the
Transportation Claims and Prevention Council, formerly known as Shippers National Freight Claim Council,
has consistently called for ratification of the Hamburg Rules. Neither of the two groups has the power to enact
their favored regime but each group has the power to block the adoption of the other group's regime. The U.S.
Congress is simply unwilling to be caught in the middle of this dispute. Michael F. Sturley, «Proposed
Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act» (1996) Hous. J. Int'l. L. 609 at 614. For the latter
assertion see also Leslie W. Taylor, «1999 Proposed Changes to the COGSA : How will they Affect the U.S.
Maritime Industry at the Global Level? » (1999) Int'l. Trade. L. 1. 39 at 39.
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carrier and shipper interests835 . The new document, the U.S. Senate COGSA '98 and
its current September 1999 draft [hereinafter draft COGSA 1998], is the 6th revision
of the initial draft that is intended to apply to all U.S. water transport of goods, both
domestic and foreign traveling to and from the U.S.836. Although congressional
supporters gave the draft document a sympathetic ear, it was never written into a bill
for lawmakers consideration83?
For this reason, we will merely insist on draft's provlslOns of particular
interest to our study, such as its multimodal carriage provision (Sec. 2(a)(5)(A)(i)),
the abolition of the 'nautical fault' defense (Sec. 9(c)(l)) and limitation of liability
issues (Sec. 9(h)(l)) 838.
Sec. 2(a)(5)(A)(i) refers to transport by different modes and its presence is
due to the desire to create a uniform liability regime to govern multimodal carriage.
It succeeds its purpose, but only to a certain extent since it only applies to
contracting, with the shipper, multimodal carriers (for instance, ocean carriers
assuming liability for the door-to-door journey or freight forwarders acting as
carriers), expressly excluding non-contracting carriers from its scope839. Not
835 The u.s. is not the only country that has attempted adoption of a hybrid regime: Australia (supra note
516), China, Slovenia are examples of the many countries that have successfully undertaken similar initiatives
leading to proliferation of legal regimes in transportation. William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate
COGSA : the Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (1999) 19991. Mar. L
& Com. 595 at 606s.
836 This includes water carriers before and after loading or discharge, up to now subject to the Harter Act. The
draft does not apply to purely inland water carriage that remains governed by the Harter Act. History: From
1993 to 1996, the U.S. Maritime Law Association (MLA) prepared a new U.S. COGSA (U.S. MLA COGSA
'96), presented to the U.S. Senate on April 21, 1998. Ever since, the Senate Subcommittee has drafted new
texts, the very last ones being those of April 1999, June 1999 and the current September 1999 we will
presently concentrate on. William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disintegration of
Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 1. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 597 and
Michael McDaniel, Proposed Changes to u.s. COGSA (1998) online: Countryman & McDaniel Homepage
<http://www.cargolaw.com/presentations_cogsa98.html> (last visited: Sept. 25, 2001). For the September
1999 COGSA draft see Annex No. II, Table No. 4(bis) at clxvi.
837 R. G. Edmonson, «Cargo Liability Reform is still Years Away but Progress is being Made» J Com. (2002)
online: LEXIS (1. Com.).
838 For other COGSA draft provisions see William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA : the
Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com.
595 at 597-598.
839 Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (1999) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http :www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html>(lastvisited:Nov.30.2001).Itis Sec.
3(b) that expressly excludes from its scope 'interstate or foreign motor carrier or rail carrier who are not
contracting carriers to the extent that the claim relates only to motor or rail carrier services'. The complex
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applying to intermediate multimodal carriers (not contracting carriers) in case of a
'through' BOL since it is the initial carrier who makes arrangements with the
shipper (contracting carrier), draft COOSA 1998 is said not achieve desired
uniformity throughout the intermodal chain84o .
The Hague and Visby 'nautical fault' defense does not make part of the draft
COOSA (Sec. 9(c)(l)) list of liability exceptions841 . However, Sec. 9(d)(2) places
'nautical fault' burden of proof on the cargo claimant842 . This is an onerous burden
ofproof considering that shippers do not have access to the facts needed to prove the
presence of the nautical fault843 . Presumably shipper beneficial abolition of nautical
fault is, therefore, lessened in practice.
Finally, draft COOSA 1998 adopts the Visby Rules limitation (Sec. 9(h)(1 ))
of 666.67 SDR 'per package' or 2 SDR 'per kilo', whichever is higher. This
provision, although opposed by carriers, is said to be a clear improvement from the
outdated Hague 500$USD 'per package' limitation844. Even though it is argued that
phraseology of the draft document makes Pro Tetley wonder whether it would have been better or at least less
complicated to have adopted the 1980 Multimodal Convention. William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S.
Senate COGSA: the Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999)
19991. Mar. L. & Com. 595 at 600. Freight forwarders have expressed the view that the draft COGSA 1998
is not freight forwarder friendly. Continuing Discussion between FIATA ad hoc Working Group on u.s.
COGSA and Representatives of u.s. Interests Seeking Passage of New Law (2002) online: Forwarderlaw
Homepage online: <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/cogsapas.htm> (last visited: March 13, 2002). Sec.
2(a)(2) of the draft bill defines contracting carriers as parties who contract with the shipper.
840 Aviva Freudmann, "Foreign Groups Seek to Derail COGSA Bill" J. Com. (2000) online: LEXIS (1. Com.).
Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (1999) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http :www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html> (last visited: Nov. 30, 2001).
841 The nautical fault defense is one of the most controversial clauses of the draft document. R. G. Edmonson,
"The COGSA Battle Resumes" J. Com. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
842 Sec. 9(d)(2) provides: «In an action for loss or damage in which a party alleges that the master, mariner,
pilot or servants of the ocean carrier were negligent in the navigation or management of the ship, the burden
of proof is on the party to prove negligence in the navigation or management of the ship». Pr. Sturleyexplains
the benefit of this COGSA provision in a practical manner by taking the example of a ship lost at sea due to
master error in navigation (nautical fault) in part and a sea peril in part. Under the Hague and the Visby Rules
both these causes would exonerate the carrier. If draft COGSA 1998 were to eliminate the 'nautical fault'
defense, the carrier would have to prove the extent to which the loss is attributable to each cause to be
partially exonerated. Under the draft COGSA, the intent was to divide the burden of proof between the carrier
and the shipper so that shipper proves the nautical fault and carrier the peril of the sea. Michael F. Sturley,
«Proposed Amendments to the Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act» (1996) 18 Hous. 1. Int'l. L. 609 at 632.
843 William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disintegration of Uniform International
Carriage ofGoods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 601-602.
844 The Visby Rules are adopted by U.S. major trading partners. Frank Wilner, "Change for Liability" Traffic
World (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). On carrier opposition, "The COGSA Battle Resumes" J.
Com. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
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there is no definition in the draft document of the term 'package', there are available
statutory (Visby and draft COGSA) and case law guidelines to clarify this term845 .
However, the fact that this limitation only applies to contracting with the shipper
intermodal carriers, reduces the importance of this uniform provision.
Supporters of the draft document welcome the U.S. initiative that works out
an industry consensus, offers a reasonable increase in liability limits and brings
dispute resolution to the U.S. where there is a U.S. connection to the incident846.
They argue that if all affected commercial interests agree on the worked out
compromise as they did with 1936 COGSA, Congress will adopt it847 . However,
industry consensus at the national and the international level has been elusive and
prospects of passage of the draft COGSA 1998 in the current Congress appear
dim848 . The main problem area of the draft document is its 'extra-territorial'
character and the fact the U.S. is trying to enact its own perspective of the 1978
Hamburg Rules adding, in this way, to the proliferation of regimes governing
multimodal transport849. In effect, the draft document applies to all shipments
845 "A COGSA Compromise" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Paul Edelman, "The Latest
News from Washington" (2000) 3/28/2000 N. Y. Law. 1. 3 (col. 1) (WESTLAW-Newsletters). Vincent de
Orchis, New United States Proposal (2000) online: Maritime Advocate Homepage
<http://www.maritimeadvocate.com/il0_usco.htm> (last visited: Feb. 10, 2000). Infra at 244s.
846 Courtney Tower, "The Long Arm of the Law" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
"Liability Limbo J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
847 As reported by Michael F. Sturley, «Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act» (1996)
18 Hous. J. Int'!. L. 609 at 661.
848 Courtney Tower, "The Long Arm of the Law" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) and
William Augello, "What is Ahead for Logistics Professionals?" Log. Mgmt. (2001) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters) referring to the opposition of inland waterway interests and foreign vessel operators to the
proposed draft document. A coalition of European and Asian ship owners argues that the U.S. draft COGSA
jumps the gun on and undermines international efforts to create a uniform multimodal carrier liability regime.
"A COGSA Compromise" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters), Aviva Freudmann, "Foreign
Groups Seek to Derail COGSA Bill" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Authors have also
referred to the draft COGSA as a 'nightmare' for merchants, practitioners, judges and foreigners to whom it
will apply if this draft document becomes law. William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the
Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com.
595 at 597. Opponents of the draft COGSA asked Congress to stand by until the Comite Maritime
International (CMI) develops a plan. Constantine G. Papavizas, Lawrence I. Kiern, "1999-2000 Legal
Developments" (2001) 32 1. Mar. L. & Com. 349 at 367-368. The author probably referred to the
'CMI/UNCITRAL Draft Instrument', supra at 58s. On opposition to the draft COGSA see also supra note
839.
849 Courtney Tower, "The Long Arm of the Law" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Canada
Board of Marine Underwriters 2000 (2000) online: Canada Board of Marine Underwriters Homepage
<www.cbmu.com/CBMUMayOO.htm> (last visited: March 13,2000).
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from/to the U.S. and leaves no choice to parties except for U.S. jurisdiction and U.S.
arbitration for resolution of disputes85o . That's unreasonable and certainly creates a
conflict ofjurisdiction with Canada851 .
Canadian freight forwarders, carriers and shippers opme that the 'extra-
territoriality' of the U.S. law would add expense, inconvenience and occasion lost
business to Canada, the biggest purchaser of U.S. goods and dependent on U.S.
transportation and applicable laws852. Moreover, Canadian government and the
Canadian Maritime Law Association have protested about the fallacies of draft
COOSA 1998853 . Finally, Pro Tetley states that U.S. drafters have been wrong not to
act as jurists trying to produce the best law possible instead of drafting a report that
reflected all the views of each national association but lacking international legal
perspective854. He suggests that international interests should not negotiate with the
U.S. Maritime Law Association since this will just have as effect to increase their
clout before Congress855 .
We are going to examine currently applicable laws and practices to the basis
of multimodal carrier liability in the U.S. and Canada Par. 1, and then proceed to
850 William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disintegration of Uniform International
Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 19991. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 604. Vincent de Orchis, New
United States Proposal (2000) online: <http://www.maritimeadvocate.com/ilO_usco.htm> (last visited: Feb.
10, 2000). Consequently, a Canadian or other shipper in Canada suffering loss or damage in Canada would be
forced to take action in the U.S. since the shipment originates from or is destined to the U.S., where normally
they would have a right to do it at home. Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (1999)
online: CIFFA Homepage <http :www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html> (last visited:
Nov. 30,2001).
851 Courtney Tower, "The Long Arm of the Law" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Tony
Young, Multimodal Convention: a Goal that Can't be Achieved? (1999) online: Forwarderlaw.com
Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/multyou.htm> (last modified: Nov. 26, 1999).
852 Ibid. William Tetley repeats the words of the late John F. Kennedy: 'Geography has made us neighbors,
history has made us friends, economics has made us partners and necessity has made us allies. Those who
nature has so joined together, let no man put asunder'.
853 William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disintegration of Uniform International
Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 617. Transport Canada 1999
consultation paper on the revision of the 1993 COGWA to consider adoption of the Hamburg Rules retained
COGWA as the governing statute for ocean carriage until the next review period, January 1, 2005. Tony
Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (1999) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http :www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html> (last visited: Nov. 30, 2001).
854 William Tetley, «The Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA: the Disentegration of Uniform International
Carriage of Goods by Sea Law» (Oct. 1999) 1999 1. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 618.
855 Ibid at 619.
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the comparative analysis of the multimodal carrier liability exceptions in the U.S.
and Canada Par. 2.
Par. 1. Overview of the Basis of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S.
and Canada: In the absence of uniform multimodal carrier liability rules in the U.S.
and Canada, unimodal carrier liability will make the object of the present analysis:
U.S. and Canadian motor (A), rail (B) and ocean carrier (C) basis of liability. In
general, similar liability principles -incorporated in BsOL/tariffs- seem to apply to
land and ocean unimodal and said segments of intermodal carriage in each of these
two countries. However, since cross-country intermodal tariff provisions are specific
to multimodal carriage and are usually more explicit than BsOL liability terms, we
will examine both BsOL and tariffprovisions856.
A. Overview of us. and Canadian Motor Carrier Basis ofLiability: As we
have previously affirmed, Canada's interprovincial and international trucking is
856 The following seems to be the practice of mentioned transport companies as reported by persons
interviewed and/or reference documents. For ocean transport this refers to the Hague (U.S.) and the Visby
Rules (Canada) incorporated in BsOL or tariffs. Interview of the author with U.S. based SANCO
Inc.lIMOREX SHIPPING personnel (Dec. 21,2001) and Canadian Maritime International shipment expert
(Dec. 21,2001). Annex No. I, Table No.3 at xxviii, xxxii,xlii.
The U.S. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe (BNSF/U.S.) and Canadian National (CN/CAN) Railways
intermodal tariffs and unimodal BsOL will be herein examined but cross-references will also be made to U.S.
Northern Suffolk (NSIU.S.) and Canadian Pacific (CP/CAN) railways intermodal tariffs and unimodal BsOL.
For precedence of intermodal tariffs over BsOL provisions see infra at 182. Certain tariffs can be found
electronically: CP International Intermodal Tariffs (2003) online: Canadian Pacific Railways Homepage
<http://www2.cpr.ca/TariffLi.nsf:> (last modified: Feb. 24, 2003). For the BNSF Intermodal Rules and
Policies Guide (2002) online: BNSF Homepage
<http://www.bnsf.com/business/iabulpdf/intermodalJules.pdf> (last modified: Aug. 1, 2002 (modifications
marked in red». For NS Circular #2 (2003) online: NS Homepage for Intermodal Transport
<http://www.nscorp.com/intermodaIlShowDoc/english/intermodallgenerallintermodal_rules_circular.pdf>
(last modified: May 15,2003). All these documents are found in Annex No. 1, Tables No.6, 7,8 at lxvi-xcix.
Some history: For CN and CP railways see supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, par. 2 (A)(a). BNSF was
created in 1995, is the product of mergers and covers the western two thirds of the U.S.. NS was founded in
the 1800's, it is the product of more than 200 railroad mergers and serves the center-east part of the U.S.
(Texas-East Coast). With these U.S. and Canadian railways we've got all of Canada and U.S. geographically
covered. Annex No. III, Table NO.1 at clxxviii-clxxxi.
U.S. American Freightways BOL and tariff liability provisions will be herein examined for U.S. motor
transport. American Freightways Uniform Straight Bills of Lading (2001) online: American Freightways
Homepage <http://www.af.com/Straight_BOL.pdf> (last modified: June 21,2001). Annex No. I, Table No.4
at l-liii. American Freightways has been re-branded to FedEx Freight since June 3, 2002. We refer herein to
company's documents employed before said date. In Canadian motor transport we will examine statutory
provisions reproduced in the uniformly applied Canadian CUBOL. Interview of the author with Liaison Can /
U.S. Courrier (1986) Inc. personnel (Dec. 21, 2001) and Canadian Manitoulin Transport personnel (Dec. 21,
2001). Annex No. I, Table No.5 at Iv.
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subject to the 1987 Motor Vehicle Transport Act (MVTA)857 that delegated to the
provinces the authority to regulate in this field. Interprovincial agreement has led to
the adoption of the 'Canadian Uniform Highway Bill of Lading' (CUBOL)858.
CUBOL provisions apply to all interprovincial and international freight in Canada,
the form of the bill is prescribed by the province where the carriage originates859 and
its content is more or less uniform among provinces so that possible divergences are
more of an academic, rather than of a practical, interest86o.
CUBOL presumes carrier liability once shipper-claimant makes its prima
facie case (proof of loss, receipt of goods in good condition by the carrier and
delivery in bad condition)861. Its clause 5 adopts common law carrier liability
defenses with some enlargement862: i) acts of God, ii) Queen's or public enemies,
iii) riots, iv) strikes, v) defect or inherent vice in the goods, vi) act or default of the
consignor owner or consignee, vii) authority of law, viii) quarantine and ix) natural
shrinkage. If a carrier is to rely on one of these liability exemptions he must prove
that the particular defense was the proximate cause of loss to which his, or his
servants, negligence did not contribute863. The burden of proof will then shift again
to the shipper to prove carrier, or carrier servant's negligence. CUBOL clauses
857 Motor Vehicle Transport Act, (MVTA) R. S., 1985, c. 29 (3rd Supp.). On recent amendments of the Act
see supra note 655.
858 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 2.
859 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 28 and 14.
860 Ibid at 29 and 12. This is why we will herein refer to the Provinces of Ontario, British Columbia and
Quebec motor carrier BsOL forms. Annex No.1, Table No.5 at Iv.
861 Calgary Tpt. Services Ltd. v. Pyramid Mgnt Ltd. (1976), 71 D. L. R. (34) 234 (Alta. C. A.) citing John S.
McNeil. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 66-67. Voest-Alpine
Canada Corp. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co. (1991), 55 B. C. L. R. (2d) 357 (B. C. S. C.). This is an ocean
carriage case that refers to two U.S. multimodal (ocean-motor) transport cases and adopts their conclusions on
burden of proof, explicitly stating the need to provide for uniform laws. Annex No.1, Table No.5 at Iv.
862 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 99. Annex No.1, Table No.
5 at Iv and Annex No. 111, Table No.5 at cxc.
863 Chet's Transport Inc. v. Seaway Distributors Ltd. [1987], N. S. 1. No. 368 (N. S. S. C.) and Calgary Tpt.
Services Ltd. v. Pyramid Mngnt Ltd. (1976), 71 D. L. R. (34) 234 (Alta.C.A.) citing John S. McNeil, John S.
McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 67. Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T.
Doyle, Lic Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in North America (Tuscon:
National Law Center for Interamerican Free Trade, 1996) at 53.
In the present study, the concepts of negligence and of absence of fault will be used interchangeably since in
civil law systems authors describe negligence as a variation of the concept of fault (involuntary fault). In
common law systems, the concepts of 'negligence' and of 'fault' are, if not identical, at least very similar,
with the concept of fault being inclusive of the concept of negligence. G.H. Treitel, Frustration and Force
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contain permissive language sanctioning the principle of freedom of contract even
though parties will rarely have recourse to it864. Contractual exclusion of carrier
liability would probably be disallowed for public policy reasons865.
In the case CUBOL provisions are not applicable or not respected by the
carrier, common law (and in the province of Quebec, civil law) will appll66.
Common law defenses include: i) acts of God, ii) acts of the King's enemies, iii)
inherent vice of the goods (i.e. natural shrinkage) and iv) default of the shipper or
the owner867. Carrier failure to use reasonable care in foreseeing or avoiding the
consequences of those excepted perils will disallow him the benefit of these
exceptions. Freedom of contract, recognized by common law, is only impaired by
public policy considerations that prohibit exculpatory provisions completely
releasing carrier from all liabilitl68 . Quebec Civil Code869 (civil law) provisions
(art. 2049) presume carrier liability when the shipper has made its prima facie
Majeure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) at 474 and France Ferrari, "Comparative Remarks on Liability
for Ones Own Acts" (1993) Loy. L. A. Int'1. L. 1. 813 at 825-826.
864 Quebec courts have excluded the possibility of contractual limitation. Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I,
Par.2(B)(b).
865 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 60 and Canadian cases
such as Robertson v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. ofCanada (1895),24 S. C. R. 611 (S. C. C.) referring to the
U.S. authority case Hart v. Pennsylvania, 112 U.S. 331 (U. S. S. C. 1884) applicable on the matter. See,
however, Davies v. Alberta Motor Assn [1991], A. J. No. 792 (Alta Pro Ct) that held that contractual exclusion
of liability will be permitted if both parties had knowledge of the clause and manifested clear intent to adopt
it.
866 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 46 and 60.
867 George C. Anspach CO. V. Canadian National Railway Co. (1950), O. R. 317 (Ont. H. C.) as reported in
Banks V. Budget Transfer Ltd [1986], A. 1. No. 1367 (Alta. Pro Ct). See also John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier
Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 99 and at 10.
868 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 60 and note 88 at 46.
869 The first Quebec Civil Code was approved in 1866 and was greatly inspired by the contents of the French
Civil Code (Code Napoleon). The official order had the word "Quebec" replaced by the words "Lower
Canada" so that the first Quebec Civil Code was called "Civil Code of Lower Canada". The codifiers did opt
for some parts of British law such as commercial law, maritime law and parts of English law of wills.
The Civil Code ofQuebec is nothing more than a huge provincial statute or law containing ten head-subjects.
As such, it was subjected to a complete overhaul by the Quebec government in the late-eighties. The reform
took years but culminated in a new Quebec Civil Code which went into effect on January 1, 1994. In the
present study, we will refer to the 1994 Quebec Civil Code provisions.
Some history: In 1663, when the French King assumed jurisdiction over the territory now known as Quebec,
he declared that the population would be subject to the "Custom of Paris." After Quebec was ceded to the
British in 1763, the English monarchy and their North American governors never did set down exactly which
laws were to be applied in the territory of what was then known as New France. Legal chaos reigned. Matters
got so bad that in 1786, one survey discovered that judges were applying French or English law depending on
their nationality! In 1861, the National Assembly of Quebec ordered a bilingual consolidation of Quebec civil
law. Quebec Civil Code (1997) online: World Wide Legal Information Association Homepage
<http://www.wwlia.org/ca-ccode.htm> (last visited: March 24, 2001).
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case
870
and exonerate him in case of: i) force majeure, ii) inherent defect in the
property, iii) natural shrinkage87l . Art. 2055 adds that iv) any ommission of the
shipper with respect to the goods does not render the carrier liable872 . Negligence on
the part of the carrier or his agents in producing the damage will hold carrier
partially or totally liable for the loss when this does not exceed the value of the
goods (art. 2052)873. Moreover, carrier cannot exclude or limit his liability except
subject to the conditions established by law (art. 2034). Since Quebec BOL
provisions are deemed 'minimal' by law, (this having been interpreted as 'd'ordre
publique'), contractual limitation or exclusion of carrier liability is not permitted by
Q 'b rt 874ue ec cou s .
Motor carriers in the U.S. are subject to the 1906 Carmack Amendment, the
1980 Motor Carrier Act, the 1994 Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act and the
1995 Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, the three last acts setting
in principles of contract to govern carrier liabilitl75 • In all cases, shippers may not
recover if they do not make a prima facie case of receipt of goods in good condition,
arrival in damaged condition and amount of damages876. This creates a presumption
of carrier liability and shifts the burden of proof to the carrier who will be relieved
from liability only if it can prove both its freedom from negligence with respect to
870 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
72 (transport terrestre). See also Durand v. Transport de /'Epiphanie (1986), R. J. Q. 610 (P. C.).
871 Article 1675 of the former "Civil Code of Lower Canada" refers to both force majeure and fortuitous
event. The 1994 Quebec Civil Code uses only the term force majeure. We are going to study later the
difference in the terms used. Infra note 991. With respect to the carriage of goods and persons the Quebec
Civil Code is divided in two sections: the first deals with the rules applicable to all means of transportation
(art. 2040-2059), the second concerns specifically water transport rules (art. 2059-2079). Art. 2049 makes
part of the first group. Note that the 'force majeure' liability exception exonerates carrier under the Quebec
motor BOL. Annex No.1, Table No.5 at lxiii.
872 The annotated Civil Code of Quebec notes, below this article, that this is a new article that is inspired by
international conventions.
873 See also Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis,
1986) at 45.
874 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 2(B)(b).
875 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 1 for these acts. Currently, most U.S. large shippers and many
smaller ones use contract carriage. Ibid at Par. I(B) and Stephen G. Wood, «Multimodal Transportation: an
American Perspective on Carrier Liability and Bill of Lading Issues» (1998) 46 Am. J. Compo L. 403 at 411.
876 49 U. S. C. A. par. 11706 (Carmack Amendment) recited in Missouri Pac. R. Co. V. Elmore and Stahl, 84
S. C. 1142 (S. Ct. 1964). Beta Spawn Inc. v. FFE Transportation Services Inc., 250 F. 3d 218 (3rd Cir. Pa.
2001). Proof is made by preponderance of evidence relying on direct or circumstantial evidence.
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an excepted peril: i) an Act of God, ii) public enemy, iii) authority of law iv) act or
omission of the shipper or owner v) inherent nature of the goods vi) delay due to
stoppage in transit vii) natural shrinkage877. These liability exceptions are not all
present in the Carmack Amendment but appear on the Uniform Straight Bill of
Lading878, (also known as 'long form' bill), one of the U.S. BsOL forms motor
carriers use today and which may incorporate and expand, but cannot vitiate,
Carmack Amendment common law provisions879 . The 'short form BOL' and the
'Shipper-Provided Short Form BOL' are BOL formats much more often
encountered in practice, incorporating by reference Uniform bill's terms880.
Possibility of contractual limitation of motor carrier liability has permitted
U.S. motor carriers to attain contractual uniformity in the liability amounts
applicable881 . The principle of contractual limitation contrasts Quebec courts
conclusions.
The Carmack Amendment restates common law provisions on land (motor,
rail) carrier liability and takes effect when contractual provisions do not882. Its
877 Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lic Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice
in North America (Tuscon: National Law Center for Interamerican Free Trade, 1996) at 53. Current forms of
Uniform Straight BsOL contain the additional exceptions of 'riots' and 'strikes'. Annex No. I, Table No.4 and
4(bis) at !iii-Iv and Annex No. III, Table No.6 at cxcii.
878 Annex No. I, Table No. 4(bis) at Iii-Iv. for a sample of such a bill. "Bills of Lading : The Choice is Yours"
Log. Mgmt (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). This bill is the granddaddy of all BsOL formats having
been lifted from the railroads in the mid-1930s. Sometimes referred to as the 'long-form' BOL because of its
size (81/2 by 11 inch), this bill is published in the National Motor Freight Classification (NMFC) where all
BOL in use by motor carriers must be published. Ibid.
879 Federated Dept. Stores Inc. v. Brinke, 450 F. 2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1971), Capon Textile Trading Co. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1083 (S. D. N. Y. 1982). Unlike U.S. rail carriers, U.S. motor carriers
are not obliged to use a specific BOL format. Infra at 181. The additional exceptions on the Uniform bill do
not vitiate the Carmack Amendment that allows contractual limitation of carrier liability under the 1980
Motor Carrier Act.
880 "Bills of Lading: The Choice is Yours" Log. Mgmt (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). The reason
the 'long form' bill has been rendered obsolete is its requirement that the 'terms and conditions' be printed in
full on the back (in verso), something that adds to the printing costs. The 'short form BOL' has no such
requirement and the reverse side is left blank, but the shipper agrees he is familiar with the implied 'Terms
and Conditions' of the long form. Ibid.
The 'Shipper-Provided Short-Form Bill', a non-negotiable bill published in the NMFC and giving shippers
the authority to furnish their own BsOL, provides for an analogous provision binding both carriers and
shippers. For more options ofBsOL see ibid.
881 See supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. leA). Rip Watson, "Liability Meeting Held Key to NAFTA
Market Access for Trucks" J Com. (1995) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
882 The Carmack Amendment was first applicable to U.S. railways, later extending its reach to motor carriers.
It responds to the desire of Congress to provide uniform interstate carrier liability rules. After the passage of
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geographical scope comprises a shipment originating in the U.S. with destination
adjacent, to the U.S., countries and excludes transportation originating from an
adjacent country, or transportation to or from a foreign country non-adjacent to the
U.S.883 . Otherwise, federal common law as existed before enactment of these acts
applies. Since most inland intermodal cargo in foreign commerce excludes
application of the Carmack Amendment, common law takes effect884. Common law,
in reality codified by the Carmack Amendment, presumes motor carrier liability for
loss or damage unless the loss or damage is caused by i) an act of God, ii) the public
enemy, iii) the act of the shipper himself, iv) public authority v) inherent vice or the
nature of the goods885 . Under common law principles, negligent carriers cannot be
exonerated886. Moreover, carriers can contract their liability but they cannot exempt
themselves from liability for negligence887.
B. Overview of us. and Canadian Rail Carrier Basis ofLiability: Railroads
III Canada are subject to the 1996 Canada Transportation Act that redefined
interprovincial and international carrier liability to conform it to the current
deregulation environment888 .
Section 137(1) of Canada Transportation Act permits shippers and railways
to contractually define their liability absent which regulatory provisions will apply
the Carmack Amendment, the Supreme Court continued to folIow the old general common law liability rules
but transformed them into rules of federal common law binding in state and federal courts. Morris v. Covan
Worldwide Moving Inc., 144 F. 3d 377 (5th Cir. (La.) 1998).
883 Saul Sorkin, «Limited Liability in Multimodal Transport and the Effect of Deregulation» (1989) 13 Tul.
Mar. L. 1. 285 at 287 and 294.
884 Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism» (1989) 64
Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 555. Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of
Multimodalism» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 555. Richard W. Palmer, Frank P. DeGiulio, «Terminal
Operations and Multimodal Carriage» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 281 at 325. The Carmack Amendment,
however, preempts common law provisions. Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F. 2d 700, (4th Cir.
1993).
885 49 U.S.C.A. § 11706 of the Carmack Amendment.
886 Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F. 2d 700 (4th Cir. (Md.) 1993).
887 Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism» (1989) 64
Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 556. Authority case Hart v. Pennsylvania, 112 U.S. 331 (U. S. S. C. 1884) very frequently
cited today by U.S. and Canadian courts (supra note 865) and Household Goods Carriers Bureau v. ICC,
584 F2d 437 (D. C. Cir. 1984). See also supra note 645.
888 S. C. 1996 c. 10. Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 2. On amendments of the act see supra note
659.
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(Section 127(2))889. Both CN and CP BsOL issued for multimodal or unimodal
shipments, reproduce the 'Railway Traffic Liability Regulations' liability exceptions
that a rail carrier, presumed liable when shipper makes its prima facie case890, can
invoke to be exonerated891 . i) act of God, ii) war or an insurrection, iii) a riot, strike
or lock-out, iv) any defect in the goods, v) any act negligence or omission of the
shipper or owner of the goods, vi) an authority of law, vii) a quarantine, viii) any
differences in the weights of grain, seed or any other commodity that are caused by
any natural shrinkage that occurs during the transportation of the goods and ix) any
discrepancies in elevator weights of grain where the elevators are not operated by
the carrier, unless certificates have been issued.. .in respect of the scales that are
used to weigh the grain. To benefit from these exceptions, rail carrier must prove
'freedom from negligence' on its part and on the part of its servants with respect to
it892.
In case Canadian rail BOL clauses or rail tariffs do not apply or are not
respected by the carrier, common law provisions will take effect, leading to
application of the same principles as in the case of motor carriers893 . In the civil law
province of Quebec, the same civil law provisions applicable to motor carriers will
take effect with respect to rail since Civil Code provisions on 'carriage of property'
889 Also Promech Sorting Systems B. V v. Bronco Rentals & Leasing Ltd (1995), 123 D. L. R. (4th) 111 (Man.
C. A.).
890 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
72. Supra note 861 and accompanying text for the primafacie case.
891 Railway Traffic Regulations to the National Transportation Act, 14 Aug. 1991, Gaz. C. 1991, (Vol. 125
No. 18) 2544 at 2545 P. C. 1991-1435. Annex No. I, Table No.9 at civ-cxiii and Annex No. III, Table No.7 at
cxciii for CP and CN BOL and liability exceptions.
892 Canadian Westinghouse Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1925), S. C. R. 579 (S. C. C.).
893 Supra at 176-177 for motor carriers. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Harris (1946), S. C. R. 352 (S. C.
C.). In D.M Duncan Machinery Company Limited v. Canadian National Railway Company et al. (1951), O.
R. 578 (Ont. H. C. J.) the court stated that under common law the carrier is responsible for all losses not
occasioned by i) an act of God or of the King's enemies, ii) ordinary wear and tear or ordinary loss and iii)
personal neglect, wrong or misconduct of the owner or shipper. Willes J in Blower v. Great Western Ry. Co.
(1872),7 C. P. 655 as reported by ibid. Grand Trunk Railway Co. ofCanada v. Vogel (1886), 11 S. C. R. 612
(S. C. C.) held that under common law, a rail carrier may contractually limit its liability but it cannot absolve
himself from liability for negligence. See, however, Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital
Corp. [1999],3 S. C. R. 423 (S. C. C.) that upheld such clauses since they were not deemed unconscionable.
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apply to all modes of transport except for water transport which is subject to specific
provisions894 .
In the U.S., railways are subject to the Carmack Amendment, the 1980
Staggers Act and the 1995 Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act that
sanction the principle of freedom of contracting895 . Although U.S. motor carriers are
not required to use a Uniform Straight Bill of Lading, use of such a bill is mandatory
for U.S. rail carriers896. This BOL will exonerate carrier in case of: i) act of God, ii)
public enemy iii) the authority of law iv) the act or default of the shipper or owner,
v) vice or defect in the property or natural shrinkage, vi) riots and strikes and vii)
stoppage in transit upon the request of the shipper, owner or party entitled to make
such request, viii) quarantine897 . As with U.S. motor and Canadian motor and rail
carriers, U.S. railways are presumed liable if the shipper makes its prima facie
case898 and can only be exonerated by proving presence of an excepted peril and
absence of carrier and servants negligence with respect to it899. Freedom of
contracting is permitted but exclusion of liability for negligence is strictly
forbidden90o . In brief, rail carrier basis of liability rules do not greatly differ in the
U.S. and Canada. When Uniform Straight BOL provisions do not take effect, the
Carmack Amendment reciting common law provisions will. The same burden of
proofOI , carrier defenses902 and freedom of contracting rules as in the case of motor
carriers will apply in this respect.
894 Supra note 871 and accompanying text.
895 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 1.
896 49 C.F.R. § 1035.1(a). Colin Barrett, "Bills of Lading Revisited" J. Com. (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters). "Bills of Lading: the Choice is Yours," Log. Mgmt (2000) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Also look at C. A. R.Transp. Brokerage Co. Inc. v. Darden Restaurants Inc., 213 F. 3d 474 (9th Cir. Cal.
2000). Supra note 879 for U.S. motor carriers.
897 Uniform Straight BOL under Contract Terms and Conditions Sec. (l)(b). Annex No. I, Table No.9 at c and
Annex No. JII, Table No.7 at cxciii.
898 Condakes v. Southern Pac. Co., 303 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Mass. 1968). Supra note 861 and accompanying
text for the primafacie case.
899 Ibid. Sarno v. Southern Pac. Co., 277 F. Supp. 628 (D. Mass. 1967).
900 Fine Foliage of Florida, Inc. v. Bowman Transp. Inc., 901 F. 2d 1034 (l1th Cir. 1990), American
Cyanamid Co. v. New Penn Motor Exp. Inc., 979 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. (Pa.) 1992) and Missouri Pacific R.R.
Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (U. S. S. C. 1964).
901 Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (U. S. S. C. 1964) stating common law
principles as codified by the Carmack Amendment. Supra at 179 for motor carriers.
902 Ibid and Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department ofTransp. , 105 F. 3d 702 (C. A.D. C. 1997).
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u.s. and Canadian international intermodal rail tariffs take precedence over
BsOL provisions because of their specificity to the intermodal carriage and their
contractual nature903 . Said tariffs sanction the principle of carrier liability for
negligence and not the BsOL principle of presumption of liability. This means that
intermodal rail carrier is not presumed liable once shipper makes its prima facie
case, but his negligence needs to be proven by the shipper and carrier can be
exonerated for mere absence of negligence with respect to the loss or damage
without proof of a specific exoneration cause904. In such a case, rail BsOL liability
exceptions could be combined with the principle of carrier liability for negligence,
as these exceptions constitute narrow duplications of this principle905 . Depending on
the railway company, a list of carrier exoneration causes similar to rail BsOL
liability exceptions may appear in the rail tariff close to the principle of carrier
liability for negligence, requiring proof of the specific cause of damage by the
carrier906. We will affirm that, in this case, rail BsOL liability exceptions tend to
regroup, by their generic terms, a number of rail tariff specific exoneration events.
Since rail BsOL exoneration causes can be combined one way or the other with rail
BsOL liability exceptions, both rail tariffs and BsOL will be herein examined.
C. Overview of us. and Canadian Ocean Carrier Basis of Liability:
Canadian international ocean carriage is subject to the 2001 Marine Liability Act
(MLA) that implemented the Visby Rules907 . U.S. international shipping is governed
903 We refer specifically to tariff liability provisions. Canadian National Railways (CN) intermodal tariff
7589-AN Item 300, Canadian Pacific Railways (CP) intermodal tariff 7690-E Items 00075, 00080, U.S.
BNSF Intermodal Rules and Policies Guide Item 62 and Norfolk Southern (NS) Circular #2 Sec. 8.3.3. The
same rail BsOL are used for unimodal and multimodal transport but intermodal rail tariffs take precedence
over BsOL provisions. BNSF Intermodal Rules and Policies Guide Item 60, CN tariff 7589-AN Item 300
(13), NS Sec. 8.2. See Annex No.1, Table No.6, 7,8 at lxvi-xcix.
904 See, for instance, BNSF Intermodal Rules and Policies Guide Item 62. Annex No.1, Table No.6 at lxix.
For a more detailed analysis see infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1.
905 Infra at 221 «q) exception) and Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 for a more extended analysis of this
reasoning.
906 U.S. BNSF Intermodal Rules and Policies Guide Item 62(1), CP rail tariff 7690-E Item 00075, NS Sec.
8.3.3(d) provide for these specific exoneration causes, specific but not exhaustive examples of carrier absence
of negligence. This seems also to correspond to CP practice: Interview of the author with CP Freight Cargo
Claims personnel (May 7, 2002). CN tariff only refers to carrier liability for negligence. Annex No. I, Tables
No.6, 7, 8 at lxvi-xcix and Annex No. III, Tables No.7, 8 at cxciii-cxciv.
907 Canadian Marine Liability Act (S.C. 2001, c. 6.) contains, in Schedule III, a recast of the Visby Rules
(supra at 9). Visby Rules apply outward from Canada (from any Canadian international port) and inward
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by 1936 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)908 enacting the 1924 Hague
Rules909. Both these acts cover ocean carrier liability from 'tackle to tackle' but
parties in multimodal transport can provide that they apply to the land segment(s) of
the multimodal journey or for the time agreed between the parties91O.
Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(4) provides that a bill of lading is prima facie
evidence that goods were received by the carrier in apparent good order and
condition (part of shipper prima facie case)911. This establishes a presumption of
liability against the ocean carrier who can rebut it by proving: i) due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage and ii) a carrier
defense912. Carrier defenses are more numerous than those encountered in land
transport and, at times, specific to ocean carriage:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants ofthe carrier
in the navigation or in the management ofthe ship.
b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity ofthe carrier.
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.
d) Act of God
from a foreign port in a contracting state or if the BOL is issued in such a state. (Visby Rules and 2001 MLA
art. X). 2001 MLA can also be found in Marine Liability Act (2001) online: Canadian Department of Justice
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/M-0.7/ (last modified: August 31, 2001).
908 Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat.1207 (1936) (codified as amended at) 46 U. S. C. App. [ss]
1300-1315 (1988). The COGSA applies to ocean shipments to and from the Unites States (46 U.S.c. par.
1312).
909 Inland carriers in the U.S., -carriers intervening right before cargo is loaded onto the ship and after its
discharge as well as water carriers in lakes, rivers, inland waters, intercoastal waterways- are governed by the
1893 Harter Act (46 U.S.C. par. 190-196). Richard W. Palmer, Frank P. DeGiulio, «Terminal Operations and
Multimodal Carriage» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 281 at 326.
910 Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism» (1989) 64
Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 554.
911 See also William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
133 and 142. U.S.: Us. v. Ocean Bulk Ships Inc., 248 F. 3d 331 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 2001) and Polo Ralph
Lauren L.P. v. Tropical Shipping & Const. Co. Ltd, 215 F. 3d 1217 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 2000). Canada: Wirth
Ltd v. Belcan N. V (1996) [1996], F. C. J. No. 603 (F. C.) and Voest-Alpine Canada Corp. v. Pan Ocean
Shipping Co. (1991),55 B. C. L. R. (2d) 357 (B. C. S. C.).
912 In U.S. and Canadian ocean and land transport the cause of the loss or, absent proof of the exact cause, the
circumstances of the loss (theory of probabilities) have to be identified. (ocean Can / U.S.): William Tetley,
Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 365-366. The author cites
decisions burdening the carrier with the proof that the excepted peril incident was a reasonable one, even
though not proven in all details. Ibid. U.S.: Leslie Tomasello Weitz, "The Nautical Fault debate" (1998) 22
Tul. Mar. L. J. 581 at 583. Us. v. Ocean Bulk Ships Inc., 248 F. 3d 331 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 2001), Skandia Ins.
Co., Ltd v. Star Shipping AS, 2001 A.M.C. 1527 (S. D. Ala. 2001). Canada: (land) John S. McNeil, Motor
Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 67 with the author adding that reasonable care to
avoid the consequences of the excepted peril has also to be proven by the carrier at this stage. Voest-Alpine
Stahl Linz GmbH v. Federal Pacific Ltd (1999) [1999], F. C. J. No. 1326 (F. C. C.). For the Hague and the
Visby Rules see Annex No. JI, Tables No.2, 3 at cxlii-clviii and Annex No. JII, Table No.5 at cxc.
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e) Act of War
f) Act of Public Enemies
g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process.
h) Quarantine restrictions.
i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative.
j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause,
whether partial or general.
k) Riots and civil commotions.
1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea.
m) Wastage in bulk of weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent
defect, quality or vice of the goods.
n) Insufficiency of packing.
0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks.
p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence.
q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or
without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of
proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that
neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents
or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
Art. 3(8) of both the Hague and the Visby Rules prohibits contractual
limitation of carrier liability except as provided in the rules (i.e. declaration of
value). The conflict with land laws is apparent since in both the U.S. and Canada
land carriers can contractually limit their liability (except for Quebec motor
carriers).
When the Hague or the Visby Rules do not take effect, common law
provisions do in Canada (including Quebec) and the U.S.913 . When applicable to
ocean carriers, common law presumes carrier liable for the whole value of the
913 U.S.: (multimodal) Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Kaisha, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C. D. Cal. 1997).
Tampella Ltd. Boiler Div. v. M!V NORLANDIA, 1988 WL 149627 (S. D. Ga. 1998) and Pasztory v. Croatia
Line, 918 F. Supp. 961 (E. D. Va. 1996). Canada: It is ITO and Miida Electronics Inc. v. Mitsui o.s.K. Lines
Ltd. (1986), 1 S. C. R. 752 (S. C. C.) (authority case) that held that maritime law is federal law, uniform
across Canada and not the law of any province, thus, leaving little scope for the application of provincial
legislation in this sphere. As a result, in the absence of federal legislation to govern maritime law, common
law principles should apply in the province of Quebec. As reported by William Tetley, "The Demise of the
Demise Clause?" (1999) 44 McGill LJ. 807 at par. 16, Guy Lefebvre, "L' Uniformisation du Droit Maritime
Canadien aux Depens du Droit Civil Quebecois: Lorsque I' infidelite se Propage de la Cour Supreme a la
Cour d' Appel du Quebec" (1997) 31 Rev. 1. Themis. 577 at par. 1 and Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au
Quebec (Montreal, Canada: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 7 and at 270. Ontario Bus Industries Inc. v.
Federal Calumet [1992], 1 F. C. 245 (F. C. C.) and Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd.-Tahsis Pacific
Region v. Beltimber (1999) [1999],4 F. C. 320 (F. C. C.). The water transport provisions of the Civil Code of
Quebec (art. 2059-2079), in force as ofJanuary 1, 1994.
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damage or loss (presumption ofliability) if the shipper makes its prima facie case914.
The carrier will be exonerated in the presence of common law liability defenses -i)
acts of Ood, ii) Queen's enemies iii) inherent defect in goods themselves iv) default
of shipper- provided he is not negligent915 but contractual exclusion of carrier
liability for negligence is not permitted916.
The general principles of basis of ocean and land carrier statutory liability
are, therefore, quite similar: same burden of proof, same presumption of carrier
liability, same carrier proof of absence of negligence with respect to the cause of the
loss. However, ocean carriers are granted additional statutory protection ('nautical
fault', perils of the sea, saving life at sea, fire, 'catch-all exception). Moreover, U.S.
and Canadian ocean carriers cannot contractually limit their liability while their land
counterparts can with the exception of Quebec motor carriers who are prohibited to
do so. Finally, ocean carriers cannot invoke a liability exception if they do not prove
vessel seaworthiness before and at the beginning of the journey. Before we enter
into the comparative analysis of cross-country and cross-modal liability exceptions,
we will focus on ocean carrier duty to provide a seaworthy vessel and ocean/land
carrier duty to care for the cargo.
Seaworthiness/Care for Cargo: Both the Hague and the Visby Rules oblige
carriers to exercise 'due diligence' to make the vessel seaworthy before and at the
beginning of the voyage (art. 3(1) and 4(1», a pre-condition to carrier invoking a
COOSA or MLA liability exception (overriding obligations)917. In land transport, a
914 Canada: Produits Alimentaires Grandma Ltee v. Zim Israel Navigation (1987) [1987], F. C. 1. No.5 (F. C.
C.) affirmed in appeal by Produits Alimentaires Grandma Ltee v. Zim Israel Navigation Co. (1988), F. C. J.
No. 24 (F. C. A.). Even the Quebec Civil code contains such a presumption in articles 2071 and 2072 on
water transport. For the U.S.: Matter ofIntercontinental Properties Management S.A., 604 F. 2d 254 (4th Cir.
(Va.) 1979). Supra note 861 and accompanying text for shipper primafacie case.
915 U.S.: Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Kaisha, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C. D. Cal. 1997), Hanover Ins.
Co. v. Shulman Transport Enterprises Inc. 581 F. 2d 268 (1 st Cir. 1978). Canada: Canadian Pacific Forest
Products Ltd.-Tahsis Pacific Region v. Beltimber (1999),4 F. C. 320 (F. C. C.).
916 U.S. : Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism»
(1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 556, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 3d ed. (U.S.: West
Group, 2003) Chapter 10(A) at par. 10-4. Canada: Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd v. Beltimber (1999),
4 F. C. 320 (F. C. A.).
917 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 371-374
and Lefebvre Guy, L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous Connaissement (LL.
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corresponding obligation of roadworthiness (obligation to make vehicles or trains fit
and safe for transport) exists but it does not constitute a condition precedent to
carrier invoking a liability exception918• However, reference to seaworthiness to
determine whether a land vehicle is roadworthy relieving land carrier from
negligence with respect to a liability exception, may be of assistance since the
conditions under which a land vehicle is unroadworthy and a vessel unseaworthy
present resemblances919•
Seaworthiness must exist 'before and at the beginning' of the voyage so that
unseaworthiness during intermediary stops is not taken into account (majority
view)92o. Its presence must be defined with respect to the 10SS92I. Seaworthiness has
been defined as the state of the vessel in such a condition, with such equipment
M. Thesis, University of Montreal, 1986) at 75-78 [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers de Droit 81]. U.S:
u.s. v. Ocean Bulk Ships Inc., 248 F. 3d 331 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 2001), Hale Container Line Inc. v. Houston Sea
Packing Co. Inc., 137 F. 3d 1455 (1Ith Cir. (Fla.) 1998). Canada: Primex Forest Products Ltd. v. Harken
Towing Co. [1997], B. C. 1. No. 1644 (B. C. S. C.), Voest-Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH v. Federal Pacific
Ltd.[1999], F. C. J. No. 1326 (F. C. C.), Federal Insurance Co. v. Rail and Water Terminal (Quebec) Inc.
[1980], C. S. 994 (S. C. Que.).
918 Canada: Pacific Great Eastern Railway Co. v. Bridge River Power Co. [1944], S. C. R. 196 (S. C. C.)
which cites the New Zealand case Trickett v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd. [1936], A. C. 159 (authority
case) in deciding that seaworthiness and roadworthiness are roughly comparable. (English case) Clarke v.
National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation, Ltd. [1963],2 Ll. Rep. 35 (C. A.) advancing more details on
the comparison. U.S: Rainey v. Paquet Cruises, Inc., 709 F. 2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1983).
919 English case Clarke v. National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation, Ltd. [1963],2 Ll. Rep. 35 (C. A.)-
very frequently citing New Zealand case Trickett v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd. [1936], A. C. 159, (an
authority case on the parallel of the two concepts and referred to by Canadian case law)- states that
overloading can determine unseaworthiness and unroadworthiness alike. It is carrier obligation to provide a
roadworthy vehicle although this may not be explicitly stated. Craig E. Philip, Charles T. Connors, James G.
Cunningham, 1. B. Hunt Robert H. Maisch, «Motor Carrier Panel» (2001) 28 Transp. L. J. 473 at 478-479.
920 Canada: Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis,
1986) at 198 and Plumper Bay Sawmills Ltd. v. Jericho Towing Ltd. [1980], F. C. 1. No. 406 (F. C. C.).
However, in Martel v. Fortier [1995], F. C. J. No. 1713 (F. C. C.) the court followed British law and required
proof of seaworthiness 'at the commencement of each stage' (stages doctrine). See the explicit rejection of
the 'stages doctrine' in the U.S. very frequently cited American Mail Line Ltd. v. U. s., 377 F. Supp. 657 (W.
D. Wash. 1974) case. On the 'stages doctrine' and seaworthiness see the LL. M. thesis of Lefebvre Guy,
L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous Connaissement (LL. M. Thesis,
University of Montreal, 1986) at 43s. [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers de Droit 81].
The exact moment when the vessel must be seaworthy cannot be precisely defined. William Tetley, Marine
Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 377. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de
Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 198. However, doctrine and
case law are unanimous in deciding that 'before and at the beginning of the voyage' refers at least to the
moment when commencement of charging goods on board is about to take effect. Lefebvre Guy,
L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous Connaissement (LL. M. Thesis,
University of Montreal, 1986) at 59 [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers de Droit 81].
921 CanadalU.S.: William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications,
1988) at 374.
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and manned by such a master and crew that normally the cargo will be loaded,
carried, cared for and discharged properly and safely on the contemplated voyage
(due diligence)922. This appreciation is based on industry standards and practices at
the relevant time so long as these standards and practices are reasonable. In other
words, whether a vessel is seaworthy is a question of fact923 . Carrier will be held
liable for servant's acts rendering the vessel unseaworthy (non-delegable duty)924.
U.S. and Canadian common law principles impose an overriding duty of
seaworthiness on the ocean carrier, in the same way statutory law does, but this duty
is absolute and not based on due diligence925.
Note must be made, in this respect, of Hague and Visby Rules article 3(2)
that puts the duty of 'properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for
and discharge the goods carried' on the carrier. This provision is not to be
confounded with art. 3(1) of mentioned rules that also refers to carrier caring for the
cargo but is limited in time to the period 'before and at the beginning of the journey
922 Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(1). Canada: Martel v. Fortier [1995], F. C. J. No. 1713 (F. C. C.), Jean
Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 143.
U.S.: Henry v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 134 F. Supp. 71 (S. D. N. Y. 1955). On the elements of vessel
(un)seaworthiness (structural characteristics, equipment, crew competence, installations for the receipt and
conservation of cargo) see the Lefebvre Guy, L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises
sous Connaissement (LL. M. Thesis, University of Montreal, 1986) at 1-35 [published in (1990) 31 Les
Cahiers de Droit 81].
923 U.S.: Ringering v. Compania Maritima De-La-Mancha, 670 F. Supp. 301 (D. Or. 1987). Canada: Martel v.
Fortier [1995], F. C. J. No. 1713 (F. C. C.) and Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co. v. Canada Steamship
Line [1930] S. C. R. 262 (S. C. C.). Vessel's latent defect which would have been revealed by a carrier
diligent examination engages his liability if such defect renders vessel unseaworthy causing, thereby,
damages to the goods. Lefebvre Guy, L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous
Connaissement (LL. M. Thesis, University of Montreal, 1986) at 38-39 [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers
de Droit 81].
924 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 385 and
Lefebvre Guy, L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous Connaissement (LL. M.
Thesis, University of Montreal, 1986) at 63 [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers de Droit 81]. U.S.: Sabah
Shipyard SDN. BHD. v. MlV Harbel Tapper, 984 F. Supp. 569 (S. D. Tex. 1997) and Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (D. S. S. C. 1946). Canada: Primex Forest Products Ltd. v. Harken Towing Co. [1997],
B. C. J. No. 1644 (B. C. S. C.), Plumper Bay Sawmills Ltd. v. Jericho Towing Ltd. [1980], F. C. 1. No. 406 (F.
C. C.).
925 This is an implied warranty of seaworthiness (de facto seaworthiness) unless otherwise provided by
contract. In the U.S., this de facto seaworthiness exists only in certain circumstances such as shipowner's
liability to longshoremen employees, worker's compensation and wrongful death because of unseaworthiness
or actions against ocean carriers. American Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum Inc., 845 F. Supp. 91 (E. D. N.
Y. 1993) and C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. MlV Hans Leonhardt, 719 F. Supp. 479 (E. D. La. 1989) and
Grace Line Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F. 2d 361 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1974). Canada: City ofAlberni (The)
v. Hunt, Leuchars, Hepburn, Ltd. (1947) [1947], Ex. C. R. 83 (Ex. C. C.).
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and only targets vessel seaworthiness. The latter is an overriding obligation whose
disrespect impedes carrier from invoking art. IV liability exceptions of the same
rules. The former provision does not refer to vessel seaworthiness but to the
protection of cargo imposing on the carrier a higher than due diligence, though not
absolute, standard of care that must be present throughout the joumey926. It is not an
overriding obligation so that carrier can invoke art. IV liability exceptions even
though he did not fulfill art. 3(2) obligations927. As with vessel seaworthiness,
Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(2) engages carrier liability for agent's and
independent contractor's faults928. Further, contractual shifting of this carrier duty to
the shipper is prohibited under Hague and Visby Rules art. 111(8)929. However, if the
shipper or its agent improperly stow goods on the ship or in a container, the carrier
may be absolved from liability under the 'shipper fault' exception93o.
This leaves pending the question of who bears the burden of proof of
(un)seaworthiness and (un)roadworthiness. In all cases, the shipper must first make
its prima facie case931 . The burden of proof will then shift to the ocean carrier who
926 This degree of care is very similar to that of an insurer of cargo. However, courts, particularly in the U. S.,
continue to refer to due diligence to care for cargo something that is patently wrong. Opinion of William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 531,541 and
552 and 553.
927 This is said to be due to the Hague and Visby Rules proviso 'Subject to the provisions of art. IV' appearing
before enunciating carrier duty of care for the cargo under art. 3(2) and which does not appear in the Hague
and the Visby Rules art. III(l) or in COGSA par. 1303(2) corresponding provision. William Tetley, Marine
Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 543 and at 546.
928 William Tetley, Tetley's Law and other Nonsense Chapter 26 Sec. 5 (Update of Marine Cargo Claims
Volume) (2002) online: Tetley's LawlMcGill Homepage <http://tetley.law.mcgill.caich26.htm> (last
modified: continuously). U.S. and Canadian land transport render carrier liable for his or his agent's lack of
care for the cargo throughout the journey, but the degree of care required in this respect is reasonable care and
not a higher standard of care, the larter making easier shipper burden of proof. U.S.: Crockett v. Uniroyal
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 821 (M. D. Ga. 1984), Eastern Wine Corp. v. New York Cent. R. Co., 355 F. 2d 30 (2nd
Cir. 1966). Canada: General Motors Corp. v. Cast (1983) Ltd. (1994), F. C. J. No. 255 (F. C. C.), Grand
Trunk Railway Co. ofCanada v. Vogel (1886), 11 S. C. R. 612 (S. C. C.).
929 William Tetley, Tetley's Law and other Nonsense Chapter 25 Sec. 5 (Update of Marine Cargo Claims
Volume) (2002) online: Tetley's Law/McGill Homepage <http://tetley.law.mcgill.caich25.htm> (last
modified: continuously). at Chapter 25, Sec. 5.
930 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 545.
931 Ocean U.S.-Canada: The following is based on William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3d ed. (Montreal:
International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 142-143 and 542-543. Land Canada: John S. McNeil, Motor
Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 67. Land U.S.: Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 211 F. 3d 367 (7th Cir. 2000). Supra note 861 and accompanying text for the
prima facie case proof.
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must establish vessel seaworthiness and the exoneration cause932. Land carriers only
need to prove the exoneration cause of the loss and absence of negligence in this
regard933 . It is only then that the burden of proof will shift again to the shipper to
prove ocean, land or servant's absence of due diligence in the production of the
damage.
Paragraph 2. Comparative Analysis of Multimodal Carrier Liability
Exceptions in the U.S. and Canada: Although ocean carrier liability exceptions are
inclusive of most land carrier exoneration causes in both countries, differences
between them exist. Presently applicable carrier liability exceptions cross-modally
and cross-country are placed in four categories: liability exceptions due to Third
Party Actions Liability (A), Exceptions due to Natural Causes (B), Cargo, Vessel,
Shipper Fault (C), and Ocean Specific Liability Exceptions (D). Three are the
challenges in undertaking a comparative study of cross-country and cross-modal
liability exceptions. First, find out if common or similarly phrased cross-modal and
cross-country liability exceptions are applied in the same way by case law in both
countries. Second, determine whether differently phrased or different cross-modal
and cross-country liability exceptions have common areas of application. Third,
study the ocean specific liability exceptions in the two countries and explain their
absence in land BsOL or rail tariffs in both countries.
A. Liability Exceptions due to Third Party Actions: There is a category of
liability exceptions which, with some variations, follows same wording throughout
modes and countries and comes into play when extraordinary force is exerted upon
the ship, ship owner or goods by concerted action of third persons, usually through
forms of organized governments934. These are: authority of law, quarantine, acts of
932 William Tetley, Tetley's Law and other Nonsense Chapter 18 Sec. 4 (on sea perils) and Ch. 6(II)(l)©
(Update of Marine Cargo Claims Volume) (2002) online: Tetley's Law/McGill Homepage <http://
tetley.law.mcgill.ca/ch26.htm> (last modified: continuously). The cause of the loss is proven by
'preponderance of evidence' and not by 'clear and convincing evidence'. Ibid at Ch. 6(11)(3). Even if, in
theory, the carrier has to prove the cause of the loss because he is better placed to do so, in practice, both
shipper and carrier are obliged to prove all the facts available to them. Ibid at Ch. 14, Sec. 8.
933 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 67.
934 Whearton Poor, Poor on Charterparties and Ocean Bills ofLading (N. Y.: Matthew Bender, 1968) at 185.
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war, acts of public enemies, rulers of the world or seizure under legal processes,
riots, civil commotions, insurrections935 . To these we could probably add the theft of
containers or other cargo related liability exceptions we encounter in some
intermodal rail tariffs. For the most part, however, mentioned exceptions have
generated little litigation and have received little discussion in the drafting of
statutes and international conventions936.
The 'authority of law' liability exception that we find in Canadian and U.S.
land BsOL and rail intermodal tariffs, has not been worded in exactly the same way
in U.S. and Canadian ocean BsOL that employ the 'arrest or restraint of princes,
rulers of people or seizure under legal processes' expressions937 . Under all its
different denominations, however, this liability exception is a valid defense for
carriers when in-transit cargo damage occurs through intervention of governmental
h .. 938aut orztzes .
'Quarantine'939 an explicit land and ocean BsOL and CP intermodal rail tariff
liability exception, has been treated as an 'authority of law' (land) or 'restraint of
princes' (ocean) liability exception by U.S. and Canadian doctrine and courts940.
935 Ibid. For all herein studied exceptions see Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv.
936 Michael F. Sturley, «An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case» (1997) 21
Tul. Mar. L. Rev. 263 at 312.
937 In land transport, we also fmd terms as civil and military authority (BNSF tariff), confiscation of goods by
government. Ocean terms 'restraint of princes, rulers of people', use archaic language taken from old
insurance policies. M. E. DeOrchis, «Restraint of Princes: the Carrier Dilemma when trouble brews at
foreign ports» (1980) 1980 Eur. Transp. L 3 at 5. Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7,8 at cxc-cxciv.
938 Cases found on the issue are limited to ocean carrier ones. See, in this regard, William Tetley, Marine
Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 448-449. Governmental intervention
does not necessarily involve physical danger to the goods. 'Reasonable apprehension' (grounded fear) that if
the carrier proceeds to an act there will be governmental interference suffices. However, mere rumors of
possible governmental intervention are not good enough. M.E. DeOrchis, «Restraint of Princes: the Carrier
Dilemma when trouble brews at foreign ports» (1980) 1980 Eur. Transp. L. 3 at 5. U.S.: (ocean) Northern
Pacific Railway v. American Tobacco Co., 195 U.S. 439 (S. Ct. 1904), New England Insurance Co. v. The
Sarah Ann., 30 U. S. 345 (13 Pet. 400 1839) and The Styria, 186 U. S. 1 (S. Ct. 1902). Canada: (ocean)
Winchester v. Busby (1889), 16 S. C. R. 336 (S. C. C.). Examples of restraint of princes: naval blockage or
embargo, governmental acquisition of vessel, danger of confiscation of goods. Grant Gilmore, Charles L.
Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 164 and (English) T. G. Carver,
Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 225, sources of inspiration for both U.S. and
Canadian case law.
939 'Quarantine' is the space offorty days, or less quantity of time during which the crew, or cargo ofa ship or
vessel coming from a port or place infected or supposed to be infected by a disease, are required to remain on
board after their arrival, before they can be permitted to land. The objective of the quarantine is to ascertain
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'Seizure under legal processes' appears close to the 'restraint of princes,
rulers or people' ocean liability exception and is not found in land transport since
creditor claims on vessels or ocean cargo are much more frequent and onerous than
those encountered on land941 . This ocean specific liability exception refers to the
ordinary civil administration ofjustice on the basis of creditor's claims and does not,
therefore, make integral part of the 'restraint of princes' exception942. It can only be
employed if the carrier could not have foreseen the seizure943 .
'Acts ofwar' and 'public enemies' constitute two separate liability exceptions
often appearing together in BsOL and tariffs because of their conceptual
similarity944. The 'acts of war' liability exception is found in Canadian-U.S. ocean
and Canadian rail BsOL, CP and BNSF intermodal tariffs but not elsewhere. More
descriptive terms such as insurrections, rebellion, invasion may be used in this
regard945. All these terms refer to acts committed by countries at war, country's civil
that the crew or cargo is not infected. The Lectric Law Library's (2002) online: Lectric Law Library
Homepage <www.lectlaw.com/def.htm> (last modified: Feb. 28, 2002), s. v. 'Quarantine'.
940 Ocean U.S.lCanada: Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien,
americain et anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 132. Ocean-U.S.: Grant
Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 164 and note
78. M.E. DeOrchis, « Restraint of Princes: the Carrier Dilemma when trouble brews at foreign portS» (1980)
1980 Eur. Transp. L 3 at 5. Land-U.S.: Robert J. Prahl, "Understanding Motor Truck Cargo Insurance-an
Overview" Rough Notes (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters) even though the quarantine exception is
not always found in U.S. motor BsOL or U.S. rail tariffs. Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv.
The only Canadian case which seems permissive, though not dispositive, of the approximation of quarantine -
restraint of princes exceptions is Canadian International Paper Co. v. Manchester Concorde [1981], F. C. 1.
No. 707 (F. C. C.). England: T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 175
(quarantine-restraint of princes) and 176. Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7 at cxc-cxciii.
941 Annex No. III, Table No.5 at cxc. We found only an Australian land case mentioning this exception.
Thomas National Transport (Melbourne) Pty. Ltd and Pay v. May & Baker (Australia) Pty. Ltd [1966],2 Ll.
Rep. 347 (HC. Aus.).
942 For instance, a ship being arrested and detained by a creditor of the carrier with resulting damage to cargo
belonging to third party. Morrisey v. SSA. & JFaith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N. D. Oh. 1965) as reported by
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at note 98
(Chapter 18). Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press,
1975) at 164. It is not certain, however, if this exception concerns seizure of the vessel or of the transported
~~o~;l~t:~ Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 449.
Morrisey v. SSA. & J Faith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N. D. Oh. 1965).
944 Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. The 'act of war', 'act of public enemies' and 'arrest or
restraint of princes, or rulers of the world or seizure under legal processes' liability exceptions can overlap to
a certain extent. Restraint of princes may be an act performed for the prosecution of war. Likewise, an act
performed in the prosecution of war might be an act of public enemy. Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The
Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 164. M.E. DeOrchis, «Restraint of Princes: the
Carrier Dilemma when Trouble Brews at Foreign PortS» (1980) 1980 Eur. Transp. L. 3 at 5.
945 Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciii.
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war or political strife against a nation946. U.S. and Canadian case law seem to
conclude that war does not need to be declared in this respect, war like acts or
anticipated state of war are enough to justify presence of this liability exception947 .
'Public enemies' liability exception is found in all U.S. and Canadian BsOL
and rail intermodal tariffs except in the Canadian rail BOL and CP intermodal rail
tarift48 . It appears in Canadian motor BOL close to the term 'Queen's enemies' (or
King's enemies at common law), something that is generally not found in other land
or ocean BsOL in the U.S. and Canada949 .
English case law, source of inspiration for both jurisdictions and
CanadianlU.S. doctrine, seems to conclude that Queen's or King's enemies are
enemies of the state, countries at war thereof and, in general, public foreign enemies
but it does not include organized or unorganized crime95o • Even though Canadian
946 Michael Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien, americain et anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de I' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 132 based on english case law. Robert 1. Prahl,
"Understanding Motor Truck Cargo Insurance-an Overview" Rough Notes (2001) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletters).
947 U.S.: Eastern Air Lines Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F. 2d 957 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1976) mentioning
the ocean case Claveresk, 264 F. 276 (C. A 1920). Canada: Although we found no ad hoc case for Canada,
Azevedo v. Markel Insurance Co. ofCanada [1998], A 1. No. 1134 (Alta. Q. B.) referred to a carrier liability
insurance clause that defmes 'acts of war' very extensively: «War, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities
(whether war be declared or not) civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection ... " and Canadian National
Railway Company v. Canada Steamship Line [1947], O. R. 585 (S. C. C.).
948 Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxiv. Canadian land (specifically motor) cases on this exception
refer to English case law. WR. Johnson & Co. v. Inter-City Forwarders Ltd. [1946], O. 1. No. 97 (Ont. S. C.)
referring to Shaw v. Great Western Railway (1894), 1 Q. B. 373 (Q. B. D.) and Fishery Products
International Ltd. v. Midland Transport Ltd [1994], N. 1. No. 65 (Nfld. S. C.) referring to Secretary ofState
for War v. Midland Great Western Rly Co. ofIreland [1923], 2 1. R. 102 on this exception.
949 It has been suggested that Canadian motor carrier 'Queen's or public enemies' exception refers to
something more than 'Queens enemies', otherwise the term 'public enemies' would be superfluous. John S.
McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 102. However, according to Carver,
'public enemies' expression was presumably used in place of the more usual 'act of King's enemies' in order
to cover the case where the exception applies to a republican form of government. T. G. Carver, Carriage by
Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 537. In the English case Secretary of State for War v.
Midland Great Western Rly. Co. ofIreland, [1923],21. R. 102 judge Dodd, J. sided with Pr. Carver and after
considering the history of the exception noted that this is also the case in the U.S .. We agree with the author's
view that the term public enemies is not superfluous but probably refers to a republican form of government.
Inpa note 1378.
95 This does not include robbers on land but may include pirates, robbers on the high seas or enemies of all
nations. T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 14, Ham v. McPherson
(1842), 6 U. C. Q. B. (0. S.) (c. A) as reported by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 101-102. See also Secretary ofState for War v. Midland Great Western Rly Co
of Ireland [1923] 2 1. R. 102 and Michel Pourcelet aligned opinion. Michael Pourcelet, Le Transport
Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien, americain et anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I' Universite
de Montreal, 1972) at 132.
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and U.S. case law is sparse on the topic, Canadian cases conclude that the mere
phrase 'public enemies' conjures up images of war, intrigue and rebellion and
certainly does not include political protest of independent truckers951 .
The 'riots' and 'strikes' exceptions are present cross-modally and cross-
country even though terms used in this respect may differ952 . They constitute two
separate liability exceptions even though they often appear together in BsOL,
commentaries and texts and, thus, in the present study. Even though case law is
scarce on the issue, we learn that ocean transport 'riots and civil commotions'
liability exception refers to civil wars or organized public uprising against the
government953 .
Although names may differ (picketing, labor stoppage or disturbance, locks-
out), 'strikes' is a cross-modal and cross-country liability exception that exists when
a group ofemployees acts in concert with respect to a labor dispute954 . 'Picketing',
'locks-out', 'stoppage of labor', often appearing close to the 'strikes' exception, are
strike related concepts with 'stoppage of labor' regrouping all mentioned terms955 . A
951 Canada: Fishery Products International Ltd. v. Midland Transport Ltd [1994], N. J. No. 65 (Nflnd. C. A.)
overturning the Newfoundland Supreme Court decision (Fishery Products International Ltd. v. Midland
Transport Ltd [1992] N. J. No. 209 (Nflnd. S. C.)). U.S: authors argue that the expression 'public enemies'
usually means a country hostile or at war with the ship's flag country. Kenneth M. Klemm, «Forum Selection
in Maritime Bills of Ladng under COGSA» (1989) 12 Fordham Int'l L. 1. 459 at note 27. This exception
equally refers to the action of military or naval forces unconnected with either the carrier or the goods. Grant
Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 164.
952 Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. Civil commotions, acts of civil disobedience, locks-out,
labor disturbance or stoppage are some of the varied terms used cross-modally and cross-country. Ibid.
953 Michael Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien, americain et anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 134.
954 Employees may be employees of the carrier, independent stevedores at the port of charge or discharge and
the strike may be directed towards the carrier in question or carriers in general. Ibid at 133. Canada: Fishery
Products International Ltd. v. Midland Transport Ltd [1994] N. J. No. 65 (Nflnd C. A.) where various
English and Canadian cases were mentioned. English case Tramp Shipping Corporation v. Greenwich Marine
Inc. [1975],2 ALL E. R. 989 (C. A.), mentioning said Canadian case, held that 'strikes' are motivated by 'a
rise in wages, improvement of conditions, support for other workers or for political changes; expression of
sympathy or protest'. Same position is adopted in the U.S. where it is pointed out that a 'strike' is almost
always a matter of money and can be ended by money payment although failure to do so does not hold the
carrier liable. Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press,
1975) at 165 commenting on charterparties. See also Hellenic Lines Limited v. Director General of India
Sl'tPly Missionfor and on BehalfofUnion ofIndia, 452 F. 2d 810 (2nd Cir. (N. Y. 1971).
95 Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. For stoppage of labor regrouping other mentioned causes:
U.S.: Kapiolani Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 581 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978). Canada: Caron v. Canada (Employment and
Immigration Commission) [1991], 1 S. C. R. 48 (S. C. C.) explaining that if it is the employer who does not
allow employees to work then the stoppage is called 'lock-out' and if it is the employees then it is called
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strike directed against the government and not the employer has been held to
constitute a 'strike' in the U.S. and Canada956 • Moreover, under Canadian and U.S.
ocean and land case law, a chain of consequential results of a strike of a group of
employees may still qualify as a strike957 • On the contrary, a public demonstration
that brings disruption in a workplace does not constitute a strike, nor does a political
demonstration by a group of independent truckers958 •
Although all cross-modal and cross-country liability exceptions require proof
of absence of negligence on the part of the carrier in order to take effect, absence of
negligence becomes an explicit statutory condition under the U.S. COGSA 'strikes'
exception, a provision intended to clarify rather than modify the Hague Rules on the
issue959• Even in the presence of a 'Liberty Clause' -giving carrier the freedom to
'strike'. Picketing is legally defined in U.S. and Canadian case law as an activity intended to exert improper
influence on secondary or neutral parties to come out to strike or to remain on strike. Canada: Construction
Royal Co. v. Royal Trust Co. (1956), O. R. 911 (Ont. C. A.), Husband Tpt. Ltd. v. C.N.R. (1967), C. S. 589
(C. S. 589 (Que. S. C.). U.S.: International Union ofOperating Engineers Local 150 AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 47
F. 3d 218 (7th Cir. 1995) and R.L. Coolsaet Const. Co. v. Local 150 Intern. Union ofOper. Engineers, 177 F.
3d 648 (7th Cir. 1999).
Occasionally, U.S. land case law will refer to 'locks-out'. Richter v. North American Van Lines Inc., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2000) refers to locks-out as a boilerplate contract term and condition of a uniform
household goods bill of lading also governed by the Carmack Amendement. In the same sense, see
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co. ofOr. , 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Or. 1953).
956 Canada land: Fishery Products International Ltd. v. Midland Transport Ltd. (1994), 113 D. L. R. (4th) 651
(Nfld. C. A.), and (non-transport) Re United Glass and Ceramic Workers ofNorth America et al. v. Domglas
Limited et al. (1978), 19 O. R. (2d) 353 (Ont. Div. C.) mentioned by the former and Tenneco Canada Inc.
(c.o.b. Albright & Wilson Americas) v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1999), 1999 B. C. C.
A. 415 (B. C. C. A.). U.S. Intermodal: Jane Massey Draper, «Coverage under all-Risk Insurance» (1995) 30
A. L. R. 5th 170 at par. 120.
957 Canada land: John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 102. Rebels
or rioters have been found to fall both under this category. Ibid with reference made to an English case. U.S.
land: Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 (U. S. S. C. 1964) for U.S. railway riots and strikes,
Southern Pac. Co. v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 304 S. W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App. San Ant. 1957). Canada (ocean):
'Innocent carriers' victims of the 'strike' who are prevented from performing their contract of carriage can
also invoke this exception. Tenneco Canada Inc. (c.o.b. Albright & Wilson Americas) v. British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority (1999), 1999 B. C. C. A. 415 (B. C. C. A.) mentioning U.S. (ocean) case Dant &
Russell v. Gray's Harbor Exportation Co., 106 F. (2d) 911 (9th Cir. 1939). See also Michael Pourcelet, Le
Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien, americain et anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I'
Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 133.
958 Canada (land): Fishery Products International Ltd. v. Midland Transport Ltd. (1994), 113 D. L. R. (4th)
651 (Nfld. C. A.) overruling the lower court holding and MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Hydro
and Power [1992], B. C. J. No. 2310 (B. C. S. C.) on the issue. U.S.: John A. Glenn, "Ally and Single
Enterprise Doctrines in Secondary Boycott Cases (1972) 13 A. L. R. Fed. 466 par. 10 by reasoning a
contrario to the ally doctrine as applied to picketed independent truckers customarily performing work for the
struck employer. Laborers' Intern. Union ofNorth America Local 859 AFL-CIO v. N. L. R. B., 446 F. 2d 1319
(D. C. Cir. 1971).
959 COGSA Sec. 13040). William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at note 89 (Chapter 18). Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New
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use his own judgement in case of danger of occurrence of a risk-causing event_960
the carrier must' act reasonably under the circumstances' (due diligence)961.
B. Liability Exceptions due to Natural Causes: Apart from carrier liability
defenses due to third party actions, there are other defenses that regroup natural
causes of damage: the acts of God and sea perils liability exceptions962 . Their
common characteristic is the absence of human agency in the production of damage
that is, rather, due to natural causes.
Contrary to already examined liability exceptions whose denominations
often vary, the 'acts of God' (theominia-vis major963) liability defense appears in the
exact same terms in both land and ocean BsOL and intermodal rail tariffs in the U.S.
and Canada964 . Rests to determine if courts in both countries view it in the same
way. Canadian965 and U.S. courts966 refer to the English case Nugent v. Srnith967 to
define 'acts of God':
York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 165-166. Southern Pac. Co. v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 304 S. W. 2d 383
(Tex. Civ. App. San Ant. 1957), and Mormacsaga (The) v. Crelinsten Fruit Co. [1969],2 Ex. C. R. 215 (Ex.
Ct. C.) (Canadian case decided on the basis of U.S. case law).
960 Liberty clauses are purported to give carriers great discretion in their decisions and are common practice in
international ocean carriage in the US., Canada and worldwide. Drew Brown Ltd v. Orient Trader (The)
[1974], S. C. R. 1286 (S. C. C.).
961 Mormacsaga (The) v. Crelinsten Fruit Co [1969], 2 Ex. C. R. 215 (Ex. Ct. C.) a Canadian case decided on
the basis ofUS. law and Kroll v. Silver Line, Limited, 116 F. Supp. 443 (N. D. Cal. 1953).
962 Michael F. Sturley, «An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case» (1997) 21
Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 310.
963 'Theominia' is the Greek word ('Theos' means God and 'menos' means rage) for the 'acts of God'
liability exception. See the English case Nugent v. Smith. (1875), 1 C. P. D. 19. Vis major (a greater or
superior force; an irresistible force by law, a force majeure) is also used by US., Canadian and English cases.
The beginning of the 'act of God' defense is an enigma but it is certain that the defense applies also to non-
transport cases. As reported by Denis Binder, « Act of God? or Act of Man? : a Reappraisal of the Act of
God Defense in Tort» (1996) 15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 5 and 8.
964 Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. The only exception constitutes the CP intermodal rail
tariff that does not contain this liability exception although it is hard to imagine that, in practice, a rail carrier
will not be exonerated on the basis of the 'act of God' liability exception under the principle of liability for
negligence. BNSF rail tariff refers to specific 'acts of God' events apart from the 'acts of God' liability
exception it adopts. Annex No. I, Tables No.6 at lxix and Annex No. III, Table No.8 at cxciv. Pro Tetley states
that this is a 'catch-all' liability exception. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International
Shipping Publications, 1988) at 446.
965 The vast majority of Canadian cases on this exception explicitly refer to English cases and the Nugent
holding. (railway) Pleet v. Canadian Northern Quebec Railway Co. (1921), 50 O. L. R. 223 (ant. C. A.),
Brookins V. C.N.R. (1973),43 D. L. R. (3d) 280 (P. E. I. S. C.), (ocean) Turgel Fur CO. V. Northumberland
Ferries Ltd. (1966), 59 D. L. R. (2d) (N. S. S. C.) and Kruger Inc. Et al. v. Baltic Shipping Co. (1987), 11 F.
T. R. 80 (F. C. C.). (motor) John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at
101.
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'natural causes, directly and exclusively, without human intervention [causing
damage] and that it could not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and
pains and care reasonably to be expected from him' (Nugent v. Smith).
On the basis of this and other cases, a recent survey in the U.S. has concluded
that there has been reluctance on the part of English and American cases to
formulate a clear, rule-defined theory of what is to be accounted as an act of God in
law968 . Instead, case law has developed two essential features for the 'acts of God'
liability exception969 : first, it is a natural cause of damage that denotes absence of
human contribution in producing the harm-causing event970 . Second, and most
important, 'acts of God' cannot be avoided or guarded against by any means which
the carrier or servants could reasonably be expected to use971 . In this respect, the
carrier must prove that the harm causing event was unforeseeable and irresistible
(cumulative conditions translating into absence of negligence), that no foresight or
endeavor of man reasonably to be expected would have prevented its production972 .
966 American courts adopted 200 years of English jurisprudence on this exception. Denis Binder, «Act of
God 7 or Act of Man 7 : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort» (1996) 15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 13.
Referring to the Nugent holding and English case law: (ocean) West Bros. Inc. v. Ressource Management
Service, 1970 A. M. C. 1434 (Ala S. C. 1970) Hurricane Donna, 1966 A. M. C. 1165 (1966) (railway) Co-
operative Shippers Inc. v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1985) 613 F. Supp. 788 (N. D. Il1.) and
(motor-multimodal) Anvil Knitwear Inc. v. Crowley American Transport Inc., 2001 A. M. C. 2382 (S. D. N.
Y. 2001) the latter referring to 'acts of God' as natural events damaging cargo absent carrier negligence.
967 (1875), 1 C.P.D. 19.
968 Denis Binder, « Act of God 7 or Act of Man? : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort» (1996)
15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 12.
969 The following is noted by T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 11.
970 Human action must be purely passive. Canada: (motor) John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 101, (rail) Canada v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1965],2 Ex. C. R. 222 (Ex.
Ct. C.) U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press,
1975) at 163.
971 U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at
163-164, Denis Binder, « Act of God? or Act of Man 7 : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort »
(1996) 15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 12. See also (motor-multimodal) Anvil Knitwear Inc. v. Crowley American
Transport Inc., A. M. C. 2382 (S. D. N. Y. 2001) (ocean) Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS A. M. C. 1527
(S. D. Alta 2001). Canada: (ocean) Canada v. Blue Peter Steamships Co. [1974], F. C. 1. No. 314 (F. C. C.),
Canada v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd.[1950], S. C. R. 532 (S. C. C.) and The Queen v. Federal Court of
Canada (1985),2 F. C. 247 (F. C. C.).
972 Canada: (railway) Canada v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1965],2 Ex. C. R. 222 (Ex. Ct. C.) on the
basis of English law, (motor) John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at
101, (ocean) Canada v. Blue Peter Steamships Co. [1974], F. C. J. No. 314 (F. C. C.). U.S.: (ocean) Skandia
Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Star Shipping AS, 2001 A. M. C. 1527 (S. D. Ala. 2001). For a very good case law analysis of
the 'acts of God' legal meaning see non-transport case Curtis v. Dewey, 475 P. 2d 808 (Idaho 1970) as
reported by Denis Binder, «Act of God 7 or Act of Man 7: a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort»
15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 12. These cases also reflect English case law on the issue. Ibid.
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Unforeseeability consists in failing to direct one's mind to the potential
consequences of one's actions (reasonableness standard)973. The defense is generally
limited to truly unforeseeable events rather than situations involving unusual or
extraordinary but not unprecedented impacts974. Advance in technology makes
easier proof of foreseeability of weather conditions975 . Irresistibility does not refer to
carrier absolute impossibility to prevent the harm-causing event, proof of reasonable
precautions taken suffices in this regard976. This is an objective standard test based
on what a reasonable person under similar circumstances knew, or reasonably
should have known977.
'Perils of the sea' is an ocean specific (HagueNisby Rules) carrier liability
exception that, like 'acts of God', has not been statutorily defined leaving definition
of its content to the judges. Being an ocean specific carrier exoneration cause, it
differs from 'acts of God', an exception that does not know modal boundaries. This,
however, is not the only difference between the two exceptions. Even though both
tend to overlap as external, natural causes of loss978, they differ in nature because
973 Canada: (motor) Matheson v. Coughlin [1989], P. E. I. J. No. 119 (P. E. I. S. C. T. D.), (ocean) Plumper
Bay Sawmills Ltd. v. Jericho Towing Ltd. [1980], F. C. J. No. 406 (F. C. C.). U.S.: (motor) Marjan Intern.
Corp. v. VK. Putman Inc., WL 541204 (S. D. N. Y. 1993), (rail) Marriott Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 319
F. Supp. 646 (E. D. Mo. 1970) holding that '5 or more inches of rain fell in 4-hour period, an occurrence
which had not happened for 20 years ... ' constitutes an act of God. For more insight on the unforeseeability
element see Denis Binder, « Act of God ? or Act of Man ? : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort»
(1996) 15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 8 and note 81. See ibid at 7 for English case law in the same sense.
974 Bradford v. Stanley, 355 So. 2d 328, 330 (Ala. 1978) as reported by Denis Binder, « Act of God? or Act
of Man ? : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort» (1996) 15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 13. Although U.S.
courts may frequently refer to the extraordinary nature of an 'act of God' event, this is done so as to
determine whether the event is foreseeable, whether these are occurrences of common experience. Shea-S &M
Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F. 2d 1245 (D. C. Cir. 1979) and Davis v. Ivey, 112 So. 264 (Fla. 1927),
as referred to by Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. U s., 519 F. 2d 1184 (5th Cir. Fla. 1975).
975 As reported by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 101. This
also applies to all liability exceptions where foreseeability plays an essential role.
976 Canada: (railway) Pleet v. Canadian Northern Quebec Railway Co (1921), 50 O. L. R. 223 (Ont. C. A.),
(motor) Eckersley v. Raitar Transport Ltd. [1949], OJ. No. 266 (C.A.) and Keystone Transports Ltd. v.
Dominion Steel & Coal Co. Ltd. (1942), S. C. R. 495 (S. C. C.). For a very good analysis of this element see
(ocean) Canada v. Blue Peter Steamships Co. [1974], F. C. J. No. 314 (F. C. C.). U.S.: (ocean) Skandia Ins.
Co. Ltd. v. Star Shipping AS 2001 A. M. C. 1527 (S. D. Ala. 2001), (motor) Miller v. AAACON Auto
Transport Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1201 (S. D. Fla. 1978), (railway) Marriott Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 319 F.
Supp. 646 (E. D. Mo. 1970).
977 Denis Binder, « Act of God? or Act of Man ? : a Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort» (1996)
15 Rev. Litigation 1 at 17.
978 Scrutton as mentioned by Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 124 and 131. William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 446.
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'sea perils' must result from the action of the sea [perils of the sea] and not simply
be encountered at sea [perils at sea] whereas 'acts of God' comprise both types of
events979.
Influenced by English law on the issue, the Supreme Court of Canada held, in
Keystone Transports Ltd. v. Dominion Steel & Coal Co. Ltd, that a 'sea peril' a)
should not be attributed to someone's negligence and b) needs not be extraordinary
in nature or arise from irresistible force in the sense of arising from causes which
are uncommon
980
. Rough seas, violent waves and winds, a common sea peril, are not
always extraordinary in nature981 . On the contrary, American sea perils are events of
extraordinary nature that arise from the 'irresistible force or overwhelming power
of the event which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human
skill and prudence,982. U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not been overly helpful as
to what precisely constitutes an event of such extraordinary nature, this is a matter of
fact for the courts to decide depending on the circumstances of each case983.
979 'II ne s'agit pas des dangers qui surviennent en mer mais de ceux qui en proviennent'. Pro Rene Rodiere on
sea perils, Scrutton and Colinvaux. It is also noted that the 'perils of the sea' concept is used much as we use
the 'dangers of the streets' expression by which we mean not necessarily dangers arising from the street itself.
but dangers which are peculiarly incident to being in or passing along the streets. Michel Pourcelet, Le
Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit canadien, americain et anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I'
Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 123 and 164-165. T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens
& Sons, 1982) at 164. I.e. rain, thunders and storms or damage by rats, cockroaches are not perils of the sea
but perils at sea since they are encountered at sea rather than resulting from its action. On the contrary, a ship
striking a sunken rock, floods, icebergs earthquakes, blizzards constitute perils of the sea and acts of God at
the same time. Winds may also constitute sea perils. U.S.: Melissa K. Stull, 'Act of God' (1962) 1 Am. Jur.
2d Act of God § 5 and Michael F. Sturley, «An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the
Cargo Case» (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 310. Canada: John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 101 on ocean carriage.
980 (1942) S. C. R. 495 (S. C. C.), Charles Goodfellow Lumber Sales Ltd. v. Verreault [1971], S. C. R. 522 (S.
C. C.), a leading Canadian case on sea perils, Kruger Inc. v. Baltic Shipping Co. [1988], 1 F. C. 262 (F. C. C.),
Cleveland v. Sunderland Marine Mutual Insurance Co. [1987], N. S. J. No. 364 (N. S. S. C.) and
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. ofCanada v. Straits To [1972], F. C. 804 (F. C. C.), all based on
English law. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et
An§.lais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 125. T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea
13 ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 166 and English case The Xantho (1887), 12 A. C. 503 (H. L.)
holding that sea perils are neither the natural action of the waves and winds causing normal wear and tear nor
extraordinary violent winds or waves.
981 Carver adds that presence of unknown rocks to mariners cannot be an extraordinary peril, but a wreck
upon such rocks is a sea peril. T. G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 166.
982 Underwriters at Lloyd's V. Labarca, 260 F. 3d 3 (1st Cir. 2001), Thyssen Inc. V. s.s. Eurounity, A. M. C.
1638 (2nd Cir. 1994), Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Found/Press,
1975) at 162.
983 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 436-437.
Herbert R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie
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For the rest, both Canadian and U.S. cases hold that carner or servant's
negligence (except for servants nautical fault) will disallow him the benefit of this
exception984. The damage may either result from negligence985 and not from a sea
peril or from negligence in not i) foreseeing or ii) guarding against a sea peril
(cumulative conditions). Unforeseeability of the sea peril is an important element in
exculpating U.S. or Canadian ocean carrier under this exception986 . In effect, a
seaworthy vessel should be able to withstand reasonably expectable (foreseeable)
sea perils. Irresistibility, insurmountability of the harm-causing event refers to
events that cannot be guarded against by exercise of reasonable care987.
Apart from the extraordinary character of U.S. sea perils, therefore, both the
U.S. and Canada reason on the same terms. We cannot but disagree, in this respect,
with Pr. Tetley opinion that U.S. courts have adopted the strictest view in defining
sea perils while English courts have followed a less strict stance with Canadian
Company, 1979) at 525. What is certain is that the Supreme Court can find authority to support both majority
and dissenting opinions as to whether the forces of nature meet the standard of sea perils. Ibid at 526-527:
984 U.S.: J. Gerder & Co. v. SS Sabine Howaldt, 437 F. 2d 580 (2nd Cir. 1971), Jordan Int'l v. Piran, 1975
A. M. C 130 (S. D. N. Y. 1974). Canada: Transports Ltd. v. Dominion Steel & Coal Co. Ltd (1942), S. C. R.
495 (S. C. C.).
985 The City of Khios, 13 F. Supp. 7 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) held that damage to the goods was the result of
improper stowage rather than a sea peril.
986 U.S.: The overwhelming majority of American courts have employed (un)foreseeability when determining
presence of a sea peril and only some courts have looked at other factors besides foreseeability. Harry
Apostolakopoulos, Navigating in Perilous Water: Examining the 'Peril of the Sea' Exception to Carrier's
Liability under COGSA for Cargo Loss Resulting from Severe Weather Conditions (1999) online: South
Texas Law College Review Homepage
<http://www.stcl.edu/lawrev/Articles/PeritoCthe Sea/peritotthe_sea.html> (last modified: Jan. 25, 2000).
Thyssen Inc. v. SS Eurounity, A. M. C. 1638 (2naCir. 1994). Canada: Consolidating Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Straits Towing Ltd. (1972),2 F. C. 804 (F. C. C.) and Carling O'Keefe Breweries ofCanada Ltd. v. CN
Marine Inc. [1990], 1 F. C. 483 (F. C. C.) on sea peril foreseeability. Wind velocity, time of year,
geographical location, damage to ship and other vessels in the vicinity will be taken into account by the court.
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 436 (U. S.) and
at 439 and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd. (1973), 2 Ll. Rep. 469 (S. C. C.). In
contrast, British and Commonwealth courts allow coverage even for foreseeable sea perils. Supra at 104s.
987 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 126-127. Canada: Charles Goodfellow Lumber
Sales Ltd. v. Verreault (1971), 1971 R. S. C. 522 (S. C. C.), Kruger Inc. v. Baltic Shipping Co [1988], 1 F. C.
262 (F. C. C.) citing Goodfellow, Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd v. Chimo Shipping Ltd[1974], S. C. R. 933
(S. C. C.) and Bastos du Canada Ltee v. Guilbault Transport Inc. (1978), 1978 C. A. 393 (F. C. C.). On this
case, see Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis,
1986) at 206. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at
439. U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press, 1975)
at 162, Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397 (U. S. S. C. 1889).
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courts being the most lenient of all988 . On the contrary, we embrace the opinion of
Mr. Apostolopoulos that comparative case law on sea perils can be described as a
spectrum where one end is defined by North-American (U.S.-Canadian) approach
barring defense where a foreseeable storm causes the damage. The other end IS
occupied by the Angloaustralian approach which denies foreseeability a
determinative role while the middle part is dominated by major European maritime
nations intermediate approaches989. This is why the 'sea perils' exception is said to
be carrier best but least dependable friend990.
In the Civil law province of Quebec and, generally, in civil law systems, land
(and ocean) carrier liability exceptions due to third party actions as well as those due
to natural causes constitute force majeure (superior force) or fortuitous cause (cas
fortuit) events991 . What's more, in the French version of Canadian land BsOL and
988 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 431.
989 Harry Apostolakopoulos, Navigating in Perilous Water: Examining the 'Peril of the Sea' Exception to
Carrier's Liability under COGSA for Cargo Loss Resulting from Severe Weather Conditions (1999) online:
South Texas Law College Review Homepage <
http://www.stcl.edu/lawrev/Articles/Peril_oUhe_Sea/peritoCthe_sea.html> (last modified: Jan. 25, 2000).
For this reason, Mr. Apostolopoulos argues that doing away with the 'foreseeabilty' test in the U.S. and
Canada for the sake of international uniformity will not only be harmful to nations economies but will also
not achieve its purpose. Supra at 105s for the Anglo-Australian approach and infra note 1363 for European
laws.
990 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Canada: International Shipping Publications 1988) at 431. Herbert
R. Baer, Admiralty Law ofthe Supreme Court 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1979)
at 523.
991 We have seen that in the province of Quebec international ocean carrier liability is subject to common law
provisions so that the force majeure concept should not be used with respect to the ocean carriage. Still, land
transport documents in Quebec maintain the concepts of 'force majeure' and 'fortuitous' events, terms that
are used interchangeably in civil law tradition. Articles 152 and 165 of the Mexican law 'Vias Generales de
Comunicacion' exonerate carrier in case of force majeure or fortuitous events. "Transporte, Responsabilidad
en el Contrato de Transporte. Pruebas» Jurispr. Corte Suprema Mex (LEXIS-Mexico-Jurisprudencia). Boris
Kozolchyk, Martin L. Ziontz, 'A Negligence Action in Mexico: an Introduction of the Application of
Mexican Law in the United States' (1989) 7 Ariz. 1. Int'l Compo L. 1 at 28. This is also the case of France
(art. 1148 of the French Civil Code), Lousiana and even the U.S. where reference is made to both terms.
Before its 1994 revision, Quebec Civil Code art. 1072 contained same provision while after 1994, art. 2037
(land transport) and art. 2072 (water carriage) only refer to the force majeure concept. It is generally stated
that modem codes have eliminated either one or the other member of the traditionally compound expression.
Saul Litvinoff, "Fortuitous Events v. Irresistible Force" (2001) 5 La. Civ. L. Treat. 16.93.
Even though the terms 'force majeure' and 'fortuitous event' may be used interchangeably, there is a subtle
distinction between them. In the force majeure concept (also known as objective force majeure) the notion of
'fault or act of person' is absent. On the other hand, a fortuitous event (or subjective force majeure) is always
associated with the fault or act of the carrier. The fortuitous event refers to an event which is external,
unforeseeable, irresistible, non-imputable to the carrier, the latter element not being part of the force majeure
concept. Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations: Actes et Responsabilites (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee,
1997) at 408.
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Quebec Civil Code ocean carrier provIsIOns, force majeure constitutes a separate
carrier liability exception substituting for land/ocean 'acts of God'/'acts de Dieu'
exception and other Visby Rules exoneration causes992.
a) Force Majeure Concept and Carrier Liability Exceptions: Under the
principle of presumption of liability (obligation de resultat)993 applicable to motor
and ocean intermodal carriers, liability exceptions are limitatively defined with some
of them presenting the characteristics of force majeure, namely, being extemal994,
reasonably unforeseeable and irresistible (unsurmountable) causes of damage995.
This is the case, for instance, of the 'acts of God', 'public enemies', 'acts of war',
'authority of law', 'quarantine' exoneration causes996. Pro Jean Pineau argues that
992 French version of Canadian land BsOL translates the 'act of God' liability exception into 'force majeure
(or cas fortuit) and not 'acte de Dieu'. Annex No. I, Tables 5 and 9 at Ixiii and cv. Note also that 2001 MLA
(Schedule III) 'act of God/acte de Dieu' as well as other liability exceptions (act of war, act of public
enemies, arrest or restraint of princes ... the (q) exception) are replaced by the force majeure concept in art.
2072 (water transport) and art. 2049 (land carriage) of the Quebec Civil Code. For a detailed analysis see
intra at 288s. For rejection of the q exception by civil law systems see infra at 221.
99 On this civil law principle see our suggestions infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1.
994 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Ttransport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
53-54. An external cause of damage is external to the author, its business and activities and not merely
external to the object causing the damage while under carrier control. Maurice Tancelin, Des Obligations:
Actes et Responsabilites (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1997) at 408. Eastern Coated Papers Ltd. v. Syndicat
des Employers de Metier (1986), A. Q. no. 1012. (Que. C. A.), Shawinigan v. Lemay (1981), 1982 C. A. 131
(Que. C. A.), Desrochers v. P.G. du Quebec (1977), R. P. 304 (Que. S. C.), Roberge v. Hydro-Quebec (1977),
C. P. 246 (C. P.), Louis Clement Ltee v. Sotramont Inc. (1982), J. E. 82-639 (Que. S. C.). The U.S. state of
Louisiana, to a large extent a civil law jurisdiction, follows the same principle on the issue. Saul Litvinoff,
'Events Recognized as Fortuitous' (2001) 5 La. Civ. L. Treat. § 16.31.
995 Unforeseeability and irresistibility do not burden the carrier with an absolute duty to prevent the event but
merely require him to take all reasonable measures to foresee and prevent the occurrence of the loss.
Unforeseeability: Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions
Themis, 1986) at 206s. and 52. Leopold v. Ibex Developments Ltd. (1977), C. S. 629 (Que. S. C.) and
Simoneau v. Cote (1981), C. P. 123 on the 'authority of law' exception. Irresistibility: St Timothee v. Hydro-
Quebec (1999), J. E. 99-1804 (Que. S. C.), Louis Clement Ltee v. Sotramont Inc. (1982), J. E. 82-639 (Que. S.
C.). For strikes and employers negligence see Dubreuil v. Ville de Montreal (1988), R. R. A. 752 (Que. S. C.).
Planiol et Ripert as reported by Saul Litvinoff, 'Bad Faith Of The Obligee' (1999) 6 La. Civ. L. Treatise,
Law Of Obligations § 5.31. Unless otherwise provided by the parties impossibility to execute needs to be
absolute, not merely onerous. Canada Starch Co. v. Gill & Dufus (Canada) Ltd. (1990), R. L. 602 (C. A.),
Otis Elevator Co. v. A. Viglione & Bros. Inc. (1981), J. E. 81-92 (Que. C. A.), Commission des Normes du
Travail v. Manufacture Sorel Inc. (1984), C.S. 747 (Que. C. A.), C.S.R. de la Baie des Chaleurs v. Sanitor
Ltee (1978), J. E. 78-919 (Que. S. C.).
996 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
206. Saul Litvinoff reasons on the basis of French force majeure concept when defming it as an event that
does not involve any fault of the obligee (shipper), could not have been foreseen or resisted by the obligor
(carrier), prevents performance by the obligor relieving him of liability for his failure to perform. Saul
Litvinoff, "The Code Napoleon and French Doctrine (Obligations)" (1999) 6 La. Civ. L. Treat. (Obligations)
§ 5.31. So, ocean and land shipper fault or assimilated therein liability exceptions (inadequacy of marks,
numbers ... ) do not make part of the force majeure concept. For a more exhaustive comparison see infra at
Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 3.
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even though today courts are more lenient in concluding on irresistibility and
unforeseeability, it is certain that the simple presence of an exoneration cause will
not absolve the carrier if there is fault on his part997 .
On the basis of studied case law, the Quebec force majeure requirements of
unforeseeability and irresistibility of the harm-causing event are identical to u.s.
and Canadian absence of negligence requirement when referring to specific liability
exceptions998 . This does not mean to say that the absence of negligence and the force
majeure concepts are synonymous. In effect, even if authors argue that force
majeure 'external cause of damage' element is not very essentiae99, absence of
negligence does not require the presence of an external cause of loss as force
majeure does lOOO •
b) Force Majeure Clauses-Common Law: The necessity to explicitly mention
land and ocean BsOL liability exceptions instead of using the force majeure concept
to exonerate carrier stems from the fact that English law ignores the concept of force
majeure100l . In reality, there is a common law and Uniform Commercial Code (U.S.)
force majeure doctrine but claimants are more likely to recover on the basis of
contractual force majeure clauses than on the basis of the doctrine itself1oo2. Instead
997 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
208.
998 See i.e. acts of God and sea perils liability exceptions supra at 195s.
999 Jean Louis Beaudouin, Pierre Gabriel Jobin, Les Obligations 5th ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions
Yvon Blais, 1998) at 698-699. The author argues that 'strikes' may constitute an internal, to the carrier, cause
of damage, still, they will exonerate him. Also, art. 1470 of the Quebec Civil Code does not refer to this
element in describing the force majeure concept. A subtle distinction needs to be made in this respect:
although not essential, it is certain that an internal cause of damage to the debtor will exonerate him less easy
than an external cause of damage since the former is more easily foreseeable and resistible.
1000 Infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 and Par. 3 for the comparison herein made.
1001 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l' Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 131.
1002 P. J. M. Declercq, "Modem Analysis of the Legal Effects of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of
Commercial Impracticability" (1995) 15 1. L. & Com. 213 at 217-218. Susan Zachos, Gas Purchase
Contracts: Equitable Remedies for Breach (1987) 24 Hous. L. Rev. 991 at 1012. The common law standard
of recovery is quite strict under the force majeure doctrine as it will provide remedy only where extreme
hardship has been established. Robert E. Coltin, "Force majeure: Does it Really Work"? 14 Real Estate L. 1.
279 at 279-280. Michael B. Victorson and James S. Chase, "How to Interpret Insurance and Indemnification
Provisions in Mining Contracts" (1993) 14 E. Min. L. Found par. 7.03. The common law concept of 'force
majeure' has developed over the years starting off as a contractual synonym of the common law doctrine of
legal impossibility and moving, with time, in the direction of impracticability. P. J. M. Declercq, "Modem
Analysis of the Legal Effects of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of Commercial Impracticability" (1995)
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of attempting to articulate a definition of the force majeure concept, force majeure
contractual clauses enumerate a laundry list of excusable events that can be
contractually modified1003. These clauses are not really popular in transportation
contracts probably because of the precision of presently applicable BOL carrier
exception clauses and, for ocean carriage, ocean carrier prohibition of contractual
limitation of carrier liability.
Force majeure clauses concern unforeseeable and irresistible events (absence
of negligence) as the civil law force majeure concept does l004 . However, force
majeure clauses enumerate specific abnormal risks exonerating debtor while civil
law force majeure concept contains a non-exhaustive list of exculpating occurrences
responding to specific criteria1005. This does not mean to say that the force majeure
concept is necessarily broader in scope than a force majeure clause, they are just
different in nature. Force majeure clauses events may not be external to the carrier
and may cover inherent vice, elements that do not make part of the civil law force
majeure conceptl006 . Moreover, even though many force majeure clauses contain a
'reasonable control' language to indicate absence of (carrier) negligence, this is not
always the case and the drafter could also specify the reasonable control language or
even decide to exempt certain faults or negligent acts of the parties1007. In other
15 J. L. Com. 213 at 214. Michael W. Graff, "The Determination of Property Rights in Public Contracts"
(1998) 38 Nat. Res. J. 197 at note 159. Analysis of these theories exceeds the scope of the present study.
1003 The most prevalent force majeure clause events are: acts of God, fire, flood, acts of civil disobedience,
war, riot, nuclear disaster, labor disputes, acts of governments, unusual climatic conditions, acts of a public
enemy, explosion, or power failure. H. Ward Classen, "Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships
under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law" (1991) 42 S. C. L. Rev. 379 at 394.
1004 This is to be taken into account in drafting a force majeure clause. Robert E. Coltin, "Force majeure: Does
it Really Work"? 14 Real Estate L. J. 279 at 279-280. P. J. M. Declercq, "Modem Analysis of the Legal
Effects of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of Commercial Impracticability" (1995) 15 J. L. Com. 213 at
233, 236 and 238.
1005 It has been stated that a civil law contract is more succinct in defining force majeure since the tendency is
not to clarify or embellish established concepts such as force majeure. John D. Crothers, 'Recent Experience
in Project Finance and Privatization in Africa' (2000) 809 PLI/Comm 519. Canada Starh v. Gill and Duffus
(Canada) Ltd. (1983), J. E. 84-88 (S. C. Que.).
1006 River Terminals Corp. v. U. s., 121 F. Supp. 98 (E. D. La. 1954) reciting hull insurance contract
provisions covering inherent vice. On the comparison of the two concepts see infra at Part II, Chapter II,
Section II, Par. 3.
1007 P. J. M. Declercq, "Modem Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of
Commercial Impracticability" (1995) J. L. Com 213 at 248. Force majeure clauses can be statutorily provided
and even though their language was once regarded precise and of strict construction, it is now increasingly
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words, force majeure clauses are contractual clauses that parties can tailor to their
needs and which do not have to respond to the rigid conceptual criteria of the civil
law force majeure concept. Being so malleable in nature, force majeure clauses and
the civil law concept of force majeure cannot be effectively compared.
C. Cargo, Vessel, Shipper Fault: Another category of carrier liability
exceptions comes under the category of cargo (inherent vice), vessel (latent defect)
and shipper faults.
Although names may differ cross-modally and cross-country, Canadian and
U.S. ocean and land BsOL and intermodal rail tariffs refer to the inherent vice
liability exception1008. Initial remarks need to be made in this respect: in Canadian
and U.S. land transport, reference to inherent vice always concerns the transported
goods or containers (intermodal rail tariffs), not the transport vehicle (truck, vessel,
wagon) 1009.
Canadian and U.S. ocean and land transport cases refer to the 'inherent nature
or quality' of the goods when defining inherent vice under its various
denominations1010. The most common form of inherent vice is natural shrinkage that
recognized by courts as malleable. Ibid at 233. Harold F. Moore, "Force Majeure and Indonisia's Economic
Woes" (2001) 1240 PLI / Corp 463.
1008 Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. Art. 2049 of the Quebec Civil Code refers to 'vice propre
du bien'. The vast majority of cases on this exception concern ocean rather than land transport. 'Inherent
defect' is a term frequently used by U.S. and less by Canadian courts that seem to refer more to 'inherent
vice'. U.S.: William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
480. Canada: David Oppenheimer & Associates v. Arizona (The) [1974], F. C. J. No. 902 (F. C. C.) and
Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd.-Tahsis Pacific Region [1999], 4 F. C. 320 (F. C. A.). We will retain
the term 'inherent vice' for all these terms used.
1009 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 479 and
Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21
Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 313. It has also been held that the CMR prohibits consideration of the vehicle's inherent
vice. C. Pau, Pau, March 17,2003, Groupama Transport et a. c. Cie Helvetia et a. 2985 Bull. Transp. Log.
323-324 (2003).
1010 For instance, the presence of invisible bacteria in the cargo, discoloration of chemical products because of
the transport, deterioration of perishable goods. Canada: (motor) John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo
Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 103, (ocean) Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Merlac Marine Inc.
[1994], O. J. No. 282 (ant. c. 1.). U.S.: (rail) Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U. S. 134
(U. S. S. C. 1964) (authority case frequently cited), (ocean) Vana Trading Co. v. s.s. Mette Skou, 556 F. 2d
100 (2nd Cir. 1977) and (motor) Mulay Plastics, Inc. v. Grand Truck W R.R. Co., 822 F. 2d 676 (7th Cir.
1987) citing the Missouri holding. So, this exception does not only refer to a defect in nature of the goods but
also to the very nature of the goods that may be liable to deterioration. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport
Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 208. See the interesting opinion of Pro
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certain BsOL and tariffs will reproduce as such or in other, more descriptive terms
that may appear along with or, separately from, the inherent vice liability
exceptionlOll . Natural shrinkage refers to the loss of weight of transported goods
(i.e. oil, wine) due to temperature conditions, the length of the journey, the nature of
d 1012the goo s... .
As with previous liability exceptions, the cause of the loss and absence of
carrier and servant's negligence with respect to the inherent vice must be proven1013.
Both require highly factual proof to be made lOl4• Absence of negligence implies
absence of reasonable care to detect (unforeseeability) and prevent (irresistibility)
the inherent vice unless special care for the cargo is explicitly or implicitly required,
in which case the carrier will be held to a higher standard of care lOl5 •
In container trade, if the container is provided, packed and sealed by the
shipper the carrier has only general knowledge of the goods therein contained as
well as container condition and will generally not be held liable except if there is
Tetley on the issue. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications,
1988) at 480, Thomas G. Carver, Carriage by Sea 13th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1982) at 15.
lOll Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv. For a very descriptive definition of natural shrinkage see
CN/CP BOL in Annex No. III, Table No. 7 at cxciii and Annex no. I, Table No. 9 at civ and ccvii. On the
assertion that natural shrinkage is a form of inherent vice see Secretary ofAgriculture v. United States, 350 U.
S. 162 (V. S. s. e. 1956), a U.S. railway case making reference to other cases.
10\2 Calculation of natural shrinkage is established on the basis of a percentage of weight wastage tolerated
and accepted by custom. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l' Vniversite de Montreal, 1972) at 115.
10\3 V.S.: cause of loss: William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at 480. Negligence: Insurance Co. ofNorth America v. MlV Frio Brazil, 729 F. Supp. 826
(M. D. Fla. 1990). On the distinction between carrier negligence and inherent vice see V.S. Propeller Niagara
v. Cordes, 62 V. S. (21 How. 1859) 7. Canada: N M Paterson & Sons Ltd. v. Cargill Grain Co. [1968], 1 Ex.
e. R. 199 (Ex. Ct. C.) citing English case law on the issue.
1014 Robert Mottley, "Chilling out Handling Refrigerated Cargo" Am. Shipper (2000) online: WESTLAW
(Newsletter).
1015 V.S.: "Cargo Claims" CFMIC § 25.01 (1997) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). (ocean) The Poleric, 25
F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1928), U S. Fire Ins. Co. v. M V. Asia Friendship, 495 F. Supp. 244 (S. D. N. Y. 1980) and
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 484 on the
special care for the cargo. (Railway) Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 V. S. 134 (V. S. S.
C. 1964). Canada: In (rail-motor) Premium Grain & Seed Ltd. v. Finora Canada Ltd [1999], S. J. No. 382 (S.
e. Q. B.) on both unforeseeability and irresistibility of the harm, (ocean) Produits Alimentaires Grandma
Ltee v. Zim Israel Navigation Co. (1987) (1987), [1987] F. e. J. NO.5 (F. C. e.) affIrmed in appeal Produits
Alimentaires Grandma Ltee v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., (1988) F. e. J. No. 24 (F. e. A.). Cretinsten Fruit
Co. v. Maritime Fruit Carriers [1974], F. e. J. No. 709 (F. e. C.) and Attorney-General of Canada et al. v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (1987),61 O. R. (2d) 673 (ant. H. e. J.) on the special care required for certain types
of cargo.
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negligence in his attempt to detect them1016. On the contrary, if the carrier provides
container and packs container contents he has reasonable opportunity to verify
container good working condition and goods quality, so that he will generally be
held liable unless he can prove cargo's inherent vice lO17.
Because shipper is better informed than carrier on goods condition at the time
of the shipment, courts expect him to ultimately prove absence of inherent vice lO18.
This is, no doubt, a heavy burden of proof placed on the shipper. Moreover,
although in cargo damage cases a clean BOL will generally be sufficient proof of
apparent goods condition at the time of shipment, a clean BOL is not enough to
support shippers prima facie case with respect to inherent vice lO19.
The ocean specific Hague and Visby Rules 'latent defect' exception (art.
4(2)(p» only refers to vessel or cargo handling equipment latent defects1020 not
discoverable by carrier due diligence (explicit condition)1021. With respect to this
1016 (ocean) William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
489 for U.S. cargo inherent vice and Project Hope v. MIV IBN SINA, 96 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S. D. N. Y. 2000)
for latent container defect. (rail) Masonite Corp. v. Norfolk and W Ry. Co., 601 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. (Va.)
1979) and (motor) United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F. 2d 442 (4 th Cir. 1953) where it was decided that
even if it is contractually provided that carrier is not obliged to inspect freight containers for internal defects
he is liable for damage caused by container defects reasonably known or discoverable. BNSF Tariff Item
65.2.a.5 specifies that the railway will not be held liable for non-inspection of container defects provided by
the shipper. Annex No. I, Table No.6 at lxxi. Canada: CN 7589-AN Tariff, Item 300(5), (8) and CP 7690-E
Item 00080 (C), (F) at Annex No. I, Tables No.7, 8 at xci and xcviii. (multimodal), LutfY Ltd v. Canadian
Pacific Railway Co. [1973], F. C. 1115 (F. C. C.) and Atlantic Sugar Ltd v. Paul G. Palsson Partrederi
[1981], F. C. J. No. 908 (F. C. C.) for cargo inherent vice and (ocean) Capilano Trading Post Ltd v. Sea-
Land Service Inc. [1985], B. C. J. No. 858 (B. C. Co. Ct.) for container defect.
1017 Ibid. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 489.
1018 U.S.: (ocean) American Tobacco Co. v. Goulandris, 281 F. 2d 179 (2nd Cir. 1962), C. Itoh & Co.
(America) Inc. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd, 470 F. Supp. 594 (S. D. N. Y. 1979), Gillespie & Co. v. Continental
Ins. Co. 1958 A. M. C 2437 (N. Y. S. C. 1958). Canada: (ocean) Produits Alimentaires Grandma Ltee v. Zim
Israel Navigation [1987], F. C. J. No.5 (F. C. C.) affirmed in appeal, (intermodal-land) Premium Grain &
Seed Ltd. v. Finora Canada Ltd [1999], S. J. No. 382 (S. C. Q. B.).
1019 U.S.: (ocean) The Daido Line v. Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp., 299 F. 2d 669 (9 th Cir. 1962), Letanino Co. v.
SS Hellas, AMC 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), GTS Industries SA. v. SIS "Havtjeld", 68 F. 3d 1531 (2nd Cir. N. Y.
1996), (motor) Matthews-Carr v. Brown Exp, 217 S. W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Canada: (ocean)
Produits Alimentaires Grandma Ltee. v. Zim Israel Navigation Co. et at. (1988) affirmed in appeal, 86 N. R.
39 (F. C. A.) (often cited), Francosteel Corp. v. Fednav Ltd [1990], F. C. 1. No. 810 (F. C. C.).
1020 U.S.: Sony Magnetic Prod v. Merivienti DIY, A. M. C. 1259 (1st Cir. 1989), Container Schiffsreedei TS
Columbia New Zealand v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 1981 A. M. C. 60 (S. D. N. Y. 1980) as reported by
Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21
Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 313 and note 336. Canada: Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co. v. Canada Steamship
Lines Ltd (1930), S. C. R. 262 (S. C. C.). Annex No. III, Table No.5 at cxci.
1021 U.S.: Tata Inc. v. Farrell Lines, 1987 A. M. C. 1764 (S. D. N. Y. 1987) as reported by Michael F. Sturley,
"An Overview ofthe Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at
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liability exception, not often used in practice, authors talk about in transit
seaworthiness since reasonable care with respect to said 'latent' defect has to be
exercised during the voyage while art. IV(l) and art. III(l) vessel seaworthiness
requires proof of reasonable care before and at the commencement of the
joume/022. Even though 'inherent vice' may appear in a force majeure clause1023
and vessel 'latent defect' has been argued to constitute a force majeure event,
neither inherent vice nor latent defect seem to constitute force majeure incidents
under civillaw1024.
Inherent vice frequently appears together with shipper fault in case law as
alleged carrier defenses 1025. However, these two exceptions appear separately III
BsOL and intermodal tariffs. Like inherent vice, shipper fault is found in U.S. and
Canadian land and ocean BsOL and intermodal rail tariffs under a variety of
names 1026. Unlike inherent vice, however, a clean BOL establishes shipper prima
facie case in case of shipper fault 1027.
313 and note 337. Canada: Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co. v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. (1930), S. C.
R. 262 (S. C. C.).
1022 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal; Editions Themis, 1986) at
209 and Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et
Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 116. Supra note 923 for vessel latent
defect leading to unseaworthiness.
1023 River Terminals Corp. v. U 8., 121 F. Supp. 98 (E. D. La. 1954). Supra at Part II, Chapter I, Section I,
Par. 2(B)(b) for force majeure clauses and inherent vice.
1024 Although it is argued that vessels latent defect and inherent vice can be classified as a force majeure
event, Paul Chauveau disagrees with such a classification. Paul Chauveau, Traite de Droit Maritime (Paris:
Librairie Technique, 1958) at 559. See also Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime,
Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 55. This is probably why inherent vice and natural shrinkage
are separate exoneration causes from force majeure under art. 2049 (land transport) and art. 2072 (water
transport) of the Quebec Civil Code. Certain U.S. cases have assimilated 'inherent vice' to an 'act of God'
(force majeure event): cases reported by Henry N. Longley, Common Carriage of Cargo (San Fransisco,
California: Matthew Bender, 1967) at 134.
1025 Rene Rodiere, Emmanuel Du Pontavice, Droit Maritime 12nd ed. (Paris: Editions Dalloz, 1997) at 351.
For instance, shipments need specific conditions of carriage absent which they are deteriorated in nature or
characteristics and shipper fails to indicate these to the carrier. Inversely, in the English case Gee & Garham
Ltd v. Whittall (1955),2 L. L. L. R. 562 (Q. B.) the court held that 'inadequate packing (normally a shipper
fault) brings the case under the plea of inherent vice of the goods'. As reported by Michel Pourcelet, Le
Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal) at 107 and at 111. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International
Shipping Publications, 1988) at 488.
1026 Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxiv. For specific BNSF provision in Annex No. I, Table No.6 at
lxvi (Shipper responsabilities). See also Quebec Civil Code art. 2054, 2055 (land transport) and art. 2064,
2065 (water transport).
1027 This only applies if the carrier provides the container and issues a clean bill, in which case he is generally
liable for inadequate packing and marking of the goods therein contained. If a clean BOL is issued for sealed
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Shipper fault refers to shipper failure to develop a plan to meet the extremes
of movements normally expected and to include a factor of safety against the
unexpected1028. In this respect, much more specific is statutory ocean and land
transport case law making shipper the guarantor of packing1029 and of accuracy of
marks 1030 (Hague and Visby Rules art. IV(2)(n) and (0», accuracy of numbers,
quantity and weight so that inaccurate declarations or absence of notification of
cargo characteristics by the shipper will normally exonerate carrier103 1. All shipper
faults involve highly complicated factual scenarios1032. Shipper fault will only
exonerate carrier in his dealings with the shipper, it will not apply towards third
containers, a prima facie case is not made by a clean BOL since goods are not in apparent good order.
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 272 and
supra note 1020.
1028 Canada: Beloit Canada Ltee v. Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. (1988), 10 A. C. W. S. (3d) 146 (F. C. C.) as
reported by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 109, Bodnoffv.
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1946], S. C. R. 392 (S. C. C.) on shipper or shipper agent's fault. U.S.:
Tubacex Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F. 3d 951 (5th Cir. 1995). Other defmitions of shipper fault also exist.
1029 This is one of the earliest ocean carrier defenses and still predominant within the Hague and the Visby
Rules. It refers to both insufficient or defective packing. Sufficient packing is normal or customary packing in
trade, (depending on the nature of the goods, the way the packing was made, packing usages and other
variants of the journey) that prevents all but the most minor damage under normal conditions of care and
carriage. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 491
(based on U.S. case law). U.S.: (ocean) The Rita Sister, A. M. C. 910 (E. D. Pa. 1946), (rail) Masonite Corp.
v. Norfolk and WRy. Co. 601 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1979), (truck) United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F.
2d 442 (4th Cir 1953). Canada: (motor) Northern Industrial Carriers Ltd. v. Jasper Millwork Ltd [1978], A. J.
No. 720 (Alta. D. C.), (railway) D.M Duncan Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Canadian National Railway Co. (1951),
O. R. 578 (ant. H. C.), (ocean) Pakistan National Shipping Corp. v. Canada (CA.) [1997],3 F. C. 601 (C. A.
F.).
1030 See also Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(5). To permit goods identification, each package delivered to
carrier is marked with a set of initials, or a geometrical sign or both. The name and address of the consignee
are rarely put on the package. The 'mark' is copied on the BOL, a copy of which is always taken on the
voyage and when it is time to unload the packages, these are 'cut out of the herd' by their 'brands'. Grant
Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty 2nd ed. (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at
167. Marks must be made clearly and legibly. Parties can contractually agree on what will constitute
sufficient marking on the goods but they cannot contractually designate circumstances of insufficient marking
that will exonerate the carrier. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 110. On sufficient
marking see U.S.: Super Service Motor Freight Co. v. Us., 350 F. 2d 541 (6th Cir. 1928), Canada: Canadian
Klockner Ltd. v. DIS AIS Flint [1973], F. C. 988 (F. C. C.).
1031 See also Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(5). U.S.: "Act or Fault of Shipper or Consignee (American
Jurisprudence)" (2000) 13 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 418. (rail) Greisler Bros. Inc. v. Packer/and Packing Co.
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 206 (E. D. Wis. 1975), (motor) Pilgrim Distributing Corp. v. Terminal Transport Co. Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 204 (S. D. Oh. 1974). Canada: (truck) Keystone Fisheries Ltd. v. Leftrook & Mid-West Truck
Lines Ltd. (1959), 16 D. L. R. (2d) 680 (Man. C. A.), (rail) FW Pirie Co. v. CN.R. (1943), S. C. R. 275 (S. C.
C.). See also art. 2066 (water transport) and art. 2055 par.! (land transport) of the Quebec Civil Code and
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Aerocon Freight Forwarders (1994), J. E. 94-749 (Que. S. C.).
1032 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
207. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal) at 106. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 108-109.
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parties (i.e. consignees) in good faith who will be compensated by the carrier even
in the presence of shipper fault 1033 .
Carrier exoneration towards the shipper is always conditioned on his and his
servant's absence of negligence (unforeseeability, irresistibility) with respect to
shipper fault1034. However, it results from U.S. and Canadian statutory law and cases
that if shipper fraudulently, for U.S. and Canadian land transport l035, fraudulently
and knowingly for U.S. COGSA (Sec. 1304(5)), or just knowingly for Canadian
MLA (Schedule III, art. 4.5(h)), Hague (4(5) in fine) and Visby Rules (5(h))1036,
mistates the nature or the value of the goods", carrier will not be held liable towards
third parties or the shipper1037. Although 'fraudulently and knowingly' means that
the carrier is initially obliged to prove that the shipper not only knew of the
misstatement but also intended to deceive and to benefit himself at the expense of
1033 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 454 and
493. In the same sense see art. 2055 par. 2 (land transport) of the Quebec Civil Code rendering carrier liable
towards third parties in case of shipper act or omission and inherent vice.
1034 Canada: (rail) Canadian Westinghouse Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co [1925], S. C. R. 579 (S. C.
C.), D.M Duncan Machinery Co. Ltd. v. Canadian National Railway Co. (1951), O. R. 578 (Ont. H. C.),
(motor) John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 108 and (ocean) Gulf
Canada Resources Ltd. v. Merlac Marine Inc. [1994], O. 1. No. 282 (Ont. C. J.). U.S.: (rail) Masonite Corp. v.
Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. 601 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1979), (ocean) F. J. McCarty Co. v. Southern Pac. Co. 289 F.
Supp. 875 (N. D. Cal. 1968), (truck) United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F. 2d 442 (4th Cir. 1953). On
motor transport comparative law see Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lic Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya,
Transportation Law and Practice in North America (Tuscon: National Law Center for Interamerican Free
Trade, 1996) at 57.
1035 U.S. land: Mass v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines Inc., 577 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978). Canadian land:
(motor) Paine Et Ux. v. Tippet-Richardson Ltd. et al.(1966) (1966),54 W. W. R. 420 (B. C. S. C.), mentioned
but distinguished by the more recent case (motor) Drake v. Bekins Moving and Storage Co. [1982], B. C. 1.
No. 1020 (B. C. Co. Ct). Royal Bank v. Hale (1962), 30 D. L. R. (2d) 138 (B. C. S. C.), Prudential Trust Co.
Ltd. v. Cugnet (1956), S. C. R. 914 (S. C. C.) and Drake v. Bekins Moving and Storage Co.[1982], B. C. 1.
No. 1020 (B. C. Co. Ct.). Art. 2053 (land transport) of Quebec Civil Code exonerates land carrier in case
shipper makes a 'deliberately misleading declaration ... ofthe nature or value of the goods' (implying fraud).
(motor) Pigeon v. Purolator Courrier Ltee (1994), 1. E. 95-316 (Que. C.), Oppenheim v. Walter Pelly
Transport (1985) Inc. (1999),1. E. 99-1494 (S. C. Que.).
1036 Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 3, 4 at cxlvi, clv and clxii respectively. Canada: William Tetley, Marine
Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 455, 456 and Sherrit Gordon Mines
Ltd. v. Garifalia (The) [1990], F. C. J. No. 401 (F. C. C.). See also Quebec Civil Code art. 2067 (water
transport). U.S.: (ocean) William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at 456s. A Fortune v. s.s. lrisg Larch (1973) 503 F. 2d 952 (S. D. N. Y.) and
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co v. the Eliza Jane Nicholson, 138 F. Supp. 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1956).
1037 Knowingly indicates that shipper did not act through accident, mistake or ignorance but through
knowledge that he had or should have had on the nature or/and value of the goods. No need of specific intent
to defraud is required. Fraudulently goes even further and requires proof of intention to deceive and to benefit
himselfat the expense ofanother, not merely knowledge of fraud. On intentional and knowing faults see infra
at 234s.
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another, it seems that fraud related incidents are usually available to the shipper so
that the burden of proof soon shifts to him as in the case of inherent vice lO38• All
these scenarios are highly case specific and imply judges subjectivity on the
issue1039•
The stoppage in transit liability exception we find in U.S. and Canadian
motor BsOL, U.S. rail BOL, Norfolk Southern intermodal rail tariff but also in both
countries ocean carriage case law lO40, has the effect of transferring the risk ofloss or
damage to the party entitled to give stoppage instructions1041. This may be the
shipper, consignee, shipper's/consignee's creditors or other third parties in right1042.
Because 'in transit' is, at times, hard to determine (i.e. in case of imperfect demand
of delivery by the consignee) Canadian and U.S. case law has concluded that the test
to be used in this respect is in what capacity the goods are held by the person in
custody1043 •
D. Ocean Specific Liability Exceptions: The last category of liability
exceptions are specific to ocean, not land, carriage and include fire, the catch-all (q)
liability exception, saving life at sea, the nautical fault exception and already
examined sea perils and latent (vessel) defect, all making part of the Hague (U.S.)
and the Visby Rules (Canada).
1038 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 456 for
shipper ultimate proof. Supra at 204s for inherent vice.
1039 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 104), Canadian
Westinghouse Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co [1925], S. C. R. 579 (S. C. C.).
1040 Annex No. III, Table No.5, 6, 7, 8 at cxc-cxciv and (ocean) Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 'Bills of lading'
Admiralty & Mar. Law § JO-lJ (2001) WESTLAW (Tp-all) and William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims
(Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 987 and note 203. This exception was intended to
alleviate carrier from increased liability following prolonged physical detention of the cargo due to stoppage
in transit.
1041 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3d. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 78s.
1042 Ibid. For this reason we make this exception appear close to the shipper fault liability exception.
1043 Ibid. Both countries case law indicates that the person entitled to stop goods in transit can do so until
receipt of good by the consignee, representative or transferee. U.S.: William H. Danne, "Right to withhold or
Stop Delivery" (2002) 45 Fla. Jur. 2d Sales and Exchanges of Goods § 204 (WESTLAW-Tp-all). Canada:
Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (l 991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559 (Ont. C. A.).
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Under the Hague, Visby, COOSA and MLA, the ocean carrier is exonerated
in case of 'fire unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier' 1044. Authors
suggest that the fire exception should be treated separately from other exceptions1045
since the U.S. has an ancient (1851) 'Fire Statute,l046 enacted before the Hague
Rules and intended to protect shipowners against fire on board, a common
catastrophe of the times, absent carrier 'design or neglect,l047. COOSA Sec. 1308
specifically protects the Fire Statute from implied repeal 1048 but does not provide
any further guidance on the interrelationship between the COOSA fire defense and
the Fire Statute. This was left to courts to resolve upon shipper invoking the (Fire
Statute and/or COOSA) fire defense1049. As we are going to confirm, U.S. courts are
divided on the issue of which act takes priority over the other.
1044 Art. IV(2)(b) of the Hague, Visby Rules and MLA (Schedule III), COGSA Sec. 1304(2)(b). Annex No. II,
Tables No.2, 3, 4 and Annex No. III, Table NO.5 at cxc. Fire is the peril most dreaded by all mariners, and
most difficult to combat in a fully laden ship. Herbert R. Baer, (3 rd ed.) Admiralty Law ofthe Supreme Court
(Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Company, 1979) at 491. Today, it is affirmed that since the Lloyds of
London began writing ocean marine coverage over 300 years ago, incendiary fires have increased
dramatically in the latter part of the twentieth century. Gary S. Mogel, "Arson Defense to Coverage Under
Property Insurance" Am. Jur. (1995) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
1045 Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at
161.
1046 The statute is really called 'Limitation ofShipowners Liability Act' (1851) 46 U. S. Code 182 (1997) R. S.
4282 [hereinafter Fire Statute] and contains a liability exception known as the Fire Statute, exonerating
carrier in case offIfe loss. Patricia Wong, "Intercircuit Conflict with Respect to the Burden of Proof Standard
under the Fire Statute and the Fire Exemption Clause of COGSA" (1994) 201. Legis. 91 at 91. U.S. courts
have held the Fire Statute constitutional since it is within the powers of Congress to determine U.S. maritime
law. Consumers Import Co. v. Zosenjo, 320 U. S. 249 (U. S. N. Y. 1943) as reported by Herbert R. Baer, (3 rd
ed.) Admiralty Law ofthe Supreme Court (Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Company, 1979) at 492.
1047 The raison d'etre of the Fire Statute was the New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank ofBoston,
47 U. S. (6 How.) 344 (U. S. S. C. 1848) case that held carrier liable for damage to the goods due to personnel
negligence in causing the fIfe on board and unsafe construction of the vessel. As reported by Herbert R. Baer,
(3rd ed.) Admiralty Law ofthe Supreme Court (Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Company, 1979) at 490. The
Fire Statute was pattented after its English counterpart but since it did not resolve the ongoing tensions
between shippers and carriers, Congress passed the Harter Act in 1893 followed later by COGSA to apply to
ocean carriage. Patricia Wong, "Intercircuit Conflict with Respect to the Burden of Proof Standard under the
Fire Statute and the Fire Exemption Clause of COGSA" (1994) 20 J. Legis. 91 at 91-92. The COGSA fIfe
exception and its Fire Statute counterpart are very similarly plrrased. Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the
Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 309. William Tetley,
Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 428.
1048 COGSA Sec. 1308 specifically sets forth that 'the provisions of this chapter shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the carrier under the provisions ... of ... 46 U.S.c. sections 175, 181 to 183, and 183b to 188,'
the Fire Statute being section 182. Annex No. II, Table No.4 at clxiii.
1049 Joseph P. Tabrisky, "COGSA and the Fire Statute" (1997) 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 359 at 363. In case of
damage to goods from shipboard fire, the defendant must determine which, if not both, fire defenses he will
assert. Eugene J. O'Connor, Shannon O'Reilly, "The Fire Defenses under U.S. law" (2002) 33 1. Mar. L. &
Com. III at 115.
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COGSA, MLA and the Fire Statute require a visible flame or light and not
mere heat for 'fire' to exist1050. Moreover, all three statutes prescribe the same
standard of carrier care, due diligence, in case of fire l051 . The similarity of retained
criteria and COGSA incorporation of the Fire Statute in its provisions is probably
the reason why U.S. courts frequently base their holdings on both COGSA and the
Fire Statute with respect to the fire exception. This, however, may frequently create
problems since there are notable differences between the two acts l052.
In effect, it may be that under COGSA, MLA (Schedule III) and the Fire
Statute the shipper has to make its prima facie case of loss or damage before the
burden of proof shifts to the carrier to prove the cause of the loss (how the fire
1050 U.S.: Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo case" (1997)
21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 309, Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal) at 118 citing U.S. case law.
Canada: David McNair & Co. Ltd v. The Santa Malta (1967),2 Ll. Rep. 391 (Ex. C. C.), (not transport case)
Brothers v. Atlantic Insurance Co.[1998], N. J. No.8 (Nfld. S. C.) opposing Duncanson v. Continental
Insurance Co. (N. S. C. A.) [1990], N. S. J. No. 118 (N. S. S. C. A. D.).
1051 This translates into 'what the owner knows or is charged with finding out', about the occurrence causing
the fire or measures taken to extinguish it. U.S.: In re Damodar Bulk Carriers Ltd, 903 F. 2d 675 (9th Cir.
1990), In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F. 2d 225 (2d Cir. 1982), Asbestos Corp. Ltd, AMC
1683 (2nd Cir. 1973) and Banana Servs. Inc. v. M/V Tasman Star, 68 F. 3d 418 (lIth Cir. 1995) holding that
the Fire Statute and COGSA negligence criteria are identical. See also Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The
Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at 161 and 896 and 878 (note 87), Patricia
Wong, "Intercircuit Conflict with Respect to the Burden of Proof Standard under the Fire Statute and the Fire
Exemption Clause of COGSA" (1994) 20 J. Legis. 91 at 92. Canada: Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian
Government Merchant Marine L. [1957], S. C. R. 801 (C. S. C), Hunter & Co. v. Owners Schr. "Morning
Star" (1817-28) as reported by Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v. Saint John Shipbuilding L [1991], N. J.
No. 257 (Nfld. S. C. T. D.). Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal:
Editions Themis, 1986) at 204.
1052 Some of the less important differences between COGSA and the Fire Statute as reported by William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 425: Difference (I)
COGSA-Fire Statute: U.S. Fire Statute only applies to shipowners, carriers and demise (not other) charterers,
not agents, master or crew. U.K. Fire Statute applies to carrier and all charterers. COGSA is applicable to the
shipowner, (contracting, actual) carriers and charterers (demise charterers or issuing charterers or charterers
who have accepted some or all of the liabilities of the Hague or the Visby Rules). Because of the ambiguity in
the hierarchy of U.S. COGSA and the Fire Statute, we do not know with certainty which act will cover
persons not envisaged by the other. Ibid at 234s. Difference (2) COGSA-Fire Statute: The Fire Statute only
applies to goods that are on board the vessel whereas COGSA applies from 'tackle to tackle'. Henry N.
Longley, Common Carriage of Cargo (San Fransisco: Matthew Bender, 1967) at 170, Thomas 1.
Schoenbaum, Excepted Perils 3rd ed. (U.S.: West Group, 2003) at par. 10-27. Difference (3) COGSA-Fire
Statute: COGSA applies to all ships, not merely American ships. Difference (4) COGSA-Fire Statute: Under
COGSA and 2001 MLA (Schedule III) article 3(2), once fire has started carrier, master, crew and servants
must act 'properly and carefully' to protect cargo whereas carrier personal negligence will only hold him
liable under the Fire Statute. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at 426.
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started and that it caused the IOSS)1053. However, an inter-circuit conflict exists in the
U.S. on whether the carrier must prove vessel seaworthiness before invoking the fire
exception under COGSA and the Fire Statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit required proof of vessel seaworthiness as a precondition to carrier
invoking the fire exemption1054. Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit has held that
the ocean carrier only has to prove that he "personally" exercised due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy with respect to the fire before and at the beginning of the
journey, making seaworthiness a delegable duty 1055. With this decision, the Ninth
Circuit has been said to approximate COGSA to the Fire Statute1056. In effect, under
the Fire Statute there is no overriding, non-delegable duty of seaworthiness so that
only shipper proof of carrier personal vessel unseaworthiness before or at the
beginning of the journey, causing the fire, will render him liable1057. U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits align themselves with Fire
Statute provisions on this point and do not make proof of vessel seaworthiness a
1053 U.S.: Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo case" (1997)
21 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 309 and Henry N. Longley, Common Carriage of Cargo (San Fransisco: Matthew
Bender, 1967) at 165. For the same proof in Canada: Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government
Merchant Marine L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (S. C. C.). Proof has to be made by preponderance of evidence.
Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal) at 119. Fire need not directly ignite cargo to be cause of
damage. U.S.: Westinghouse Electric Co. v. M/V Leslie Lykes, 734 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984), Banana Services
Inc. v. M/V Tasman Star, 68 F. 3d 418 (11th Cir. 1995). On the contrary, in Canada, Maxine Footwear Co. v.
Canadian Government Merchant Marine L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (S. C. C.) and Dominion Glass Co. v. Anglo
Indian (The) [1944], S. C. R. 409 (S. C. C.) have required fIre to be the direct cause of the loss.
1054 Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, 603 F. 2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979) on the basis of COGSA
and the Fire Statute. In rendering its decision, the court cited Canadian case Maxine Footwear Co. v.
Canadian Government Merchant Marine L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (C. S. C.) concluding in the same sense. This
argument was said to be wrong since Canada does not have a Fire Statute resulting in Sunkist being
incomplete and unsound. In the more recent COGSA case Re Damodar Bulk Carriers Ltd. (1990) 903 F. 2d
675 (9th Cir.) Sunkist is mentioned.
1055 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. M/V Hyundai Explorer, 93 F. 3d 641 (C. A. 1996). rejecting the
Complaint ofDamodar Bulk Carriers, 903 F. 2d 675 (9th Cir. 1990) holding. Joseph P. Tabrisky, "COGSA
and Fire Statute" (1996) 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 359 at 365. 'Personal' refers to persons occupying a
managerial position within the corporate structure, either the ocean carrier or corporate or managing offIcers.
William Tetley, Tetley's Law and other Nonsense Chapter 17 Sec. 8(4) (Update of Marine Cargo Claims)
(2002) online: Tetley's Law/McGill Homepage <http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/ch26.htm> (last modifIed:
continuously). Eugene J. O'Connor, Shannon O'Reilly, (2002) "The Fire Defenses under U.S. law" 33 1. Mar.
L. & Com. 111 at 125. On seaworthiness being a non-delegable duty see supra at 185.
1056 Joseph P. Tabrisky, "COGSA and Fire Statute" (1996) 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 359 at 366-367.
1057 William Tetley, Tetley's Law and other Nonsense Chapter 17 Sec. 8(4) (Update ofMarine Cargo Claims)
(2002) online: Tetley's Law/McGill Homepage <http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/ch26.htm> (last modifIed:
continuously) and Westibghouse v. Leslie Lykes, 734 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984) cited by In re South Coast Boat
Rentals, Inc. 1999 WL 615180 (E. D. La. 1999).
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condition precedent to carrier invoking the fire exception under the Fire Statute or
the COOSA1058.
The inter-circuit conflict may be attributed to Fire Statute provisions
opposing COOSA, and COOSA's vagueness on the interrelationship of the two acts.
It has been argued, in this respect, that the Fire Statute undermines international
uniformity the Hague Rules intended to promote, inviting the Supreme Court to
intervene to end the conflictl059. In effect, Canadian and other national courts are not
divided on the issue of vessel seaworthiness and make it an overriding, non-
delegable duty, condition precedent to carrier invoking any liability exception,
including fire 1060.
Under all mentioned acts, once carrIer proves, when applicable,
seaworthiness and establishes the cause of the loss (fire), the burden of proof shifts
again to the shipper to establish carrier personal fault in the commencement of the
fire. This is a heavy burden of proof since it is the shipper who must prove carrier
personal fault, the 'largeness of authority' of this exception embracing only carrier
or its managing representatives in case of corporate ownershipl061. The only
1058 Re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F. 2d 225 (2d Cir. 1982), Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. MlV
Leslie Lykes, 734 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984) under the Fire Statute and COGSA, Banana Servs. Inc. v. MlV
Tasman Star, 68 F. 3d 418 (lIth Cir. 1995) for the COGSA/Fire Statute fire defense. As reported by Michael
Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J.
263 at 309-310.
1059 Michael Sturley as reported by Patricia Wong, "Intercircuit Conflict with Respect to the Burden of Proof
Standard under the Fire Statute and the Fire Exemption Clause of COGSA" (1994) 20 J. Legis. 91 at 93.
1060 Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (C. S. C.),
Dominion Glass Co. v. Anglo Indian (The) [1944], S. C. R. 409 (S.C.C) on the comparison with the U.S. fife
exception. Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd. (1974), S. C. R. 933 (S. C. C.) and Michel
Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les
Presses de I'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 119-120. See also Quebec Civil Code art. 2063 (water
transport).
1061 U.S.: Eugene J. 0' Connor, Shannon O'Reilly, "The Fire Defenses under U.S. law" (2002) 33 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 111 at 118. Herbert R. Baer, (3 rd ed.) Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court (Charlottesville, Virginia:
Michie Company, 1979) at 491 for the Fire Statute and COGSA, mentioning the early decision Walker v.
Transportation Co., 70 U. S. (3 Wall. 1865) 150. See also Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the
Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at note 320 for U.S. cases
on the issue. The following carrier representatives have been held to satisfy statutory criteria: managing
director, general agent, general manager, operations manager, general superintendent, marine superintendent,
superintending engineer, assistant superintending engineer, port captain, port engineer, general foreman of a
barge owner. The fault of the master or minor shore employees is excluded. Canada: In Maxine Footwear Co.
v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (S. C. C.) the court held that fire must be
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exception would be MLA (Schedule III) and COGSA vessel unseaworthiness
(before and at the beginning of the voyage) causing the fire, where the carrier is
always liable for the fault of its agents 1062. Under the Fire Statute, however, there is
not a non-delegable duty of seaworthiness and vessel unseaworthiness causing the
fire will only hold carrier liable when it is attributed to him personally1063 .
Overall, the source of problems for the ocean fire liability exception is the
preponderance given to the Fire Statute over COGSA by certain U.S. courts. This
results in overpowering COGSA duty of seaworthiness before and at the beginning
of the journey and duty to care for the cargo once fire has started, multiplying, in
this manner, applicable legal principles. Authors argue that there is no reason to
maintain the Fire Statute since its raison d'etre, namely, carrier protection, is not
present today, the Hague Rules having reached a new balance of liabilities and
rights between carriers and shippers1064.
Land BsOL and intermodal rail tariffs in the U.S. and Canada do not contain
a fire liability exception except for the U.S. BNSF intermodal rail tariff (Item 62. 3)
that enumerates 'fire' among carrier exoneration causes lO65 • Moreover, the 'fire'
exception has occasionally been found in older Canadian and U.S. land BsOL1066.
For the rest, 'fire' will not exonerate the land carrier except if another liability
exception i.e. shipper fault, inherent vice, act of God, causes the fire or the
damage lO67 • Or, when land carriers in multimodal transport incorporate ocean carrier
personal to the carrier or its directing mind (the life and soul of the company, the very ego and center of the
personality of the corporation).
1062 Supra at 185s.
1063 Westibghouse v. Leslie Lykes (1984) 734 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir.).
1064 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 428.
1065 Ibid at 411 on the inexistence ofthis exception in land transport. Annex No. III, Tables No.5, 6, 7, 8 at
cxc-cxciv and Annex No. I, Table No. 6 at lxx for the BNSF rail tariff. See also Quebec case Richard v.
Centre de Camions Chrysler Montreal Ltee (1978), J. E. 78-185 (S. C. Que.) where tort law principles
decided motor carrier liability in case of fIre.
1066 U.S.: (rail) Missouri Pac. R Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 (u. S. S. C. 1927) even though no reference was
made to carrier actual 'fault or privity'. Canada: (rail) Lake Erie and Detroit River Railway Co. v. Sales &
Halliday (1896), 26 S. C. R. 663 (S. C. C.) where it was not clear or signifIcant whether the fIre exception
concerned railway as a carrier or as a warehouseman. Nor did the case refer to carrier 'actual fault or privity'.
1067 Canada: 'act of God'- 'fire' see (rail) McMorrin v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1901) O. 1. No. 104
(Ont. H. C. J.). U.S.: Shipper fault in not notifying carrier of the nature of the goods and subsequent fire
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liability provisions to their segment of transportation. Absence of a land 'fire'
exception is probably due to the fact that the need to protect ocean carriers from
such an occurrence is not as evident in land transport.
Hague, Visby, MLA (Schedule III) and COOSA exempt the ocean carrier in
case of 'saving or attempting to save life or property at sea' ('salvage defense,)1068.
Authors argue that this liability exception is similar to the 'perils of the sea' ocean
exoneration cause that also concerns maritime perils1069. Public policy in favour of
assisting those in distress at sea is so strong that this liability defence has never been
controversial1070. In practice, the salvage defence has not retained much judicial
attention1071 to permit a more detailed analysis of its components. Although authors
may suggest that carrier or servants negligence during salvage operations is
resulting thereof, (rail) Crump v. Thompson (1949) 171 F. 2d 442 (8th Cir.) and (motor) B. C. Truck Lines
Inc. v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 1 (N. D. Ga. 1963).
1068 Art. IV(2)(I) of the Hague, Visby Rules and MLA (Schedule III), COGSA Sec. 1304(2)(1), Annex No. IlI,
Table No.5 at cxc and Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 3, 4. This defense is proof that salvage operations can be
part of a contract of carriage: U.S.: Marva Jo Wyatt, « Contract Terms in Multimodal Contracts: COGSA
Comes Ashore» (1991) 16 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 177 at 200. Canada: Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.
(1991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559 (Ont. C. A.). Salvage principles are so well settled that are sometimes said to be the
jus gentium or the international law of the sea. In both Canada and the U.S., as internationally, the salvor may
establish a claim for a salvage award if he establishes: (1) marine peril (property or lives saved must be on
water, not on land) which does not need to be imminent or absolute but has to be present (reel) or reasonably
apprehended; (2) services voluntarily rendered (not under official or legal duty or salvor saving his own ship);
(3) success of the salvage operations, in whole or in part. Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 236-239. U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law of
Admiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at 532s and Andrew Anderson, "Salvage and
Recreational Vessels: Modem Concepts and Misconceptions (1993) 6 U. S. F. Mar. L. J. 203 at 208-210.
The salvage concept, however, must be distinguished from the salvage defence. Salvage awards, granted to
the salvor for his meritorious services, presuppose successful salvage services whereas the Hague and the
Visby Rules exonerate carrier even in case of attempts to save life or property at sea. Canada: Jean Pineau, Le
Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 209. U.S.: Grant
Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at 560. First,
in the legal sense of the term, the salvage award is an amount of money given to the salvor as indemnity for
the property and life saved whereas the salvage defense simply exonerates him from liability for damage to
property on the salving ship as a result of salvage operations.
1069 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 446 and
Marva Jo Wyatt, « Contract Terms in Multimodal Contracts: COGSA Comes Ashore» (1991) 16 Tul. Mar.
L. 1. 177 at 200.
1070 U.S.: Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997)
21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 313, Marva Jo Wyatt, « Contract Terms in Multimodal Contracts: COGSA Comes
Ashore» (1991) 16 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 177 at 201. Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 233-234 and Ontario v. Mar-Dive Corp. [1996], O. 1. No. 4471
(Ont. Ct. GD).
1071 U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc.,
1975) at 560. Canada: cases only mention this exception as part of the Visby Rules without further comment
made on it.
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irrelevant to this exception1072 this is incompatible with absence of negligence being
part of herein mentioned carrier liability exceptions and also of claims of salvage
awards in both the U.S. and Canadal073 .
Due diligence is also a key concept with respect to Hague, Visby Rules art.
IV(4) and respective domestic laws providing for carrier exoneration in case of
'reasonable deviations' 1074 in general, or specifically destined to save life or property
at sea lO75 • The doctrine of 'unreasonable deviation' is narrowly construed to include
mainly cases of geographical deviation1076 punishing carrier for an intentional or
1072 Robert Force, «A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules: Much Ado about?»
70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051 at 2068. This is a theoretical argument the author bases on the comparison of the
Hamburg Rules art. 5(6) reference to 'reasonable' measures during salving operations, with the Hague and the
Visby Rules provisions that do not use the term 'reasonable'. This, according to the author, implies that due
diligence needs not be exercised by the carrier in case of the Hague and the Visby Rules. See also infra note
1373.
1073 U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc.,
1975) at 553-555. Thomas Segalla, "Insurer" 12 Couch on Ins. § 183:148 (2000) WESTLAW (Tp-all) and
Laura Hunter Dietz, "Salvage Operations: Imputation of Liability to Others" 68 Am. Jur. 2d Salvage § 35
(2000) WESTLAW (Newsletters). Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 238. Manchester Liners Ltd. v. Scotia Trader (The) [1971], F. C. 14 (F. C. C.).
1074 Art. IV(4) of the Hague, Visby Rules and 2001 MLA (Schedule III) reflects the 'doctrine of unreasonable
deviation' which is firmly entrenched in maritime law: «Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or
property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this
chapter or of the contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting
therefrom". Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 3 at cxlvi and cliv. U.S. COGSA Sec. 1304(4) adds that "provided,
however, that if the deviation is for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo or passengers, it shall, prima
facie, be regarded as unreasonable". Annex No. II, Table No.4 at clviii. This additional COGSA provision
refers to specific factual patterns that create a prima facie case (rebuttable presumption) of unreasonable
deviation. In this way, lucrative oriented deviations on the part of the carrier are presumed unreasonable.
Michel Pourcelet, Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 81. See Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A, 782 F. 2d 329 (2d Cir.
1986) on deviation for unloading cargo.
1075 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
209. We should note that the doctrine of 'unreasonable deviation' does not exist in civil law countries and this
provision does not make part of the 1966 French law implementing Visby Rules provisions in France. Rene
Rodiere, Traite General de Droit Maritime (Tome II) (Paris: Editions Dalloz, 1968) at 407. In the province
of Quebec, however, art. 2072 of the Code Civil on water transport refers to this Visby Rules exception. No
Quebec cases were found on this exception.
1076 Michel Pourcelet, Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 81. U.S.: SPM Corp. v. M/V Ming Moon, 965 F. 2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1992), SNC s.L.E. v.
M/V Newark Bay, III F. 3d 243 (2nd Cir. 1997). Although in the beginning U.S. courts had extended the
doctrine to some non-geographic deviations (i.e. quasi-deviations), they have, in more recent years, cut back
on quasi-deviations so that geographic deviation and unauthorized deck carriage (quasi-deviation) are now the
only deviations subject to the doctrine. Mitsui Marine Fire and Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Direct Container Line Inc.,
119 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S. D. N. Y. 2000), Michael Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in
Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 653-654. Canada: William Tetley, Marine Cargo
Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 99 and Z1. Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line
N. V. [1999], F. C. J. No. 1584 (F. C. C.) citing Pro Tetley. Unauthorized deck carriage (a U.S. quasi-deviation)
is named 'departure from the contract of carriage' in Canada and classifies as an unreasonable deviation.
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voluntary and unjustifiable (unreasonable) deviation, which has "so changed the
essence of the agreement as to effect its abrogation,,1077. Reference to 'reasonable'
(deviation) alludes to exercise of 'due diligence' in deviating (in the perspective of
salvage), an element subject to an in concreto examination lO78 .
In U.S. and Canadian land transport the concept of deviation from the
scheduled itinerary or from the terms of the contract of carriage exists, even though
it is not connected to saving life or property on land or to a carrier liability
defence1079. Further, there is no land 'salvage defence' since there is no similar
public policy that would reward a truck driver stopping to assist a stranded
motorist1080. This, along with the implicit duty to properly care for the cargo would
seem to prohibit an interruption in the carriagel081 . In 1988, U.S. Congress attempted
Consumers Glass Co. Ltd. et al. v. Farrell Lines Inc. et al. (1985),53 O. R. (2d) 230 (Ont. C. 1.). We found
no U.S. or Canadian cases on deviation and the 'salvage defense'.
1077 U.S.: Sedco Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F. 2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1986), Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F.
Supp. 386 (D. C. N. Y. 1953) as reported by SPM Corp. v. M/V Ming Moon, 965 F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir. 1992).
'Unreasonable' or 'unjustifiable' means 'substantially increasing the exposure of cargo to foreseeable dangers
that would have been avoided had no deviation occurred'. SNC S.L.B. v. M/V Newark Bay, 1996 WL 82384
(S. D. N. Y. 1996) and General Elec. Co. Intern. Sales Div. v. s.s. Nancy Lykes, 706 F. 2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1983),
Manuel International v. Rascator Maritime, A. M. C. 523 (S. D. N. Y. 1985) (deviation for carrier own
benefit is unreasonable). Canada: z.I. Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line N. V. [1999], F. C. 1. No. 1584 (F. C. C.)
on deviation for carrier own benefit, Toronto Elevators Ltd. v. Colonial Steamships Ltd. [1950], Ex. C. R. 371
(Ex. Ct.), Canastrand Industries Ltd. v. Lara S (The) (TD.) [1993],2 F. C. 553 (F. C. C.) and Beloit Canada
Ltee/Ltd. v. Neptune Orient Lines Ltd.[1988], F. C. 1. No. 310 (F. C. C.). See also infra at 236 and 249.
1078 U.S.: Robert Force, «A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules: Much Ado
about?» 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051 at 2069. In case of a 'liberty clause' (supra note 960) courts will declare the
clause null and void if the carrier did not act reasonably in deviating. Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M V.
Hakusan 11,954 F. 2d 874 (3rd Cir. 1992), General Elec. Co. Intern. Sales Div. v. s.s. Nancy Lykes, 706 F. 2d
80 (2nd Cir. 1982). Canadian Drew Brown Ltd. v. Orient Trader (The) [1974], S. C. R. 1286 (S. C. C.) just
comments on U.S. law.
If we take a closer look at this Hague and Visby Rules provision we note that 'any deviation to save life or
property at sea '" or any reasonable deviation' will benefit carrier. This does not mean that the deviation to
save life or property at sea should not be reasonable, on the contrary, it constitutes an example of a reasonable
deviation, not a case apart. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at 738.
1079 Canada: Although routing is rarely specified in inland contracts, its presence is a necessity in international
shipments in order to give effect to pre-arranged commitments on the part of the shipper taking place at the
border. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Ontario: Carswell, 1997) at 76. Compagnie des
Chemins de Fer Nationaux du Canada v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. [1990],3 C. F. 114 (F. C. C.), F. T
James Co. v. Dominion Express Co. (1907), 13 O. L. R. 211 (Ont. Div. Ct.), England v. Heimbecker (1997),
78 D. L. R. (3d) 117 (Sask. Dist. Ct.) on geographical and non-geographical deviation. U.S.: Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. M/V 'OOCL BRAVERY', 79 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S. D. N. Y. 1999), Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
Ltd. v. Skyway Freight Systems Inc, 67 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S. D. N. Y. 1999), the latter referring to the 'material
deviation' doctrine.
1080 Marva Jo Wyatt, «Contract Terms in Multimodal Contracts: COGSA Comes Ashore» (1991) 16 Tul.
Mar. L. 1. 177 at 20l.
108l Ibid at note 159 with reference to multimodal cases where ocean rules were extended to land carriers.
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extension of COOSA benefits to land carners by including the new 'saving or
attempting to save life' ("at sea" being conspicuously absent). Authors argued that
there is no reason to imply into a contract of carriage the intent to recognize a duty
to an unlimited number of third parties1082. Thus, COOSA salvage defence remains,
today, specific to the ocean carriage.
Art. 4(2)(q) of the Hague, Visby Rules, MLA (Schedule III), and COOSA
Section 1304(2)(q) contains a catch-all no fault exception drafted in common law
style, exonerating carrier from liability for any cause not provided in the litany of
exceptions, absent negligence on his part and on the part of his agents and
servants l083 . In this way, causes of damages other than those provided in said sets of
rules, i.e. pilferage, theft, collision, rust, sweat, bursting of pipes, breakdown of
machinery etc., may exonerate carrier if they meet the requisite conditions1084.
The nature of this exception is very interesting to examine. We have seen that
the Hague and the Visby Rules presume carrier liability and exonerate him only in
case of proof of enumerated occurrences (presumption of liability). Certain of them
constitute force majeure events in civil law jurisdictions while others do not lO85 . We
will regroup both these categories of force majeure and non force majeure liability
1082 Marva Jo Wyatt, « Contract Terms in Multimodal Contracts: COGSA Comes Ashore» (1991) 16 Tul.
Mar. L. J. 177 at 201. Carrier duties must be narrowly construed.
1083 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at
210. Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at
167. The exception reads: 'Any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier or (and
for COGSA) without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall
be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the
carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage'.
Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 3, 4 and Annex No. III, Table No.5 at cxc. The underligned 'or' term really
means'and', so that COGSA is really in conformity with MLA (Schedule III) and international conventions.
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 515. See also
Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 137 (note 269).
1084 U.S.: Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc.,
1975) at 167. These causes of loss cannot fall under the catch-all 'acts of God' or 'perils of the sea' liability
exceptions since they are not natural causes of damage. (theft) The Remington Rand v. U.S.A., 98 F. Supp.
334 (S. D. N. Y. 1951), (collision) MGolodetz Export Corp. v. Lake Anja (1985) 751 F.2d 1103 (2nd Cir.).
(hold condensation) Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 129. Canada: (carriage on deck) A. Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St. Simeon
Navigation Inc. [1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R.) mentioning Canadian National Steamships v. Bayliss (The
Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R. 261 (S. C. C.). Both cases apply the q exception after having decided that the
'perils of the sea' exception is inapplicable.
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exceptions under the principle of presumption of liability requiring carrier to prove
the cause of the IOSSI086. The q exception seems to be so much more generous to the
ocean carrier by establishing a presumption of fault principle exonerating him
beyond the scope of specific exoneration causes without need to prove a specific
cause of IOSSI087. In reality, however, the ocean carrier needs to prove the cause of
the loss under the (q) exception because this is the way one can determine whether
carrier or his servant's negligence contributed to it1088.
The convergence of the principles of presumption of fault and presumption of
liability the (q) exception seems to operate by requiring proof of the cause of the
loss, is put into question by civil law systems that strongly reject this exception,
replacing it by the 'roughly similar' force majeure conceptl089. However, this
difference between common and civil law jurisdictions seems to be of little practical
importance since ocean carriers rarely have recourse to the (q) exception because of
its heavy burden of proof that we will examine as follows. Ocean carriers prefer to
invoke other exoneration causes such as insufficiency of packing, shipper fault or
perils of the sea to be exonerated for the very same facts 1090. Thus, the field
1085 Supra at 201 s.
1086 See infra note 1323 and accompanying text on our perception of the presumption ofliability concept.
1087 Infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 for the presumption of fault and presumption of liability
principles.
1088 Need for such carrier proof does not stem, therefore, from the presumption of liability or negligence
principles but from the (q) exception wording 'contributed to the loss ... '. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport
Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 135-136 and
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 517. U.S.:
Quaker Oat Co. v. MlV Torvanger, 734 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1984). In case carrier or agents merely contribute
to the loss, the carrier will be held liable for the whole damage unless he can establish what proportion of the
damage results from a cause for which he is not responsible. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296 (U. S. S. C. 1934),
American Home Assoc. v. American President Lines, 44 F. 3d 774 (9th Cir. 1995) and American Marine
Corp. v. Barge American Gulf III, 100 F. Supp.2d 393 (E. D. La. 2000). Canada: Canadian National
Steamships v. Bayliss (The Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R. 261 (S. C. C.) and A. Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St.
Simeon Navigation Inc. [1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R.) mentioning the Bayliss case on this issue.
1089 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 524.
Rene Rodiere describes this ocean carrier liability exception as 'the legal monster that torments civil law
minds'. Quebec Civil Code art. 2072 (water transport) and the 1966 French law implementing the Hague and
the Visby Rules at the domestic level, have respectively substituted the concepts of force majeure or 'facts
constituting an event non imputable to the carrier' for the (q) exception. See also infra at 288s.
1090 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de I'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 135. Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation
Press Inc., 1975) at 168. Canadian National Steamships v. Bayliss (The Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R. 261 (S.
C. C.). Fondation Co. OfCanada Ltd. v. Ship 'Fort Geaorge' (1978),20 N. R. 251 (F. C. C.) as reported by
Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 210.
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occupied by the q exception is really limited to cases of theft and actions of third
parties1091 .
Under this exception, once shipper establishes its prima facie case, carner
needs to prove vessel seaworthiness1092, the cause of the loss and absence of his or
servants negligence contributing to the 10SS1093. Even though this order of proof does
not seemingly differ from judicial requirements for Hague and Visby Rules (a)-(q)
and land carrier exceptions, the fact that the (q) exception explicitly refers to carrier
burden of proof means that this is not merely a burden of going forward with the
evidence, but a real burden of persuasion1094. Consequently, the burden of proof
does not return to the shipper once carrier proves vessel seaworthiness with respect
to the loss or damage, the cause of the loss or damage and absence of his and his
servants negligence contributing to the loss or damage but, rather, judgement hinges
upon the adequacy of carrier proof1095. As with all the other exceptions, the degree
of care is that of 'due diligence' on the part of the carrier and its servants1096. The
1091 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 135.
1092 U.S.: Tubacex, Inc. v. MlV Risan, 45 F. 3d 951 (5th Cir. 1995). Canada: A. Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St.
Simeon Navigation Inc.[1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R.) affirmed by the Supreme Court in St-Simeon
Navigation Inc. v. A. Couturier & Fils Ltee (1974), S. C. R. 1176 (S. C. C.).
1093 Canada: Canadian National Steamships v. Bayliss (The Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R. 261 (S. C. C.) and
A. Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St. Simeon Navigation Inc. [1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R.) mentioning Bayliss
on this point. U.S.: EAC Timberlane v. Pisces Ltd (1984) 745 F. 2d 715 (1S1 Cir.). A/S Dampskibssetskabet
Torm v. US 64 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S. D. N. Y. 1999).
'Servants' includes independent contractors and all parties to whom the carrier has delegated any of its
responsibility to care for the cargo as long as he retains control over loading and discharge (condition
precedent). William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
519. Agrico Chemical v. Atlantic Forest, 459 F. Supp. 638 (E. D. La. 1978) and Metalimport ofRomania v. S
S Italia, 426 F. Supp. 770 (S. D. N. Y. 1976), Tapco Nigeria, Ltd v. MlV WESTWIND, 702 F. 2d 1252 (C. A.
La. 1983).
1094 Quaker Oats Co. v. MlV Torvanger, 734 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1984). US v. Ocean Bulk Ships, Inc., 248 F.
3d 331 (5th Cir. 2001) and Lekas & Drivas Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F. 2d 426 (2nd Cir. 1962).
1095 Ibid. In citing EAC Timberlane v. Pisces Ltd, 580 F. Supp. 99 (D. Pto Ric. 1983), Pr. Tetley opines that
once the burden of production and of pursuasion is satisfied by the carrier, shippers have to meet, with at least
equal proof carrier or servant causative or contributory negligence. As a result, the burden of proof under the
(q) exception returns to the shipper following this author's view. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims
(Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 520. The two views are not necessarily
contradictory. We believe that, in practice, the burden of proof will eventually shift to the shipper once carrier
satisfies his proof under the (q) exception, simply courts will attribute greater burden to carrier proof.
1096 U.S.: Leslie Tomasello Weitz, «The Nautical Fault Debate» (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 581 at 583. William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 519 mentioning
Sankyo Seiki v. Korean Leader, 556 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. N. Y. 1982) and Metalimport v. SS Italia, 426 F.
Supp. 770 (S. D. N. Y. 1976). Quaker Oat Co. v. MlV Torvanger, 734 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1984). Canada:
Canadian National Steamships v. Bayliss (The Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R. 261 (S. C. C.) and A. Couturier
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heavier burden ofproof of the (q) exception was intended to remedy a specific harm,
namely, the abuse ofnon-statutory exception clauses in bills of lading1097 .
Courts insist that the q exception should be viewed as part of the Hague and
the Visby Rules and not as conflicting them. In this way, agents nautical fault
exonerating carrier does not contradict the q exception that will take effect when the
nautical fault or other enumerated exception are inapplicable 1098. Moreover,
contractually agreed upon occurrences that exonerate carrier on the basis of the q
exception principle of presumption of fault contravene the Hague and Visby Rules
art. 111(8) that prohibits contractual limitation of carrier liability rendering, therefore,
ineffective such clauses1099 .
In land transport, there IS no exception similar to the ocean transport (q)
exception. Land perils being less frequent or intense than ocean risks, the need
justifying a land (q) exception was seemingly not present. As a result, land carrier
will be held liable even though neither him nor his agents have committed any fault
so long as a specifically enumerated land carrier exoneration cause is not present.
To this we should add that land carriers will generally be held liable for the
damage caused by their agents and servants, something that is not always the case
with ocean carriers (nautical fault).
Nautical fault: Hague, Visby Rules, MLA (Schedule III) art. IV(2)(a) and
COGSA Sec. 1304(2)(a) exonerate carrier in case of 'act, neglect, or default of the
& Fils Ltee v. St. Simeon Navigation Inc. [1970], Ex. C. R 1012 (Ex. C. R) mentioning Bayliss in deciding
that foreseeable weather carrier and crew could guard against, did not justify presence of a sea peril or of the
(q) exception.
1097 James H. Hohenstein, «The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases» (1983) Un.
of Chicago L. Rev. 1146 at 1158.
1098 U.S.: Matter of Intercontinental Properties Management, S.A. (1979) 604 F. 2d 254 (4th Cir.), Quaker
Oats Co. v. MlV Torvanger, 734 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1984) Canada: A. Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St. Simeon
Navigation Inc.[1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R) the court mentioned Canadian National Steamships v.
Bayliss (The Lady Drake) (1937), S. C. R 261 (S. C. C.). This is the meaning of the (q) exception 'any other
cause of loss'.
1099 U.S.: Anvil Knitwear Inc. v. Crowley American Transport Inc. 2001 WL 856607 (S. D. N. Y. 2001).
Canada: Sf-Simeon Navigation Inc. v. A. Couturier & Fils Ltee (1974), S. C. R. 1176 (S. C. C.) affirming A.
Couturier & Fils Ltee v. St. Simeon Navigation Inc. [1970], Ex. C. R. 1012 (Ex. C. R.) in deciding that parties
cannot contractually limit carrier liability beyond what is statutorily provided on the basis of the q exception.
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master, manner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier III the navigation or in the
management of the ship' when this constitutes the proximate cause of damagel1OO .
This is known as the 'nautical fault' ocean carrier liability exception that came into
being in the 19th century as a contractual BOL c1ausel1°I, was intended to reconcile
carrier and shipper interests1102 and has given rise, overtime, to great doctrinal
controversy. Despite this fact, the nautical fault defense rarely succeeds in court,
particularly in recent years, not only because of the difficulty of proof it entails, but
also because courts do not seem overly fond of excusing carrier for the negligence
of its own employees l103 .
The problem that has particularly vexed courts when considering this
exception is the distinction between servants error in navigation or error in the
management of the vessel ('faute nautique' ou 'faute dans l'administration du
navire') exonerating carrier, and servants error in the management of the cargo or
commercial default (faute commerciale ou faute dans I'administration de la
cargaison) holding him liable1104 . This distinction, based on the nature of servant's
faults, is not contained in international conventions and courts have difficulty to
1100 On the proximate cause of damage see U.S.: Insurance Co. o/North America v. SS Flying Trader, 306 F.
Supp. 221 (D. C. N. Y. 1969) and Canada: Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine
L [1957], S. C. R. 801 (S. C. C.).
1101 Annex No. III, Table No. 5 at cxc and Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 3, 4. At the end of the nineteenth
century, navigational technology did not permit carriers to communicate with their ships at sea so that the
nautical fault exception was deemed a necessary carrier protective measure. Eun Sup Lee, Seon Ok Kim,
"Carriers Liability for Commercial Default or default in the Navigation and management of the Vessel"
(2000) 27 Transp. L. 1. 205 at 212. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping
Publications, 1988) at 397. This contractual exception was not permitted by American courts before the 1893
Harter Act. In Canada, contractual 'negligence clauses' exempting carrier for masters and servants negligence
were successfully used before adoption of the Hague Rules. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre,
Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 201, Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific
Railway Co. [1950], S. C. R. 356 (S. C. C.). Glengoil Steamship Co. v. Pilkington (1897), 28 S. C. R. 146 (S.
C. C.) held that 'negligence clauses' are not contrary to public policy.
1102 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de I'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 96.
1103 Michael Sturley, "An Overview in the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21
Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 308. Although the nautical fault defense rarely succeeds before the courts, it constitutes
a valuable carrier defense in collision cases.
1104 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 398s and
Rene Rodiere, Emmanuel du Pontavice, Droit Maritime Ith ed. (Paris: Dalloz, 1997) at 345-346. Hereinafter,
we will refer to 'nautical fault' to designate the first category of servants errors exonerating carriers and to
'commercial fault' when dealing with servants errors with respect to the cargo.
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delineate its components since, in the majority of instances, the same act may be
. d . b h f 1105vlewe upon as covenng ot types 0 errors .
Both a nautical and a commercial fault involve damage to cargo without
which neither can existll06. However, a nautical fault refers to an act or omission
towards the safety or well being of the vessel and, therefore, the safety of the
venture. When attributed to carrier servants, this fault exonerates the carrier. It
comprises errors in the navigation and errors in the management of the vessel ll07.
The former error constitutes a violation of practical and technical rules of navigation
dictated by custom or regulation and taking place at sea or before the beginning of
the voyage: choice of the route or man oeuvre that lead to the sinking of the vessel,
error in reading luminous signs, excessive speed, defective functioning of sirens or
signalization lights in fogy weather1108 . The latter error refers to any operation,
equipment or man oeuvre affecting directly and principally the well functioning of
the vessel itself (i.e. maintainance, reparations) and only incidentally and indirectly
affecting cargoll09 .
On the other hand, a commercial fault concerns an act or omISSIOn with
respect to the cargo and will not exonerate carrier since Hague and Visby Rules art.
111(2) holds carrier liable for his or his servants acts and omissions with respect to
1105 This is because errors in the management of the vessel generally result in damaging the cargo. Michel
Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal,
1972) at 97,98 and 101-102 and Michael Sturley, "An Overview in the Considerations Involved in Handling
the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 307.
1106 Rene Rodiere, «Faute Nautique et Faute Commerciale devant la Jurisprudence Fran9caise» (1961) 13 D.
M. F. 451 at 453.
1107 Ibid. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 96.
1108 Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 96, 97-98 and 100 based on U.S. case law and Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport
Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 201 for Canada.
1109 Ibid. at 98-99 and at 104 on the basis of U.S. and Canadian case law respectively, ibid. at 201 for Canada.
Canadian case Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1950], S. C. R 356 (S. C. C.), later
mentioned by Seaway Distributors Ltd v. Newfoundland Container Lines (1982) N. S. 1. No. 135 (N. S. C.
C.) held that an error in the navigation concerns the navigation or moving of the vessel whereas the
management of the vessel goes beyond these and concerns the vessel itself. Citing U.S. decisions,
Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chima Shipping Ltd. [1969], 2 Ex. C. R. 261 (Ex. C. R) held that removal
of the hatches for the sake of ventilation might be an error in the management of the ship but has nothing to
do with its navigation.
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the cargo1110. Sailing in bad weather, forcing the ship through the storm, navigating
in ice without proper equipment1111 or failing to use the apparatus of the ship for the
protection of the carg01112, are examples of errors in the administration of the cargo.
In case of doubt as to the nature of servant's error, the 'primary intent' test
differentiates errors in the administration of the vessel exonerating carrier from
errors in the management of the cargo holding him liable. This test inquires into
what was the intent of servants in proceeding to the harm-causing act, whether it
was to stabilize the vessel (nautical fault) or to care for the cargo (commercial
fault)l113. This leaves courts a great margin of consideration in drawing the line
between nautical and commercial faults 1114 . What is certain is that parties cannot
1110 On Hague, Visby Rules and 2001 MLA (Schedule III) art. III(2) and corresponding COGSA Sec.
1303(2).
1111 These incidents can be grouped in the category of 'maintaining course through a storm'. U.S.: Hershey
Chocolate Corp. v. SS Mars, 172 F. Supp. 321 (E. D. Pa. 1959). Canada: C.N.R. v. E & S Barbour Ltd
(1963), S. C. R. 323 (S. C. C.) as reported by William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International
Shipping Publications, 1988) at 402. Entering a strike-bound port is like entering an ice-bound port or sailing
in bad weather so that this will hold carrier liable. Crelisten Fruit Co. v. Mormacsaga (1969),2 Ex. C. R. 215
(Ex. Ct).
1112 Eun Sup Lee, Seon Ok Kim, "Carriers Liability for Commercial Default or default in the Navigation and
Management of the Vessel" (2000) 27 Transp. L. J. 205 at 218. See also Canadian case Kalamazoo Paper Co.
v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1950], S. C. R. 356 (S. C. C.).
1113 U.S.: Eun Sup Lee, Seon Ok Kim, "Carriers Liability for Commercial Default or default in the Navigation
and management of the Vessel" (2000) 27 Transp. L. J. 205 at 214. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime
sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 97-98 and 99. Grant
Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at 157-158
and 159 and Herbert R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie
Company, 1979) at 508-509. The 'primary intent' test is a judicial test that preexisted COGSA, taking effect
under the Harter Act. The Germanic (1905) 196 U.S. 589 (S. C. C.) and Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills
(1900), 179 U. S. 69 (S. C. C.). Canada: Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien
(Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 201, Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. (1950), R. C. S. 356 (S. C. C.)
citing the U.S. Germanic case and The Sylvia, 171 U. S. 462 (U. S. N. Y. 1898) in concluding that damage
affecting cargo may constitute a nautical fault where the primary concern of master's acts was to stabilize the
ship and, as a result, the cargo was incidentally damaged. Leval & Co. Inc. v. Colonial Steamships Ltd.
[1961], S. C. R. 221 (S. C. C.).
1114 A ballasting (operation destined to stabilize vessel) error, the most common nautical fault example, has
also been held to constitute a commercial fault when it occurs during discharge operations. Michel Pourcelet,
Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 97-
98. Inversely, authors have argued that improper stowage taking place during an intermediate port of the
voyage and affecting the stability of the vessel may constitute a nautical fault. When same occurs before and
at the beginning of the voyage, it will not exonerate carrier because of article III(2). Rene Rodiere, "Faute
Nautique et Faute Commerciale devant la Jurisprudence Frans;aise" (1961) 13 Droit Marit. Fr. 451 at 454.
Others, however, opine that improper stowage always constitutes a commercial fault even when intervening
before and at the beginning of the journey. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 103 and Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport
Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1986) at 202 and 203 and 204 (note 396). Knott v.
Botany Worsted Mills (1900), 179 U. S. 69 (S. C. C.) and Carling O'Keefe Breweries ofCanada Ltd. v. CN
Marine Inc. [1990], 1 F. C. 483 (F. C. A.).
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contractually provide what constitutes an error in the administration of the cargo or a
nautical fault in the BOL since such a clause will be considered null and void under
art. 111(8) of the Hague and the Visby Rules ll15 .
The nature of servants acts as basis of the distinction between nautical and
commercial faults is not the only element that conditions carrier liability. The
gravity of servants acts is also determinative in this regard. In effect, servants and
agents nautical faults exonerating carrier denote servant's absence of due diligence
in the navigation and management of the vessel ll16 . However, where navigational
negligence is so extreme as to raise a presumption of incompetence of crew and,
therefore, of vessel unseaworthiness before or at the beginning of the voyage, carrier
is presumed liable and may only rebut this presumption by demonstrating that it
exercised due diligence in selecting or training a competent crew111 ? This does not
mean that a nautical fault should be confounded with vessel unseaworthiness. The
former may take place during the journey and not only before or at the beginning of
it as unseaworthiness does1ll8. In this case where the nautical fault and
unseaworthiness take place before and at the beginning of the journey, the carrier
will be exonerated if he shows that a member of the crew was sufficiently negligent
to justify the nautical fault defense but not so negligent as to have made the vessel
unseaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage1119.
1115 Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc., 1975) at
159.
1116 U.S.: Herbert R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie
Company, 1979) at 511-512, Michael Sturley, "An Overview in the Considerations Involved in Handling the
Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 307, Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. 27,946 Long Tons ofCorn, 830 F.
2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1987) and Van Muching [sic} & Co., Inc. v. M/V Star Mindanao, 630 F. Supp. 433 (E. D.
Pa. 1985). Canada: National Wholesale Clothing Ltd. v. Coast Ferries Ltd. [1975], F. C. J. No. 507 (F. C. C.)
and Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1950], S. C. R. 356 (S. C. C.).
1117 U.S.: Potomac Transport Inc. v. Ogden Marine Inc., 909 F. 2d 42 (2nd Cir. 1990). Canada: Keystone
Transports Ltd. v. Dominion Steel & Coal Corp. [1942], S. C. R. 495 (S. C. C.) citing an English case on the
issue. N.M Paterson & Sons Ltd. v. Robin Hood Flour Mills, Ltd. [1968], I Ex. C. R. 175 (Ex. Ct). On this
point see also the Lefebvre Guy, L 'Obligation de Navigabilite et Ie Transport des Marchandises sous
Connaissement (LL. M. Thesis, University of Montreal, 1986) at 21-23 [published in (1990) 31 Les Cahiers
de Droit 81] and supra note 922 and accompanying text.
1118 The vessel can be seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage but during the voyage improper
ballasting may constitute a nautical fault exonerating carrier. American Mail Line Ltd. v. United States, 377 F.
Supp. 657 (W. D. Wash. 1974).
1119 I.e. the fact that a vessel sails with the doors open leading to wetting the cargo constitutes
unseaworthiness. However, when a vessel sails with the doors open on purpose to light the hold, this is not
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A nautical fault is always due to carrier servants, not to the carrier himself.
The master, mariner and pilot are specifically provided by the Hague and the Visby
Rules nautical fault exception as being carrier servants1120. Case law seems to add
that officers, engineers, and other carrier employees will exonerate him in case of
nautical fault l121 : Common and civil law agency principles apply to determine who
qualifies as an agent and servant of the carrier1122 with emphasis put on carrier
control over the servant or agent to determine the agency relationshipl123. Although
it is not always clear where the line is drawn between an officer who acts as the
carrier and an employee who acts as a servant, an assistant marine superintendent is
considered to be an employeel124.
unseaworthiness but a nautical fault because the doors had not been closed once the vessel had sailed. As
reported by Grant Gilmore, Charles L. Black, The Law ofAdmiralty (New York: The Foundation Press Inc.,
1975) at 160 and Michael Sturley, "An Overview in the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case"
(1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. l. 263 at 308. U.S.: Usinas Siderugicas de Minas Geras Sa-Usiminias v. Scindia
Steam Nav. Co. Ltd, 118 F. 3d 328 (5th Cir. 1997) and American Mail Line Ltd v. United States, 377 F.
Supp. 657 (W. D. Wash. 1974). Canadian: Maxine Footwear Co. v. CDN Government Merchant Marine Ltd
(1957), S. C. R. 801 (S. C. C.) where carrier was held liable because of vessel unseaworthiness despite
presence of a nautical fault. See also CNR. v. E&S Barbour Ltd (1963), S. C. R. 323 (S. C. C.) and NM
Paterson & Sons Ltd v. Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd [1968], 1 Ex. C. R. 175 (Ex. Ct.).
1120 Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague, Visby Rules, 2001 MLA (Schedule III) and COGSA Sec. 1304(2)(a). See also
U.S.: Insurance Co. of North America v. SS Flying Trader, 306 F. Supp. 221 (S. D. N. Y. 1969) and
Complaint ofGrace Line Inc., AMC 1253 (S. D. N. Y. 1974) and Canadian: Eisenerz G.m.b.H. v. Federal
Commerce and Navigation Co. Ltd (The Oak Hill) (1974), 1974 S. C. R. 1225 (S. C. C.) for pilot's error in
navigation.
1121 Miami Structural Iron Corp. v. Cie Nationale Beige De TM, 224 F. 2d 566 (5th Cir. 1955) explained that
the pilot, master, mariners, engineers or other persons in the service of the ship or for whose act the shipowner
is liable, are envisaged by this exception. Although no Canadian case law or doctrine was found on the issue,
English case law, source of inspiration for Canadian courts, seems to conclude in the same way. Foscolo,
Mango and Company, Limited and Others v. Stag Line Limited [1931],2 K. B. 48 (C. A.).
1122 U.S.: lody L. Mikasen, "Shipping (Officers and Pilots)" 70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping § 264 (1987)
WESTLAW (Tp-all) and Canadian National Wholesale Clothing Ltd v. Coast Ferries Ltd [1975], F. C. l.
No. 507 (F. C. C.). for reference made to agency laws.
1123 Three are the common and civil law principles for an agency relationship to exist: an agency contract,
carrier control over the agent and assent to perform respective duties. Art. 2130 of the Quebec Civil Code,
U.S. and Canadian common law principles. Carrier control over the agent is the most important element of
this relationship because it justifies carrier liability for agents acts. Agent's nautical tasks are not delegable to
independent contractors so that when stevedores commit a nautical fault, carrier will not be exonerated. U. S.:
Universe Tankships Inc v. Pyrate Tank Cleaners Inc., 152 F. Supp. 903 (S. D. N. Y. 1957). Canada Sears Ltd
v. Murmansk Shipping Co. (CA.F.) [1988], A. C. F. No 529 (F. C. A.).
1124 U.S.: Leval & Co. v. Colonial Steamships Ltd, (1960), Ex. C. R. 172 (Ex. Ct. C.) a Canadian court case
decided on the basis of U.S. case law and Canadian CNR. v. E &S Barbour Ltd (1963) S. C. R. 323 (S. C.
C.) (English case law referred therein).
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In land transport as well as in certain international conventions governing
ocean and air carriage, there is no nautical fault carrier defense1125 . The carrier is,
therefore, liable for servants and agents negligent acts. The presence of ocean carrier
nautical fault defense is said to be a great difference between sea, air and land
transportation and a major obstacle in achieving a uniform multimodal carrier
liability regime1126. Courts attribute the different statutory provisions to the fact that
navigational errors at sea are not analogous to trucker's inability to follow a
·fi d h· h 1127speci Ie route on a 19 way .
Lack of uniformity of ocean and land carrier liability provisions is one of the
reasons supporters of the abolition of the nautical fault exemption advance in
advocating its elimination. They also argue that survival of the nautical fault
exception protects the worst performers, increases shipper costs in insuring their
goods, is incompatible with carrier duty to care for the cargo and is not supported by
technological advances1128. Proponents of the nautical fault exemption argue that
this carrier exemption operates as a protective shield for the carrier in case of grave
occurrences (i.e. collisions) so that its abolition would increase litigation without
having an effect on masters and officers conduct and, in any case, this defense is not
very frequently invoked in litigation1129. They specifically state that the nautical
fault liability exception works to spread loss among cargo underwriters, with little
effect on the world's cargo premiums1130. From the opposition between carrier and
1125 The nautical fault exemption has also been abolished by the Hamburg Rules, Multimodal Convention as
well as the 1929 Warsaw Convention on international air transport. For the Hamburg Rules and the
Multimodal Convention see supra at 51.
1126 Leslie Tomasello Weitz, «The Nautical Fault Debate» (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L. J. 581 at 591.
1127 Vistar S.A. v. MlV Sea Land Express, 792 F. 2d 469 (5th Cir. 1986) holding that contractual extension of
ocean rules to the land segment of multimodal carriage does not apply to the nautical fault defense except if
there exists clear intent of the parties to apply this exception to land transport. On this last point see U.S.:
Vistar S.A. v. MlV Sea Land Express, 792 F. 2d 469 (5th Cir. 1986). Canada: Glengoil Steamship Co. v.
Pilkington (1897), 28 S. C. R. 146 (S. C. C.) where the BOL extended to the railway company the 'error in
judgment of the pilot, master, mariners or other servants of the ship owners' liability exemption. See also
Union Steamship Co. ofBritish Columbia v. Drysdale (1902), 32 S. C. R. 379 (S. C. C.).
1128 Leslie Tomasello Weitz, «The Nautical Fault Debate» (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L. J. 587.
1129 Ibid at 587-588. Masters have interest to act diligently since the opposite would adversely affect their
records and could lead to criminal liability. Ibid.
1130 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, «International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss,
Damage and Delay» (1995) 5 J. Transnat'l. L & Pol'y 1 at 28.
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shipper arguments we can conclude that the impact of elimination of the nautical
fault liability exception on carrier liability is difficult to quantify1131.
Because of the strong opposition between carrier and shipper interests, Pro
Mandelbaum suggests that, rather than maintain a complete exception, a qualified
nautical fault defense would be equitable to both sides of the debate. Under the
suggested concept, the ship owner would have the burden of proof of lack of control
or lack of knowledge of captain or crew acts (faults) in the operation or management
of the vessel due, i.e., to concealment, in order to be exoneratedl132 . Otherwise, he
would be liable for damage to or loss of the goods in case of nautical fault. In
considering multimodal carrier uniform liability rules such intermediate solutions
between abolition or maintainance of the nautical fault exception need to be taken
into account.
1131 Ibid.
1132 Ibid at 38.
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Section II: Limitation of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the U.S. and Canada
In moving international shipments the shipper wishes to minimize his freight costs
and maximize the chance of full recovery in the event of damage. A carrier, on the other
hand, desires to maximize shipper freight costs and minimize his exposure to liability1133 •
Depending on the country and mode, however, the flexibility in delineating carrier
liability limitation varies and is fixed by statute, treaty or convention1134. We will herein
examine limitation of motor Par. 1 rail Par. 2 and ocean Par. 3 carrier liability.
Paragraph 1. Limitation of Motor Carrier Liability: We will first examme
motor carrier limitation of liability in the U.S. (A) and Canada (B) before presenting loss
of motor carrier limitation benefit in both countries (C).
A. u.s. Motor Carrier Limitation ofLiability: Carmack Amendment 49 U.S.c. §
14706(C)(1)(A) provides that U.S. motor carriers are liable for the 'actual loss or injury'
of transported goods except if parties explicitly agree to limit, though not contractually
exclude, carrier liability for negligence1135. 'Actual loss or injury' is ordinarily measured
by the reduction in market value at destination or by replacement or repair costs
occasioned by the harm1136. Courts are divided on whether freight charges make part of
goods 'actual' value and are, therefore, recoverable whereas incidental damages to the
contract of transport are always recoverable1137. Although delay seems to be outside the
scope of Carmack Amendment 'actual loss or injury', U.S. case law renders motor carrier
liable for unreasonable delay in delivering goods unless otherwise agreed by the
parties 1138. Finally, consequential damages reasonably contemplated by the parties in case
ofloss, damage or delay will also be compensated1139.
1133 Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COGSA Package" (1993) Pace. Int'1. L. Rev. 115 at 134.
1134 Saul Sorkin, «Limited Liability in Multimodal Transport» (1989) 13 Tul. Mar. L. J. 285 at 296.
1135 If a lower value is declared, agreed upon or determined by tariff, this will apply unless otherwise contractually
provided. Sec. 5(a) of American Freightways BOL in Annex No. I, Table 4 (bis) at Iii, Annex No. lII, Table No.9 at
cxcv and Sec. 1(B)(3) of the American Freightways tariff Annex No. I, Table NO.4 at I. Contractual exclusion of
motor carrier liability is prohibited. Supra at 178.
1136 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706. Camar Corp. v. Preston Trucking Co. Inc., 221 F. 3d 271 (1st Cir. 2000). Annex No. lII,
Table No.9 at cxcv.
1137 Annex No. lII, Table No.9 at cxcv. For a good analysis of freight charges see Contempo Metal Furniture Co. of
California East Texas Motor Freight Lines Inc., 661 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) and for incidental damages see
American Telegraph & Telephone Inc. v. Con-Way Southern Exp. Inc., 1996 WL 24763 (N. D. Cal. 1996).
1138 White & Summers, "Uniform Commercial: Carriage Of Goods Covered By Bills Of Lading, Rights of Shipper
Against Carrier" WS-UCC-TOC (1995) online: WESTLAW (Tp-all) and Richter v. North American Van Lines Inc.,
110 F. Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2000).
1139 U.S.: H. N. Cunningham, «Transborder-Road Transportation» (1992) 23 St. Mary's L. 1. 801 at 813 on the
foreseeability test of consequential damages (natural and probable consequence of damage to goods including
231
Possibility of contractual limitation ofliability has permitted U.S. motor carriers to
lower their liability sometimes to levels equal or lower to the prescribed by regulation
Canadian liability amounts 1140. This, however, does not occur often and virtually all U.S.
motor carriers today limit their liability to 25$USD 'per pound', 'per piece' lost or
damaged or lOO.OOO$USD 'per shipment' whichever IS lower (contractual
uniformity) 1141. "Per shipment" means "per container" because motor carrier tariffs for
containers are determined on a "per container" basis1142. The 'per piece' gimmick fmds
its origins in air transport and applies carrier weight limitation to the weight of the
property lost or damaged instead of the weight of the entire shipment l143 . Same liability
limitations apply to U.S. motor container transport1144. Volume shipments as well as
certain commodities (i.e. transport of paintings, electronics), however, may be subject to
specific limitations1145. Apart from specific standardized liability limits, confidential
contracting of motor carrier liability limitations is possible and actually practiced by U.S.
motor carriers1146.
intentional infliction of emotional distress). Gordon v. United Van Lines Inc., 130 F. 3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997),
Rosenthal v. United Van Lines, F. Supp. 2d 2001 WL 1561550 (N. D. Ga. 2001). On contractual provisions on delay
see Co-operative Shippers Inc. v. Atchison Topeka andSanta Fe Ry.Co., 613 F. Supp. 788 (N. D. Ill. 1985).
1140 See supra at 123s.
1141 William J. Augello, Logistics Issues Your Providers Usually do not Talk About (1999) online: Supply Chain &
Logistics Journal <http://www.infochain.org/quarterlylNov99/Augello.html>(lastmodified:ApriI25.2000).This
limitation does not normally appear on motor carrier BsOL but it is generally applicable on the basis of carrier
tariffs. See i.e. American Freightways Rules Tariff 125-J, Item 420 (l)(B)(3) online: American Freightways
Homepage <http://www.af.com/tarifCarfw_125g.asp> (last visited: Jan. 31, 2002). Annex No. I, Table NO.4 at I
and Annex No. III, Table No.9 at cxcv.
1142 On the basis of U.S. Carmack Amendment case law, the "per shipment" limit is determined by applicable tariffs
or special written agreement, as we will see this being the case for rail carriage. Bio-Lab Inc. v. Pony Exp. Courier
Corp., 911 F. 2d 1580 (11th Cir. 1990), Esprit De Corp v. Victory Express, 225 F. 3d 662 (9th Cir. 2000),Insurance
Co. of North America v. NNR Aircargo Service (USA) Inc., 201 F. 3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). Shippers have to be
aware, however, that there are companies like American Freightways that apply a 100.000$USD limitation 'per
incident' which quite differs from the 'per shipment' limitation and is applicable to the entire shipment. American
Freightways Rules Tariff I 25-J, Item 420 (1)(B)(3). Annex No. I, Table NO.4 at I.
1143 In 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board ordered airlines to increase their unreasonably low liability limit of
0.50$USD per piece to the Warsaw Convention level (9.07$USD per pound). International airlines applied the
9.07$USD limitation only to the weight of the pieces that were lost or damaged and not to the weight of the entire
shipment. Motor carriers adopted the same rule on partial losses which substantially reduced claimants recoveries
without any reduction on freight rates. William J. Augello, "The Evolution of Liability Limitations" Log. Mgmt
(2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters). Small Businessman's Guide to Shipping via Trucklines (2000) online:
Transport Law Homepage <http://www.transportlaw.com/tcpc/smallbusinessman.htm> (last visited: Dec. 2001).
1144 This seems to be the practice of American Freightways. Interview of the author with customer service of
American Freightways, (Dec. 21, 2001 and Jan. 29, 2002).
1145 This seems to be the practice of American Freightways. Volume shipments, such as 20 feet container and/or
16.000 pounds or more of shipment, are subject to the specific limitation of I$USD per pound following American
Freightways rules. Interview of the author with American Freightways Intermodal personnel (Jan. 31, 2002). This is
not a confidential contract, it is a standard contract sent to interested shippers. William Augello, "Avoid the
Liability-Limitation Trap" Log. Mgmt (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
1146 Supra at 119.
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B. Canadian Motor Carrier Limitation of Liability: Canadian CUBOL clause 10
limits motor carrier liability to 4.41$CAD 'per kilo' or 2.00$CAD 'per pound' computed
on the total weight of the shipment1147. This has been interpreted to mean 'weight oflost
items with respect to the weight of the whole shipment' (as in the U.S.)1148. Said
limitation, much lower than its 25$USD counterpart but higher than the 1$USD high-
volume container limit, is also applicable to international container trade1149. BOL Clause
9, (Valuation of shipper loss including shipper declaration of value or agreed upon
amounts), provides that shipper loss represents the difference between goods market
value at the time of shipment and their market value at the time of the breach1150. The
same clause also provides that shipper can recover freight and 'other charges', meaning
incidental payments to the transport contract1151 . Although delay seems to be outside the
scope of CUBOL clause 10 'any loss or damage', CUBOL clause 6 retains motor carrier
liability for umeasonable delay in delivering goods unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties1152. Consequential damages reasonably contemplated by the parties will also be
compensated1153.
1147 CUBOL Clause 10 reads: 'The amount of any loss or damage computed under paragraph (a) or (h) of Clause 9
shall not exceed 4.41$CAD per kilogram computed on the total weight of the shipment unless a higher value is
declared on the face of the bill of lading by the consignor'. The 2.00$CAD amount is in Imperial measure and the
figure is entirely due to legislative policy decision. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1997) at 117. Annex No. I, Table No.5 at Iv-Ixv and Annex No. III, Table No.9 at cxcv.
1148 Trafi-Tech Inc. v. Transport All Type/Division de Jerry Cohen Forwarders Ltd. (1999), J. Q. no. 2571 (Que. C.).
Supra at 142-143. The case insists on interpretation ofBOL Clause 10 and concludes that the holding is conform to
the civil code and the laws of Quebec. Such conclusion probably puts an end to the doctrinal discussion on whether
the limitation amount is based on the total weight of the shipment or the weight of the lost or damaged property to
which the case referred. Proponents of the former view suggest that this is the literal interpretation of the BOL that
reflects legislative intent that carrier maximum liability is the same whether the loss is total or partial. Proponents of
the latter view argue that BOL language refers to the total loss of the shipment so that a partial loss has to be
computed differently. The reason for the dispute is that if the carrier knows that its liability is the same in case of
total or partial loss of the cargo, when partial loss occurs he may ensure a total disappearance of the freight, knowing
that his liability will remain same. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997)
at 121-123. For the U. S. see supra at 230.
1149 This seems to be the practice of mentioned transport companies. Interview of the author with two Canadian
motor carrier companies personnel (Liaison Can / US Courrier Inc. and Manitoulin) (Dec. 17, 2001 and Jan. 31,
2002).
1150 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 168 referring to David
McNair & Co. Ltd. v. Trade Wind [1954], Ex. C. R. 450 (Ex. C. C.) cited more recently by Redpath Industries Ltd.
v. The "Cisco" (1993), 110 D. L. R. (4th) 583 (F. C. A.). Annex No. I, Table No.5 at lv-Ixv and Annex No. III, Table
No.9 at cxcv.
1151 This may also include custom duties paid by the carrier even though these appear separately from 'other
charges' in rail BsOL and motor case law. Bank ofMontreal v. Overland Freight Lines Ltd. [1989], B. C. J. No. 572
(B. C. S. C.) and John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 174.
1152 CUBOL clause 6 provides: "no carrier is bound to transport the goods by any particular vehicle or in time for
any particular market or otherwise than within due dispatch, unless by agreement specifically endorsed on the bill of
lading and signed by the parties thereto". John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) at 73. Annex No. I, Table NO.5 at lv-Ixv.
1153 Cathcart Inspection Services Ltd. v. Purolator Courrier Ltd. (1982),39 O. R. (2d) 656 (ant. C. A.). On the
foreseeability test (direct and natural consequences of the breach which may include mental distress) Canada v.
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Even though Quebec courts exclude contractual limitation of motor carner
liability, Canadian common law courts have held that lower than statutory (tariff)
limitations will be taken into account by courts1154. What is theoretically possible,
however, does not seem to be used in practice by Canadian motor carriers involved in
intermodal transport of goods or otherwise1155. This is probably because uniformity of,
lower than U.S., Canadian motor carrier liability amounts is achieved by means of an
interprovincial agreement not present in the U.S. where contractual uniformity, easier to
deviate, reigns. U.S. carrier use of liability limitation amounts as low as l$U.S. does not
seem to have created a threat to Canadian motor carrier industry although this should not
be excluded in the future.
U.S. motor carriers have attempted to convince Congress to adopt a lower liability
limitation similar to the one used by Canadian truckers but U.S. shippers disagree and the
dispute is essentially one between carriers and shippers1156. Shippers and the U.S. DOT
insist on Carmack Amendment provisions rejecting Canadian limitation as too low, only
covering 50 to 70 percent of the value of goods being transported by truck1157. An
agreement on motor carrier liability limitations is fundamental since it affects how
quickly NAFTA becomes a reality1158. Difference in motor carrier liability limits in the
two countries and U.S. motor carrier more frequent use of contractual limitation of carrier
liability than their Canadian counterparts are the two major obstacles in achieving motor
carrier uniformity in the U.S. and Canada.
Hochelaga Shipping & Towing Co. [1940], S. C. R. 153 (S. C. C.) and John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo
Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 120 and at 178, 185 and 75.
1154 Bank ofMontreal v. Overland Freight Lines Ltd [1989], B. C. J. No. 572 (B. C. S. C.). See also John S. McNeil,
Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 167-168. Supra at 138s.
1155 This seems to be the practice of herein mentioned transport companies. Quebec: Interview of the author with
Liaison Can/U.S. Courrier Inc. personnel located in Montreal (Jan. 31 and May 22, 2002) and container shipment
expert of Big Freight Inc. located in Manitoba (Feb. 1, 2002) for common law provinces. This also excludes the
possibility of confidential contracting. Ibid. Supra at 143-144.
1156 The Transportation Consumer Protection Council Inc. (1999) online: Transport Law Homepage <http:
www.transportlaw.com/tcpc/td.htm> (last visited: July 30, 1999) on carrier proposal to adopt Canadian limits on
limitation of liability. Rip Watson, "Liability Meeting Held Key to NAFTA Market Access for Trucks" J Com.
(1995) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
1157 Stephen a.Wood, «Multimodal Transportation: an American Perspective on Carrier Liability and Bill of Lading
Issues» (1998) 46 Am. J. Compo L. 403 at 411. William J. Augello, Logistics Issues Your Providers Usually do not
Talk About (1999) online: Supply Chain & Logistics Journal
<http://www.infochain.org/quarterlylNov99/Augello.html> (last modified: April 25, 2000).
1158 Rip Watson, "Liability Meeting Held Key to NAFTA Market Access for Trucks" J Com. (1995) online:
WESTLAW (Newsletters). On a recent initiative in this regard see infra at 300.
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C. Loss ofus. and Canadian Motor Carrier Limitation Benefit: Through case law
study we learn that, unlike liability exceptions, U.S. and Canadian statutory or
contractual limitations will survive carrier and servants negligence l159.
Where carrier non-performance amounts to fundamental breach In Canadian
common law provinces (or rupture de contrats in Quebec), liability limitation provisions
will be of no avail to him1160. Fundamental breach and its Quebec counterpart refer to
carrier non-performance of an agreement that goes to the root of the contractl161 .
Fundamental breach also requires intent to renounce or repudiate the contractl162 . In this
respect, intentional or willful misconduct, the latter referring to carrier knowledge that
damage might occur from its actions l163 , will lead to loss of carrier limitation benefit l164.
1159 William J. Augello, Logistics Issues Your Providers Usually do not Talk About (1999) online: Supply Chain &
Logistics Journal Homepage <http://www.infochain.org/quarterly/Nov99/Augello.html> (last modified: April 25,
2000) for the U.S and Canada. Canada: CUBOL Clause 9 refers to limitation of liability amount no matter carrier
negligence and John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3'd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 117. U.S.:
Praxair Inc. v. Mayflower Transit Inc., 919 F. Supp. 650 (S. D. N. Y. 1996).
1160 Annex No. III, Table No.9 at cxcvi. Common law provinces: Bill Le Boeuf Jewellers of Barrie v. B.D.C Ltd.
[1982], O. J. No. 1626 (ant. C. A.) and John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3,d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) at 126s. G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (Canada: Carswell, 1994) at 565. On the Quebec
equivalent of fundamental breach see William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3'd ed. (Montreal: International
Shipping Publications, 1988) at 99 although the literal translation of fundamental breach is 'violation (inexecution)
fondamentale'. Rupture de contrats actions may be based on resolution, resiliation (both referring to the
performance of the contract with the latter applying to successive contracts) or nullity (vice in contract formation) of
contracts. Resolution actions approach the closest the fundamental breach concept. Ibid at 10 1, 99 and O'Connor v.
Omega Engineering Inc. (1999) [2000], R. J. Q. 243 (Que. S. C.), Assoc. des Manoeuvres Interprovinciaux v. Assoc.
des Employes du Syndicat du Quebec [1998], A. Q. no 1103 (Que. S. C.). The rupture de contrats concept is broader
than that of fundamental breach that only refers to contract performance, not its formation.
Servant's fundamental breach engages carrier liability on the basis of agency laws. Sti-Tech Business Systems Ltd v.
Purolator Courrier Ltd (1996), A. J. N. 1157 (Alta. Pr. Ct. CD), P. A. B. v. Curry (1997), B. C. J. No. 692 (B. C. C.
A.). These will not retain our attention.
1161 G. H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (Canada: Carswell, 1994) at 565. Non-performance should
not be confounded with negligent performance, the latter not occasioning carrier loss of his limitative benefits.
Monta Arbre Farms v. Inter-Traffic (1983) Ltd (1988), 10 A. SC. W. S. (3d) 244 (ant. H. C.), Saint John
Shipbuilding Ltd v. Snyders (CA.N.-B.) [1989], A. N.-B. no 814 (C. A. N. B.). Jean Louis Baudouin, Pierre Gabriel
Jobin, Les Obligations 5th ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1998) at 586 stating that a 'faute
legere' in not performing a contract is not enough to justify a resolution action.
1162 Kwick Clean v. Ledingham (1999), B. C. J. No.1897 (B. C. S. C.) also citing Tomenson v. Saunders WhiteHead
Ltd. (1987), 43 D. L. R. (4th) 346 (B. C. C. A.). Civil law resolution concept does not require intentional
misconduct to exist making this concept more shipper protective than the fundamental breach concept.
1163 Grand Truck Railway Co. of Canada v. Fitzgerald (1881),5 S. C. R. 204 (S. C. C.) and A. L. Patchett & Sons
Ltd v. Pacific Great Eastern Railway Co. (1959), S. C. R. 271 (S. C. C.) as reported by John S. McNeil, Motor
Carrier Cargo Claims 3'd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 130. We should note, however, that the distinction
between intentional and willful misfeasance is not clear in Canada and courts often refer to willful misconduct with
respect to an intentional tort. Moreover, although cases usually mention intentional or willful acts, they imply more
than mere acts.
1164 Meditek Laboratoty Services Ltd v. Purolator Courrier Ltd (1995), 125 D. L. R. (4th) 738 (Man. C. A.),
Premier Lumber Co. v. G. T P. Rwy Co. (1923), S. C. R. 84 (S. C. C.) as reported by John S. McNeil, Motor
Carrier Cargo Claims 3'd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 130. From Quebec case law definitions of 'faute
intentionnelle' we have concluded that it is not clear whether there must be an intent to act or, instead, an intention
to cause damage. Supra note 530. U.S. courts define intentional fault as more than an intent to act ifnot an intent to
cause harm. Infra note 1176 and accompanying text.
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It is only in Quebec that gross negligence ('faute lourde') will also lead to same resu1t!!65.
Assimilation of faute lourde to dol may be considered a delicate issue in the province of
Quebec!!66 but some courts seem to decide, still, that such assimilation is valid!!67.
In all cases, the breach may be a geographical or other deviation from contractual
terms 1l68 that lead to loss of carrier limitation benefit!!69. However, if the breach in
question is in the contemplation of the contracting parties at the time of contracting,
maximum liability will survive the breachll7O. Parties sophistication, experience,
knowledge in commercial dealing will be considered in determining the true construction
of the contract!!7!. In case of ambiguity, courts apply the contra preftrentem rule
1165 Annex No. /II, Table No. 9 at cxcvi. Quebec: Art. 1474 of the Quebec Civil Code holds beneficiairy of
contractual exclusions liable in case of intentional fault or 'faute lourde'. (motor) Bagatelle Canada Inc. v. Jerry
Cohen Forwarders Ltd (1988), 10 A. C. W. S. (3d) 94 (Que. C. A.), Pigeon v. Purolator Courrier ltee c. Q. Abitibi
(1994), J.E. 95-316 (Q. C.), Pafco,Compagnie d'Assurances ltee v. Federal Express Canada ltee (1997), J. E. 97-
886 (Q. C.) and Blondeau c. Excellent Van Lines Inc. (1998), B. E. 98BE-551 (Que. S. C.) citing Jean Pineau, Le
Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 85 and 70. This is not
so in the rest of Canada and the U.S that limit carrier liabili7 in case of gross negligence. Canada (common law
provinces): John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3r ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 130. U.S. Praxair
Inc. v. Mayflower Transit Inc. (1996) 919 F. Supp. 650 (S. D. N. Y.) and White v. United Van Lines Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 1240 (N. D. Ill. 1991).
1166 Jean Pineau, Serge Gaudet, Theorie des Obligations 4th ed. (Montreal: Editions Themis, 2001) at 799 on the
basis of art. 1474 of the 1994 Quebec Civil Code which does not assimilate 'faute lourde' to 'dol' as art. 1074 and
1075 of the C. C. B. C. did, but defines 'faute lourde' as gross recklessness, gross caralessness or gross negligence.
SUljra note 543.
116 Chubb Insurance Co. ofCanada v. Kingsway Transports Ltd [1997], A. Q. no 375 (Que. C. A.), Riquet v. Royal
Aviation Inc. (fa.s. Royal) [2000], J. Q. no 1297 (Ct. Que. CD).
1168 Cases reported by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 76-77,
Quebec non transport case Breuvages Colt Ltee v. Breuvico Inc. (1990), J. E. 90-1054 (Que. S. C.). Mr. McNeil
argues that although it is tempting to conclude that deviation constitutes a fundamental breach case, there is a
substantial difference between the two doctrines, the former concerns carrier performance of the contract of carriage
whereas the latter refers more to the effects of carrier non-performance. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo
Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 78.
1169 Fundamental breach doctrine developed as a device applicable to contract exclusion clauses impeding the
defaulting party to rely on them. M.H. Ogilvie, "Fundamental Breach Excluded but not Extinguished: Hunter
Engineering v. Syncruse Canada" (1991) 17 Can. Bus. L. J. 75 at 86 for sea and land transport contracts. William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 101. Today, fundamental
breach also allows parties to end a contract as rupture de contrats does. Nowlan v. Midland Transport (c.o.b. Polar
Bear Transport) [1996], N. B. J. No. 88 (C. A. N. B.) and Hines v. Johnson [1986], B. C. J. No. 2043 (B. C. S. C.).
Civil law resolution actions (most closely resembling fundamental breach), on the other hand, will either abrogate
the contract or ask for its specific performance in which case contractual provisions and limitations should be
respected except in case of intentional, willful misconduct or gross negligence. William Tetley, Marine Cargo
Claims 3rd ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 104.
1170 John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 126. (motor) Bill Le Boeuf
Jewellers of Barrie v. B. D. C. Ltd [1982], O. J. No. 1626 (Ont. C. A.), Peter Cortesis Jeweller Ltd v. Purolator
Courrier Ltd (1981), 35 O. R. (26) 39 (Ont. Co. Ct). 1994 Quebec Civil Code art. 1425 provides that it is parties
intention that should be taken into account in interpreting a contract.
11?1 Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd (1989),57 D. L. R. (4th) 321 (S. C. C.) (authority case in
Canada on fundamental breach, also applicable to transport cases) held that if a contract is unconscionable,
exemption clauses in it will not be given effect. Unconscionability implies consideration of equitable elements,
mainly equality of bargaining power, sophistication and parties experience. John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo
Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 126s, (air transport) Holt Renfrew & Co. v. Burlington Northern Air
Freight (Canada) Ltd (1990), O. J. No. 1579 (Ont. C. A.). Art. 1426 of the Quebec Civil Code also refers to taking
into account all the circumstances in which the contract took place.
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according to which the contract is construed adversely to its author so that carner
protective provisions will not be available to him1172.
The U.S. equivalent of fundamental breach, the admiralty unreasonable deviation
doctrine l173 , has not been transposed to Carmack (land) transport cases. Courts content
that this is a doctrine of purely admiralty origin with no application in the context of air
and land transport1174. However, it has been consistently held that when land and ocean
carriers intentionally and unjustifiably deviate from specified route (geographical
deviation) they are liable as insurers of cargo and cannot invoke contractual limitative
clauses1175. U.S. courts seem to refer equally to intentional and voluntary (willful)
deviations in this regard1176. Failure of contractual or statutory limitative provisions
because of fraud is justified by public policy reasons I177.
1172 See cases referred to by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 128.
The contra preferentem is a rule of contractual construction also applicable to transport contracts specifically. See
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 861-862
(ocean transport). On this rule, see also 1994 Quebec Civil Code art. 1432.
1173 For the concept of unreasonable deviation see supra at 217s. Unreasonable deviation concerns carrier non-
performance (going to the essence of the contract) rather than carrier negligent performance. Praxair Inc. v.
Mayflower Transit Inc., 919 F. Supp. 650 (S. D. N. Y. 1996).
U.S. law is familiar with the concept of fundamental breach that it defines in the same way as Canada, meaning that
it concerns an intentional or willful breach that goes to the essence of the contract and is not contemplated by the
parties. Unreasonable deviation is but one kind of fundamental breach. The concept of fundamental breach was
added to the unreasonable deviation line of cases by the ocean case Berisford Metals Corp. v. SIS SALVADOR, 779
F. 2d 841 (2nd Cir. 1985). Stanley L. Gibson, "The Evolution of Unreasonable Deviation under U.S. COGSA"
(1991) 3 U. S. F. Mar. L. J. 197 at 224 and Chester D. Hooper, "Carriage of Goods and Charter Parties" (1999) 73
Tul. L. Rev. 1697 at 1719. Jo Desha Lucas, "Admiralty and Maritime Law" (1987) 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1491 at 1503
and Harry M. Flechtner, "Remedies under the New International Convention: the Perspective from Art. 2 of the U.
C. C." (1988) 8 J. L. & Com. 53 at 76.
1174 Conoco Inc. v. Andrews Van Lines Inc., 526 F. Supp. 720 (D. C. Okl. 1981) for motor transport. For the
explanatory reasons see railway case Minneapolis Society ofFine Arts v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 213 F. Supp.
129 (D. Minn. 1963) referred to in Conoco.
1175 Annex No. III, Table No.9 at cxcvi. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951), "Carriers:
Rights, Duties and Liabilities" (2000) 11 Tex. Jur. 3d Carriers § 310 at §377 (WESTLAW-Tp-all) referring to cases
that denied carrier the benefit of the liability defenses and of the limitation benefit. For all modes, carrier servant's
unreasonable deviation engages carrier liability on the basis of agency laws. "Deviation from Route, Schedule or
Mode of Travel" 9 Couch on Ins. par. 135:23 (3rt! ed) (1997) online: WESTLAW (Tp-all). On agency laws see
sue,ra note 1123.
II 6 Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N. D. Ill. 1999), Hughes v. United Van Lines Inc., 829 F.
2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987) and case law cited by Duerrmeyer v. Alamo Moving and Storage One Corp., 49 F.Supp. 2d
934 (W. D. Tex. 1999) also referring to conversion and fraud. A. T. Clayton & Co. Inc. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 901 F. 2d 833 (10th Cir. 1990) (frequently cited ever since) stating that willful misconduct will deny carrier its
limitation benefit and Jeanne Kaiser: "Moving Violations: An Examination of the Broad Preemptive effect of the
Carmack Amendment" (1998) W. NewEngl. L. Rev. 289s on this point. See infra at 251 on the willful misconduct
translating into a voluntary fault.
U.S. and English case law on willful misconduct refers to carrier intention to cause damage or consciousness that
damage will probably result. The U.S. concept of intentional fault denotes something more than malicious intent to
act, if not intent to cause damage. Supra note 532 and accompanying text.
1177 U.S.: Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170 (S. C. Mass. 1941).
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In the more recent and consistently cited ever since Praxair Inc. v. Mayflower
Transit Inc. holding, U.S. court denied land carrier BOL liability limitations in motor or
rail traffic because of carrier failure to abide by shipper specialized safety measures for
which an additional charge was paid1l78. By allowing principally geographical deviations
to deny carrier the limitation benefit, U.S. law is more carrier protective than Canadian
fundamental breach doctrine that embraces a larger scope of deviations1179. As in the case
of Canadian fundamental breach, however, U.S. unreasonable deviation should not be
within parties contemplation.
In summary, in both Canada and the U.S. we need a breach that goes to the essence
of the contract and is not contemplated by the parties in order to deny carrier beneficial
limitative provisions [fundamental breach (Canada), rupture de contrats (Quebec) and
unreasonable deviation (U.S.)]. Breaches that produce this effect relate to contract
performance and are combined with or, in certain cases, exist independently from gravity of
carrier or servant's fault (intentional, willful misconduct, gross negligence). The nature of
breach differs in Canada, Quebec and the U.S. since geographical deviations will principally
lead to loss of the limitation benefit in the U.S. whereas Canada (including Quebec) adopts
a more shipper protective position in awarding the said effect to both geographical and other
deviations. Moreover, Quebec courts very strict carrier stance in depriving grossly negligent
carrier its limitation benefit is attenuated by the more pro carrier Canadian and U.S. case
law reference to intentional or willful misconduct (deviations) with respect to fundamental
breach or unreasonable deviations. In all mentioned cases judges are left with a great margin
of appreciation.
Paragraph 2. Limitation of Rail Carrier Liability: Canadian and U.S. rail
statutory and, thus, BOL provisions permit parties to contractually limit carrier
liabilityI 180. In this way, railways in both countries have elaborated specific tariffs to
govern international intermodal traffic. Even though we cannot examine liability terms
1178 919 F. Supp. 650 (S. D. N. Y. 1996) later cited by Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Skyway Freight
Systems Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S. D. N. Y. 1999) and The Limited Inc. v. PDQ Transit Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 842
(S. D. Ohio 2001) that refused to extent Praxair's effect to other deviations. Seetapun v. Illinois-California Express
Inc., 518 P. 2d 885 (S. C. Ok!. 1973), (frequently cited ever since), held that carrier deviation from agreed upon
packing, stowing or transporting of goods also denies carrier the limitation benefit. Annex No. III, Table No.9 at
cxcvi.
1179 This is an important difference according to William Augello. William J. Augello, Logistics Issues Your
Providers Usually do not Talk About (1999) online: Supply Chain & Logistics Journal
<http://www.infochain.org/quarterly/Nov99/Augello.html>(lastmodified:ApriI25.2000).AnnexNo.III. Table No.
9 at cxcvi.
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and conditions applicable to all Canadian and U.S. rail compames, we will take the
representative examples of Canadian National Railways (CN) and Burlington Northern
Santa Fe Railways (BNSF)1l81. Both company's tariffs provide that when tariffs are
inapplicable BsOL provisions will take effect so that study of both BOL and tariff
provisions on rail carrier liability limitation is imposed1l82.
We will first examine Canadian and U.S. rail carrier limitation of liability (A) and
then analyze loss of Canadian and U.S. rail carrier limitation benefit provisions (B).
A. Canadian and Us. Rail Carrier Limitation ofLiability: Canadian and U.S. rail
statutory and, therefore, BsOL provisions hold rail carriers liable for actual physical
damage to the goods [based on their market value at shipment (Canada) or at destination
(U.S.)] and for incidental transportation charges II83. U.S. case law and Canadian BsOL
and case law also hold carrier liable for unreasonable delay and contemplated
consequential damages unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties II84.
1180 On the effect of deregulation on contractual limitation of carrier liability see supra at 124 and 137-138.
1181 Annex No. I, Tables No.6, 7 at lxvi and at lxxxix. Accessorily, references will be made to other railway
companies such as Norfolk Southern Railways (NS) and Canadian Pacific (CP) as well. Annex No. I, Tables No.
6(bis), 8 at lxxvi and at xcii respectively. CN and CP lines cover all Canadian territory. BNSF and NS cover all U.S.
territory. Annex No. III, Table No. I at clxxx-clxxxi.
1182 Supra notes 856 and 903 and accompanying text.
1183 Canada: Sec. 4 of the Railway Traffic Liability Regulations applying the National Transportation Act and
reproduced in the CN and CP BsOL refers to 'any loss damage or delay' measured at the time o/the shipment by the
difference between the market value of the goods at the time of shipment and their market value at the time of the
breach. David McNair & Co. Ltd v. Trade Wind [1954], Ex. C. R. 450 (Ex. C. C.) recently stated by (ocean)
Redpath Industries Ltd v. The "Cisco" (1993),110 D. L. R. (4th) 583 (F. C. A.). This means that if there is an
increase in value in transit, the increase will not be recovered. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre,
Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 84. Under CN and CP BsOL 'Valuation' clause, the
lesser value of either the value represented by the shipper, agreed upon by carrier and shipper or determined by tariff
will be taken into account to determine shipper loss at the time of shipment. The same provision stipulates that
shipper indemnity will include freight, 'other charges' and custom duties. Annex No. I, Table No.9 at cxi and at civ-
cv. 'Other charges' means direct and incidental to ordinary transport contract charges such as taking goods from
railway storage house and other shipping costs. North-West Line Elevators Association v. Canadian Pacific Ra.
[1959], S. C. R. 239 (S. C. C.), Sparling v. D.H Howden and Co. [1970], S. C. R. 883 (S. C. C.). U.S.: Carmack
Amendment 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 11706(a) and U. S. case law 'actual loss or injury' is based on the difference between
the market value of goods in the condition in which they should have arrived at destination (common law rule) and
their market value in the condition they did arrive. Contempo Metal Furniture Co. 0/ Calif. v. East Texas Motor
Freight Lines, 661 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981). U.S. Rail BOL Sec. 2(a) provides that if there exists a lower declared,
agreed upon or tariff determined value, this will apply to determine shipper loss. Annex No. I, Table No. 9 at ci.
Even though not explicitly provided by the BOL or the Carmack Amendment, case law compensates carrier for
incidental charges to the transport contract. Moffitt v. Bekins Moving and Storage, 818 F. Supp. 178 (N. D. Tex.
1993) referring to Intech Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Inc., 836 F. 2d 672 (1st Cir. 1987). U.S. courts, however,
are divided on the question whether freight recovery under Carmack amounts to 'actual loss'. Contempo Metal
Furniture Co. o/Calif. v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 661 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) referring to specific cases
on this inter-circuit conflict. For comparison of valuations with motor carriage see Annex No. III, Tables No.9 and
10 at cxcv-cxcvii.
1184 Unreasonable delay: U.S.: Tube City Inc. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 170 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) and
American Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & N R. Co., 422 F. 2d 462 (6th Cir. 1970). Canada: CN and CP
BsOL (look under 'liability of the carrier') and Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien
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Although CN and BNSF intermodal tariffs refer to compensation of actual
physical loss or damage, they explicitly exclude carrier compensation for consequential
damages 1185. Moreover, liability limitation amounts exist and differ on each side of the
border. For the CN, a distinction is made between damage to the container itself or the
contents thereof: damage, loss or delay sustained to any container is limited to the lesser
amount of: 3.000$CAD for a container under 40 feet, 5.000$CAD for a container over 40
feet or the depreciated reproduction value of the container based on specific calculations
included in the tariffl186. Damage, loss or delay sustained to the contents of a container
shall be limited to the lesser amount of either: i) value of the contents at place and time of
loading (at shipment) including freight charges if paid and customs if paid or payable and
not refunded or refundable, ii) 10.000$CAD for a container under 40 feet, 20.000$CAD
for a container over 40 feet or iii) ocean carrier liability under the ocean BOL the last
specifically considering intermodal transport I 187.
NS and BNSF limit their liability only for the contents of the shipment to the
lesser value of the destination value of the cargo (at destination) or 250.000$USD 'per
shipment' (per container)1I88. For damage sustained to the containers themselves, BNSF
makes the distinction between rail controlled and private containers. Damage to the
former type of containers is not a shipper concern but is, rather, determined by the UIIA
(Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 82. Consequential damages: Canada: CP RailMcCain Produce [1981], 2
S. C. R. 219 (S. C. C.)(frequently cited thereafter), Vandenbrink Farm Equipment Inc. v. Double-D Transport Inc.
[1999], O. J. No. 2302 (ant. S. C. J.). U.S.: Pillbury Co. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. C.A.8, 687 F. 2d 241 (8th Cir.
1982), Turner's Farms Inc. v. Main Cent.R.Co. D. C. Me., 486 F. Supp. 694 (D. C. Me. 1980) and American
Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & N R. Co., 422 F. 2d 462 (6th Cir. 1970). Annex No. I, Table No.9 at civ and
at cvii.
1185 CN Tariff7589-AN Item 300 par. 1 and 3(a) (also providing for delay), BNSF Rules and Policies Guide Item 62
and NS Circular #2 Sec. 8.3.3(e) Annex No. I Tables No. 6-8 at xc (CN), lxix (BNSF) and lxxx (NS), and Annex No.
Ill, Table No. 10 at cxcvii. Where specific reference is not made i.e. to compensation of customs and incidental
damages, U.S. and Canadian rail case law and BsOL will apply and compensate shippers for their loss. Supra note
1184.
1186 CN Tariff 7589-AN Item 300 par. 2. Similar provision with, however, different depreciation scales is contained
in CP Tariff 7690 Item 00080 (A)(1). Annex No. I, Tables No. 7-8 at xc and xcvi respectively and Annex No. Ill,
Table No. 10 at cxcvii. Even though not explicitly provided, compensation most likely applies to shipper provided
containers.
1187 CN Tariff7589-AN Item 300 par. 3. Similar provision is contained in CP Tariff 7690 Item 00080 (A)(1). Annex
No. I, Tables No. 7-8 at xci and xcvi respectively and Annex No. Ill, Table No. 10 at cxcvii.
1188 BNSF Rules and Policies Guide Item 62 and NS Circular #2 Sec. 8.3.3 adopting similar phrasing. Annex No. I,
Tables No.6, 6(bis) at lxix and at lxxx. The 'per shipment' term actually means 'per container'. Interview of the
author with BNSF and NS customer service (Feb. 7, 2002). Also, interview of the author with a BNSF Freight
Claims personnel (Feb. 5, 2002) also indicating that BNSF Intermodal Rules & Policies Guide definition
(Definitions: in fine of tariff) of the term shipment means 'per container' and that it could not have been otherwise
since rates are set per container. Annex No. I, Table No.6 at lxxv. The BNSF intermodal tariff is the only tariff that
explicitly provides for compensation for unlocated damage (defining it as the damage where the cause cannot be
determined, undetermined damage) but provides that it will not reimburse it if it is the liability of another carrier
and, for the rest, it will cover it only for commodities indicated (Item 63). Annex No. I, Table No.6 at lxx.
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agreement to which BNSF is member I 189. The latter type of containers are containers
provided by shippers, damage to which will be compensated by the railway merely on the
basis of container depreciated value, although different depreciation scales are adopted
by different Canadian and U.S. railway companies I 190.
If the shipper declares cargo's value the declaration will operate as a restriction on
the quantum of damages (limitation of liability) cross-modally and cross-country if the
amount declared is less than the market value of the cargo l191 . Usually, shippers choose
to declare a lesser value for the transported goods or leave blank the space for declaration
on the BOL in order to pay lesser freight or save the insurance premium for the additional
value of the goods l192 . In case of value declaration the shipper understandingly and freely
makes a business decision involving the risk of receiving compensation limited to the
declared value of the goods in case ofloss or damage1l93 .
From a comparative point of view, U.S. and Canadian rail tariffs may vary as to
applicable limitation amounts. They seem, however, to uniformly apply at the domestic
level despite their contractual nature (contractual uniformity). This approximates U.S.
and Canadian rail tariff provisions to U.S. (contractual) and Canadian (statutory)
uniformly applicable, at the domestic level, motor carrier limitations I 194. As we are going
to see later, this is also true for both countries ocean limitations determined by
international conventions.
1189 BNSF Rules and Policies Guide Item 65 and Annex No. I, Table No.6 at lxxii. Also interview ofthe author with
a BNSF Freight Claims Manager (Feb. 5, 2002). The Uniform Intermodal Interchange Agreement (UIIA) is a
standard industry contract between Intermodal truckers/drayage companies and water and rail carriers (Equipment
Providers). The UIIA was developed as a means of achieving a degree of uniformity in the interchange process.
About UIIA (2003) online: UIIA Homepage <http://www.uiia.orglu-about.html> (last visited: June 13,2003).
1190 Ibid.
1191 Land, cross-country: John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 182 and
Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 84-85
(land transport). Ocean cross-country: See also 2001 MLA 4(5)(a)) and COGSA Sec. 1304(5) and Jean Pineau, Le
Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 214 and at note 429
(ocean transport).
1192 James A Calderwood, "Container Liability" Transp. & Distr. (2001) online: WESTLAW (Newsletters).
Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar.
L. J. 263 at 324 for ocean transport.
1193 Canada: (motor) Hi-Tech Business System Ltd v. Purolator Courrier Ltd (1996), 194 A. R. 247 (Prov. Ct.) and
Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 84-85
and 214. U.S.: (rail) Union Pac. R. Co. v. Burke, 41 S. Ct 823 (U. S. S. C. 1921), (rail) Yamazen U.S.A. Inc. v.
Chicago and Northwestern Transp. Co., 790 F. 2d 621 (7th Cir. 1986), (motor) Novelty Textile Mills Inc. v. CT.
Eastern Inc., 743 F. Supp. 212 (S. D. N. Y. 1990).
1194 Supra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. I(A)(B). As in the case of U.S. motor transport of goods where
contractual limitation of liability is rather the principle than the exception and unlike Canadian motor carriers that do
not easily have recourse to such practices, U.S. and Canadian rail contracts are dependent on contractual definition
of carrier liability. This amounts to an informal harmonization supra at 20s.
241
Confidential contracting, very widely used today in rail transport, is another
variable that disturbs the seemingly calm waters of domestic uniformity of land (motor-
rail) liability limitations through application of agreed upon provisions and/or
amounts 1195. Although their content is not made public, people having access to their
provisions inform us that liability terms and amounts and not just rates are actually
negotiated within the frame of these contracts1l96.
B. Loss of Canadian and us. Rail Carrier Limitation Benefit: Like railway
statutes and BsOL, rail tariffs do not contain provisions on loss of carrier limitation
benefit and case law in both countries is left to deal with the issue. As in the case of
motor carriage and unlike liability exceptions, U.S. and Canadian contractual limitations
will survive carrier and servants negligence unless otherwise agreed by the parties1l97.
This includes gross negligence with the exception of the province of Quebec where 'faute
lourde' or equivalent fault will deprive carrier of the limitation benefit1198. For the rest,
Canadian fundamental breach1l99 and U.S. unreasonable deviation12oo denying rail
carriers the limitation benefit follow motor carriage laws.
1195 On motor confidential contracting see supra at 231 and 119.
1196 This seems to be the practice of mentioned transport companies. Canada:. Interview of the author with CN
Freight Claims Department (Dec. 18, 2001). CN personnel referred to a Quebec Paper Company that agreed, in its
confidential contract with CN, not to bring any claims against the railway in case of damage (O$CAD liability). It
also referred to a confidential contract further limiting rail carrier liability for the transport of ocean containers
despite the fact that these are already subject to railway tariff liability limitations. Finally, it stated that even liability
terms of standardized forms of confidential contracts are sometimes negotiated between the parties. It all depends on
the volume of the shipment and the specific needs of each shipper. A CP Confidential Contract Negotiator
confirmed the same information being more reserved when referring to specific examples. He stated, however, that
if a shipper is disposed to provide more than a 1000 containers, (for a 1000 containers only a 'quote' confidential
rate without negotiation of carrier liability will be provided), all aspects of contracts, including liability, can be
negotiated confidentially. Interview of the author with a CP negotiator of confidential contracts, (Jan. 8, 2002). In
the U.S., Union Pacific (UP) Damages Prevention and Freight Claims Manager also affirmed that liability and rates
can be negotiated within the frame of confidential contracts taking place for great volumes of shipments. Interview
of the author with a UP Freight Claims Manager (Jan. 9, 2002).
1197 Canada: Sutherlandv. Grand Truck Railway Company (1909), 18 O. L. R. 139 (Ont. C. A.) as reported by John
S. McNeil, Motor Carrier Cargo Claims 3,d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 117. U.S.: Saul Sorkin, "Changing
Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 Forum 710 at 711-712.
1198 Canada: Fitzferald v. G. TR.(1881), 5 S. C. R. 204 (S. C. C.) as reported by John S. McNeil, Motor Carrier
Cargo Claims 3' ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 130-131, on the exclusion of gross negligence. For Ouebec see
Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 85, 70
and 52. U.S.: "Limitation of Liability" (2000) 14 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 572 (WESTLAW-Newsletters) on carrier
gross negligence not voiding limitation limits (i.e. released value). The text referred to the Quasar Co. a Div. of
Matsushita Elec. Corp. ofAmerica v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1106 (N. D. III. 1986).
1199 On the distinction between fundamental breach (non-performance that goes to the essence of the contract) and
negligent performance see E.G. Linton Construction Ltd v. Canadian National Railway [1975], 2 S. C. R. 678 (S.
C. C.) as reported by Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd (1991), 7 O. R. (3d) 559 (Ont. C. A.). The Linton
holding was later mentioned by the Hunter Engineering authority case on fundamental breach, applicable to motor
carriers. Also supra at 234s. Quebec province case law on 'rupture de contrats' remains same in rail as in motor
transport. Ibid. Annex No. III, Table No.9 at cxcvi. .
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Paragraph 3. Limitation of Ocean Carrier Liability: Commenting on ocean
carrier liability limitations is particularly important not only because ocean carriage is, in
practice, the most significant segment of multimodal transport, but also because land
carriers will often 'import' ocean limitations in their BsOL1201. U.S. ocean carriers are
subject to the Hague Rules through the 1936 COGSA whereas their Canadian
counterparts follow the Visby Rules through their national statute, the 200 1 Marine
Liability Act (MLA)1202. In this way, uniform liability limitation amounts apply at the
domestic level.
We will first focus on Canadian and U.S. ocean carrier limitation of liability rules
(A) before examining U.S. and Canadian ocean carrier loss of the limitation benefit
provisions (B).
A. Canadian and Us. Ocean Carrier Limitation ofLiability: Both the Hague and
the Visby Rules hold ocean carrier liable for shipper actual losses or damage to the
goods1203. Actual losses or damages constitute the difference between the market value
(Hague) or the 'exchange value,1204 (Visby Rules art. 4(5)(b)) of the goods at destination
in intact and non-intact condition, plus freight (the latter element encountered only in the
U.S.), customs and other elements that refer to actual 10ss1205. Although recovery for
1200 On the distinction between deviation and negligent performance see Quasar Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1106 (N. D. Ill. 1986). For geographical deviation and inability of carrier to invoke
contractual liability limitation see "Carriers: Rights, Duties and Liabilities" (2000) 11 Tex. Jur. 3d Carriers § 377
(WESTLAW-Tp-all) referring to railway cases. On the extension of geographical deviations to other deviations
from shipper instructions in rail transport see Praxair holding as applicable to rail. Supra at 237. Fraud, intentional
misconduct and conversion may deprive carrier of the benefit oflimitative conditions.
1201 Jack G. Knebel, Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism» (1989) 64 Tul.
L. Rev. 543 at 559. See also supra note 14.
1202 For these acts see supra notes 45 and 47 respectively. Ocean tariffs and BsOL incorporate Hague and Visby
Rules provisions. Supra note 856 at 174.
1203 Art. 4(5) of the Hague and the Visby Rules and respective domestic provisions refer to carrier liability for 'any
loss or damage'. If the actual losses are inferior from the statutory or other limitations, actual losses amount cannot
be overcome (art. 4(5) of the Hague Rules and Sec. 1304 (5) par. 2 of COGSA). Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport
Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1972) at 145. William Tetley, "Limitation, Non-Limitation and Disclaimer Clauses" (1986) 11 Mar. Law.
203 at 213.
1204 Although the concepts of 'market value' and 'exchange value' should not be equated, they approximate each
other since it is said that the most secure way to obtain sound 'market value' is to obtain prices at established
commodity markets, that is commodity 'exchange prices'. George F. Chandler, « Damages to Cargo: The Measure
of Damages to Cargo» (1997) 72 Tul. L. Rev. 539 at 541. Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous
Connaissement (Droit Canadien Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at
145 on the Hague Rules that remain silent on the issue and applicable, in practice, value.
1205 U.S.: Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 145. Canada: Visby Rules art. 4(5)(b) refers to the
calculation of the actual loss first on the basis of the goods exchange price, in the absence of which the market price
will be taken into account and absent this, value of goods in the same kind and quality will be retained. Union
Carbide Corp. v. Fednav Ltd [1997], F. C. J. No. 655 (F. C. C.). Canada has not followed U.S. case law with
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delay and foreseeable consequential damages is not explicitly provided by the Hague or
the Visby Rules 1206, Canadian and the majority of U.S. courts have sanctioned it,
subjecting private agreements on the matter to art. 111(8)1207.
COGSA maximum limitation is 500$USD 'per package or customary freight unit'
unless higher value has been declared by shipperl208 . This limitation is considered today
largely outdatedl209 . 2001 MLA applies the higher Visby Rules limitation of '666.67
SDR per package or unit or 2 SDR1210 per kilo of gross weight of goods 10st1211 ,
whichever is higher'. Both U.S. and Canadian statutory limitations can be contractually
increased but not limited, as is the case with motor carrier limitation of liability in
Quebecl212 . Contrary to U.S. and Canadian land transport where confidential contracts
respect to freight and will not, therefore, permit set-off of carrier claim for freight because of shipper's claim.
Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. Geneva v. Sipco Inc. (2001), F. C. J. No. 1460 (F. C. C.), William Tetley, Marine
Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 900 and 907. In all cases, parties can
contract recovery or not of freight charges. Ibid at 896. Annex No. II, Table NO.3 at clv on the Visby Rules and
Annex No. III, Table No. 11 at cxcviii for the Hague and the Visby Rules.
1206 William Tetley, "Limitation, Non-Limitation and Disclaimer Clauses" (1986) 11 Mar. Law. 203 at 225 on the
basis of Hague and Visby Rules art. 4(5). Author notes that although art. 4(5)(b) is ambiguous on this point, text's
interpretation that delay and other damages are excluded is probably the most plausible one. Ibid at note 133.
1207 U.S.: Ibid at 334s. Anyangwe v. Nedlloyd Lines, 909 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md. 1995) citing cases reflecting the
majority and minority view. (majority view) Mitsui Marine Fire and Ins. Co. Ltd v. Direct Container Line Inc., 119
F. Supp. 2d 412 (S. D. N. Y. 2000), (minority view) Narcissus Shipping Corp. v. Armada Reefers Ltd, 950 F. Supp.
1129 (M. D. Fla. 1990). Hoogwegt Us. Inc. v. Schenker Intern. Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N. D. III. 2000). for
consequential damages. Canada: Max Ganado & Hugh M. Kindred, Marine Cargo Delays (London: L10yds of
London Press Ltd, 1990) at 20-22 for Hague and Visby Rules provision and Canadian position on the issue. The
book also refers to St. Lawrence Construction Limited (Plaintiff) v. Federal Com [1985], 1 F. C. 767 (F. C. A.)
(frequently cited).
Both the Hamburg Rules (art. 5(1) and (2)) and the Multimodal Convention (art. 16(1)(2)) retain carrier liability for
unreasonable delay.
1208 COGSA 46 U. S. C. par. 1304(5) and Hague Rules 4(5). Annex No. II, Tables No.2, 4 at cxlvi and at clxii
respectively. Hague Rules provision merely refers to a 'unit' limitation (and not to a 'customary freight unit'): '100
pounds strerling per package or unit or the equivalent of that sum in other currency ... ', which corresponds to
500$USD or 500$CAD. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications,
1988) at 890. In 1926, England 'went off the gold standard' and defined the limitation in English pounds,
(applicable under certain conditions), that only some countries followed, leading to lack of uniformity. Ibid at note
76 and Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at note 480. On
declaration of value for all modes see supra at 240.
1209 This is because the size of the average package has risen, the value of the dollar has fallen and shippers virtually
never take advantage of their right to declare value or contractually increase carrier liability. Michael F.Sturley, "An
Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 324.
1210 (art. 4(5)(a)) of2001 MLA and the Visby Rules. Annex No. II, Tables NO.3 at cliv. Use of the Special Drawing
Rights (SDR) and its adaptability to economic realities put an end to Hague Rules 'problematic' limitation. For the
S.D.R. see supra note 247.
1211 The Visby Rules did not only raise the Hague Rules limitation amount but also added a limitation based on
weight softening the Hague Rules unidimensional package limit. Benjamin W. Yancey, "The Carriage of Goods:
Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg" (1983) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238 at 1248. Although in U.S. and Canadian motor
carriage there is a doctrinal dispute on whether the weight limitation is reported to the weight of the whole shipment
or of the damaged articles (supra note 1148), the Visby Rules leave no doubt in deciding that it is latter that will be
taken into account. Annex No. I, Table No.5 at lvi, Annex II, Table NO.3 at cliv and Annex No. III, Table No.9 at
cxcv.
1212 46 U.S.C. par. 1304(8) of COGSA and art. 3(8) of the Visby Rules, Hague Rules and 2001 MLA for the explicit
prohibition of contractual limitation of carrier liability. Shipper declaration of value does not frequently take place.
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liability limitations are subject to negotiation, ocean carriage confidential contracts do not
vary on carrier liability terms and adopt, therefore, statutory limitations1213. What is
negotiable in ocean confidential contracts are rates and rates only1214.
Even though it is not clear how case law defines 'package,12l5, there are general
standards most courts in both countries seem to apply1216. A controlling, albeit not
conclusive, factor mostly relied upon by courts in defining the 'package' term is parties
intent, when latter does not violate statutory language1217. Having announced the ground
rule, certain nuances have to be made.
To simplify a complicated legal reality, U.S. doctrine distinguishes between
damages or losses to containerized and non-containerized cargo. Canadian case law
seems to follow the same general reasoning frequently referring to U.S. cases. We will,
hereby, follow the U.S. classification in order to better comprehend how the intention
element functions in both countries prevailing legal regime.
For non-containerized cargo that is fully boxed or crated, each box or crate will
generally constitute a package regardless of the size and weight of the cargo12l8.
Conversely, cargo that is shipped without any packaging whatsoever, is generally treated
as "not shipped in packages,,1219. Parties agreement to the contary cannot supplant
COGSA provisions and will, therefore, not influence courts1220.
Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tu!. Mar.
L. J. 263 at 347 and 349, see also supra note 1192. Annex No. III, Table No. JJ at cxcviii.
1213 This seems to be the practice of mentioned transport companies. Canada: Interview of the author with a
Canadian Maritime International shipment expert, (Dec. 18,2001) commenting on international ocean shipments.
U.S.: interview of the author with pricing personnel of Sanco Inc.lImorex Shipping (Dec. 18, 2001), a freight
forwarding company whose personnel noted that most ocean carriers in the U.S. follow COOSA terms and
conditions of carriage.
1214 Ibid. Supra at 241 for land carrier confidential contracts.
1215 For instance, it was decided in the U.S. that a large tractor transported surrounded by large protective trunks was
not a package whereas a yacht transported on a vessel was considered to be a package. As reported by Michel
Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les
Presses de I'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 143.
1216 Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul.
Mar. L. 1. 263 at 324-325 for the U.S .. We will refer to Canadian cases as follows.
1217 Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COOSA Package" (1993) Pace Int'!. L. Rev. 115 at 131 for the U.S .. We will refer
to Canadian cases as follows.
1218 U.S.: cases reported by Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo
Case" (1997) 21 Tu!. Mar. L. 1. 263 at 325 and Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or Customary
Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par.1 at par. 12. Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au
Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 276 and Trenton Works Lavalin Inc. v. Panalpina Inc. (1993),
N. S. J. No.455 (N. S. S. C.), Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. et al v. Chimo Shipping Limited et al [1974], S. C. R.
933 (S. C. C.) that noted that, generally, a 'package' requires packaging.
1219 U.S.: Thus, bulk shipments, a free-standing locomotive, an uncrated generator unit and a loose tractor/ are not
deemed packages. Michael F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case"
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When considering cargo in the twilight zone, meaning prepared for shipment but
not fully boxed, crated or enclosed, U.S. courts are split. Some of them follow the
'facilitation of handling' test according to which when the packaging preparation is made
for the purpose of facilitating the handling of cargo, partially packaged cargo is deemed a
package l221 . Others, reject the 'facilitation of handling' test as based on an unpersuasive
reasoningl222 insisting, as Canadian courts generally do, on parties intent as evidenced by
BOL description of the goods and limited only by minimum statutory requirements In
determining the presence or not of a packagel223 .
Parties intent as evidenced by the BOL is also the criterion taken into account by
U.S. (exceptions exist) and Canadian courts in deciding ocean carner 'package'
limitation with respect to containerized cargo l224. To determine parties intent for
containerized cargo courts base their holdings on the totality of circumstances of the case,
primarily parties BOL description of the goods, but also shipper sophistication, previous
(1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 325-326. Authority to the contrary exists. Supra note 1215. Cases reported by
Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or Customary Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par. 1
at 18. Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 276 with
sgecific reference made to bulk and not packed shipments.
I 20 U.S.: Middle East Agency Inc. v. The John B. Waterman, 1949 86 F. Supp. 487 (D. C. N. Y. 1949) very
frequently cited thereafter. The court held that an uncrated tractor should not be regarded as if it were described as
crated, and the use of the printed word "package" on bill of lading should not be construed as a stipulation that the
tractors were packages under the statute. Cited by Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or Customary
Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par.l at par. 16. Canada: Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime
sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal,
1972) at 140 mentioning the container case Anticosti with respect to bulk cargo (wine, grain, wheat) that parties
cannot describe as packaged when it is really not.
1221 Michael F.Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul.
Mar. L. J. 263 at 326s and for a clearer analysis and case law see Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or
Customary Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par. 1 at par.13-14.
1222 Ibid.
1223 U.S.: cases reported by Michael F.Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo
Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263 at 327-328. It was held, for instance, that parties were bound by their
declaration on the BOL '1 Skid of Machinery'. The author notes that in the case of 'imported' limitations, (land
segments of multimodal transport applying ocean carrier rules), parties description of the goods will be given greater
weight since COOSA does not apply as a matter of law. Ibid and Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or
Customary Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par.l at 18. Other examples: if the BOL says that the
cargo loaded 'is not shipped in packages' or if the BOL describes cargo as a 'loose printing machine' the (customary
freight) unit limitation will apply. Morris Graphics Inc. v. Transfreight Lines Inc., 1990 WL 96765 (S. D. N. Y.
1990) and Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. Ltd v. Lyjes Bros. s.s. Co. Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1051 (S. D. N. Y. 1990).
Canada: International Factory Sales v. The Alexandr Serafimovich (1976), 1 F. C. 35 (F. C. C.).
1224 U.S.: Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, 636 F. 2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1981). This test is gaining favor in the
U.S., both the 11 th and the 4th Circuit having adopted it in the desire to fashion a uniform body of law. As reported
by Michael F.Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul.
Mar. L. J. 263 at 330-331 and Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COOSA Package" (1993) Pace Int'1. L. Rev. 127 at 131,
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 642 and 881s.
Canada: Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 276 specifically
mentioning that if the BOL states 25 articles, each article is a package. In the absence of such precision the container
will be deemed a package. Ibid. 2001 MLA and Visby Rules art. 4(5)(c) provides that where a container pallet or
similar article is used to transport packages that are enumerated by shipper on the BOL as contained in the unit of
transport, the individual packages will be considered as 'packages' under respective rules.
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dealings with the carrier, freight rates ... 1225. This gives judges a great margin of
interpretation, which may occasionally lead to conflicting conclusions1226. Despite
variations in its implementation, however, case law criterion of parties intent in
determining what constitutes a 'package' seems to be the same in the U.S. and Canada.
Reference to 'package or unit' in both the Hague and the Visby Rules was
intended to cover packaged goods ('per package') and non-packaged merchandise ('per
unit') respectively1227. As with the 'package' limitation, there is considerable case law
controversy as to what constitutes a 'unit', whether it is an unpacked object (shipping
unit) i.e. a vehicle, tractor, yacht, bulk cargo, or a freight unit1228.
Believing that the Hague Rules' "unit" meant a "customary freight unit," U.S.
Congress hoped to claritY the law in adopting the COGSA 'per customary freight unit'
limitation1229. This is a COGSA specific (not Hague or Visby Rules) limitation, based on
the way carriers collect money (freight units) and not on the weight or physical
1225 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 883. Canada:
(multimodal) Bombardier Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd (1991), O. J. No. 2035 (Ont. C. A.), Consumers Distributing
Co. v. Dart Containerline Co. (1979), F. C. J. No. 1113 (F.C.A.), Havercate v. Toronto Harbour Commissioners et
al. (1986), O. J. No.676 (Ont. H. C. J.), Quebec Liquor Corp. v. Dart Europe (1980), 1979 AMC 2382 (F. C. C).
(ocean) International Factory Sales v. The AlexandrSerafimovich (1976), 1 F. C. 35 (F. C. C.), NS Tractors &
Equipment Ltd v. Tarros Gage (1986), F. C. J. No. 127 (F. C. C.), Carling O'Keef Breweries v. CN Marine
(1987), 2 C. F. 107 (F. C. C.), The 'Tinder:f.jell' [1973], C. F. 1003 (F. C. C.). Fraser Valley Milk Producers
Cooperative Assn. v. Kaslo Cold [1994], B. C. J. No. 1928 (B. C. S. C.) on the basis of both American and Canadian
cases. U.S.: Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COGSA Package" (1993) Pace Int'!. L. Rev. 127 at 131 and William
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 880-881. Joseph E. Edwards,
"What Constitutes Package or Customary Freight Unit within COGSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par. 1 at par. 10-11.
Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, 636 F. 2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1981), Sperry Rand Co. v. Norddeutscher Lloyd,
1973 A. M. C. 1392 (N. D. N. Y. 1973), Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M V Nedlloyd Rotterdam, 759 F. 2d 1006
(N. Y. C. A. 1985), Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. Ltd v. Lyjes Bros. SS Co. Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1051 (S. D. N. Y.
1990).
1226 Canada: (intermodal) Consumers Distributing Co. v. Dart Containerline Co. (1979), F. C. J. No. 1113 (F. C.
A.). Here, each carton within the container appeared under description of the goods and the court distinguished this
from U.S. cases where descriptions such as '1 container said to contain machinery' and absence of shipper
indication of cartons contained in container were insufficient to qualify machinery as package. However, in U.S.
Inter-American Foods Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1331 (S. D. Fla. 1970) the court
held that individual cartons indicated on carrier receipt were 'packages' even though the BOL contained a clause "1
trailer load 'said to contain' shrimp product". St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sea-Land Service Inc., 735 F.
SUfP. 129 (S. D. N. Y. 1990).
122 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at
212, Sept-Iles Express Inc. v. Clement Tremblay (1964), Ex. C. R. 213 (E. C. C.).
1228 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 884. Andre
Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 276.
1229 Sec. 1304 par. 5. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
884 (note) 41. Annex No. II, Table No.4 at clxii.
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characteristics of the cargo1230. Parties intent and, III case of doubt, custom, will
determine the freight unit taken into account1231 .
On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the Hague and Visby
Rules "unit" refers to a 'unit of goods' that is legally distinct from the U.S. COGSA
"customary freight unit" which refers to a unit of freight1232. In this way, Canadian
decisions align themselves with English case law in deciding that goods, which cannot be
packaged because of their nature or dimensions, constitute shipping units (i.e. bulk
cargo)1233. As in the U.S., parties intent will determine the type of retained 'shipping unit'
in the absence of which all non-packaged goods will constitute a unit of goods1234. This
may produce unjust results since unpackaged goods of great value may be limited to
500$USD limitation. But as it was stated in Anticosti, later reproduced in Falconbridge,
'the rule does not seem to permit qualification' 1235.
The last draft of U.S. COGSA 1998 adopts the Visby Rules limitation without
reference to the 'customary freight unit' or the 'unit' limitation measures1236. The
Multimodal Convention and the Hamburg Rules raise multimodal transport operator and
\230 A customary freight unit is defined as 'the unit of quantity, weight or measurement of cargo customarily used as
the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be charged'. This may be weight tons, measure tons or a lump sum.
Thus, if pieces of structural steel weighing more than 100 pounds each are transported on a 64 cents per 100 pounds
freight, the customary freight unit is not the piece of steel but the 100 pounds upon which the freight was calculated.
If the freight is charged on the basis of measure tons (i.e. freight of 43,319 pound tractor measured on the basis of 40
cubic foot units), the measure ton (40 cubic foot) will be the customary freight unit. If the freight charge is a lump
sum (a single price per item shipped), the single item being shipped will be the customary freight unit but, in this
case, the same limitation would result if the shipped item were determined to be a package. As reported by Michael
F. Sturley, "An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L. J. 263
at 333-334 and note 457 and Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COOSA Package" (1993) Pace Int'!. L. Rev. 115 at note
23 and accompanying text. Annex No. III, Table No. I I at cxcviii.
\23\ Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit Canadien Americain et Anglais)
(Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 142. Joseph E. Edwards, "What Constitutes Package or
Customary Freight Unit within COOSA" (2000) 27 A. L. R. par.l at 26-28 and par. 28-33. Michael F.Sturley, "An
Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case" (1997) 21 Tu!. Mar. L. J. 263 at 334-336.
Allied Chem. Intern. Corp. v. Compania de Navegacao Lloyd Brasiliero, 775 F. 2d 476 (2nd Cir. 1985), also reported
by Nancy A. Sharp, "What is a COOSA Package" (1993) Pace Int'!. L. Rev. 115 at 124-125 and 131.
\232 Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd v. Chimo Shipping Ltd (1974), S. C. R. 933 (S. C. C.) (authority case) which
held that a car constitutes a 'unit', not a 'package' reproduced by Atlantic Consolidated Foods Ltd v. The Ship
Dorothy (1979), 1 FC 283 (F. C. C.). Michel Pourcelet, Le Transport Maritime sous Connaissement (Droit
Canadien Americain et Anglais) (Montreal: Les Presses de I'Universite de Montreal, 1972) at 142.
\233 Ibid. The Ermua v. Coutinho, Caro & Co. Canada Ltd [1982] 1 F. C. 252 (F. C. C.) and William Tetley,
Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 885.
\234 Trenton Works Lavalin Inc. v. Panalpina Inc. (1993), N. S. J. No.455 (N. S. S. C.) that held that since the parties
had indicated the weight of the railcar on the BOL, the railcar is considered a 'unit' under the BOL. In the very
interesting Canadian (ocean) case Power Construction Ltd v. Canadian National Railway Co. (Nf[l984], N. J. No.
67 (Nfld. C. A.) the court held that as evidenced by BOL description the crane (single item shipped) was a 'unit'
under the Hague Rules applicable to the rail segment of transport even if a BOL had not been issued.
\235 Anticosti Shipping Company v. Viateur St.-Amand [1959], S. C. R. 372 (S. C. C.), Falconbridge Nickel Mines
Ltd et al v. Chimo Shipping Limited et al [1974], S. C. R. 933 (S. C. C.).
\236 Sec. 9(h)( 1). For draft COOSA 1998 see supra at 169s and Annex No. II, Table No. 4(bis) at clxxiv.
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ocean 'per package or unit' limitation amounts but do not refer to a customary freight
unit limitation1237. Pro Tetley argues, however, that the limitation measure 'customary
freight unit' should be the one adopted because it is the most appropriate limitation for
bulk cargo 1238.
Even though the above-mentioned principles are not always uncontested, parties
intent seems to be a key element in determining what constitutes a package or a unit. This
gives way to subjective judicial interpretations and calls for shippers alertness as to the
indications made on the BOL and knowledge of basic legal principles in this respect1239.
On the other hand, parties intent is an element easily adaptable to technological advances
so that invention of 'new' packages, as was the case of containers some decades ago, will
not render the test obsolete.
In total, all modes allow contractual limitation of carrier liability except for
Canada/U.S ocean carriers and Quebec motor carriers1240. U.S. motor, and U.S. and
Canadian rail carriers actually give effect to this contractual defmition of carrier liability
that seems to uniformly apply at the domestic level within each mode (contractual
uniformity). Multimodal carriage at the domestic or international level, however, is
subject today to liability limitations that vary in their amounts and measures cross-
modally and cross-country. We pass from one motor carrier weight limitation amount,
through another 'per package/unit' Hague and 'per package/unit' or 'kilo' Visby
limitation, to end up to still other 'per container' rail limit, exception made of rail and
confidential contracts where, depending on the shipper and volume of merchandise,
everything may be negotiated (except for ocean carriers). All these limits are intended to
compensate shipper actual loss, including unreasonable delay, consequential damages
(except for rail container movements) and freight, (except for freight in Canadian ocean
carriage), calculated on the basis of goods market value at destination (except Canadian
motor and rail' at shipment') unless another value has been declared by the shipper.
1237 Hamburg Rules art. 6(1)(a) and Multimodal Convention art. 18(1). Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "International
Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage or Delay: A U.S. Approach to COOSA, Hague Visby,
Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules" (1995) 5 J. Transnat'l. L. & Pol'y 1 at 19.
1238 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 885.
1239 1.e. if the shipper indicates on the BOL: 'a locomotive 10 tons' it will result in a different limitation than the
indication' a locomotive 10.000 kilos' since in the second case the kilo and not the ton will be retained for the
application of the maximum limitation. Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien
(Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 212.
1240 See a table representation of all that follows and more in Annex No. 111, Tables No.9, 10, 11 at cxcv-cxcic.
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B. Loss of Canadian and u.s. Ocean Carrier Limitation Benefit: COGSA and
MLA statutory limitations will survive carrier or servant's negligence unless otherwise
agreed upon by parties1241. There is misconduct, however, that will lead to loss of ocean
carrier limitation benefit although the required degree of misconduct differs for the
Hague and the Visby Rules.
Under Hague Rules and COGSA art. 4(5) 'neither the carrier nor the ship shall in
any event be or become liable .. .in an amount exceeding... '. Despite the expression 'in
any event', the majority of U.S. courts conclude that unreasonable deviation or quasi
deviation will deprive carrier of the COGSA limitation benefit l242. We have seen that the
unreasonable deviation and quasi-deviation concepts are the counterpart of Canadian
fundamental breach, are limited in scope to geographical deviation and carriage on deck
and must, in all cases, be intentional or voluntary and unjustifiable to result to loss of
carrier limitation benefit1243.
In considering presence of unreasonable deviation in ocean carriage, judges are
given considerable leewayl244. There is at least one court decision that has concluded that
gross negligence and not intent is necessary to constitute an unreasonable deviation even
though innocent, erroneous deviations or those made out of necessity do not generally
produce such effect1245. Most of the time, however, intentional (i.e. fraudulent)1246 or
willful misconduct will be needed for unreasonable deviation to exist. Moreover, even
1241 Andre Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 275 commenting on
the Visby Rules. Same reasoning is applicable to the Hague Rules.
1242 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at III and Michael
F. Sturley, «Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act» (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int'I. L. 609 at 653-
654. When 1936 COGSA was enacted, there was a disagreement as to whether the 'unreasonable deviation' doctrine
survived COGSA's enactment. The majority of courts followed pre-COGSA case law and continued to hold that an
unreasonable deviation nullifies the contract of carriage, including package limitation protection. The Seventh
Circuit and a few other courts reached the opposite conclusion and held that the drafters intended the package
limitation to apply to all situations, including those in which a carrier unreasonably deviates. J. Hoke Peacock III,
"Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules and the COGSA" (1990) 68 Tex. L. Rev. 977 at 987.
!ligan Integrated Steel Mills Inc. v. S S John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F. 2d 68 (N. Y. C. A. 1974), David M. Blachman,
"Punitive Damages under the COGSA: a Bulkhead is Breached" (1986) 62 Wash. L. Rev. 523 at 528.
1243 Supra at 217s and 236.
1244 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 114.
1245 Ibid. at 114 and 112. Herbert R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, Virginia:
The Michie Company, 1979) at 513.
1246 Olivier Straw Goods Corp. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha ("Olivier II"), 47 F. 2d 878 (2d Cir. 1928), a pre-COGSA
case on fraud still valid law today. Berisford Metals Corp. v. SS Salvador, 779 F. 2d 841 (2d Cir. 1985) reaffirmed
Olivier II and introduced the term 'fundamental breach' to U.S. unreasonable deviation. Supra note 1173. The
'intent' to deviate can be adduced in many ways by courts: i.e. deviation 'for nefarious reasons', 'absence of excuse
for the deviation' and the burden of proof of absence of intent is on the carrier. William Tetley, Marine Cargo
Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 112.
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though deviation may lead to abrogation of the contract of carriage, most courts have
limited its effect to simple loss of carrier limitation benefit1247.
Visby Rules and MLA art. 4(5)(e), applicable to Canada, specifically target carrier
loss of the limitation benefit1248 in providing that' an act or omission of the carrier done
with intent to cause damage1249, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would
probably result' will produce such effect. The burden of proof of carrier acts and mens
rea is on the claimant. The draftsmen of the Visby Rules copied this article from Warsaw
Convention art. 22 as amended by the 1955 Hague Protocol1250. Unlike amended Warsaw
Convention art. 22, however, Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) requires a personal ocean carrier
1247 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 110, 118-119.
Today, courts will very frequently deprive carrier of the benefit of express statutory or contractual exclusions or
limitations of liability, less frequently hold that the express contract is entirely or wholly displaced or abrogated and
sometimes conclude that the carrier is deprived of the benefit of only those provisions which are affected by the
deviation complained of, or which relate to its substantive liability. "Displacement of Provisions of Contracts of
Carriage" (2001) 17 N. Y. Jur. 2d Carriers § 195 (WESTLAW-Tp-all). See also J. Hoke Peacock III, "Deviation and
the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules and the COOSA" (1990) 68 Tex. L. Rev. 977 at 987. U.S. courts
majority view brings the unreasonable deviation doctrine closer to Canadian land common law fundamental breach
that produces the same effect. Supra note 1169. Annex No. III, Table No. 9 and I I at cxcvi and cxcix.
1248 Merely carrier limitation benefit and not other benefits such as carrier liability defenses are concerned by this
provision. Abraham Mocatta, Michael J. Mustill, Stewart C. Boyd, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills ofLading
19th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) at 456 (note 36, 37, 40) to which the Canadian case Ontario Bus
Industries Inc. v. The Federal Camulet (1992), 1 F. C. 245 (F. C. C.), commenting on the Visby Rules, referred. 2.1.
Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line N. V (1999), 1999 F. C. J. No. 1584 (F. C. J.) referring to Pr. Tetley statements on this
point.
249 Note here the intent to cause damage and not the intent to act. According to Pr. Tetley art. 4(5)(e) 'intent to
cause damage' goes too far since persons who act fraudulently rarely intent to cause damage and seek, rather, to
benefit themselves. William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at
122-123.
In a uniformity perspective, international maritime carriage in Quebec follows common law principles. ITO-
International Terminal Operators Ltd v. Miida Electronics Inc. (1986), 1 R. C. S. 752 (S. C. C.). Supra note 913.
As a result, a grossly negligent ocean carrier will not be deprived of its liability limitation benefit as is the case with
Quebec land carriers. Fitzgerald v. G. TR. (1881),5 S. C. R. 204 (S. C. C.) (very frequently cited). See also Andre
Braen, Le Droit Maritime au Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1992) at 115 and 132. Maritime law in
Canada is uniform and does not belong to any province.
1250 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Transportation by Air, 12 October
1929, 261 U.N.T.S. 423 (hereinafter Warsaw Convention) (also supra note 528) and Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, ICAO
DOC 7632 (hereinafter Hague Protocol).
The Montreal Protocol No.4 signed in Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975 and entering into force on Nov. 25, 1999 in
Canada and on March 4, 1999 in the U.S. amended the Warsaw convention. For the Warsaw Convention signatories
see Documents (2000) online: Dial Space Homepage
<http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/bobtoldmetodoit/ds/documents.htm> (last visited: Feb 1, 2002) and for the Montreal
Protocol No. 4 see 1975 Montreal Protocol No. 4 (1999) online: International Civil Organization Aviation
<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mp4.htm> (last visited: March 13,2001). See also U.S., U.S. Department of State,
Us. Aviation Policy: The Montreal Convention and the Hague Protocol (2003) online: U.S. Department of State
Homepage <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ris/rmI2003121869.htm>(lastmodified:June17.2003).Weshouldnote.in
this respect, that the Montreal Protocol No.4 art. 25 maintains amended Warsaw Convention article 22(5) only for
the transport of persons and baggage but not for air cargo for which carrier does not lose its limitation benefit. The
Montreal Protocol No.4 is not to be confounded with the Montreal Liability Convention signed in Montreal on May
28, 1999,24 Annals of Air & Space L. 25, a convention intended to replace the Warsaw Convention and not yet in
force. Up to June 2003, only 29 out of 30 countries required to sign it before its entry into force have done so.
Conventionfor the Unification ofCertain Rulesfor International Carriage by Air (2003) online: International Civil
Aviation Organization Homepage <www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.htm> (last modified: June 11,2003).
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fault to deprive him of its limitation benefit so that master or other agent fault cannot
operate loss of ocean carrier limitation benefit1251 . Since Canadian case law on this Visby
Rules provision is really scarce, we will often make recourse to Canadian air cases when
commenting on ocean carrier loss of the limitation benefit.
Air transport cases provide guidance when commenting on the expression
'recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result' 1252. Domestic courts
have described this type of carrier conduct as 'willful misconduct', 'faute inexcusable',
'faute lourde' or 'gross negligence,1253. U.S. and Canadian common law case law have
adopted the denomination 'willful misconduct' for this Visby Rules provision while
Quebec and French courts reason on the 'faute intentionnelle' and 'faute inexcusable'
concepts respectively to describe the common law concept1254. In both countries, willful
misconduct denotes both intent to cause harm (French/Quebec 'faute intentionnelle') or
belief that the consequences of the act are substantially certain1255, the latter expression
reflecting the inexcusable fault concept in France. In this sense, inexcusable fault and
willful misconduct are located in between the concepts of intentional fault and gross
negligence and describe a voluntary fault, this means to say, an act or omission
committed with conscience of the implied danger and damages that might occur1256.
A controversy seems to exist in Canadian air case law as to whether intent and
recklessness should be appreciated objectively, as is the case in France, or subjectively,
1251 Warsaw Convention article 22 as amended by the Hague Protocol states: «The limits of liability specified in
Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants
or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably
result; provided that, in a case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved he was acting within the
scope of his employment».
1252 On the basis of Canadian air cases, Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) 'reckless' term indicates a decision to run a risk
acting indifferently of its presence and must be combined with knowledge that damage would probably result.
Johnson Estate v. Pischke (1989), S. J. No. 58 (Sask. Q. B.) that granted carrier his limitation benefit since, although
reckless, he was also naIve about the consequences of his acts and that it is unconceivable he would have proceeded
had he realized a crash was probable. The same case teaches us that 'probable' implies something more than
'f,0ssible', it is a common word and implies that something is likely to happen. Ibid.
1 53 As reported by Harry Richer Furs Inc. v. Swissair (1988), 2 F. C. 117 (F. C. C.) that cited English case law for
willful misconduct and gross negligence, French case law for 'faute inexcusable' and Swiss cases for 'faute lourde'.
1254 Bin Cheng, "Willful Misconduct from Warsaw to Hague and from Brussels to Paris" (1977) Annals of Air &
Space L. 55 at 64 (Anglo-Saxon) and 94 (France). For Quebec see supra note 537 and supra at 108-109. However,
the term 'faute inexcusable' is used in air carriage in Quebec to describe this type of misconduct. Jean Pineau, Le
Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 320. Not to confuse
terms and concepts herein used, we will employ the term 'faute inexcusable' (inexcusable fault) to describe presence
of dolus eventualis.
1255 Supra at 107s and note 532 for U.S. and English cases and doctrine on willful misconduct and its civil law
counterpart. We should add, in this regard, the illuminating case Pel/etti v. Membrila, 234 Cal. App 2d 606 (2nd
Distr. Cal. 1965).
1256 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at 319
and 320. For French 'faute inexcusable' and 'willful misconduct' notions see supra at 108-109.
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as is the case of U.S. majority view case law1257. The objective standard test is more
predictable since it reasons on the conduct of a 'prudent' carrier, contrary to the
subjective standard test that takes into account the mens rea of the specific carrier1258. Pro
Bin Cheng prefers the objective test since this would defeat the spirit of the Warsaw
Convention and judges would be 'flying in the face of justice in search of absolute equity
in individual cases'1259. Pro Jean Pineau, on the other hand, argues that cases should be
viewed in concreto not in abstracto, since this seems to be the intent of drafters of the air
convention based on preparatory negotiations1260.
Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) may approximate Canadian fundamental breach doctrine
mens rea requirements (intentional or willful misconduct), still, it must be distinguished
from the latter doctrine which also concentrates on the seriousness of carrier breach. U.S.
unreasonable deviation, on the other hand, may refer to intentional or willful acts but its
principle reference to geographical deviation makes it more restrictive in scope than the
Visby Rules provision. Another aspect that one should also consider with respect to the
loss of the limitation benefit cross-modally and cross-country is the U.S. 'fair
opportunity' doctrine and the Canadian 'sufficient notice' test that we have examined in
d ul · 1261our transport ereg atlOn part .
Despite divergences, all mentioned theories and provisions seem to limit their
effect, in theory or in practice, to the loss of carrier limitation benefit. According to Pro
Tetley, Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) reference to carrier loss of the limitation benefit does not
prevent loss of carrier liability defenses and other protective provisions in case of
1257 Canada: Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis,
1986) at 321-322. Harry Richer Furs Inc. v. Swissair (1988),2 F. C. 117 (F. C. C.), Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Canada (CA.) (1993),2 F. C. 293 (F. C. A.) that decided that the result would be the same whatever the standard
adopted. Swiss Bank Corp. v. Air Canada (1988),1 F. C. 71 (F. C. A.) commenting on the French shipper protective
objective standard. For the U.S. subjective test see Bin Cheng, "Willful Misconduct from Warsaw to Hague and
from Brussels to Paris" (1977) Annals of Air & Space L. 55 at 66-67, Keith Jacobson, «A Global Perspective on
Airline Tort Liability" 13 DePaul Bus. L. J. 273 at 281.
1258 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at
321-322.
1259 Bin Cheng, "Willful Misconduct, From Warsaw to the Hague and From Brussels to Paris" (1977) 2 Annals of
Air & Space L. 55 at 99. The author argues that the objective standard test is particularly appropriate in the case of
international uniform law based on treaties, change in which cannot and should not be made unilaterally by any of
the participating states or courts. Ibid.
1260 Jean Pineau, Le Contrat de Transport Terrestre, Maritime, Aerien (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 1986) at
322. The only Canadian case commenting more in detail on this Visby Rules point is Ontario Bus Industries Inc. v.
Federal Camulet (1992), 1 F. C. 245 (F. C. C.).
1261 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Sec. 1, Par. 1 (C) and Sec. II, Par. 2.
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fundamental breach or deviation1262. Scrutton agrees with Pro Tetley but notes that if
carrier servants engage in deviation or fundamental breach, these doctrines will not
operate carrier loss of the limitation benefit under the Visby Rules because of the ocean
carrier personal fault requirement l263 .
u.s. Draft COGSA '98 proposes an interesting solution in approaching Visby
Rules art. 4(5)(e) and the unreasonable deviation doctrine. In Sec. 9(h)(3)(D)) it
reproduces Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) but also operates loss of carrier limitation benefit in
case of 'unreasonable deviation committed intentionally or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage will probably result' 1264. This provision advances an interesting
uniformity proposal in combining unreasonable deviation doctrine with Visby Rules loss
of carrier limitation benefit provisions1265.
Conclusion
Overall, all Canadian and U.S. land and ocean carriers are generally subject to
either contractual or statutory liability limitations uniformly applicable within each mode
at the domestic level, although amounts and measures greatly vary cross-modally and
cross-country. This is where harmonization efforts should intervene to advance a
harmonized limitation amount and measure that will ensure stability in international
intermodal shipping.
1262 Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd-Tahsis Pacific Region [1999] 4 F. C. 320 (F. C. A.) and William Tetley,
Marine Cargo Claims (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1988) at 123. The author argues that art.
4(5)(e) is a specific fundamental breach/deviation provision that can co-exist with the general theories in the U.S.
and Canada. Ibid at 111 and 121. Note, in this respect, that Visby Rules art. 4(5)(a) continues to use the expression
'in any event', possibly implying that preexisting doctrines are not abolished. Ibid at 122. We have seen, however,
that unreasonable deviation and fundamental breach limit, in practice, their effect to loss of carrier limitation benefit.
SUfra notes 1169 and 1247.
126 Abraham Mocatta, Michael J. Mustill, Stewart C. Boyd, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills ofLading 19th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) at 456 to which the Canadian case Ontario Bus Industries Inc. v. Federal
Camulet (1992),1 F. C. 245 (F. C. C.) refers.
1264 (Sec. 9(h)(3)(D)) of the Draft COGSA '98 provides: Paragraph (1) (limitation amounts) does not apply if it is
proven that the loss or damage resulted from: (i) an act or omission of the carrier, within the privity or knowledge of
the carrier, done with the intent to cause such loss or damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss or
damage would probably result; or (ii) an unreasonable deviation if the carrier knew, or should have known, that the
deviation would result in such loss or damage.
1265 Supra at 252 on the difference between Visby Rules art. 4(5)(e) and the unreasonable deviation doctrine.
Authors opine that draft COGSA 1998 limitations and loss of the limitation benefit provisions will save considerable
claims expense since the cargo interests will no longer be able to defeat damage limitation with technical arguments
such as the claims that there was no 'fair opportunity' to declare value on the BOL. Michael McDaniel, Proposed
Changes to u.s. COGSA (1998) online: Countryman & McDaniel Homepage
<http://www.cargolaw.com/presentations_cogsa98.html> (last visited: June 13, 2003). For the U.S. specific 'fair
opportunity' doctrine see supra at Part I, Chapter II, Sec. 1, Par. 1 (C) and Sec. II, Par. 2 (ocean and land transport).
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Loss of statutory or contractual liability benefit provIsIOns are not always
uniformly applicable within each mode at the domestic level. It may be that U.S.
unreasonable deviation operates loss of ocean and land carrier limitation benefit.
However, U.S. jurisdiction split on the 'fair opportunity' doctrine, the Canadian common
law fundamental breach doctrine and its Quebec land carrier rupture de contrats
counterpart add to the complexity of rules governing loss of carrier limitation benefit.
Because of the diversity of applicable concepts, harmonization efforts are needed with
respect to loss of intermodal carrier liability provisions.
Conceptual variations and divergent applications of mentioned limits and
provisions need to be approximated to form a harmonized whole. Suggestions to this
direction are made in our following chapter.
Chapter II: Suggestions on Uniformity of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the
U.S. and Canada
When observing multimodal legal reality in the U.S. and Canada one cannot but
be left in great astonishment as to the complexity of presently applicable rules burdening
carriers and shippers and incapacity of the interests involved to elaborate a uniform
regime to govern multimodal carrier liability.
We are here to contribute by our writing to elaborating uniform multimodal
liability rules. What we offer is suggestions towards uniformity, in other words, we do
not advance a multimodal carrier liability regime but simply make uniformity proposals
on certain liability issues 1266. Our suggestions are based on existing legal realities in the
U.S. and Canada and take into account different proposals advanced, so far, by doctrine.
Even though the scope of our study is geographically limited, most of our suggestions
and reasoning can be transposed to the international level.
Our proposals will be developed in three sections: the first will concentrate on
general suggestions on multimodal carrier liability (Section I) and then will follow
suggestions on the basis (Section II) and the limitation (Section III) of multimodal
carrier liability
Section I: General Suggestions on Uniformity of Multimodal Carrier Liability
in Canada and the U.S.
So far, all topics of our diverse multimodal carrIer liability analysis are
demonstrative of the legal complexities prevailing in the sector. Diverse liability regimes,
unclear orland opposing case law applications, highly technical concepts in the two
countries need to be dealt with in an effort to achieve uniformity. In making our
uniformity suggestions on multimodal carrier liability we will be based on approximation
of existing legal principles1267. This is because our suggestions primarily seek pragmatic
solutions, in the absence of which parties (carriers, shippers and insurers) consent will be
1266 We believe that elaboration of an intermodalliability regime should be the result of a concerted effort. Supra at
11. We should also note that suggestions herein made are based on the topics already examined and could be
reformulated if new elements come into play. On the flexibility of our proposals see also infra at 260.
1267 Supra at I5s.
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withheld. In making our suggestions, we also seek to fairly balance shipper and carrier
interests and clarity, to the degree possible, of applicable provisions l268. These objectives
will be materialized as our analysis develops.
We will herein concentrate on our suggestion for a gradual, pragmatic uniformity
Par. 1, before presenting our general multimodal carrier liability suggestions Par. 2.
Paragraph 1. Gradual, pragmatic uniformity: Whatever the geographical scope
of proposed uniformity, whether bilateral, multilateral or international, we believe that
gradual, not radical, changes from currently applicable liability provisions should be
made towards this end. This is the lesson drawn from the study of the 1980 Multimodal
Convention and, more particularly, carrier and their insurer inability to predict the effects
of the newly established regime, leading to their opposing its adoption. This is also the
conclusion drawn from our deregulation study and highly diverse multimodal carrier
liability rules present in the U.S. and Canadal269 . Pro Jan Ramberg has stated, in this
regard, that any uniformity initiative should, as far as liability for loss of or damage to the
goods is concerned, rest on the present 'liability level' in order to enhance worldwide
ratification1270.
The main difficulty in establishing international multimodal transport rules seems
to stem from the fact that necessary political focus on multimodalism is lacking in both
Canada and the U.S.. In effect, private maritime or land transport laws are rarely the 'top
priority' of national lawmakers, particularly where issues of social and economic policy
are present, so that national politicians frequently succumb to the dictates of short-term
political expediency, leaving real law-making for later times l271 . Furthermore, conflicting
interests of carriers, shippers, insurers and a presently profitable multimodal transport
sector are blocking uniformity undertakings so that it would probably take a 'hand of
1268 Supra at 12-13,26, 31s for a more detailed analysis.
1269 Supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 1 for the 1980 Multimodal Convention, Part I, Chapter II for the
deregulation and Part II Chapter I for the U.S.lCanada comparative liability study.
1270 Jan Ramberg, The Future of International Unification of Transport Law (1998) online: Forwarder Law
Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg2.html>(lastvisited:March6.2001).Also.Pr. Tetley
notes that the world is not yet ready for a monolithic international law. It cannot give up its diversity of social
purpose and manner of doing things, which actually makes it richer the same way Canada is richer because of its
two cultures. William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives
to International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 823.
1271 William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to
International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 810.
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steel' and transportation sensitive politicians to lobby Congress in this direction. Lack of
political and industry consensus stresses the importance of gradual changes, whose
proximity to ground practice makes more likely their adoption by all interests involved.
Moreover, economic advantages of establishing uniform intermodal liability suggestions
cannot but bolster a political decision to undertake a uniformity effort1272•
Our gradual, pragmatic uniformity consists in proposing: an ocean v. land carrier
liability pattern (A), a contractual definition of land carrier liability (B) and a contractual
document of voluntary adoption (C).
A. Ocean v. land carrier liability pattern: Our gradual changes suggestion
becomes reality through elaboration of an ocean v. land (rail/road carriage) network
system of intermodal carrier liability representing for us the minimum uniformity
solution that best combines commitment to the present legal reality, respect of modal and
cultural diversities and likelihood of its adoption by interested parties while keeping a
uniformity perspective1273. Ocean carriage needs to be distinguished from land transport
because of the nature of the liquid element which exposes the ocean carrier to greater risk
of liability1274. This generally results in a more expansive list of liability limitations,
comparatively lower monetary limitations and reluctance of maritime carriers to accept
liability for delay1275. Land carrier liability rules are brought under the same roof
following our suggestions. The ocean v. land carrier liability pattern we propose does not
exclude adoption of common liability provisions to land and ocean carriers.
Under the proposed pattern, localized (evident) damage will be subject to land or
ocean rules, depending on the segment of the intermodaljourney the damage occurs. This
is, for us, an obvious, fair, clear-cut solution that matches the obviousness and clarity of a
localized damage. Recovery for non-localized (concealed) damage may depend on the
1272 On the economic advantages of a uniformity initiative see supra at 33s. and infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section
III (A).
1273 International laws in any form must recognize diversities in substance or they will fail. William Tetley,
"Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 823. Respondents, (industry
representatives, experts, governmental, non-governmental, inter-governmental organizations), to an UNCTAD
questionnaire are divided with regard to the type of liability system to be adopted for the multimodal carriage. Just
under half of all respondents express their support for a uniform liability system and, among the remainder of
respondents, broadly equal numbers express support for a network liability system or for a modified liability system.
UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument
(Geneve: UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/l, 2003) at par. 97. Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc.
1274 Jan Ramberg, The FIATA Model Rules on Freight Forwarding Services (2000) online: Forwarderlaw Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg3.html> (last visited: Dec. 3, 2001).
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presence of an ocean segment in the journey. If an ocean segment exists in the
multimodal journey, ocean rules will apply with respect to the concealed damage.
Otherwise, land provisions will take effect1276 . In other words, what we propose is an
ocean v. land liability pattern that will apply differently in case of localized or concealed
damage1277 . In the first case, it is the situs of the damage that determines the applicable
liability rules while, in the second case, we create a simulation of the situs of the damage
to determine applicable liability rules.
One could argue that the modesty in the degree of uniformity sought by the ocean
v. land liability pattern does not make it worthy of attention1278. A more integrated regime
should be sought for multimodal carrier liability. However, we should first note that our
suggestions are clearly situated on the path towards uniformity since they try to bring
together land carrier liability rules and examine, for the rest, common grounds between
ocean and land liability provisions. As such, they differ from current fragmented
multimodal reality. Second, our suggestions may lack audacity in the degree of
uniformity they seek, but "those who do intentionally or negligently ignore the past
[failure of the audacious 1980 Multimodal Convention] they are condemned to repeat it"
(George Santayana 1863-1952).
In this regard, considerable differences seem to exist between our suggestions and
the 1980 Multimodal Convention or the FIATA BOL (FBL) uniform liability
provisions1279. While the latter documents differ between them in other ways, they
resemble in that they propose one intermodalliability limitation amount for localized and
non-localized damage but this amount differs depending on the presence or not of an
1275 Ibid. Neither the Hague nor the Visby Rules explicitly provide for delay.
1276 Our suggestion is inspired by FBL and 1980 Multimodal Convention liability provisions. Supra at 55-56 and at
65. Depending on applicable ocean and land carrier limitation amounts as well as where damage occurs most
frequently during the intermodal journey, whether on land or at sea, proposed suggestions may be said to privilege
ocean carriers (who usually benefit from lower limitation amounts compared to other modes), or shippers. These are
considerations to take into account in defining ocean and land carriers limitation amounts within a multimodal
context, not only limited to North America (where land multimodal carriage may be used more frequently) but also
worldwide. Annex. No. IlL Table No. 12 at cc.
1277 See concurring opinion of Jonathan Rodriquez-Atkatz, "Apportionment of Risk in Vessel and Marine Terminal
Contracts" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 497 at 508 who argues that to avoid inconsistencies between the law governing
land and ocean carriers, the multimodal BOL must be drafted so that it prospectively segregates claims into
categories based upon whether the situs of the damage is known or unknown.
1278 See supra at 66-68 for an analogous reasoning with respect to the FBL. See also conform opinion of De Wit
Ralph, Carrier Liability and Documentation in Multimodal Transport (D. Jur. Thesis, Law Faculty of the Vrije
Universiteit at Brussels, 1993) [published by Informa Law and is part of the Lloyd's Shipping Law Library] at 875.
1279 For these documents see supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 1 and Par. 2 respectively.
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ocean segment in the multimodal joumey128o. This is an intermodal ocean-land v. a land
carrier limitation amount for localized and concealed damage. Our approach is different.
We maintain different limitation amounts for ocean and land carriers in case of localized
(evident) damage and apply different liability limitations for non-localized (concealed)
damage depending on whether the intermodal journey comprises or not an ocean segment
(1980 Multimodal Convention, FBL approach)1281. As such, our proposal is more modest
than that of the 1980 Multimodal Convention and the FBL.
Our suggested approach further distances itself from the FBL provisions. In effect,
the FBL gives priority to mandatory applicable domestic legislationl282. Since most
countries provide for compensation of localized damage on the basis of unimodal liability
rules, the FBL really reflects one of the most modest uniformity approaches of a
multimodal carrier liability regime, giving priority to national, fragmented unimodal
rules. We intent our suggestions to supplant domestic laws and practices upon which they
are based1283. This is an element we encounter in the 1980 Multimodal Convention whose
provisions were designed to override national laws (art. 19).
The question may be raised whether we go too far In advancing overriding
multimodal carrier liability suggestions instead of adopting the more complacent FBL
approach. We prefer not to follow this approach! Contrary to the 1980 Multimodal
Convention and the FBL document, the limited geographical scope of our study permits
an in depth analysis of domestic unimodal rules and practices so that their harmonization
may successfully replace formerly applicable rules advancing, at the same time,
uniformity.
1280 Supra at 55 and at 65 on this point.
1281 Our suggestion on localized damage differs from the FBL and the 1980 Multimodal Convention corresponding
provisions. Under both these documents uniform liability provisions, different limitations apply depending on
whether the journey contains an ocean segment and irrespective of where the damage occurs. We make the
distinction between an ocean and a land segment in localized damage and we apply the rules pertinent to each
segment depending on where the damage occurs. For non-localized damage we follow similar to said documents
principles. See also supra note 1276 and accompanying text. The overall modesty of our approach is explained by
the need to adopt viable liability rules. A more integrated approach could be envisaged at a later stage.
1282 Supra at 64.
1283 Some nuances have to be made on this point. The FBL is a document of voluntary application whose provisions
give priority to national legislation. Our document is of voluntary adoption but, when adhered to, it overrides
unimodal liability rules and gives the possibility to parties to contractually modify land carrier liability. This is
because such seems to be the case with U.S. and Canadian land carriers.
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To make sure that more integrated proposals are well represented in our study,
different degrees of uniformity will be suggested as possible solutions to consider apart
from our ocean v. land multimodal carrier liability suggestions, which constitute the most
modest approach towards uniformity. This does not mean to say that our document will
contain alternatives or options to the suggested ocean v. land liability patternl284. Under
our suggestions, the latter will represent the minimum degree of uniformity herein
retained. However, if drafters and negotiators want to reach higher degrees of uniformity
instead of our minimum level of uniformity, they could consider one of the more
integrated choices present in our study. As Pro Tetley suggests, adoption of international
law requires flexibility and objective thinking1285.
B. Contractual Definition ofMultimodal Carrier Liability?: Shipping has seen the
rise and fall of the principle of freedom of contract. Starting from carrier contractual
abuses in the l800s, it went through subsequent restrictions of this principle to end up,
today, gradually expanding its use through transport deregulation and the use of
tid . 1 . 1286con 1 entIa contractmg .
Despite this fact, ocean carrier liability in Canada and the U.S. may not be
contractually limited today (formalism). On the contrary, U.S. and Canadian land carrier
liability is largely subject to contractualism permitting carriers and shippers to agree on
its liability terms (except for Canadian motor carrier contractual limitation of carrier
liability).
Reasoning exclusively on the basis of formalism and governmental intervention
when formulating our uniformity suggestions on multimodal carrier liability would be
trying to tum stream's flow backwards. We do not rejoice in such a perspective not only
because of current deregulated reality but, also because deregulated liability limits have
achieved, in practice, a certain degree of contractual uniformityl287. For instance, inherent
1284 In drafting national or international laws, alternatives or options are to be avoided because they make the entire
process of adoption of these laws difficult and time-consuming. William Tetley, "Uniformity ofIntemational Private
Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to International Conventions" (2000) TuI. Mar. L. J. 775 at 813.
1285 Ibid.
1286 Jan Ramberg, "Freedom of Contract in Maritime Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 178 at 178s, 186 and 191.
1287 Ibid and supra note 1194. This reflects informal harmonization. Exception should be made of confidential
contracts. For these see infra at 262s. Contractual uniformity of carrier liability is a flexible concept that enhances
uniformity, not only because of the stabilization of contractual practices it gives way to, over time, but also because
it supports expansion of trade and spread of private businesses, the latter influencing development of harmonized
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to deregulation carrier abuses such as U.S. motor carrier inadvertence clauses are quite
limited in practice following deregulation.
It may be that, on an economic analysis basis, possibility to depart from
standardized contract terms under deregulation is costlyl288. However, considering the
contractual uniformity of liability terms carriers and shippers have generally reached in
practice, uniformity is generally preserved and departure from established contractual
terms will be envisaged only on the condition that it is profitable enough to overcome the
costs it will incurl289. For all these reasons, we propose that an ocean (formalist) v. land
(contractualist) multimodal carrier liability pattern, the former prohibiting contractual
limitation of carrier liability while the latter sanctioning it, be retained.
Suggesting that land carriers can contractually limit their liability in Canada and
the U.S. contravenes currently applicable Canadian motor carrier practices/laws. In
effect, even though statutory and case law language permit contractual limitation of
motor carrier liability, Canadian carriers do not make recourse to it whereas Quebec
courts do not allow such limitation1290. It is not only that Canadian motor carriers do not
make use of contractual limitations, it is also that they do not need to do it. In effect,
Canadian motor carriers currently maintain the very low uniform limitation amount of
4.41$CAD per kilo or 2$CAD per pound, much lower that its generally applicable U.S.
counterpart, the 25$USD per pound. Maintaining the lowest liability limitation, Canadian
motor carriers do not fear competition in this field to be tempted to further limit their
liability. However, we have also seen that U.S. motor carriers may apply limitations as
low as 1$USD per pound for big volume shipments1291. Even if this limit does not seem
to currently threaten Canadian motor carriers through competition, the day may come
laws at the domestic level. Stephen Zamora, "NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: the Side
Effects of Free Trade" (1995) Ariz. J. Int'I & Compo L. 401 at 421.
Pro Jan Ramberg adds that sharp competition promotes decent behavior which, coupled with the presence of a
judicial safety net, reduces in importance the need for shipper protection from carrier abuses or prevention of
damages through regulation. Jan Ramberg, "Freedom of Contract in Maritime Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 178 at
191. For a more complete analysis of this argument see infra at 301-302 on the loss of limitation of liability benefit.
1288 Paul B. Stephan, "The Futility of Unification and Harmonization of International Commercial Law (1999) 39
Va. J. Int'1. L. 743 at 783 stating that the benefits derived from standardization of contractual terms might be so
great as to make departures costly even in those cases where a modification might produce some welfare gains.
1289 Ronald J. Gilson, David M. Schizer, "Understanding Capital Structure: a Tax Explanation for Convertible
Preferred Stock" (2003) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874 at 881.
1290 Supra at Part I, Chapter II, Section I, Par. 2(B)(b). For our suggestion in this regard see Annex No. III, Table No.
12 at cc.
1291 This is the example of American Freightways, supra note 1145 and accompanying text.
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when this will occur depending on how often these extremely low liability limitations
will be used. That day, Canadian motor case law may choose to use statutory and judicial
permissive provisions/terms to sanction contractual limitation of liability.
It is certain that a deregulated environment requires shipper alertness to avoid
eventual carrier abuses but in a market economy, as is the one introduced in carriage
contracts, consumers of goods or services have to be alert and be informed of their rights
and choices. On the other hand, it is not as if deregulation denies shippers any type of
protection. Follow the deregulation trend also means that shipper sophistication and
parties intent will be seriously considered before giving effect to contractual liability
terms and conditions (passage from the regulatory to the judicial 'safety net'). Reliance
on shipper sophistication and parties' intent may increase insecurity in the outcome of
case law decisions. However, since contractual clauses limiting liability are, as
transportation laws and regulations, strictly interpreted in Canada and the U.S., the effect
of the agreement and the latitude of the judge's subjectivity are constrained1292.
Moreover, our codification of U.S. and Canadian case law conclusions on shipper
sophistication and equal bargaining power helps to clarify applicable principles in this
respect1293 . Further codification of case law, a principle adopted by our analysis, also
constitutes a useful tool for carriers and shippers in predicting case law conclusions.
Following our suggestions, U.S. and Canadian ocean carriers are always
prohibited to contract below applicable international convention limitations. This is
because of Hague and Visby Rules provisions, which form the basis of our suggestions
for ocean carriers. One, however, should not exclude evolution of ocean carriage to
permit contractual limitation of liability even if this may take considerable time to occur.
In effect, transport deregulation has often led to contractual liability limitation, mostly in
case of land confidential contracts. Even though ocean carriage confidential contracts do
not currently practice carrier liability limitations1294, competition could eventually lead to
such result. In effect, the Hague and the Visby Rules can become default rules since
1292 For the U.S. : Blake D. Morant" «Contracts Limiting Liability» (1995) 69 Tul. L. Rev. 715 at 744. For Canada:
Reed Decorative Products Ltd. v. Manchester Liners (1984) 1984 F. C. J. No. 618 (F. C. J.).
1293 Supra notes 714, 685, 641,812 and accompanying text.
1294 Supra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 3(A).
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parties to a confidential contract can opt out of their provisions with a swipe of the
pen1295.
Expanded use of such confidential contracts could lead to renegotiation of
international conventions to permit contractual limitation of ocean carrier liability. If this
were to occur, contractual limitation of multimodal carrier liability would become the
principle in all modes of transport and the only thing that would, then, be the subject of
uniformity efforts would be ocean and land carrier liability amounts and measures.
Extrapolating into the future is a highly stimulating and fulfilling task. Still, the
uniformity we advocate is based on existing realities. The way things stand at present, we
believe it is necessary to maintain the prevailing distinction between ocean carriers ban
on contractual limitation and land carriers permission to contractually limit their liability
(ocean v. land liability pattern)1296.
C. Contractual document of voluntary adoption: The question herein raised is
what type of document will embrace our suggestions. International transport law,
especially international ocean carriage, has been traditionally harmonized through
conventions1297. International conventions, however, are not the only harmonization
vehicle: standard form contracts, uniform codes, standard clauses, insurance policies all
assist in securing harmonization of law1298.
In the case of multimodal transport, failure to elaborate an international
convention to govern carrier liability has led to harmonization initiatives by means of
standardized contractual documents1299. Today, doctrine1300 leans towards adoption of
1295 Supra at 158-159. The Latest on Cargo Liability Reform (2001) online: BP & M Homepage
<http:www.bpmlaw.com/transportation/publications/legallookoutl.101.htm> (last visited: Nov. 17, 2001).
1296 The FBL does not even address the issue of contractual limitation or not of carrier liability. Supra at 65-66.
1297 Hannu Honka, «Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A Nordic Perspective» (1996) 11
Tul. Euro. Civ. L. For. 111 at 128 and 131. For instance, international ocean carriage is governed today by the
Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. International ocean and air carriage, however, have been de-harmonized
due to amendments or new conventions as well as divergent national interpretations of each convention's terms.
Ibid.
1298 William Tetley, "Uniformity ofInternational Private Maritime Law" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 787.
1299 Supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 2.
1300 Hannu Honka, «Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A Nordic Perspective» (1996) 11
Tul. Euro. Civ. L. For. 111 at 151, 152, 154. For CIFFA position see Tony Young, Position Statement on
Multimodal Liability (2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html> (last visited: Nov. 9, 2001). Jack G. Knebel,
Denise Savoie Blocker, «United States Statutory Regulation of Multimodalism» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 543 at 565s.
H. Hillenbrand, "Proper Drafting of the Intermodal Contract as a Solution to Liability Differences between
Transportation Modes" (presentation to Pac, Rim Mar. L. Conf., Jan. 6, 1989) as reported in Richard W. Palmer,
Frank P. DeGiulio, «Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage» (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 281 at note 440 and
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standardized contractual documents ('properly drafted intermodal through bills... or
connecting carrier agreements') prescribing uniform multimodalliability standards. This
seems also to be the opinion of practitioners1301.
Such a choice is also justified from an economIC point of VIew. In effect,
standardized contracts reduce the costs of drawing up contracts. If a transport company is
making similar agreements with millions of customers a year, it is a lot cheaper to draft a
single contract with options to cover likely variations among what customers want than to
redraft the contract for each transactionl302. The benefits of standardized contracts are
. d . 1303tIme an money savmgs .
We side with this opinion. Our choice to adopt a modest uniformity approach does
not only translate into maintaining an ocean v. land liability pattern but also into
advancing a contractual document of voluntary application that will either be sanctioned
by national governments or by parties private practice1304. In the latter case, uncertainty
remains with documents of voluntary application since there is no guarantee that carriers
and shippers will adopt them1305. However, wide adoption of our voluntary document
should not be hard to get due to the fact that its suggested contractual provisions are
accompanying text. Stephen G. Wood, «Multimodal Transportation: an American Perspective on Carrier Liability
and Bill of Lading Issues» (1998) 46 Am. J. Compo L. 403 at 415. Jan Ramberg, Unification of the Law of
International Freight Forwarding (2001) online: UNIDROIT Homepage
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articlesII998-l.htm> (last modified: Jan. 10, 2001). Jan
Ramberg, The Future of International Unification of Transport Law (1998) online: Forwarder Law Homepage
<http://www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ramberg2.html> (last modified: Jan. 10,2001).
1301 Paul S. Edelman, "Second Circuit Handles Bill of Lading for Sea, Land Transportation" (2000) 3 N. Y. Law. J.
I (WESTLAW-Newsletters). U.S., D.O.T., Towards Improved Intermodal Freight Transport in Europe and the
United States (1998) online: U.S. DOT Homepage <http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/institut/inter/eu_us2.pdf>
(last visited: July 11,2001).
However, 58% of respondents (industry representatives, experts, governmental, non - governmental, inter -
governmental organizations) to an UNCTAD questionnaire expressed the view that any multimodal instrument
should be in the form of a convention which applies on a mandatory basis and provides mandatory liability rules
(that cannot be contracted out by parties). UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility
ofan International Legal Instrument (Geneve UNCTAD/SDTE/TLBI20031I, 2003) at par. 79.
1302 For this assertion and further analysis see David D. Friedman, Law's Order (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton
University Press, 2000) at 157. See also supra at 261.
1303 Anne Brafford, "Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion" (1996) 21 Iowa J. Compo L. 33 I at
381.
1304 The Hague Rules were intended to be voluntarily incorporated by carriers into their BsOL but the rules were
given wide effect either in the form of legislative ratification or by voluntary adoption. Stephen Zamora, "Carrier
Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J. Compo L. 391 at 405. Annex No.
III, Table No. 12 at cc for our suggestions.
1305 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 393.
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based on currently applicable realities without distancing themselves greatly from them,
in the same manner the FIATA BOL provides1306.
When we compare our general suggestions on multimodal carrier liability
uniformity to the UNIDROIT principles, we find common groundl307. Both our
suggestions and the UNIDROIT principles are of voluntary application (UNIDROIT
preamble par. 2). Both adopt the principle of freedom of contract combined with a
mandatory set of rules (UNIDROIT Chap. 1, art. 1.1 and 1.5). Both intend to conciliate
principles of civil and common law tradition by adopting solutions common to existing
legal systems (and modes, in our case) increasing, at the same time, clarity and
predictability of applicable rules1308.
However, there are aspects of the two sets of adopted rules that differ. The
UNIDROIT principles are general uniform principles applicable to the formation,
validity, execution, damages and resolution of contracts at the international level. Carrier
liability rules are ad hoc rules and cannot, therefore, look to general international contract
law principles for uniformity suggestions except, perhaps, in a complementary way1309.
Moreover, because of their extended geographical scope, the UNIDROIT principles
cannot consider in depth all country laws or attribute to each one of them the same
influence l3lo . Our analysis geographical scope is more limited so that respective laws and
legal systems are considered in greater detail, attributing to each greater importance.
Finally, the UNIDROIT principles seem to follow the example of the FIATA BOL in
1306 This is the 'opt in' method of adoption of a voluntary document which takes effect where parties to the contract
choose to apply voluntary document's provisions. This is also the method of adoption of the FBL document, see
supra at 62.
1307 The objective of the UNIDROIT (Institut International pour I' Unification de Droit-International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law) principles is to establish a balanced set of rules governing the general principles of
contracting designed for use throughout the world, irrespective of the legal traditions and the economic and political
conditions of the countries in which they are to be applied. Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same
Purposes? (1996) online: <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglbiblio/bone1l96.html> (last visited: Jan. 15,2000).
1308 Common requirements to existing legal systems could be considered to constitute a sort of modern 'ius
commune'. Michael Joachim Bonell, "The UNIDROIT Principals of International Commercial Contracts" (1995)
Tul. L. Rev. 1121 at 1143-1144. Franco Ferrari, "Defining the Sphere of the 1994 'UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts" (1995) Tul. L. Rev. 1225 at 1232. Anne Marie Traham, «UNIDROIT
Principles» (Montreal: Hotel Intercontinental, CDACI 2001) (unpublished).
1309 For instance, Chapter I, art. 1.7 reference of the UNIDROIT principles to 'good faith and fair dealing in
international trade'. These complementary aspects of the UNIDROIT principles to our proposals will not retain
herein our attention.
1310 Michael Joachim Bonell, "The UNIDROIT Principals of International Commercial Contracts" (1995) Tul. L.
Rev. 1121 at 1129.
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providing that they do not limit the application of imperative domestic or international
laws on the issue (UNIDROIT Chap.l, art. 1.4 FBL clause 6.B)1311. Our suggestions may
be of voluntary application but, when adopted by the parties to the transport contract,
they override existing (unimodal) applicable rules moving, at the same time, towards
uniformity of multimodal carrier liability. Because of the specificity of transport liability
rules, the limited geographical scope of our study permitting a more in depth analysis of
carrier liability and the effect of our suggestions on domestic laws, we will not herein
reason on the basis of the UNIDROIT principles.
Gradual changes towards uniformity presuppose frequent review of the voluntary
contractual document adopted, in order to adapt it to economic, legal and political
realities. Scheduling for systematic (i.e. every three or four years) review of the adopted
proposals at the bilateral level would condition continuing successful implementation of
proposed suggestions1312.
Equally important to its systematic reView, IS foreseeability of commercial
contract provisions. When a dispute arises, the parties must be able to trust the contract.
This is why it is necessary to comment on the content of the contractual voluntary
document adopted.
Paragraph 2. General liability provisions: We have already affirmed that the
way to achieve uniformity consists in retaining what is common throughout modes and
countries, approximate divergent liability rules (i.e. encounter the 'middle ground'
solution) and, in case such approximation seems impossible, invite parties to negotiate a
commonly agreed upon solution1313.
1311 Ibid at 1135. The author asserts that it is very controversial which type of mandatory rules will take priority in
each given case. See also Franco Ferrari, "Defining the Sphere of the 1994 'UNIDROIT Principles ofInternational
Commercial Contracts" (1995) Tul. L. Rev. 1225 at 1237. Anne Marie Traham, «UNIDROIT Principles» (Montreal:
Hotel Intercontinental, CDACI 2001) (unpublished).
1312 Bringing up to date international documents is a challenging task because if the revision procedure is not easy
and flexible, proposed amendments to the document will not be adopted. On the examination of different revision
procedures see William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives
to International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 817s.
1313 Supra at 20-21 for our harmonization approach. 39% of respondents, (industry representatives, experts,
governmental, non-governmental, inter-governmental organizations), to an UNCTAD questionnaire considered a
new international instrument to govern multimodal transport to be most appropriate against 26% opting for a
revision of the 1980 Multimodal Convention and 13% expressing support for an extension of the ocean or land
liability regime to land and ocean segments of the transportation respectively. UNCTAD, UNCTAD Secretariat,
Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
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Taking a look at cross-modal and cross-country liability limitation provisions we
observe that land and ocean carriers in both countries share common liability exceptions
and are subject to limited liability that may be either contractual or statutory. We will,
therefore, exonerate all carriers in the presence of common liability exceptions and limit
multimodal carrier liability to an amount that should be translated into SDR to serve as a
hedge against monetary inflation!3!4. Moreover, shipper prima facie case and carrier
proof of absence of negligence (reasonableness standard) with respect to carrier
exoneration causes are common case law conclusions that will be herein retained1315.
Further, current statutory law and cases hold all carriers liable for the actual value of the
physical loss, damage and delay to the extent of a prescribed liability limitation
amount!3!6. Finally, we will not permit contractual exclusion of carrier liability as no
modal or country case law seems to permit such an eventuality. We cannot but retain
these common statutory or case law conclusions.
In ocean transport, proof of vessel seaworthiness before and at the commencement
of the journey will constitute the condition precedent to ocean carrier invoking liability
exceptions, since this is a common Hague and Visby Rules provision based on carrier due
diligence and which does not vest such great importance in land transport (ocean v. land
pattern)!3!7. We will also retain an ocean v. land liability pattern with respect to carrier
care for the cargo and the higher degree of care ('properly and carefully') encountered in
ocean carriage when compared with land transport (due diligence)1318.
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1, 2003) at par. 32. We should remind the reader that we are attentive of our use of the
'middle ground' solution method so as not to remote ourselves from present liability rules. Supra note 102.
1314 Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for a graphical representation of our (general liability) suggestions. On the
possibility to limit multimodal carrier liability see comments of Boris Kozolchyk, "On the State of Commercial Law
at the State of the 20th Century" (1991) Az. J. Int'I. & Compo L. 1 at 11 and 19.
SDR is an international measure of value whose basket of currencies best reflects present international economic
reality coupled with a constant update of its value. Tony Young, CIFFA Submission To Transport Canada: the
DECD's Maritime Transport Committee Workshop in Paris (Jan. 25-26, 2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/downloads/submission/CIFFA_Submission.pdf.> (last visited: Feb.20, 2001). Jan Ramberg,
"The Development towards Control of Maritime Contracts by Mandatory Law" (1993) LI. Mar. & Com. L. Q. 178
at 190. See also supra note 247.
1315 For these see multiple pages supra at 175-221.
1316 For delay see also opinion of Jan Ramberg, "The Law of Carriage of Goods, Attempts at Harmonization" (1974)
9 E. T. L. 1 at 40. Suggestions will not be made on consequential damages provisions, measure of goods value 'at
shipment' or 'at destination' and payment of ocean freight charges to the shipper (for a schematic representation of
said modal provisions see Annex No. III, Tables No.9-II at cxcv-cc) (modes of calculation of actual loss). Cross -
modal legislation on these matters differs and development in detail of said concepts is needed before making
su9gestions in this respect, something that exceeds the purposes of the present study.
131 We refer to Hague and Visby Rules art. 3(1). Supra at 185s. This, despite U.S. Fire Statute provisions which
undermine efforts towards international uniformity. Supra at 213s.
1318 Supra at 187-198.
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Section II: Suggestions on the Basis of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the
U.S. and Canada
Carrier -as an insurer of cargo- initial liability exceptions were enlarged by
adoption of additional exoneration causes included in the BOL and exempting him from
the presumption of liability principle. Recently, cargo interests and developing (non-
seafaring) countries begun an effort to revise and simplify the Hague and the Visby Rules
by adopting liability based on the principle of presumption of fault 13l9. This is not only
the case of the 1978 Hamburg Rules and the 1980 Multimodal Convention1320. The
presently applicable Hague and Visby Rules (q) liability exception is also based on the
same principle, distancing itself from carrier strict liability even as enlarged by BsOL list
of liability exceptions1321.
The analysis that will follow will focus on the choice between the presumption of
fault or presumption of liability principles Par. 1 suggested liability exceptions Par. 2
and the concept of force majeure within our suggestions Par. 3.
Paragraph 1: Presumption of Fault or Presumption of Liability? The
difference between the presumption of liability and presumption of fault/negligence
principles resides in the proof to be brought by the carrier1322. The latter only requires
proof of absence of fault made by the carrier while the former requires proof of specific
carrier exoneration causes occurring without negligence1323 . In other words, simple proof
13\9 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 419.
1320 Although different patterns of the presumption of fault principle are advanced by said documents, we remain
always within the sphere of the presumption of fault principle. Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. I(B) (1980
Multimodal Convention) on the general relation between the two sets of rules.
\32\ Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 39 I at 410-4 I I.
1322 We use the terms 'fault' and 'negligence' interchangeably because of their conceptual proximity. Supra note
863.
\323 Jean Louis Baudouin, Pierre Gabriel Jobin, Les Obligations 5th ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvon
Blais, 1998) at 702-703. The presumption of fault principle can present a real advantage for the carrier in the case of
concealed damage. For the benefit of our suggestions, the principle of presumption of carrier liability, a civil law
concept, is conceived as the one accompanied by enumerated exoneration causes that need to be proven by the
carrier but need not be external to him. Even though civil law force majeure concept, the corollary of civil law
presumption of liability principle, requires carrier to prove external causes of loss and such is the requirement for
several carrier liability exceptions in civil law jurisdictions, this is not perceived as such by common law systems.
However, both civil and common law jurisdictions refer to a list of specific exoneration causes with respect to the
carrier liability as an insurer of the cargo (presumption of liability). This is why we will refer to a list of specific
exoneration causes to oppose our principle of presumption of liability to the principle of presumption of fault. On
the force majeure concept being the corollary of the civil law presumption of liability principle see ibid at 34-35 and
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of absence of negligence will not suffice, absent proof of the cause of the loss, to
exonerate carrier under the principle of presumption of liability1324. This means that the
latter principle is not as carrier protective as the principle of presumption of negligence.
Still, ambiguity seems to exist as to the carrier protective character of the
presumption of fault principle. In effect, when a carrier invokes a specific cause of loss
under the latter principle, it is not always clear whether carrier can be exonerated by
simple proof of this cause of loss -as under the presumption of liability principle- or
whether he has to prove also absence of negligence in general, -without regard to the
cause of the loss- before the burden of proof shifts to the shipper1325. In the latter case, the
principle of presumption of fault is more burdensome on the carrier than the principle of
presumption of liability.
There are authors who have argued that the two principles approximate each other
but this opinion has been rejected by modern doctrine that insists on their difference of
modes of proof1326. We agree with authors that these two concepts are de faux amis so
that their approximation, or simply opting for one system in favor of the other would be
desirable1327.
CN tariff 7589-AN and BNSF Railway Intermodal Rules & Policies Guide (Item
62) applicable to international intermodal rail container transport and currently in use by
Canadian and U.S. rail carriers sanction the principle ofliability for negligence1328• Under
this principle, carrier fault is not presumed as in the case of the 1978 Hamburg Rules, the
1980 Multimodal Convention or the Hague and the Visby Rules (q) exception but needs
see reported cases by Maurice Tancelin, Daniel Gardner, Jurisprudence Commentee sur les Obligations 7me ed.
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur Ltee, 1999) at 584 (note 2).
1324 Interview of the author with Pro Yves Tassel, Professor of Shipping law at the University of Nantes in France
(Feb 22, 2002) e-mail: ytassel@hotmail.com.This remark becomes particularly important in case of concealed
damage where, not knowing where the damage occurs, it is often difficult for the carrier to prove the cause of the
loss.
1325 Supra at 52.
1326 On the comparison of the civil law force majeure concept, (main exoneration cause of the presumption of
liability princirle) and the principle of the presumption of fault see Jean Louis Baudouin, Pierre Gabriel Jobin, Les
Obligations 51 ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1998) at 702-703. In the same sense, see also
Jean Pineau, Danielle Burman, Serge Gaudet, Theorie des Obligations 3rd ed. (Montreal: Editions Themis, 1996) at
680-681. See also Hugh M. Kindered, Mary R. Brooks «Multimodal Transport Rules» (Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) at 2.
1327 On this second suggestion see Michael Beaupre, "La Traduction Juridique" (1987) 28 Les Cahiers De Droit 735
at 742-743.
1328 Supra at 182. CP (00075-00080. A. 1), NS (Sec. 8.3.3.d) and BNSF (Item 62).
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to be proven by the shipper. The principle of liability for negligence is, therefore, even
more carrier protective than the principle of presumption of fault may be since, in the
latter case, carrier's fault is presumed and not proven by shipper.
We should note, in this respect, that contrary to the CN, the BNSF, NS and CP rail
tariffs will also exonerate rail carriers in case of a specific list of carrier liability
exceptions, narrow duplications of the principle of liability for negligence maintained by
the tariff1329. Deletion of the presumption of liability liability defenses from paper
through adoption of the principle of liability for negligence or the principle of
presumption of fault, therefore, does not really mean their elimination in practice133o. It
simply means that carrier can invoke formerly applicable liability exceptions as specific
examples of absence of negligence.
Our suggestion consists in marrying the principle of presumption of fault with the
currently applicable principle of presumption ofliability ('middle ground' solution). As a
result, the principle of presumption of fault will form the basis of carrier liability and will
be accompanied by a list of carrier liability exceptions, specific illustrations of the
principle, requiring proof of the harm-causing event by the carrier. The list of exceptions
will be based on currently applicable cross-modal and cross-country exoneration causes
we will propose as follows. This will be a non-exhaustive list of liability defenses,
meaning that additional liability exceptions could be added to the list based on evolution
of case law, parties' contractual practices and the facts of each case. However, the
additional, as well as the already present, liability exceptions will require proof of a
specific cause of damage as well as absence of carrier and servant's negligence with
respect to it. So, the carrier will not be exonerated by simple proof of absence of
negligence, as is the case of the presumption of fault principle. On the other hand, the
presumed liable carrier needs to prove absence of negligence only with respect to the
cause of the damage (and not in general) before the burden ofproof shifts to the shipper.
1329 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 420 and 411. Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979)
27 Am. J. Compo L. 357 at 360. Robert Force, "A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules:
Much Ado About?" (1996) 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051 at 2066. Supra at 182.
1330 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 420 and 411.
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To take more specific examples, insufficient ventilation or overrun engines may
cause damage to the transported goods!33!. However, they do not constitute Hague, Visby
or land BOL carrier liability exceptions since they cannot fall under the 'act of God' or
'perils of the sea' exoneration causes. As such, they do not exculpate carrier under the
principle of presumption of liability of mentioned rules. Under the principle of
presumption of fault, the fact that carrier and its agents have taken all reasonable
measures carriers and agents normally take to protect transported goods may exonerate
carrier even in the absence of identified cause of damage since, under this principle, it is
not necessary to identify the cause of damage. Proof of absence of fault suffices. Under
our suggestion, carrier may be exonerated in case of insufficient ventilation or overrun
engines contrary to the presumption of liability and in conformity with the presumption
of fault principles. However, in order for this to occur, carrier and agents absence of
negligence in connection with said causes of damage and, as a result, the cause of the
damage, have to be proven by the carrier as under the presumption of liability principle
and contrary to the presumption of fault principle.
Thus, the proposed basis of carrier liability enlarges the scope of carrIer
exoneration causes under the principle of presumption of liability but retains latter
principle's burden of proof rules. Our suggestion resembles ocean carrier (q) exception
that requires proof of carrier and servants absence of negligence but also proof of a
specific cause of loss 1332. We actually take the principle of presumption of negligence the
(q) exception advances and make it the basis of multimodal carrier liability. However,
while the (q) exception takes effect when other liability exceptions (i.e. nautical fault) do
not, our presumption of fault principle conditions carrier liability in all cases and uses
specific carrier liability exceptions as its specific illustrations. Another significant
difference between our principle of presumption of fault and the (q) exception is that the
latter puts on the carrier a burden of persuasion, which is very onerous, and which has
rendered obsolete said exception in practice1333. Our suggestion consists in obliging
carrier to simply come forward with proposed evidence and not to bear a burden of
1331 For these examples see C.W.H. Goldie, "Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Ship Owners Liability Insurance"
(1993) 24 J. Mar. L. Com. 91 at 115-116. The author uses these and other examples in commenting on Hamburg
Rules principle of presumption of fault. Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for this suggestion.
1332 Supra at 219s.
1333 Supra at 221.
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persuasion as this is done with the ocean (q) exception. The reason behind our suggestion
is not to render obsolete adopted principle as is currently the case of the (q) exception
while put, at the same time, the onus probandi of additional exoneration causes on the
party generally considered more apt to prove circumstances of damage: the carrier1334.
Some authors assert that innovations concerning the shifting of the burden of
proof and apportionment of damages are alterations that affect the presence or not of
liability1335 . Authors also argue that greater carrier burden of proof may encourage
settlement procedures undertaken on carrier initiative decreasing, in this way, litigation
costs1336. They further state that carriers faced with greater burden of proof might take
greater precaution with respect to the transported goods. This consideration, however,
may be undercut by the economic interest the carrier already has in the prevention of
damage to the transported goods 1337. Still, whatever the effects of economy and
competition on carrier liability, we are going to affirm our belief that it is law, rather than
economics, that should define, in pragmatic terms, legal concepts and carrier liability1338.
This is why we will herein use burden ofproof rules as a risk allocation mechanism.
One could argue that since specific carrier liability exceptions are much clearer
than the principle of presumption of fault, we should not choose the latter to form the
basis of multimodal carrier liability. In effect, adoption of the principle of presumption of
fault may be laudatory but it exposes carriers and shippers to considerable uncertainty by
not referring to specific exoneration causes l339. Uncertainty increases litigation and is to
be contrasted to currently higher degree of clarity and certainty maintained by ocean or
land carrier' litany' of liability exceptions1340.
1334 This is extremely important in multimodal transport where cargo is usually stuffed in sealed containers that are
passed amongst many services providers so that the task of discovering the source of concealed damage may be very
difficult, burdening the party to which proof of the cause of the loss is attributed by law. Hugh M. Kindred, Mary R.
Brooks «Multimodal Transport Rules» (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 3.
1335 Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy (United States: Yale
University Press, 1946) at 49. The author states that alterations in the burden of proof may permit parties to recover
damages from persons who have not actually caused the loss. Ibid. Others, however, suggest that the effects of a
rarticular burden allocation on carrier liability and commerce in general are uncertain and speculative.
336 James H. Holenstein, "The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases" (1983) 50 U. of
Chicago L. Rev. 1146 at 1168.
1337 Ibid at 1167. Infra at 301s.
1338 On this point see infra at 301-303.
1339 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. 1.
Compo L. 391 at 420 on carriers.
1340 Only years of case law on liability based on fault will provide increased certainty. Ibid.
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This is a valid argument that fails, however, to take into account the constant
nsmg in importance of the principle of liability for negligence sanctioned by
u.S.lCanadian domestic rail tariffs l341 . It also overlooks the adaptability of this and the
presumption of fault principles to different factual scenarios that the principle of
presumption of liability, being limited to a specific list of carrier exoneration causes,
tends to ignorel342 . Finally, it is not as if we set aside the principle of presumption of
liability since we maintain a list of specific carrier exoneration causes that could be
extended only by proof of specific causes of damage indicating absence of carrier
"negligence. A list of exculpatory causes does alleviate the vagueness of the presumption
of fault principle herein adopted, enhancing clarity under our suggestions.
Let us now examine the principles of presumption of fault, liability for fault
(negligence) and presumption of liability under the 'Law and Economics' doctrine. What
we are looking for, in this regard, is a liability principle that provides for the maximum
degree of carrier care in exchange for an economically justified cost (cost-
effectiveness) 1343.
According to economic analysis principles, carrier optimum standard of care is
achieved when for a final spend of 1$ the carrier or shipper is expected to save 1$1344.
Under the presumption of liability principle the optimal standard of care is more easily
achieved when compared with the principle of liability for fault. In effect, under the
1341 Supra at Part II, Chapter I, Section I, Par. I(B). Even from this point of view the adopted presumption of fault
'principle constitutes a 'middle ground' solution between the currently applicable presumption of liability and
liability for negligence principles.
1342 We agree, in the regard, with Mr. Tantin who has affirmed, although for different reasons, that the principle of
presumption of fault is best suited for container transport Gerard Tantin, "Les Documents de Transports Combine"
(1980) 15 Eur. Transp. L 367 at 380. The ocean carrier (q) exception may apply the principle of presumption of
fault but its limited practical use does permit to effectively consider it in this regard. 53% (51 % of Governments and
54% of others providing a response) of the respondents, (industry representatives, experts, governmental, non -
governmental, inter - governmental organizations), to an UNCTAD questionnaire supported a fault-based system of
liability and 47% supported a system of strict liability (principle of presumption of liability). UNCTAD, UNCTAD
Secretariat, Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument (Geneve:
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1, 2003) at par. 64.
1343 Reasoning by analogy to insurance and 'Law and Economics' as reported by Saul Sorkin, "Changing Concepts
of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at 717. See also infra at Part II, Chapter II, Section III, Par. 3.
1344 Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979) 27 Am. J. Compo L. 357
at 364. This is the very essence of the Pareto optimality defining efficiency in 'Law and Economics'. The Pareto
optimality simply means that all benefits are allocated, nothing is wasted. Michael J. Meurer, "Fair Division" (1999)
47 Buffalo L. Rev. 937 at 960. In other words, the cost of investment has to equal its benefit for the optimal degree
of care or other measures (i.e. national wealth) to be attained. George Priest, "Lawyers Liability and Law Reform:
Effects on Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness" (1993) 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 115 at 136-137. For the
Pareto principle see supra note 162.
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former principle liability is more clear cut -thus, more cost-effectively put to practice- so
that carrier can predict with reasonable certainty that for every 1$ spent, there will be 1$
of damages saved. Under the latter principle, as under the principle of liability for
negligence, fault is not always easy to (dis)prove 1345. In trying to delineate the borderlines
of the concept of fault, additional great litigation costs are incurred. As a result, the
optimal standard of care is not always easy to achieve with the liability for fault principle.
This, may also provide a reason why the 'middle ground' solution between the
principles of presumption of liability and liability for negligence -both these principles
being well represented in both land and ocean transport- is the herein adopted principle of
presumption of fault. Here, for every dollar spent the carrier is expected to save one
dollar principally because his liability is presumed and, therefore, is more clear-cut than
under the principle of liability for negligence where liability needs to be proven by the
shipper. However, under the adopted principle of presumption of negligence the carrier
can be exonerated by proving absence of negligence with respect to a non-exhaustive list
of liability exceptions so that the equality of the one-dollar saved equals one dollar spent
principle may not always be respected. Even though the presumption of fault principle
does not provide the optimal standard of care, it certainly offers, in economic terms as
well as in terms of its suitability to intermodal carriage, a satisfactory first approach
towards uniformity of multimodal carrier liability.
It should also be noted that adoption of the principle of presumption of fault as the
'middle ground' solution equals adoption of a satisfactory degree of carrier care for the
cargo. Among the principles of presumption of liability, presumption of fault and liability
for negligence, it is the former that provides for the maximum degree of carrier care for
the cargo. In effect, we have seen that the former principle presumes carrier liable unless
he proves specific enumerated liability exceptions whereas the latter expects shipper to
prove carrier negligence, something that may not always be achieved. The presumption
of fault principle presumes carrier liable but the latter can exonerate himself by proving
absence of fault on his part. As such, this principle is situated between the presumption of
liability and liability for negligence concepts with respect to the degree of carrier care.
1345 Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979) 27 Am. J. Compo L. 357
at 364. for the whole reasoning stated herein.
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This holds carrier to a higher standard of care than the principle of liability for negligence
where burden of proof and, therefore, risk of no proof, of carrier negligence lies with the
shipper. It holds the carrier to a lesser degree of care than the principle of presumption of
liability since, in the latter case, the carrier cannot disprove its absence of negligence
except on the basis of specified exoneration causes.
Other 'Law and Economics' authors reasoning leads to the same conclusion.
Recognizing that the presumption of liability principle operates a better incentive for
careful behavior, they propose a two-part system of liability1346. According to this
system, the responsible party (in our case the carrier) will be held strictly liable
(presumption ofliability) for the full cost of the damage, and the victim (shipper for us)
will receive little or no payment for the occurred damage. The difference in the price
actually paid by the responsible party and the price received by the victim, which might
be called fine, cannot be paid to either the carrier or the shipper. Such a system provides
the optimal deterrence of trouble from both the carrier and the shipper (risk-averse
parties) because of the price ultimately paid by each.
Recognizing that transaction and legal costs of the proposed two part system
would be prohibitively high, said authors go further in suggesting that the best
compromise between legal costs and deterrence problems would be a negligence standard
for the responsible party, in our case the principle of presumed negligence, and a
contributory negligence standard for the presumed victim1347. This would deter careless
behavior by both parties in the contract or torts action and would minimize legal costs.
Though far from being perfect, this may be the best that actual legal institutions can do,
or, at least, an improvement of the status quo 1348.
Paragraph 2: Liability Exceptions: The question then is posed: under our
suggestion of presumed carrier fault coupled with a list of carrier liability exceptions, of
what exceptions will this list consist?
1346 The following is taken out of H.E. Frech III, "State-Dependent Utility and the Tort System as Insurance: Strict
Liability v. Negligence" (1994) 14 Int'!. Rev. L. & Econ. 261 at 268.
1347 Ibid at 269. See, however, authors opinion stating that contributory negligence in other fields of law
(manufacturer-consumer liability) does not achieve the optimal manufacturer standard of care. Avery Wiener Katz,
Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law (New York: Oxford University, 1998) at 203 for more details.
1348 H.E. Frech III, "State-Dependent Utility and the Tort System as Insurance: Strict Liability v. Negligence" (1994)
14 Int'!. Rev. L. & Econ. 261 at 269.
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Implicit to a number of currently applicable ocean specific carrIer liability
exceptions (i.e. nautical fault, saving lives and property at sea) is the assumption that
ocean transport is essentially risky in nature l349 . Even if today the ocean adventure is less
hazardous and more routine than formerly, ship owners are reluctant to give up their
privileged exceptions that have acquired, over time, a sacred aura1350. Lack of
competition by other modes and disorganized cargo interests permitted them to prevail in
their positions 1351.
Recognizing the special position ocean carriage has traditionally occupied, we will
attribute to it additional carrier liability exoneration causes (A) apart from the common,
to land and ocean carriers, liability exceptions (B). In this way, an ocean v. land
multimodal carrier liability pattern is created with ocean specific liability exceptions and
other exceptions that will benefit land and ocean carriers alike. Our approach is the one
followed by the FIATA BOL even though we do not adopt verbatim the liability
exceptions therein contained1352. It is also respectful of modal diversities, a becoming
trait of the harmonization concept we have adopted in the present study.
All herein adopted liability exceptions are based on motor, rail and ocean BsOL
provisions and intermodal rail tariffs 1353. Specific to rail intermodal tariffs liability
defenses (i.e. theft of containers absent carrier negligence) we encounter in no other
mode of transport, will be treated as isolated exceptions not part of the explicit list of
exoneration causes herein adopted. Their future inclusion in the adopted list should not,
however, be excluded. It all depends on how frequently they are used by contracting
parties and under what conditions courts will give them effect.
It is certain that courts enjoy a large margin of discretion in deciding presence of
liability defenses, not only because of the principle ofpresumption of fault but also
1349 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (I975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 409. Ocean specific perils, unwillingness to concentrate the risk of catastrophic losses on carriers
and the economic power of the Ship-owners explain the reason of specific ocean carrier liability exceptions in the
Hague and the Visby Rules. Ibid at 419.
1350 Ibid at 419.
1351 Ibid.
1352 Supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 2. See Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for our suggestions and Annex
No.1, Table No.2 at xviii for the FBL.
1353 We have seen that rail BsOL liability exceptions supplement the tariffs principle of liability for negligence.
Supra at 174, 182 and Annex No. III, Tables No. 5-9 at cxc-cxciv.
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because of the relativity of the components conditioning their presence. This is why close
monitoring and codification of case law holdings and contractual practices is important to
increase predictability of carrier's conduct and court's decisions. Since parties can
contractually modifY land carrier liability terms under our suggestions, identification of
contractual trends through codification of case law and practices is necessary to enhance
and support uniformity efforts l354 .
A. Ocean specific liability exceptions: We suggest that perils of the sea, fire,
saving or attempting to save life or property at sea be the ocean specific carrier liability
exceptions in our contractual document. We, therefore, put aside the currently applicable
nautical fault liability exception while we have already commented on the adjustments
made to the (q) exception presumption of fault principle after its adoption as the basis of
multimodal carrier liability under our suggestions1355. At the very limit, we would allow
presence of a qualified nautical fault defense considering carrier and shipper
unwillingness to find a compromise in this regard.
It is certain that elimination of the nautical fault exception does not favor carriers
or their insurers, mostly in case of major damaging occurrences at sea, the ones mostly
feared by liability insurers. It is also certain that the nautical fault liability defense is
present in the Hague and in the Visby Rules as well as in the FIATA BOL (Clause 7.1).
If we advocate abolition of this exoneration cause in ocean transport it is because the
need for uniformity with other modal conventions, technological advances and the
relatively low number of cases where this liability exemption is invoked or is successful,
do not favor maintaining it1356.
We are conscious of the fact that mentioned arguments have not, so far, convinced
carriers, shippers and their insurers, mainly because of the unpredictability of nautical
fault defense abolition effects1357. Knowing how polarized shipper and carrier interests
1354 On the contractual nature of liability suggestions see supra at Part II, Chapter II, Section I, Par. I(B).
1355 Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for a table of our suggestions. It is not by negligence or intention that we do
not refer to the Hague and the Visby Rules (q) exception. We have already made of the principle of presumption of
fault the (q) exception advances, the general principle of multimodal carrier liability under our suggestions so as not
to require specific reference to it under this part. Supra at 271-272 for the (q) exception.
1356 Supra at 228-229. See also the conforming opinion of Chris Gillespie (FIATA President), FIATA Position Paper
(2000) online: Forwarder Law Homepage <http://www.forwarderlaw.c.om/feature/cmigill.htm> (last visited: Sep. 4,
2000).
1357 Supra at 228-230.
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are and realizing that parties may refuse to eliminate the nautical fault exception, Pro
Mandelbaum suggestion on institution of a qualified nautical fault defense seems to offer
a valid 'middle-ground' solution on the way towards uniformity. According to his
suggestion, the ocean carrier will not be exculpated for masters or servants nautical fault
except if he can prove lack of personal control or knowledge of captain or crew's acts in
the operation or the management of the vessel1358. In other words, we eliminate ocean
carrier nautical fault defense except if ocean carrier can prove that he had no personal
knowledge or control of master's or servants acts amounting to a nautical fault. In the
latter case, the nautical fault exception as described in the present study would take
effect1359.
We believe this suggestion operates a fair balance between carrier and shipper
interests since it does not eliminate the nautical fault exception while it places the burden
of proof on the party mostly apt to assume it. At the same time, it partially satisfies
insurance interests concerns on abolition of the nautical fault exception while clearly
heading towards uniformity of multimodal liability by gradually making ocean carriers
count less on this exception.
It is very probable that liability insurers will oppose the qualified nautical fault
defense proposal as disturbing the convenience of currently well-settled reality.
Moreover, the qualified nautical fault defense will probably lead to long litigation
proceedings to determine the conditions that give way to its application, increasing,
therefore, incurred costs. In effect, it is not only that subjectivity exists on whether or not
we are in the presence of a nautical fault, our suggestion also implies determination of
carrier personal knowledge of servant's nautical fault 1360. In the relatively few cases
where the nautical fault defense will appear, ocean carriers will make ardent efforts to
prove absence of knowledge and control of servants acts in order to be exonerated. For
these reasons, we would urge carriers and their insurers to seriously consider elimination
of this exception, a more radical but clear-cut solution heading towards uniformity.
1358 Supra at 229.
1359 Ibid. Annex No. 111, Table No. 12 at cc for our suggestions.
1360 Supra at 229.
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'Perils of the sea' is an ocean specific carrier liability exception that we maintain
as such under our suggestions because of the common elements composing this concept
under Canadian and U.S. legislation and case law1361 . We have noted, however, that to
constitute a sea peril, U.S. case law adopts the position that a sea peril be of extraordinary
nature, unforeseeable and irresistible while Canadian case law does not insist on the
'extraordinary' nature of the incident. The rest of Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions do not
require presence of an extraordinary peril and do not even insist on peril foreseeability to
exonerate carrier1362. Between the two extremes of U.S. and Anglo-Saxon case law,
Canadian cases maintain a median, 'middle-ground' solution balancing shipper and
carrier interests in not requiring sea peril's extraordinary nature but insisting, on the other
hand, on its unforeseeability and irresistibility to exonerate carrier. Other European
maritime nations adopt similar approaches whose main trait is insistence on sea perils
foreseeability element without regard to the incident's extraordinary nature 1363. For the
sake of international, not just bilateral, uniformity it is desirable that U.S. case law takes
the direction of its Canadian counterpart on this issue.
Another Hague and Visby Rules common liability exception adopted as such
under our suggestions is ocean carrier exoneration in case of on-board 'fire, unless
caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier', a cause of damage mostly dreaded by
ocean carriers and most difficult for them to combat1364. U.S. and Canadian fire liability
exception has not given rise to uniform cross-country case law holdings since COGSA
sanctioned U.S. Fire Statute favors ocean carriers in not requiring proof of vessel
seaworthiness before they invoke the benefit of this exception or proof of care for cargo
1361 Supra at 197s. for this exception and its absence in land transport. See Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for our
suggestions.
1362 Supra at 198-199 and 104s.
1363 The Greek Code of Private Maritime Law holds carrier liable for any damage to the cargo "unless the loss or
damage is due to events which could not be avoided, even by exercise of the care of a prudent carrier". This is
particularly significant because it reflects the approach of a major maritime country that has traditionally fostered
shipping trade. Under the plain meaning of the statute, it appears that a foreseeable storm would not exonerate
carrier. For French courts, a sea peril must present the characteristics of force majeure, namely, be external,
unforeseeable (characteristic less influent today before French courts) and insurmountable. Supra at 105-106.
Belgian courts seem to adopt similar a approach. Harry Apostolakopoulos, Navigating in Perilous Water:
Examining the 'Peril of the Sea' Exception to Carrier's Liability under COGSA for Cargo Loss Resulting from
Severe Weather Conditions (1999) online: South Texas Law College Review Homepage
<http://www.stcI.edu/lawrev/Articles/Peril_oCthe_Sealperil_oCthe_sea.html> (last modified: Jan. 25, 2000).
Because domestic case law evolution on the composing elements of the 'sea peril' concept is quite interesting, it
should be closely monitored through codification of case law for uniformity purposes.
1364 Supra at 211 s. Annex No. III, Table 12 at cc for a schematic representation of our suggestions.
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once fire has started1365. The subsequent division of U.S. courts on the issue is to be
contrasted to Canadian uniform holdings abiding by Visby Rules prerequisites (vessel
seaworthiness, absence of negligence) to exonerate carrier for fire 1366.
u.s. Fire Statute, therefore, disturbs uniformity the Hague and the Visby Rules
were meant to promote. Moreover, carrier protection, the raison d'efre of the U.S. Fire
Statute, was attained through enactment of the Hague Rules exonerating carrier in case of
fire 1367. We would, therefore, join certain authors' in concluding that U.S. case law
should conform itself to its Canadian counterpart, which also seems to be what the
majority of jurisdictions apply on the issue1368. For the rest, both countries case law
holdings on what constitutes a 'fire' are very similar and should, therefore, be retained
(i.e. what constitutes 'fire', carrier 'actual fault,)1369.
We have also seen that land BsOL do not contain a 'fire' exception except for
some intermodal rail carrier tariffs (BNSF Intermodal Rules Guide (Item 62.3)) or in case
of contractual extension of ocean carrier liability exceptions to land carriers1370. We
believe that, with time, U.S. and Canadian land carriers may increase contractual use of
the fire exception in multimodal transport, following the example of BNSF railways. The
frequency of its use and its sanction by courts could justify, at some point in time,
classification of the ocean specific fire exception as a common ocean/land liability
exception. The thereby instituted land fire exception may refer to shipper burden of proof
of carrier actual fault with respect to the fire, as it is currently done under the Hague and
the Visby Rules. Historically, however, fire in land transport has not constituted as a
dreadful incident for carriers as fire set on board a vessel, so as to justify presence of said
carrier protective burden of proof137 1. As a result, if, at some point in time, fire is adopted
as a land carrier liability exception, proof of carrier actual fault brought by the shipper
1365 Supra at 212s.
1366 Supra at 214.
1367 Supra notes 1047 and 1044.
\368 Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979) on the need to achieve
uniformity with foreign jurisdictions. However, the Ninth Circuit has recently changed direction contributing to the
already existing complexity with respect to the fire exception. Supra at 213. See also Sandra A. Larkin, "The
Allocation of the Burden of Proof under the Fire Statute and the Fire Exemption Clause of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act" (1996) 20 Tul. Mar. L. J. 403 at 417.
\369 Supra at 212s. U.S. and Canadian courts, however, need to converge their holdings on whether the fire needs to
be the direct or not cause of the loss. Supra note 1053.
\370 Supra at 215-216.
\37\ Ibid.
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may not be needed. The variation in the land and ocean fire exception would be justified
by the historical evolution of the exception in land and ocean transport and would be
compatible with our harmonization concept that respects modal diversities.
Finally, we suggest that ocean carrier 'saving or attempting to save life or property
at sea' liability exception is phrased 'reasonable measures of saving or attempting to
save life or property at sea' 1372. We add the expression 'reasonable measures' so as to
leave no doubt as to the degree of care exerted by carrier in order to benefit from this
exception. 'Reasonable measures' is a Hamburg Rules (art. 5(1)) and a Multimodal
Convention (art. 16(1)) explicit statutory provision1373.
In this respect, we also adopt Hague and Visby Rules ocean carrier exculpation
'any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any reasonable
deviation'1374. COGSA Sec. 1304(4) adds that deviations to unload passengers or cargo
are presumed unreasonable, a rebuttable presumption intended to avoid lucrative
deviations 1375. Intending to clarify currently applicable law, we would suggest inclusion
of the additional provision in the ocean liability exception retained by our proposals. For
the rest, no equivalent public policy to save life or property at sea exists in land transport,
making this exception an ocean specific one1376.
B. Common land-ocean liability exceptions: We maintain, with some variations,
the following liability exceptions to govern ocean and land carrier liability: 'acts of war,
public enemies, riots, civil commotions or insurrections', 'authority oflaw, seizure under
legal processes', 'strikes, locks-out, stoppage of labor', 'acts of God' and 'shipper fault,
cargo, vehicle latent defect and stoppage in transit'. In this way, all liability exceptions
present in ocean, land BsOL and intermodal rail tariffs will be covered by our
suggestions1377.
1372 Supra at 216s. Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for our suggestions.
1373 Supra at 217. Also, under Warsaw Convention art. 20, air carrier was presumed liable unless "all necessary
measures" are taken to avoid damage. Case law interpreted this as "all reasonable measures" as is the case of the
Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Convention. 1999 Montreal Convention intended to replace the Warsaw
Convention (supra note 1250) does not refer to the expression 'all necessary measure' except for delay claims.
1374 Supra at 217s and at note 1078 on deviation and its reasonableness requirement when saving or attempting to
save life or property at sea.
1375 Supra note 1074.
1376 Supra at 218s.
1377 Annex No. I II, Table No. 5-8 at cxc-cxciv for the modal liability exceptions in Canada and the U.S. and Annex
No. III, Table 12 at cc for a schematic representation of our suggestions.
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Let's start with the liability exceptions that have given rise to sporadic case law
and, for the rest, do not seem to engender any controversy cro'ss-modally and cross-
country. Because of their similarity and sporadic use by courts, we would regroup 'acts
of war', 'public enemies', 'riots', 'civil commotions or insurrection', commonly found in
contracts and case law practice cross-modally and cross-country, under one liability
exception entitled 'acts of war, public enemies, riots, civil commotions or
insurrections' 1378. Even though rail intermodal tariffs use much more descriptive terms to
indicate different forms of such events, (acts of civil or military authority, rebellions,
invasion, hostilities), 1379 we believe that the terms herein chosen are generic terms,
representative of events described in the rail tariffs. All these terms conjure up either
images of (civil or international) war or public uprising against the government and
frequently overlap1380. Although case law may be sparse on this exception and a lot of
issues need to be specified, there are certain things that seem to be excluded from its
scope such as the fact that political protests of independent truckers are excluded from
the public enemies exception1381.
Another category of third-party liability exceptions that we will herein retain is the
'authority of law or seizure under legal processes' liability exception, an expression that
seems to effectively enclose in substance different exoneration events contained in BsOL
and tariffs l382. They all presuppose damage done to the cargo or ship due to an act of
governmental authorities or ordinary civil administration of justice and include, in all
cases, quarantine measures 1383. Rail tariffs, usually more descriptive in their terms than
ocean or land BsOL also refer to 'confiscation', 'customs', 'civil or military authority'
1378 We do not use the terms Kings (common law) or Queens (Canadian motor HOL) enemies along with 'public
enemies' because we believe that the term 'public enemies' is more adapted to the present organization of society.
Chosen term intents to cover spherically, without redundancies the conceptual and geographic scope of this
exception. Supra note 940 and accompanying text. See also Annex No. 111, Tables No. 5-8 at cxc-cxciv and Annex
No. 111, Table 12 at cc for a schematic representation of our suggestions.
1379 Supra at 191s. and Annex No. 111, Tables No. 6-8 at cxcii-cxciv.
1380 Ibid.
138l Supra at 193.
1382 Annex No. Ill, Table No. 5-8 at cxc-cxciv and Annex No. Ill, Table 12 at cc for our suggestions. I.e. we do not
use ocean 'restraint of princes' liability exception because we consider it part of the 'authority of law' exoneration
cause and because it uses archaic language taken from old insurance companies. Supra note 937 and accompanying
text. Seizure under legal processes may not be frequently encountered on land but it is not excluded from land
carriage applications. Supra at 191.
1383 Supra at 190.
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which we consider to be specific examples of the 'authority of law' liability
. 1384
exceptlOn .
'Strikes, locks-out or stoppage of labor' is the last third party exoneration cause of
damage we encounter cross-modally and cross-country and which we retain under our
suggestions1385. Stoppage oflabor seems to regroup 'strike' and strike related concepts on
the basis of Canadian and U.S. case law1386. In all cases, 'strikes' in the U.S. and Canada
require a concerted employee's action against the employer in the presence of a labor
dispute or concerted employees' action against the government1387. The term 'strikes'
seems to include 'picketing' by definition1388. The ocean and Canadian rail term 'locks-
out' indicating employer's refusal to give work to his employees in order for them to
accept certain working conditions, is not widely used in U.S. land transport case law that
does not, however, reject it1389. Our desire to retain whatever seems to be common to all
modes in both countries while maintaining the scope BOL drafters intended to give each
of these exceptions, makes us retain 'strikes, locks-out or stoppage oflabor' to exonerate
carrier.
In the absence of case law definition of the term 'labor disturbances' we find in
the CP and BNSF intermodal tariffs, it is doubtful whether its use by rail intermodal
tariffs is intended to describe or enlarge the 'strike' concept1390. Canadian and U.S. case
law has indicated that when there is no legal definition of a term, it will be used by courts
for descriptive purposes only1391. Since the content of this liability term is not clearly
defined to determine whether cross-modal and cross-country case law sanctions it, we
cannot presently include it in suggested list of liability exceptions. Close monitoring and
codification of case law could change our conclusion at a later time.
\384 Supra note 937 and Annex No. III, Tables No. 5-8 at cxc-cxciv.
\385 Supra at 193s. Annex No. III, Table No. 5-8 at cxc-cxciv, Annex No. III, Table 12 at cci for our suggestions.
\386 Supra at 193.
\387 Supra at 193-194. Innocent carriers are also targeted by strikes. Supra note 957 and accompanying text.
\388 Supra note 193-194.
\389 Supra note 955.
\390 The term is used in CP Intermodal Container Tariff 7690-E under 'Liability of Carrier' (Annex No. I, Table No.
8 at xcv) and BNSF Intermodal Rules & Policies Guide Item 62.1.a. Annex No. III, Table No. 7-8 at cxcii-cxciv. No
legal definition of this term was found in case law. On the contrary, the term 'picketing' is legally defined in U.S.
and Canadian case law. Supra note 955.
\39\ Canada: Re Tileo Plastics Ltd v. Skurjat et al. Attorney-General [1966], 2 O. R. 547 (ant. H. C. J.) that
concluded in this way with respect to the terms 'parading' (not given a legal definition) and 'picketing' (legally
defined). U.S.: Hamlingv. Us., 418 U.S. 87 (U. S. Cal. 1974).
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One further observation needs to be made with regard to our 'strikes locks-out or
stoppage oflabor' exception. U.S. COGSA explicitly conditions presence of the 'strikes'
exception on absence of carrier negligence, an element already built into all carrier
exoneration causes in ocean and land transport 1392. We find U.S. COGSA additional
reminder of this element superfluous, since it is not intended to clarifY an unsettled case
law question. Consequently, 'strikes, locks-out or stoppage of labor' will not be
accompanied by any such additional provision under our suggestions.
'Shipper fault, cargo, vehicle latent defect and stoppage in transit': While names
may vary cross-modally and cross-country with respect to cargo inherent vice ('inherent'
or 'goods defect or nature', 'natural shrinkage'), cargo latent defect is the name we will
retain to indicate cargo hidden weaknesses, including natural shrinkage1393 . We have seen
that cross-modal and cross-country case law on transported goods latent defect (often
phrased inherent vice) is very similar, with cross-references made between U.S. and
Canadian court decisions: similar definitions, same burden of proof ultimately burdening
shipper, clean BOL insufficiency to establish prima facie case, absence of carrier and
servants negligence1394.
In intermodal transport, defect of shipper provided containers exonerates carrier
either on the basis of explicit intermodal rail tariff provisions or on the basis of cross-
modal and cross-country case law1395 . A container defect is also described as a 'vehicle
defect' in certain intermodal rail tariffs 1396. Our retention of a 'vehicle defect' as a
multimodal carrier liability exception, however, does not only refer to containers as
vehicles but also to vessels and land vehicles such as rail vehicles and trucks. In this
sense, the adopted exception operates extension of the Hague and Visby Rules latent
(vessel) defect exoneration cause to land transport1397. In effect, our 'vehicle defect'
liability defense indicating rail vehicle and truck latent defects, does not presently make
1392 Supra at 194. Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cc for our suggestions.
1393 Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cci. Supra at 204-205 for natural shrinkage being a form of cargo latent defect.
We choose the name 'cargo latent defect' to oppose it to suggested 'vehicle latent defect' we herein retain. Note that
the denomination retained somewhat differs from the ones used by Canadian and U.S. case law. Supra note 1008.
1394 Supra at 204-205.
1395 Supra at 205-206.
1396 BNSF Intermodal Rules & Policies Guide (Item 65) and injine of the tariff under 'Definitions of terms' Annex
No. I, Table No.6 at lxxv.
1397 We are talking here about in transit roadworthiness and seaworthiness. Supra at 206-207 for the latter.
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part of U. S. and Canadian land BsOL, tariff liability exceptions or common and civil law
carrier liability defenses1398.
One cannot argue, however, that a land 'vehicle defect' carrier liability exception
is. deprived of a case law bearing. Common and civil law cases on land transport of
passengers do not hold carrier (or debtor in general) liable for latent vehicle defects not
discoverable through exercise of due diligence1399. Moreover, in property cases, the
owner or occupier of a dwelling who cannot discover its latent defects by exercise of
reasonable care will not be held liable for injuries sustained to invitees, licensees, brief,
business or social visitors as a result of property's latent defects 14oo. In other words, U.S.
and Canadian common law jurisdictions as well as Quebec case law will exonerate the
operator of an instrumentality containing an inherent defect which cannot be discovered
by operator's exercise of due diligence. We believe it's only fair to reason by way of
analogy in land carriage of goods and excuse land carriers for latent vehicle defects not
discoverable by reasonable care. For this reason, we suggest that latent vehicle (vessel,
truck, rail vehicle) defects constitute a common land/ocean carrier liability exception in
multimodal transport.
Shipper fault is another liability exception we encounter cross-modally and cross-
country and which can put on countless different masks. Intermodal rail tariffs will
disclaim carrier liability if containers do not meet weight, height or other specification
requirements without always referring to an express 'shipper fault' liability exception1401.
Despite its different manifestations, U.S. and Canadian case law seems to maintain very
1398 A 'vehicle defect' cannot qualify as an 'act of God' (or French 'force majeure' translation) or 'inherent vice'
incident under U.S. and Canadian land BsOL or common law provisions. Also art. 2049 of the Quebec Civil Code
on carrier exoneration causes only refers to force majeure, goods inherent vice and natural shrinkage. Supra note
1024. Quebec non transport case law commenting on latent vehicle defect and the force majeure concept treats the
two notions separately as pertaining to two different worlds. Groupe Commerce (Le) Compagnie d'Assurances v.
Duchesne [1993], R. R. A. 375 (S. C. Q.). This exception should not be confounded with our analysis on
roadworthiness as developed under Part II, Chapter I, Sec. 1, Par. 1(C), supra at 185-186.
1399 More specifically, case law makes reference to 'reasonable degree of human skill and foresight' and 'ordinary
skill and care' in undertaking the effort to detect the defect. Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse Railroad Co., 18 N.Y.
534 (N.Y.C.A. 1959) (frequently cited thereafter) and Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Chalifoux (1888), 22 S. C.
R. 721 (S. C. C.) (frequently cited thereafter).
1400 U.S.: Riley v. Champion Intern. Corp., 973 F. Supp. 634 (E. D. Tex. 1997) and "Premise Liability" 59 Tex. Jur.
3d at § 24 (1999) online: WESTLAW (Tp-all). Canada: Hawkins v. Botyanski [1987], O. J. No. 1419 (Ont. D. C.),
Kennedy et af. v. Hanes et al. [1940], O.R. 461 (Ont. C. A.). Quebec: Huot v. Montreal (Ville) [1999], J.Q. no 2989
(Que.S.C.) referring to other cases and Rubis v. Gray Rocks Inn Ltd (1982), 1 R. C. S. 452 (S.C.C.) on appeal from
the Quebec Court of Appeals.
1401 Supra note 1026 and accompanying text.
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similar principles on what constitutes a shipper fault, the weight and type of proof needed
to condition its presence1402 . We cannot but retain these common elements.
The only notable difference between the U.S. and Canada on this point is carrier
right to invoke shipper fault vis-a.-vis third parties when shipper has acted fraudulently
and knowingly (U.S. ocean), just fraudulently (Canadian-U.S. land transport) or
knowingly (Canadian ocean, art. 4.5(h)), Hague (4(5) in fine) and Visby Rules (5(h)) in
misstating nature or value of the goods 1403 . This aspect of shipper fault does not seem to
constitute a major contentious topic in practice so that analyzing said concepts of shipper
fraud or knowledge would exceed the length of the present study without substantially
advancing uniformity. Evolution of case law on this point should be closely monitored
for harmonization purposes.
The extended scope of the shipper fault liability exception is not as far reaching as
that of the stoppage in transit. This carrier liability defense transfers risk of loss to the
shipper or other party entitled to stop the goods in transit. Ocean conventions and statutes
may not always explicitly provide for this liability exception but case law sanctions this
carrier exoneration cause1404 . We cannot, therefore, but classify it as a common
land/ocean carrier liability exception following case law principles U.S. and Canada
follow on the issue1405 .
'Acts of God' is the only liability exception we encounter cross-modally and
cross-country without the slightest variation in wording. We herein adopt it as such.
Reputed to be a 'catch-all' liability exception, both U.S. and Canadian cases require it to
constitute a natural cause of damage, unforeseeable, irresistible and distinguished from
sea perils 1406. We cannot but retain these common elements.
BNSF intermodal rail tariff refers to specific 'acts of God' events such as floods,
earthquakes, high winds ... 1407. One could suggest, in this respect, that dressing a list of
events that may constitute 'acts of God' could be helpful in identifying 'acts of God'
1402 Supra at 208-210. Fort his exception see also Annex No. 111, Table No.12 at cci.
1403 Supra at 209.
1404 Supra at 210.
1405 Annex No. 111 Table No.12 at cci.
1406 Supra at 195s. These elements give way to a discussion on the concepts of force majeure and absence of
negligence that we will take up on as follows. Annex No. 111, Table No.12 at cci for our suggestions.
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incidents. We do not agree with such reasoning because of the simple fact that there are
myriads of events that can qualify as 'acts of God'. It is preferable, in this regard, to
clearly discern the components of an 'act of God' event and then apply the retained
criteria to different factual situations. Such an approach is more flexible and practical
than any 'acts of God' event list.
Paragraph 3: The Concept of Force Majeure: We have seen that, while certain
ocean and land carrier liability exceptions constitute force majeure events in the province
of Quebec, all cross-modal and cross-country carrier liability exceptions require proof of
absence of negligence in order for them to take effect1408 .
Both force majeure and absence of negligence concepts need proof of
unforeseeability and irresistibility of the harm-causing event exculpating carrier1409. In
general terms, absence of negligence is a much broader concept than that of force
majeure since it does not necessarily require proof of the cause of loss as force majeure
does 1410. However, this argument is not valid when reasoning in terms of specific
land/ocean carrier liability exceptions where proof of the cause of loss needs to be made
by the carrier in all cases1411 .
This is not to say that the concepts of force majeure and absence of negligence are
synonymous when referring to specific liability exceptions. We have seen that although
authors argue that force majeure external cause of damage element is not particularly
important, there are a number of carrier liability exceptions that do not qualify as force
majeure causes because they are not external causes of damage 1412. Despite this fact, we
find that further convergence of absence of negligence and force majeure concepts is not
required for the purposes of our study. In effect, what shippers and carriers are interested
in, is less how many liability exceptions qualify or not as force majeure, and more what
are the minimum general requirements for a non listed cause of damage to enter the
1407 Annex No. I, Tables No.6 at lxix and Annex No. III, Table No.8 at cxciv.
1408 Supra at 201-202 for force majeure liability exceptions. For proof of absence negligence with respect to
individual liability exceptions see supra at 195s.
1409 Supra at 202.
1410 For the required proof for the absence of negligence concept see supra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1
and supra note 1323.
1411 Ibid.
1412 Supra at 201-204. We refer to shipper fault, inherent vice etc.
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already existing list of exceptions 1413 . These requirements are that carriers need always
prove the cause of the loss, unforeseeability and irresistibility of the harm-causing event
to be exonerated from liability. If Quebec courts require, in addition, proof of cause's
external element as they currently do for certain ocean and land carrier liability
exceptions, this is what herein suggested case law codification will reveal.
This discussion brings us to the force majeure concept as a separate Canadian rail
(French version of the CN BOL), Quebec motor (Reglement sur Ie camionage) and civil
law ocean (art. 2049 of the Quebec Civil Code) exoneration cause substituting for the
'acts of God' and other land and ocean liability exceptions including the Hague and
Visby Rules (q) exception1414. On the one hand, translation of the 'acts of God' liability
exception into 'force majeure' is misplaced since force majeure is a broader concept than
that of 'acts of God', not being restricted to natural causes of 10SS1415. For this reason,
Quebec rail/motor BsOL and Quebec Civil Code art. 2049 (ocean carriage) 'force
majeure' liability exception needs to be replaced by the 'act of God' liability exception or
other exceptions literally translating English version terms. On the other hand,
exonerating carrier for absence of fault ((q) exception) and for force majeure (art. 2049 of
Quebec Civil Code) is hardly the same thing since we have seen that the latter concept is
more restrictive than the former 1416. Quebec Civil Code provision can probably be
explained by the fact that civil law is not familiar with the absence of negligence
exoneration cause in this context, which it automatically replaces by the 'force majeure'
concept1417. To avoid multiplication of carrier liability regimes and confusion of
concepts, a more faithful replica of Visby Rules liability exceptions should be maintained
by the Quebec Civil Code ocean carrier provisions.
Finally, contractual force majeure clauses found in the U.S. and Canadian
common law provinces enumerate specific exculpating events while civil law force
majeure concept contains a non-exhaustive list of occurrences, except when referring to
1413 This is the personal opinion of the author.
1414 Supra at 200-201. Annex No. I, Tables 5 and 9 at lxiii and cv. We remind, however, the reader that in the
province of Quebec common law applies to the international ocean carriage of goods.
1415 See also supra at 20 Is. for the concept of force majeure.
1416 Supra at 287 and 220.
1417 We should note that this Quebec Civil Code article is a new article of the 1994 Quebec Civil Code that was
intended to conform ocean carrier liability laws of the province with international documents.
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specific statutory or contractual carrier force majeure liability exceptions. Force majeure
clauses and civil law force majeure concept or liability exceptions are not easily
comparable. Force majeure clauses really refer to specific absence of negligence
(unforeseeability, irresistibility) events intended to protect carrier against abnormal risks
of carriage, which may, or may not be external to him1418. Civil law force majeure
concept or liability exceptions, however, refer to unforeseeable and irresistible causes of
damage that must be, in all cases, external to the carrier. Moreover, force majeure clauses
may retain inherent vice as a carrier exoneration cause whereas the civil law force
majeure concept or liability exceptions exclude it from their scope l419 . Finally, force
majeure clauses can be contractually defined or modified to a large extent, contrary to the
civil law force majeure conceptl420. Identity of denomination, therefore, does not
necessarily imply identity of concepts. Shippers and carriers should be aware of this fact.
This is not just a theoretical analysis. Although not frequently encountered in
transport, appearance of force majeure clauses under our suggested principle of
presumption of negligence should not be excluded1421. In effect, in trying to delineate
multimodal carrier liability under the principle of presumption of fault we herein retain,
parties can agree to include force majeure clauses in their BsOL to give parties some
guidance on events exonerating carrier. Because of the civil and common law force
majeure conceptual difference, civil and common law courts will be left to decide
whether incidents under such clauses will be given effect or not1422. Codification of case
law principles that will complement our mentioned analysis reveals, therefore, important.
Moreover, the question of how far parties can go in utilizing force majeure clauses
or contractually limiting carrier liability under suggested presumption of fault principle is
raised. Our suggestions retain a list of carrier liability exceptions accompanying the
adopted principle of presumption of fault. Because of this, parties will probably be less
inclined to make use of force majeure clauses and, perhaps, other contractual limitation
1418 Supra at 202-203.
1419 Supra at 203. On the contrary, U.S. courts have generally not been willing to excuse financially burdensome
performance as an unforeseeable condition beyond the control of the performing party. This, however, could be the
case of the civil law force majeure clause. Marc F. Conley, "A Reassessment of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, a
Case of Temporary Convenience" (1985) 20 Tulsa L. J. 519 at note 153.
1420 Supra at 203-204.
1421 Supra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. I.
1422 Supra at 219-220 on analogous case law conclusion under the (q) exception.
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clauses. Still, the question of how far one can push the presumption of negligence
principle by insertion of force majeure or other limitative clauses remains, since parties
may decide to complement the non-exhaustive list of liability exceptions by such clauses.
Determining the threshold not to be crossed in such a case depends on the specific force
majeure or contractual exoneration clauses 1423• This is a question of fact left to the courts
to decide, always keeping in mind that the adopted principle of presumption of fault tends
to be inclusive rather than exclusive of carrier liability defenses and that we have
excluded contractual exemption of carrier liability for negligence. Codification of civil
and common law case law decisions on this point is of crucial importance.
Overall, suggested ocean v. land basis of multimodal carrier liability respects
modal (additional ocean liability exceptions) and cultural (maintenance of civil law force
majeure concept) diversities. It also tries to maintain a fair balance between shipper and
carrier interests. On the one hand, it favors carriers by maintaining the principle of
presumption of fault and instituting exceptions such as the latent vehicle defect. On the
other hand, it protects shippers by suggesting abolition of the nautical fault liability
exception and adopting shipper-protective burden of proof mechanisms under the
adopted principle of presumption of fault 1424•
Section III: Suggestions on Limitation of Multimodal Carrier Liability in the
U.S. and Canada
Since forces shaping multimodal transport are so perplex and intertwined,
different liability limitation suggestions will be examined, choice among which will
depend on the degree of uniformity negotiators intent to reach. We will develop as
follows our suggestions on: Par. 1 uniformity of liability amounts and measures, Par. 2
loss of the limitation benefit, to later focus on the economic analysis of our suggestions
Par. 3.
1423 It is the courts which will decide to what extent contractual force majeure clauses will be permitted in ocean
carriage where contractual limitation of carrier liability is excluded under our suggestions. The latter concept and the
adopted principle of presumption of fault should not be viewed as contradictory since both can co-exist, the
exclusion of the contractual limitation of carrier liability can apply 'subject to' the adopted presumption of fault
principle.
1424 Supra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 for the presumption of fault principle and at 278 for the nautical
fault.
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Paragraph 1: Uniformity of Liability Amounts and Measures: What we need
to find out in the present part of our study is whether divergent liability amounts and
measures (per pound, per container, per package) can be approximated so that one, if
possible, liability limitation amount and measure apply to multimodal carriage. After
presenting the panorama of unimodal liability amounts and measures we will proceed to
approximation of cross-country unimodal limitation measures (A), before concentrating
on approximation of cross-country unimodal limitation amounts (B).
Let's start by observing the different applicable liability limitations. In ocean
transport, U.S. (COGSA) maintains Hague Rules SOO$USD (also SOO$CAD) 'per
package or per customary freight unit' (latter being U.S. specific) whereas Canada (2001
MLA (Schedule III)) applies Visby Rules 666.67 SDR (1332.76$CAD or 83S.74$USD)
'per package or unit' or 2 SDR (2.S0$USD or 3.99$CAD) 'per kilo,1425. Both sets of
rules ban contractual limitation of liability. U.S. and Canadian land carriers are held
liable for all damages sustained to the extent of the goods value unless otherwise agreed
by parties, with the exception of Canadian motor carrier 4.4l$CAD (or 2.77$USD) 'per
kilo' or 2$CAD (or 1.2S$USD) 'per pound' statutory amounts not subject to contractual
limitation1426. In this way, U.S. intermodal rail tariffs presented herein habitually limit
liability to 2S0.000$USD 'per shipment' and Canadian intermodal rail tariffs habitually
maintain a 10.000$CAD (6.289$USD) 'per, (under 40 ft), container' or 20.000$CAD
(l2.S78$USD) 'per, (over 40 ft), container' unless otherwise agreed upon by parties. The
same principle applies to U.S. motor carriers who habitually limit their liability to
2S$USD 'per pound, per piece or 100.000$USD per shipment' unless otherwise agreed
upon by parties. With the exception of Canadian motor carriers, therefore, all other U.S.
and Canadian land carriers do contractually limit their liability.
A. Approximation of cross-country unimodal limitation measures: We will
presently focus on cross-country unimodal uniformity of ocean, rail and motor limitation
1425 Value of the SDR see supra note 247. This is a summary of previously mentioned limitations supra at Part I,
Chapter I, Section I, Par. I that can also be found in Annex No. III, Table No.9, 10, 11 at cxcv-cc.
1426 For the conversion of U.S. to Canadian dollars and vice versa, when this conversion is necessary, we are based
on respective values as of August I, 2002: I$CAD = 0.628$USD and I$US = I.59045$CAD. On August 22, 2003
values have somewhat, but not radically changed to change our calculations. I$CAD = 0.712$USD, I$U.S. =
I.404$CAD, Universal Currency Converter (2003) online: XE. COM Homepage
<http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi> (last modified: continuously).
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measures before intending their cross-country intermodal uniformity.
Although U.S. and Canadian rail intermodallimitation amounts greatly vary, they
both maintain a 'per container' limitation measure in case of damage sustained to the
contents of the container1427. Since we retain common elements present cross-country for
each mode, we adopt the 'per container' limitation measure for the rail segment of the
multimodal journey. For damage sustained to the containers themselves the common
denominator of Canadian and U.S. intermodal rail carriage is 'container depreciated
value' although depreciated value scales vary from one company to the other in the U.S.
and Canada1428. As in the case of the 'per container' rail limitation measure for damage to
the contents of a container, we cannot but adopt container depreciation value to
determine compensation for damage to the containers themselves since both these
limitation measures are common to intermodal rail transport cross-country.
Even though uniform ocean liability measures and amounts apply within each
country's ocean transport, the only thing U.S. and Canadian ocean statutes have in
common is the 'per package' limitation measure. What we have in common we retain
adopting, therefore, the 'per package' measure for ocean carriage1429. For the rest,
liability measures differ. The U.S. COGSA specific 'customary freight unit' is rejected
by Canadian courts, which adopt the Visby 'per unit' and 'per kilo' limitation, the latter
not being present neither in the U.S. COSGA nor in the Hague Rules.
It may be that the U.S. 'per customary freight unit' measure is the only limitation
measure adapted to bulk shipments as Pr. Tetley argues1430. However, we disagree with
replacing the 'per unit' limitation measure of the Hague and the Visby Rules by the 'per
customary freight unit' COGSA limitation measure, mainly because no other country or
international ocean convention seem to have adopted latter limitation. Moreover, draft
COGSA '98 adopting Visby Rules limitations only refers to a 'per package' liability
1427 U.S. intermodal rail tariffs refer to a 'per shipment' limitation measure which is actually a 'per container'
limitation. Supra at 238s.
1428 Supra at 239-240. Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cci for a schematic representation of our suggestions.
1429 Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cci.
1430 Supra note 1238.
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measure without even mentioning the 'per unit' or 'per customary freight unit' measure
(Sec.9(h)(1))1431.
Nor can we entirely agree, however, with Canadian case law position completely
rejecting the 'per customary freight unit' limitation. On the contrary, we trust our general
case law conclusion for both Canada and the U.S. that for container, as for non-container
shipments, parties intention should determine what 'per unit' means unless this frustrates
explicit statutory language i.e. what physically constitutes a package. 'Per customary
freight' unit limitation does not explicitly make part of the Hague or the Visby Rules and
if parties choose to make recourse to it they should be welcomed to do so
notwithstanding statutory domestic provisions or case law interpretations excluding or
including this limitation measure in/from statutes. As a result, if parties decide to use the
freight unit limitation, their intent should be honored, not rejected as in Canadian case
law1432. However, we do not go as far as advocate inclusion of this limitation measure in
domestic statutes (i.e. COGSA) because no international convention or other domestic
laws explicitly provide for it. Parties intention should prime in such a case. This is why
we suggest that the 'per unit' limitation measure (Hague, Visby Rules, MLA) appears
among our suggestions, leaving its interpretation to parties intent. Case law or statutes
cannot substitute for parties intent for something that does not explicitly make part of
international conventions. Transport laws are to be strictly interpreted1433. It is only if no
parties intent exists that courts could supplement rules provisions with their own
interpretations.
Even though our suggestion distances itself from currently applicable U.S. and
Canadian case law conclusions on the issue and leaves interpretation of parties intent in
the hands of courts, parties intent is a common U.S. and Canadian case law criterion
interpreting the 'per package/unit' limitation that could conciliate the two jurisdictions
opposing views on the 'per customary freight unit' measure. Parties intent test has also
been tried before the courts and case law guidelines in this respect exist providing
1431 For all comments concerning the 'per customary freight unit' limitation see supra at 247-248.
1432 Supra at 247. See also Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cci for our suggestions.
1433 U.S.: Robert T. Stephen, "Transportation of StudentslNon-Students" Opinion of the Attorney General (1979)
Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 79-229 online: WESTLAW (All-feds). Canada: (multimodal) Reed Decorative Products
Ltd v. Manchester Liners Ltd [1984], F. C. J. No. 618 (F. C. T. D.).
294
guidance to parties1434. Finally, this criterion is flexible, easily adaptable to technological
advances.
Having adopted the 'per package/unit' measure and rejected explicit reference to
the 'per customary freight unit' to govern ocean carriage, we need to comment on the
Visby Rules kilo limitation measure. The kilo limitation is a weight limitation that does
not make part of the Hague Rules but was intended to relax the harsh Visby Rules
'package' standard and is, otherwise, very popular with u.s. and Canadian motor
carrIers.
In effect, Canadian and u.s. motor carrier limitations adopt a weight measure of
damages with a high U.S. limitation of 25$USD (37.76$CAD) 'per pound, per piece' or
lOO.OOO$USD 'per shipment' and a much lower Canadian limitation of 4.41$CAD (or
2.77$USD) 'per kilo' or 2$CAD (1.25$USD) 'per pound' that U.S. motor carriers envy
and would love to have in their BsOL. As in the case of rail carriers, "per shipment"
means "per container" because motor carrier tariffs for containers are determined on a
"per container" basis 1435. Weight limitation measures ('per pound', 'per kilo ') being
common to both u.s. and Canadian motor carriers, we adopt them to form the basis of
motor carrier liability limitations cross-country. Even though doctrinal discussion may
exist as to whether 'per pound' refers to the weight of the item lost or the weight of the
whole shipment, u.s. and Canadian case law seems to reason on the basis of the former
and this is the solution we herein adopt1436. This is the very essence of the U.S. 'per
piece' limitation measure destined to put an end to the said doctrinal discussion1437.
Because this is a common u.s. and Canadian case law conclusion, reference to the 'per
piece' gimmick under our suggestions will be unnecessary.
Visby Rules, U.S. and Canadian motor carrier weight limitation measure is also
gaining in importance in the U.S. that is debating adoption of the Visby Rules. Moreover,
U.S. and Canadian rail carriers are familiar with this limitation since they may, and
frequently do, incorporate Visby Rules limitations to govern the rail segment of the
intermodal journey. Consequently, weight limitation measures should be seriously
1434 Supra at 244s.
1435 Supra at 231.
1436 On the doctrinal discussion see supra note 1148 and accompanying text.
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considered in a uniform multimodal carrier liability setting. We, therefore, retain them as
one of our multimodallimitation measure suggestions1438.
We also adopt the U.S. and Canadian rail 'per container' (damage to goods) and
container depreciated value (damage to containers) limitation measures to apply to land
(rail-motor) carriers cross-country because we find these limitation measures to be mostly
appropriate for the intermodal transport of goods, mainly involving transport of
containers1439. We do not apply the 'per container' limitation measure to ocean carriers
since U.S. and Canadian ocean 'per package' limitation already contains the 'per
container' limit through parties intent test.
Previously noted suggestions actually consist in putting under the same roof
currently applicable U.S. and Canadian rail and motor carrier liability measures ('per
container' or 'per kilo/pound') and maintain Visby limitation measures ('per package
(containing the 'per container')/unit' or 'per kilo/pound') for ocean carriers. In this way,
an ocean v. land carrier liability measures pattern is created1440.
Even though suggested ocean and land limitation measures share many common
elements, we also suggest that ocean limitation measures herein adopted substitute for
land limitation measures whenever parties contractually agree to extent ocean carrier
limitations to land transport. In effect, ocean carriers are already familiar with the
complexities of the "per package'/'unit" limitations currently applicable to them. If
parties agree to import its intricacies to land transport, as rail carriers may do, that's what
they should get. Otherwise, the simple, clear-cut 'per container' /'per weight' limitation
should apply to land carriers and existing Visby limitations to ocean carriers.
One cannot but wonder why we should maintain or permit extension of ocean
carrier "per package or per unit" limitation measures to land carriers, when such
limitations easily create uncertainties as to the presence and amount of recovery (intent
1437 Supra note 1143.
1438 Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cd for our suggestions.
1439 Ibid.
1440 Note, however, common 'per container' and 'per weight (kilo/pound) limitation measures cross-modally and
cross-country. Ibid. Choosing between the land 'per weight' or 'per container' limit and the ocean 'per package' or
'unit' limitation measures would involve consideration of the shipper protective 'the higher of or carrier beneficial
'the lesser of mentioned measures. Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (2001) online: CIFFA
Homepage <http://www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html> (last visited: Nov. 9, 2001).
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test). Why not do away with them even within the frame of currently applicable ocean
carrier rules and be left with the more clear-cut weight and, perhaps, container
limitation(s) (measures)?1441
Our answer coincides with the main philosophy of our thesis. We are not here to
undo applicable limitations but to build on them. Moreover, by eliminating ocean 'per
package or per unit' limitation measures we are left with one sided weight limitations
which may be too onerous for ocean carriers or too low for shippers, depending on the
shipment. As far as extension of the 'per package/unit' limitation to land carriers is
concerned, it is not as if land carriers are completely foreign to its intricacies. Rail and
motor carriers can, and frequently do, contractually agree with shippers to apply ocean
carrier liability terms to their segment of the multimodal journey. Moreover, certain U.S.
motor carriers such as American Freightways have added in their tariffs (tariff 125-J for
American Freightways) a limitation equal to the lesser of 25$USD 'per pound per
package,l442. Although there are available sources used to define the term 'package', they
do not clearly indicate whether the term designates a container or the contents of the
container, exactly in the same way as with ocean carrier 'per package/unit' limitation
measure 1443 . There is, therefore, a number of important reasons why we do not consider
elimination and do not exclude extension of the ocean 'per package' limitation measure.
A more integrated limitation measure proposal approximating ocean and land
carrier limits could also be envisaged. The lower or higher of either a 'per package/unit' ,
'per container' or 'per weight' limitation could be adopted by land and ocean carriers
alike. This uniformity suggestion puts together currently applicable cross-modal and
cross-country applicable limitation measures. Adoption of a "per container" limitation in
1441 Elimination of the package limit and maintenance of clear cut weight limitation is also some authors position.
Ibid. and Tony Young, CIFFA Submission To Transport Canada: the DECD's Maritime Transport Committee
Workshop in Paris (Jan. 25-26, 2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/downloads/submission/CIFFA_Submission.pdf> (last visited: Feb. 20, 2001).
1442 Rules Tariff 125-J (Item 420(1)(2» Carrier Liability Coverage (2001) online: American Freightways Homepage
<http: www.af.com/tariff125/carrierJiability_coverage.htm> (last visited: Aug. 7, 2001). Annex No. I, Table No.4
at 1. U.S. motor limitation measures are normally defined as 'per pound, per piece or per shipment'. American
Freightways retains a limitation 'per pound per package or per incident'. The package limitation also applies in case
of excess liability coverage contracted by shippers of American Freightways.
1443 This seems to be the current practice. Interview of the author with American Freightways Freight Claims
Personnel member (Feb. 7, 2002) who read to us the package limitation definition of the National Motor Freight
Classification (NMFC) where BsOL are published and one of the sources the company uses for guidance in defining
terms. Unfortunately, this document is not available to us. The person noted that this definition can be interpreted to
mean both the container itself or the contents of the container. Ibid.
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ocean carriage would end ocean case law controversy of whether a container constitutes a
package or not. In effect, the fact that a separate 'per container' limitation would be
adopted would mean that the 'per package' measure does not refer to containers as it may
currently be interpreted to mean so. Adoption of the 'per package'/'unit' limitation in
land carriage where the 'per container' limit already applies would produce same effect.
For the rest, parties intention would determine what constitutes a 'package' or 'unit',
notwithstanding freight unit limitations, as long as it does not contravene explicit
statutory language1444. Case law codification determining parties intent on applicable
measures could enhance clarity in their determination.
Suggestions of uniform limitation measures become a dead letter when not
accompanied by suggestions of uniform limitation amounts.
B. Approximation ofcross-country unimodal limitation amounts: Let's now move
to limitation amounts and see if and how harmonization can work its way around here.
Ocean carrier limitations differ in the U.S. and Canada, the former applying the
500$USD (also 500$CAD) 'per package or unit' Hague Rules limitation while the latter
maintaining the 666.67SDR (835.74$USD or 1332.76$CAD) 'per package or unit' or 2
SDR (2.50$USD or 3.99$CAD) 'per kilo' Visby Rules limitation1445. Rail carrier
limitation amounts greatly differ in the U.S. and Canada. From the exceedingly high U.S.
250.000$USD 'per container' for the contents of each container we go down to
20.000$CAD (12.578$U.S.) or 1O.OOO$CAD (6.289$USD) 'per container' for Canadian
railways, depending on the size of the container, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties1446. Amounts and depreciation value scales also differ between the U.S. and
Canada in case of damage to the containers themselves1447. Finally, motor carrier
limitation amounts greatly vary, with U.S. motor carriers applying a 25$USD 'per pound,
per piece' or lOO.OOO$USD 'per shipment' whereas their Canadian counterparts maintain
4.41$CAD (or 2.77$USD) 'per kilo' or 2$CAD (or 1.25$USD) 'per pound'. By
1444 This proposal is considered unlikely to occur for the time being because, as Tony Young suggests, ship owner
interests are absolutely intransigent to any extension of their liability scope beyond the ship's rails, while
governments are unlikely to modify their inland liability laws with a "per package" limitation. Tony Young, CIFFA
Commentary on the CMI Singapore Conference on Issues of Transport Law (2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_singapore.html> (last visited: Nov. 9, 2001).
1445 Supra note 247 and accompanying text for the SDR limitation measure.
1446 Supra note 1426 for the conversion rate between the Canadian and U.S. dollars.
1447 Supra at 239-240.
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contractual agreement ocean carner limitations may be 'imported' to motor or rail
carriage in case of multimodal transport. The contrary, however, the extension of land
carrier limitations to the ocean carriage would only be possible if such limitations
increase ocean carrier liability since both the Hague and the Visby Rules prohibit its
contractual limitation.
In harmonizing divergent liability limitation amounts we do not aspIre at
proposing one limitation amount to apply to all multimodal carriers. We will, rather,
compare presently applicable cross-modal and cross-country limitations to make some
useful suggestions towards uniformity.
Because rail and motor carriers can contractually 'import' ocean carrier limitations
to their segment of multimodal carriage, authors have suggested that the easiest path
towards multimodal uniformity would be to extend ocean carrier limitations to land
carriers, a practice to which mainly rail carriers have usually recourse1448. Such a solution
would really do away with all anxieties as to what limitation measures or amounts would
apply or whether contractual limitation of multimodal carrier liability would be possible.
In all cases, ocean carrier rules would take effect.
On the other hand, however, subjectivity ofjudge's decisions of what constitutes a
'package' or 'unit' and low ocean carrier limitation amounts would be imported to land
carriage. Land shipper and carrier interests would have to consent to such an extension.
Their consent might be hard to get since U.S. motor shipper protective limitations would
be ceded with difficulty to adopt lower and different ocean ones. For the rest,
governments seem to oppose such a perspective1449. Although such an evolution towards
uniformity should not be excluded1450, obstacles on adoption of ocean carrier liability
amounts by land carriers will not be that easy to overcome.
Let's now examine another way towards multimodal uniformity. Since Canadian
1448 Opinion countered by Tony Young, CIFFA Submission To Transport Canada: the DECD's Maritime Transport
Committee Workshop in Paris (Jan. 25-26, 2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/downloads/submission/CIFFA_Submission.pdf.> (last visited: Feb. 20, 2001).
1449 Ibid.
1450 See supra at 58s for the negotiations on the CMI draft document and similar proposals on extending ocean
carrier liability to land carriers. This is also the opinion of Jonathan Rodriquez-Atkatz, "Apportionment of Risk in
Vessel and Marine Terminal Contracts" (1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 497 at 512.
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motor carrier 4.41$CAD (or 2.77$USD) 'per kilo' or 2$CAD (or 1.25$USD) 'per pound'
limitation approximates Visby Rules weight limitation of 2SDR = 3.99$CAD or
2.50$USD 'per kilo', uniformity between these two does not seem hard to negotiate.
This, however, only indicates a partial uniformity on a 'per kilo' or 'per pound' (per
weight) basis between the Visby Rules and Canadian motor carrier limitations. In effect,
Visby Rules and Canadian motor carrier weight limitations differ from all other currently
applicable land and ocean carrier limitation amounts1451.
The great divergence in applicable land and ocean carrier limitation amounts and
the considerable shipper and carrier resistance to work on uniformity in this regard do not
permit us to go further with our harmonization efforts. We cannot but urge interests
involved to negotiate mutually beneficial limitation amounts to shape at least the most
modest approach of multimodal uniformity [ocean (Visby) v. land pattern (per container,
per weight)].
To demonstrate how difficult it is to harmonize liability limitation amounts cross-
country even when reasoning within one mode, we will briefly examine the failed
initiative of the North American Committee on Surface Transportation to create a
Uniform Transborder Motorfreight Through Bill of Lading (UTMTBL) to govern motor
carrier liability throughout the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The working group of this
committee proposed three possible levels of liability: CMR and FBL 8.33SDR 'per kilo',
(23$USD 'per pound' or 16.65$CAD 'per kilo'), or 2.00$CAD 'per pound' or 1 S.D.R.
(1.25$USD and 1.99$CAD), or leave the level of liability to the discretion of the
parties1452. If we pay closer attention to these limitation amounts, we observe that CMR
8.33SDR approximates currently applicable U.S. motor carrier 25$USD 'per pound'
limitation amount whereas proposed 2.00$CAD 'per pound' is the Canadian limitation
for motor carriers. The third proposal consisting in contractually defining motor carrier
liability under the UTMTBL, leans towards U.S. principles of definition of motor carrier
liabilityl453. Country, carrier and shipper delegates did not agree on uniform amounts
proposed. Canadian delegation proposed limitation amounts that would differ according
1451 See supra at 297 for the summary presentation of all applicable unimodal limitations in rail, ocean and motor
carriage. Annex No. III, Table No.9, 10, II at cxcv-cxcviii for a table representation of same.
1452 Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in
North America (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Interamerican Free Trade, 1996) at 93-96.
1453 Supra at 178.
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to the country of origin whereas U.S. shippers, benefiting from the highest liability
limitation, contended that current rules should apply1454. This demonstates, once more,
that the dispute in adopting North American motor carrier limits is one between carriers
and shippers and their unwillingness to negotiate uniform liability amounts and measures.
Despite this fact, efforts undertaken to elaborate a Uniform Transborder
Motorfreight Through Bill of Lading have not been made in vain. In effect, a new
uniform BOL respecting currently applicable domestic laws of motor carriage at the
NAFTA level is now near completion and will be available to carrier and shippers early
in 2004. The document does not advance a unified motor carrier liability regime at the
regional level, it is rather a uniform document that is intended to clarify applicable rules
for trans-border motor shipments1455.
Let's now summarize our conclusions on limitation of multimodal carrier liability.
Although more integrated schemes may be envisaged, the most recommended approach
towards uniformity of U.S. and Canadian multimodal carrier liability would be, in our
opinion, to bring together land carrier limits and measures of liability and, for the rest,
maintain separate ocean transport rules (ocean v. land carrier pattern). Even though we
arrived at shaping such a pattern for liability limitation measures, we could not reach
same solution for liability limitation amounts.
Paragraph 2: Loss of the Limitation Benefit. Even though there is doctrinal
discussion on loss of various carrier liability benefits in case of serious breach and/or
gravity of carrier fault, loss of carrier liability limitation benefit will essentially retain our
attention since this is U.S./Canadian case law and statutory provisions main fOCUS 1456. In
this part of our study we will first focus on the necessity of a loss of limitation benefit
provision under our suggestions (A) before presenting our ocean v. land loss of carrier
limitation benefit suggestion (B).
1454 Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, Gary T. Doyle, Lie. Martin Gerardo Olea Amaya, Transportation Law and Practice in
North America (Tuscon, Arizona: National Law Center for Interamerican Free Trade, 1996) at 93-96.
1455 The advantage the new BOL provides is the use of a single document at the regional level. This document will
also be available in electronic form. Interview of the author with Franc;ois Rouette, transportation law attorney in
Quebec-City and Montreal, Flynn Rivard & Associates (July 4, 2003) tel: (514) 288-7156 and (418) 692-3751. Mr.
Rouette informs us that further information on this document is not yet available to the public.
1456 On this discussion see supra note 1247 and accompanying text.
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A. Loss of the Limitation Benefit: Necessary?: Before intending to harmonize
presently applicable doctrines and laws on loss of carrier limitation benefit, we will have
to ask ourselves whether or not we even need such doctrines and laws. Of course we do,
one could say! Both countries have such doctrines and laws and you base your
suggestions on existing applicable rules so that reasoning in another manner contravenes
the very foundations of your analysis. This is correct, we are committed to harmonizing
presently applicable rules. We would like, however, to extrapolate, once more, into the
future to take a taste of what ocean carrier loss of the limitation benefit might be one day,
based on our present knowledge.
Presently in force 1999 Montreal Protocol No.4 amending the 1929 Warsaw
Convention as amended by the 1955 Hague Protocol governing air transport of cargo,
persons and luggage, eliminated Warsaw/Hague Protocol loss of air cargo carrier liability
limitation benefit provision that the Visby Rules practically copied1457. This means that
air cargo carrier intentional or voluntary (inexcusable) fault no longer operates loss of its
limitation benefit. Since this Warsaw provision was intended to exclude consideration of
all former doctrines denying carrier the limitation benefit, elimination of the Warsaw loss
of limitation benefit provision for air cargo carrier, results in elimination of every
possible doctrine that produces this effect. 1999 Montreal Protocol No. 4 air cargo
limitation amounts become, therefore, unbreakable in an effort to reduce insurance and
settlement costs1458 . This inevitably makes one wonder if ocean carriers will, one day,
share the same fate as air carriers presently do under the 1999 Montreal Protocol No.4.
Considering that the Visby Rules essentially copied the Warsaw Convention, next step
for ocean carriers could be absence of loss of their limitation benefit, a very protective
air, as ocean, carrier provision.
We believe that intentional or voluntary (inexcusable) carrier faults are not just
any types of faults from which carriers should be excused. Cross-modal and cross-
country laws and courts punish such carrier behavior in order to dissuade carrier similar
1457 On these protocols and conventions see supra note 1250 and accompanying text.
1458 This was Montreal Protocol No. 4 drafters intention in increasing carrier liability amounts and eliminating
Warsaw Convention air cargo carrier loss of limitation benefit provision. Warren L. Dean, "Aviation Liability
Regimes in the New Millennium: Beyond the Wild Blue Yonder Air Carrier Liability for International Air Cargo
Shipments in the 21st Century" (2001) 28 Transp. L. J. 239 at 247.
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actions 1459. Permitting limitation of ocean carrier liability in case of such behavior really
means encouraging him to neglect cargo since, even in the worst case, he can limit his
liability1460.
This is not to say that laissez-faire policies and transport deregulation do not have
a preventive effect on cargo damages. We agree with Pro Ramberg that accentuated
carrier competition following transport deregulation is a more realistic motive than fear
ofliability for carriers to be attentive ofthe cargo 1461 . Nonetheless, and although we have
already affirmed that we are not here to impede uniform definition of carrier liability
through deregulation and competition among carriers, we do not accept these trends to
substitute for legal rules governing multimodal transportl462 . We believe that law should
set the basic uniform carrier liability rules that competition could support or complement
and upon which insurance companies should base their allocation of risks. In this sense,
punishment of intentional or willful faults is very much a legal concern, also supported
by deregulatory carrier practices. No doubt should be left that law does punish carriers
for such types of behavior.
After this rough landing on the return trip from what ocean carrier loss of
limitation benefit could be in the future, let us concentrate on existing cross-modal
realities in the U.S. and Canada.
B. Ocean v. Land Loss of Carrier Limitation Benefit: Unreasonable deviation,
mainly restricted to geographical deviation will only deny ocean and land carriers their
1459 Laws and court decisions deter carrier unreasonable conduct. Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5
Health. L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 (QUICKAW-JOUR).
1460 We should note, in this regard, that if, at some point in time, a regime similar to the 1999 Montreal Protocol No.
4 (air transport) governs ocean carriage, land and ocean regimes would be really polarized since ocean carrier
limitation benefit would be unbreakable while, for the rest, land carriers would be subject to existing loss of
limitation benefit doctrines. This adds to the reasons why the 1999 Montreal Protocol No.4 should not be
considered as an alternative for ocean carriage. See also supra note 54.
1461 Jan Ramberg, "The Law of Carriage of Goods, Attempts at Harmonization" (1974) 9 Eur. Transp. L. 1 at 39 and
Jan Ramberg, "Freedom of Contract in Maritime Law" (1993) L. M. C. L. Q. 178 at 191. Mr. David Peck is much
more explicit on this point. He argues that losses due to carrier fault are not profitable for carriers because they
reduce profitability on the shipments. They are also not profitable for liability insurers because they increase liability
insurance costs. They are, finally, not profitable for cargo insurers because their major controllable expense is cargo
damages. The author goes even further suggesting that carrier liability is one of transaction costs and that we should
not worry about regulating it because competition effectively allocates liability. David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis
of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier, or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 94, 98
and 101.
1462 It is law that should organize the marketplace by correcting distortions and not the other way round. By
correcting distortions, law organizes a more efficient market. Boris Kozolchyk, "On the State of Commercial Law at
the End of the 20th Century" (1991) Ariz. J. Int'l & Compo L. 1 at 1.
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liability limitation benefit in the U.S.. This is very much a carrier protective provision. In
Canada, a distinction is made between land transport and the Visby Rules. The Visby
Rules insist on carrier mens rea, namely, presence of intentional or willful misconduct
(inexcusable fault in Quebec) to deprive him of its limitation benefit. In Canadian land
transport fundamental breach, an intentional or willful breach going to the root of the
contract, will disallow carrier the limitation benefit in common law provinces whereas in
Quebec, rupture de contrats, (also including gross negligence as type of carrier
misconduct), will produce same result1463 .
The larger scope of envisaged breaches makes Canadian land carrier loss of
limitation benefit doctrines more shipper protective than U.S. unreasonable deviation,
which is mainly restricted to geographical deviations. We have already affirmed that the
rupture de contrats doctrine is broader and, therefore, more shipper protective than that of
fundamental breach1464. We can conclude, therefore, that, overall, U.S. loss of limitation
benefit doctrines and concepts are carrier protective whereas their Canadian land carrier
counterparts are more shipper protective with Quebec maintaining the most shipper
protective provisions compared with the rest of Canada and the U.S. 1465 .
If the U.S. adopts the Visby Rules, as it is currently considering doing under draft
COGSA 1998 or otherwise, Canada and the U.S. would apply identical provisions to
ocean carriage, operating loss of carrier limitation benefit only in case of its intentional or
willful misconduct1466. U.S. Hague Rules unreasonable deviation doctrine would,
therefore, be eliminated and uniformity with Canadian ocean transport would be achieved
through adoption of identical rules 1467. To leave no doubt as to the scope of these
concepts, intentional fault would imply, under our suggestions, presence of intention to
act in an inappropriate manner and not intention to cause damage1468. Willful fault would
1463 Supra at Part II, Chapter I, Section II, Par. 1(C), Par. 2(B), Par. 3(B). Annex No. III, Table No.9, II at cxcvi and
cxcix.
1464 Supra note 1160.
1465 Compare provisions in Annex No. III, Tables No.9, II at cxcvi and cxcix.
1466 See Annex No. III, Table No. 12 at cci for our suggestion. Similar to the Visby Rules provision is contained in
art. 8(1) of the 1978 Hamburg Rules, art. 21(1) of the 1980 Multimodal Convention, COTIFICIM art. 44, FBL
clause 8.9 and CMR art. 29 which refers to 'willful misconduct or default equivalent to willful misconduct'. On
different interpretations of European courts in this regard, see supra at 106s.
1467 The Visby Rules supplanted formerly applicable Canadian fundamental breach as far as the loss of ocean carrier
limitation benefit is concerned. Supra at 252-253.
1468 Although it is not clear whether Canadian (including Quebec) and U.S. case law define 'intentional fault' in the
same manner, an 'intent to act' seems to constitute the common requirement of all these countries definitions (supra
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underline a voluntary (inexcusable) fault, which means to say, knowledge that damage
would probably result.
In land transport, however, loss of carrier limitation benefit would still range from
carrier protective U.S. unreasonable deviation to more shipper protective Canadian
fundamental breach and most shipper protective Quebec rupture de contrats doctrines.
Between the two extremes of carrier protective U.S. unreasonable deviation and shipper
protective Quebec rupture de contrats, lies Canadian common law fundamental breach
concept (middle ground solution). Not being fair to favor either carrier or shipper
interests by opting for one of the two extremes, we suggest that land case law in both
countries be directed towards Canadian common law fundamental breach to condition
loss of land carrier limitation benefit.
Our proposal results in an ocean (Visby) v. land (fundamental breach) carrier loss
of limitation benefit pattern. Visby Rules concentrate on carrier mens rea (state of mind:
intentional or willful misconduct) while fundamental breach also requires shippers to
prove a breach that goes to the root of the contract1469. The more shipper protective Visby
Rules provision could be explained by the fact that higher and more diversified ocean
risks make less predictable ocean carrier reaction to a given set of circumstances
requiring, therefore, a more favorable burden of proof given to the ocean, than the land,
shipper.
Adopting our middle ground solution involves U.S. courts abandoning the
unreasonable deviation doctrine in favor of Canadian fundamental breach. It also
involves Quebec case law abandonment of the shipper protective concept of carrier gross
negligence. This opposes our harmonization approach which is respectful of modal and
cultural diversities, as well as authors concurring opinion that imposing one legal system
or tradition on others should be avoided to impede marginalization of these systems and
traditions 1470.
notes 530, 1164, 1176). Our suggestion differs, in this way, from Visby Rules requirement of an intent to cause
damage, a requirement that goes too far according to Pr. Tetley. Supra note 1249.
1469 On fundamental breach and Visby Rules requirements see supra at 252.
1470 Supra note 106 and accompanying text and William Tetley, "Uniformity ofInternational Private Maritime Law-
The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 823.
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However, it is not as ifU.S. case law is not familiar with the common law concept
of fundamental breach that it only chose to restrict to the unreasonable deviation
doctrine 1471 • As far as Quebec is concerned, it is true that one could argue that our
suggestion(s) tend to marginalize Quebec laws and case law principles. Gross negligence,
rupture de contrats and the ban on contractual limitation of motor carrier liability have
been done away with by our suggestions.
Quebec carriers and shippers should not feel isolated by our proposals. It is true
that we sacrificed the ban on contractual limitation of motor carrier liability and the
concept of gross negligence and rupture de contrats on the altar of uniformity but we
preserved civil law force majeure concept that qualifies certain carrier liability
exceptions. Moreover, it is to be doubted whether contracting parties in Quebec will
make use of the contractual limitation of motor carrier liability under our suggestions
since Canada applies the lowest motor carrier limitation amounts and, for the rest,
Canadian motor carriers do not make use, in practice, of such limitations. Finally,
denying land carriers their limitation benefit on the basis of Quebec gross negligence
when under no other U.S. or Canadian jurisdiction occurs the same, would really go too
far in considering this concept in a U.S.lCanadian uniformity perspective 1472• For the rest,
rupture de contrats is not eliminated but simply limited in scope to conform to
fundamental breach standards under our suggestions1473• Harmonization involves some
change in the applicable pattern and we believe that our suggestions are the closest we
can get to existing land carrier legislation in the U.S. and Canada in trying to achieve
uniformity.
We have also noted that there is a question of whether a subjective or objective
standards test should be adopted in appreciating presence of carrier intentional or willful
faults. The objective standards test is based on the conduct of a prudent carrier in general
and not of the carrier in question. It is more uniformity suited since it maintains a
1471 Supra note 1173.
1472 It may be that European civil law jurisdictions reason on gross negligence with respect to COTIFICIM and CMR
loss of land carrier limitation benefit provisions. We have seen, however, that there is a tendency in France to
restrict the scope of ' faute lourde' (gross negligence) in favor of the faute inexcusable (willful misconduct). Supra at
111. More detailed analysis of European jurisdictions cases would be interesting, in this regard, to see what is case
law direction on this issue. Such a comparison exceeds the geographical scope of our study.
1473 Rupture de contrats is a broader concept than fundamental breach but they share common elements see supra
note 1160.
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predictable standard of conduct. The subjective standards test is less predictable and more
inclined to achieve absolute equity and justice on the basis of individual cases1474. One
cannot but side, in heart, with the latter test despite its complexity and subjectivity.
However, since uniformity and predictability of multimodal carrier liability rules are the
primary goals of the present study, we will opt for the objective standards test to
condition presence of carrier intentional or willful fault.
One could then wonder why we do not adopt U.S. draft COGSA '98 uniformity
approach consisting in building into adopted Visby Rules provision the concept of
unreasonable deviation or, following our proposal, the fundamental breach notion1475.
Authors have noted that COGSA '98 provision marries applicable U.S. doctrine of
unreasonable deviation with Visby Rules provision. The new provision seems to render
clearer applicable criteria to the loss of ocean and multimodal carrier limitation benefit
under domestic law1476.
If an analogous suggestion was made for our proposed ocean (Visby) v. land
(fundamental breach) multimodal carrier pattern in Canada and the U.S., multimodal
carrier would be denied its limitation benefit in case of Visby Rules intentional or willful
misconduct or in case of carrier fundamental breach when the carrier knows or should
have known that from his actions damage wouldprobably result. Such a provision would
not alter the fundamental breach concept for the simple reason that intentional and willful
misconduct make already integral part of the fundamental breach concept. On the
contrary, the new provision would render clearer the applicable doctrines to carrier loss
of the limitation benefit. At the same time, suggested provision automatically
demonstrates common ground between the fundamental breach doctrine and said Visby
Rules provision and comparison of the two could lead to a more integrated loss of
limitation benefit rule under our suggestions. Draft COGSA 1998 loss of limitation
benefit provision could, therefore, provide a useful element to consider in pursuing a
more integrated loss of limitation benefit liability provision under our suggestions.
1474 Supra at 251-252 for further analysis and critics of the two tests.
1475 (Sec. 9(h)(3)(D)) of the draft COGSA '98 adopts Visby Rules provision but also operates loss of carrier liability
limitation in case of carrier unreasonable deviation made with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage will probably result. See also supra at 253.
1476 For draft cOGSA 1998 application to intermodal carriers see supra at 169s.
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Suggestions towards uniformity of multimodal carrier loss of the limitation benefit
would be incomplete if we did not comment on the U.S. 'fair opportunity' doctrine1477.
We have seen that if a U.S. carrier fails to notifY shipper of applicable limitations and
give him fair opportunity to declare goods value, he will be denied its statutory or
contractual liability limitation benefit. While all U.S. courts agree on the presence of the
'fair opportunity' doctrine, they are divided in 'actual' and 'constructive' notice
jurisdictions as to the presence of 'express' notice given to all shippers ('actual notice')
or notice based on shipper sophistication ('constructive notice,)1478. In recent years, U.S.
ocean and land case law seem to lean towards the constructive notice test which
approximates Canadian 'sufficient notice' test applicable on the issue, both taking into
account shipper sophistication.
We have already suggested that U.S. courts should end up homogeneously
applying the 'constructive notice' test for uniformity purposes either through Supreme
Court guidance or through its extensive judicial adoption (informal uniformity)1479.
Considering that 'the fair opportunity' doctrine and 'sufficient notice' tests are judicial
constructions, we align ourselves with authors opinion in recommending that appropriate
language in the BOL should exist to indicate the application and the content of the
applicable (converged) 'constructive' or 'sufficient' notice tests 1480.
Conclusion
Summarizing our suggestions so far, we conclude that different degrees of
uniformity of multimodal carrier liability can be attained, with an ocean v. land carrier
liability pattern being the closest possible to present reality constituting, therefore, the
1477 Pro Tetley argues that U.S. 'unreasonable deviation' and 'fair opportunity' doctrine do distance themselves from
foreign jurisdiction criteria operating loss of carrier limitation benefit under the Hague and the Visby Rules. The
author adds that this is a mere nuance of the many that exist in many national interpretations of the rules and which
do not create fundamental divergence in the carriage by sea law of the countries in question. William Tetley, «The
Proposed New U.S. Senate COGSA : the Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law»
(Oct. 1999) 1999 J. Mar. L & Com. 595 at 620. Our geographically restricted, more punctual and detailed analysis
of multimodal carrier liability permits to insist on what authors consider a mere nuance in ocean carrier liability
refsime.
14 8 Supra at 127s.
1479 Supra at 163. Authors agree with what seems to be the case law in the U.S. and Canada on the issue of
contractual definition of carrier liability, namely, that parity of bargaining power should be the primary focus in the
judicial enforceability of contracts. Blake D. Morant, «Contracts Limiting Liability» (1995) 69 Tul. L. Rev. 715 at
758.
1480 Jonathan Rodriquez-Atkatz, "Apportionment of Risk in Vessel and Marine Terminal Contracts" (1989) 64 Tul.
L. Rev. 497 at 511.
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most modest uniformity approach one can make. This uniformity approach is adopted for
our multimodal carrier liability exceptions, liability limitations and loss of carrier
limitation benefit, signaling respect of modal diversities. This, and all alternative
solutions of proposed uniformity are based on harmonization efforts of presently
applicable liability provisions. Where we found absolute carrier and shipper resistance to
negotiate a uniformity suggestion, we urged parties to negotiate and agree on commonly
acceptable solutions. Within suggested ocean v. land multimodal carrier liability pattern
we adopted contractual limitation of land carrier liability and combined it with ocean
carrier regulatory safety net prohibiting such a possibility.
Paragraph 3. Economic Analysis of Suggestions: One cannot formulate uniform
multimodal carrier liability suggestions without considering their costs or which party in
the transport contract, whether it is the carrier or the shipper -or, rather, their insurers-, is
suited to assume more efficiently a change in the current liability pattern. We will,
therefore, examine the allocation of risks and costs of our suggestions (A) but also ponder
over other suggestions made by economists intended to improve intermodalliability (B).
A. Allocation of Risks, Costs and our Suggestions: The questions relevant to
uniformity initiatives and insurance are how expensive insurance becomes and how the
allocation of insurance costs between carriers and shippers is defined on the basis of
undertaken uniformity initiatives1481 . Proper answer to these questions conditions
adoption of uniformity suggestions by insurance companies. What we need to achieve, in
this regard, is an economically justified insurance cost in exchange for an adequate
degree of care undertaken by the carrier1482 and predictability as to the allocation of risks
so that the item on the grocery shelf is not padded with unnecessary legal expenses1483.
One, however, could argue: why should we even bother about the cost of
1481 Stephen Zamora, "Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport" (1975) 23 Am. J.
Compo L. 391 at 393. The author notes that insurance costs are included in the price of the goods. For further details
on 'Law & Economics' see supra at 33.
1482 Saul Sorkin, "Changing Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at 717.
1483 M.E. de Orchis, "Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal Muddle" (1982) 17 Eur. Transp. L. 691 at 706. As Pro
Ramberg notes, what really matters is not where the risk of a certain insurable contingency is placed but, rather, a
clear distribution of risks so that one can determine as accurately as possible where the risk lies. Jan Ramberg, "The
Law of Carriage of Goods, Attempts at Harmonization" (1974) 9 Eur. Transp. L. I at 38. Opinion shared by De Wit
Ralph, Carrier Liability and Documentation in Multimodal Transport (D. Jur. Thesis, Law Faculty of the Vrije
Universiteit at Brussels, 1993) [published by Informa Law and is part of the Lloyd's Shipping Law Library] at 875.
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insurance and allocation of risks since, whatever the cost of insurance may be it will
simply be passed on from carriers to shippers or vice versa? We have seen that redefining
carrier liability does not necessarily reflect an exact same change in cargo and liability
insurance premiums. Definition of insurance premiums is not an exact science 1484.
Absorption of eventual carrier liability increases by liability insurers and the inexact
science of defining cargo insurance premiums can create imbalances in the overall
picture of seemingly exact repercussion mechanisms giving way to fear of change1485. To
the fear to adopt uniform multimodal rules operating uncertain allocation of risks changes
among insurers, we should add insurance companies successful adaptation to existing
complicated multimodal reality, which does not really create a strong motive for change.
This is why we have expressed the opinion that if there will ever be a chance to
convince insurance companies to transform the somewhat controlled multimodal legal
jungle into a freely accessible, smoothly rurming, well structured, safe multimodal
territory for carriers and shippers to venture, this will be done by making gradual, close to
the ground but firm and well defined uniformity proposals. Such solutions would not
exceedingly change present insurance costs or allocation of risks between carriers and
shippers so that insurers would have to think twice before rejecting uniformity initiatives
that intent to sort out the tangled web of multimodallegalliability.
'Law and Economics' also provides a valid motive for our reasoning. In effect,
there are some 'Law and Economics' authors who argue that more risks should be born
by the party to the contract who is more able to mitigate damages caused by the harm-
causing event (superior risk bearer test)1486. This is an economics minded theory that
answers law and economics cost-effectiveness preoccupations. Transposing this logic to
the world of intermodalism, we wonder which one of the liability or cargo insurers is
more capable of mitigating losses or damages to the transported goods.
'Law and Economics' suggests that the person who can predict and prevent the
damage or loss on the one hand, or the one who can more cost-effectively bear the
1484 Supra at 82s.
1485 Ibid.
1486 John Elofson, "The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the
Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests" (1996) 30 Columbia 1. of L. and Soc. Probl. 1 at 11-12.
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damage to or loss of the goods (risk bearer) on the other hand, should carry greater
liability (superior risk bearer test)1487. We will herein comment on both tests.
It is generally thought that a builder who builds many houses each year is m a
better position to spread losses (risk bearer) than the individual buyer1488. Transposing
this line of reasoning to the carrier/shipper relationship, it can be argued that it is
probably the carrier who is the best risk bearer since he can spread the risk of damage or
loss to the many shippers he contracts with, in the same way the builder does when
contracting with many buyers1489. However, most of the time, all damages affecting
goods in transit are settled between cargo and liability insurers who are both capable of
spreading losses to their insureds and are, hence, both good risk bearers1490. As a result,
advanced argument justifYing greater liability to be born by the carrier does not appear to
be that solid at first sight.
It is also thought that liability insurers operate more cost-effectively and,
therefore, more easily absorbing losses than cargo insurers 1491 . This puts liability insurers
in a better position (better risk-bearers) to assume a higher degree of liability. Others,
however, assert that liability insurance is more expensive than cargo insurance1492 so that,
overall, it is hard to conclude whether it is the carrier or the cargo insurers who are the
best risk bearers and can, therefore, assume a higher degree of liability1493. Inability to
1487 David D. Friedman, Law's Order (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press, 2000) at 161.
1488 Ibid at 162. See also the argument that the ability to better mitigate damages depends on the availability of
information (the insurer has of its client's business) and the uncertainty of this test. John Elofson, "The Dilemma of
Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer
Tests" (1996) 30 Columbia J. of L. and Soc. Probl. 1 at 11-13.
1489 Authors argue that if we are to minimize transaction costs and, therefore, final price of the goods, losses should
be allocated to the party who can most cheaply avoid them. David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of
Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 98. Michael F. Sturley,
"Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments About Hague, Visby, and
Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence" (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 119 at 129-130.
1490 In risk allocation we begin with the assumption that when a party is risk-averse and the other is risk-neutral the
risk-neutral party is the best risk bearer and the parties should allocate the risk to him. Between the insured and the
insurance company, the latter is risk-neutral because its very business is the spreading of risk. Jeffrey A. Greenblatt,
"Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie is not Big Enough Who Eats Last?" (1997) 64 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev.
1337 at 1355-1357.
1491 Supra at 82.
1492 Robert Hellawell, "The Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier" (1979) 27 Am. J. Compo L. 357
at 367. Opponents of carrier strict liability argue that cargo insurance is less costly than liability insurance. The
problem is that for all these arguments there is no statistical support. Stephen Zamora, "NAFTA and the
Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: the Side Effects of Free Trade" (1995) Ariz. J. Int'l & Compo L. 401 at
394.
1493 The party who can most cheaply avoid losses cannot easily be determined because of the multiplicity ofliability
regimes in multimodal transport and different characteristics of shipments. Michael F. Sturley, "Changing Liability
Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments About Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of
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determine which party to the transport contract is a better risk bearer justifies, once more,
our view of making gradual steps towards uniformity in allocating risks under our
uniform intermodalliability suggestions.
What about the second 'law and economics' test on prediction and prevention of
risks? It is generally argued that the party with control over some part of the production
process is in a better position both to prevent and to predict 10sses1494• This person may
be the builder as in the above-mentioned example but, depending on the specific fact
pattern, it may also be another person. To better illustrate our conclusion, suppose that a
professional photographer spends six months taking photographs in the Himalayas for a
big magazine at a cost of a hundred thousand dollars. When he gets home he gives the
film for development to the local supermarket that loses it. At first sight, liability lays
with the supermarket that looses the entrusted good, the film. One can, however, validly
argue that it is the photographer who is in the better position to prevent the loss and
should, therefore, be held liable. In effect, knowing the value of the film, the
photographer could have avoided the damage by taking the film to a specialist film lab
and making sure that the proprietor realizes what they are 1495 • As a result, the person who
is in the best position to prevent the loss is the photographer1496•
In the transport contract, one could assert that it is generally the carrier who has
better control of the goods in transit and is, therefore, in a better position to prevent their
damage or loss. In effect, it is the carrier who is the guardian of the transported goods, is
aware of their nature and knows the measures to be taken in this respect considering the
perils to be confronted at sea. The situation is quite similar to that of the supermarket that
holds and loses photographers film. However, we have seen that photographer may be
considered liable too, since he is aware of the value of the film and can reasonably
predict potential damage to it but does not take all the necessary precautions to avoid it.
In the same way, there are cases where shipper (for instance under the 'shipper fault'
Empirical Evidence" (1993) 24 1. Mar. L. & Com. 119 at 130-131. David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the
Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 98.
1494 David D. Friedman, Law's Order (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press, 2000) at 162. When risk
prevention measures are known, as is the case of our example, their adoption depends on whether they are cost-
effective, this means to say, whether the cost of their adoption is lower than the reduction of risk they operate. Ejan
Mackaay, L 'Analyse Economique du Droit (Montreal, Quebec: Editions Themis, 2000) at 173.
1495 David D. Friedman, Law's Order (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press, 2000) at 161-162.
1496 Ibid at 162.
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liability exception) or other parties may be considered liable for not taking all needed
precautions to insure goods safety whenever such precautions are reasonably foreseeable
by him/them. Consequently, one cannot draw a general conclusion on what party,
whether it is the carrier or the shipper, is better situated to predict and prevent damage.
The answer to this question depends on a case-by-case analysis.
We conclude that, overall, one cannot draw general conclusions as to what party to
the transport contract is the best risk bearer or most apt to predict and prevent damages.
As a result, there cannot be a generalized answer as to which party can more easily
assume a greater degree of liability when reasoning on economic terms so as to justify an
eventual increase or decrease in the degree of liability. Hence, we cannot talk about a
most cost-effective allocation of risks in the transport contract. This is one more reason
why, once more, we prefer to keep ourselves the closest possible to the present legal
reality when allocating risks between the carrier and the shipper (pragmatism).
Even if we have affirmed that one can only theorize on the consequences of
uniform multimodal rules on cargo and liability insurance, we will attempt to describe
how our uniformity suggestions operate gradual changes in the present level of insurance
costs and allocation of risks pattern (pragmatism) while keeping a fair balance between
the carrier and shipper interests (fairness)1497.
Adding new 'per container', 'per pound' or 'per package/unit' liability measures
where they did not exist before would probably increase carrier liability and premiums
due to the additional limitation amounts and measures present. Providing for abolition of
the nautical fault defense and compensation of concealed damage would probably
produce same effect. On the other hand, adoption of the principle of presumption of fault
and extension of the latent defect defense to land carriers would probably lessen carrier
liability. The fact that our suggestions are based on an ocean v. land liability pattern and
its voluntary application by carriers and shippers should moderate the importance of an
eventual carrier liability increase or decrease because of their modest approach towards
uniformity.
1497 Lacking empirical data on the following we can only reason on a hypothetic basis as precisely as possible. On
the lack of empirical data in general see supra note 400.
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Insurance costs for carriers and shippers would probably rise in a deregulated
(contractual) but harmonized legal liability environment due to the uncertainties as to the
effects of our suggestions. For the rest, insecurities relating to appreciation of parties
sophistication to determine shipper notice of carrier limitations, parties intention in
defining 'package/unit', reasonableness standard in appreciating carrier absence of
negligence and carrier mens rea to determine loss of the limitation benefit, would remain
same.
Above-mentioned liability suggestions intervene in specific (ad hoc) areas and
frequently advance only part of the desired solution (i.e. suggestion on limitation
measures without defining specific liability amounts). This certainly leaves many liability
areas uncovered by our suggestions, something that constitutes a first safety feature
impeding great alterations in the presently applicable allocation of risks pattern.
Proposed measures also emanate from ground unimodal or/and multimodal
practice being further elaborated to adapt to the multimodal carriage and operate the
necessary convergence between the modes in order to achieve the desired uniformity.
This is the case of the presumption of fault principle or the extension of the latent defect
defense to land carriers. Being defined on the basis of the present multimodal practice
said measures do not distance themselves greatly from ground rules (pragmatism).
In granting both carriers and shippers, respectfully, beneficial provisions we are
. . . 1 b l' h' d' d d 1498 F hnot almmg at precise y a ancmg out s Ipper an carrier grante a vantages . rom t e
study of cargo and liability insurance mechanisms we have concluded that allocation of
risks between carriers and shippers is not an exact science. Still, fairness has to be
maintained to the maximum degree possible to encourage adoption of proposed
measures. This is why we avoided granting one-sided benefits so as not to, greatly or
unjustifiably, benefit one group of interests over the other.
If insurance costs and allocation of risks seem to not radically change under our
suggestions, what about overall costs of our adopted approach towards uniformity
(network system of liability, constant codification and harmonization of laws and
1498 Apart from the above-mentioned suggestions see also supra at Part II, Chapter II, Section II, Par. 1 on the
presumption of fault suggestion balancing out carrier and shipper interests.
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legislation)? Because of the gradual, continuing, expansive and protracted approach
adopted to achieve uniformity, the whole harmonization procedure risks to be fastidious
and costlyl499. Authors seem to agree in asserting that an intermodal liability regime
premised on the UNCTADIICC Rules (such as the FIATA BOL and several suggestions of
ours) provides no substantial difference in total costs when compared to the present legal
realityl50o. So why change and suggest uniformity?
Same authors also argue that harmonization of domestic and modal laws, the
initiative we are undertaking in the present study, reduces uncertainty, transportation and
litigation costsl501. Further, we have seen that improvements (this also includes
improvements to liability principles governing intermodalism) to multimodal
transportation produce disproportionately higher gains to the measure of such
improvements1502. Finally, we should note that certain intermodalliability suggestions we
advance (i.e. adoption of a contractual multimodal document instead of elaboration of a
convention, abolition of the nautical fault defense, conservation of the list of carrier
liability exceptions to better define the presumption of fault principle) tend to alleviate
the costly nature of the overall proposals either in their negotiation or in their
implementation stage. Because of our effort to decrease the cost of our suggestions and
the final objective increase of benefits harmonization entails, we believe that the end
product -the uniform multimodal carrier liability regime to which we herein make a
modest contribution- will worth the costs undertaken if not in the short, at least in the
long run.
B. Other suggestions: It has been argued that the solution to multimodal transport
complexities does not lie 'in a new multimodal regime but in a new insurance
1499 See supra at 39. This seems to be the cost of choosing pragmatism and fairness.
1500 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Carrier Liability on Intermodal Freight Transport (2001)
online: Europa Homepage <http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/library/finaIJeport.pdf> (last visited: Jan. 10,2001)
at 37-38.
1501 Ibid at 38-39. However, interviews with carriers, shippers, forwarders and insurers have indicated that the
reduction in administrative costs (litigation, arbitration) resulting from harmonization would not be great. Ibid.
1502 Supra at 34-35. See also supra note 482 and accompanying text for an economic analysis of costs due to the
absence of a harmonized liability regime made at the European level. We should also note that herein suggested
codification of case law on multimodal carrier liability will not only benefit multimodal carriage. It will also benefit
advancement of the law in general since codification, clarification of notions used in many legal fields such as, for
instance, shipper sophistication, are extensively used outside the transport field.
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regime,I503. In this way, some people opine that if all risk of damage or loss were placed
on one party, either the carrier or the shipper, dual or overlapping insurance would be
eliminated as well as would be necessity for cargo or liability insurance (depending on
the adopted solution) and subrogation actions between insurers, reputed to be so very
costly1504.
Abolishing carrier liability insurance and, therefore, carrier liability as a whole has
never received serious support mainly because of the fact that the carrier would have no
incentive to take adequate measures to protect cargo1505. Some authors have argued that it
is liability insurance that should be abolished and not a person's liability since insurance
lessens the incentive of exercise of care of liable person and/or victim by assuming the
burden of loss in the event of damage or injury1506. Although both these views may have
a certain merit they should not be viewed as absolute. Carrier, as any insured person, has
an incentive to take care of his cargo irrespective of the presence of liability or liability
insurance since damages due to his lack of care will cause him loss of business and
interruption of otherwise smoothly running transport operations resulting in further
expenses1507. It is, thus, competition that creates the incentive for carriers to care for
cargo not necessarily or exclusively the presence of liability or liability insurance1508. In
any case, we view both the suggestions of abolishing liability and/or liability insurance as
largely distancing themselves from current reality (pragmatism) to be given serious
consideration.
If we want to avoid the traditional twins (cargo and liability insurance) we can opt
for elimination of cargo insurance through increase of carrier liability. Same argument of
1503 Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (1999) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http :www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimoda!.html> (last visited: Nov. 30, 2001).
1504 "Chequered History of a Legal System Bedevilled by Political Confrontation" (2000) L!. List Int'!. Sp. Rep. 19
(WESTLAW-Newsletters) on cargo insurance becoming obsolete if carrier liability were to be extended. For the
opposite view see Jan Ramberg, "The Law of Carriage of Goods, Attempts at Harmonization" (1974) 9 Eur. Transp.
L. 1 at 39-40. Supra at 78 for overlapping or dual insurance.
1505 David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or
is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 100. On this proposal being a utopian idea see Jan Ramberg, "The Law of Carriage
of Goods, Attempts at Harmonization" (1974) 9 Eur. Transp. L. 1 ar 41. M. R. Th. Sarassin, "La Signification de
I'Assurance sur Facultes en Cohesion avec Ie Postulat d'une Repartition Equilibree du Risque de Transport entre Ie
Proprietaire des Marchandises et Ie Transporteur» (1973) 8 Eur. Transp. L. 350 at 356-357. Every time such a
proposal would be made, negotiators would discard it as utopian thinking it would lead carrier to lack of care for the
cargo.
1506 Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, "Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie is not Big Enough Who Eats Last?" (1997) 64
Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 1337 at 1357-1358. See also supra at 301-302.
1507 Ibid for an analogous reasoning made on the basis of personal injury insurance.
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remoteness of this solution from present reality could be made in this regard. Moreover,
in such a case, cargo insurance may be reduced but will not be eliminated. In effect,
shipper will still use cargo insurers because payment is prompt, the cargo owner can deal
with a single insurer who may also provide coverage before and after liability insurance
is effective1509. Such a regime may, thus, present a gain for individual shippers but not for
shippers as a class1510. Finally, a raise in carrier liability falls, in the end, back upon the
shippers of cargo.
Another solution that approximates the proposal on abolition of liability insurance
is the institution of a no fault insurance system to compensate for damages to goods in
multimodal transport151 1. Here, the elimination of liability insurance does not stem from
elimination of carrier liability, as in our previous hypothesis, but from elimination of fault
as the basis of carrier liability. This is not a no-liability insurance, it is a no-fault
insurance replacing currently existing tort (fault-based) compensation of damages1512. In
effect, no-fault insurance permits carriers and shippers to be compensated by their
insurance companies in the event of damage without respect to carrier or shipper fault,
willful misconduct, gross negligence or presumption of liability, which no longer
constitute the basis of compensation1513 . Depending on the type of instituted no-fault
insurance system, tort actions may be eliminated or preserved to a certain extent but the
principle of this system is automatic compensation for sustained damages without regard
1508 See also supra at 301-302 for carrier economic motive to avoid damages.
1509 David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or
is It?" (1998) Tul L. J. 73 at 100. The author also suggests that, under such a regime, dual insurance would be
reduced but not eliminated. M. R. Th. Sarassin, "La Signification de I'Assurance sur FacuItes en Cohesion avec Ie
Postulat d'une Repartition Equilibree du Risque de Transport entre Ie Proprietaire des Marchandises et Ie
Transporteur» (1973) 8 Eur. Transp. L. 350 at 355 and 357. See also opinion of Sender-Augello made with respect
to the 1978 Hamburg Rules as reported by Alan Schoedel, "Obstacles Seen to Convening New Cargo Liability
Conference" J Com. (1987) online: LEXIS (Newsletters) and Eun Sup Lee, "Analysis of the Hamburg Rules on
Marine Cargo Insurance and Liability Insurance" (1997) 4 ILSA 1. Int'l & Compo L. 153 at 169. Saul Sorkin,
"Changing Concepts of Liability" (1982) 17 FORUM 710 at 718.
1510 Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods"
(1996) 23 Transp. L. 1. 471 at 489. Supra at Part I, Chapter I, Section I, Par. 3. C. for insurance mechanisms. It is
probably for this reason that Pro Tassel has noted in one of his articles on maritime law: "Tant que les enterprises
d'assurances perdureront Ie mal sera limite mais qu'elles viennent aetre mises en peril Ie remede aura ete pire que Ie
mal ». Yves Tassel, "La Specificite du Droit Maritime" (1997) Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Oceanique 143.
1511 As reported by Tony Young, Position Statement on Multimodal Liability (2001) online: CIFFA Homepage
<http://www.ciffa.com/currentissues_transportlaw_multimodal.html>(lastvisited:Nov.9.2001).This is also the
position of David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the
Carrier or is It?" (1998) Transp. L. J. 73 at 104.
1512 Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 3-4 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1513 David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or
is It?" (1998) Transp. L. 1. 73 at 104. No Fault Insurance (2002) online: 4Insurance Homepage
<http://www.4insurance.com/auto/nofault.asp> (last visited: Feb. 22, 2002).
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to any person's fault 1514. When carrier and shipper insurance is no longer based on fault,
cargo and liability insurance tend to converge so that, in the end, liability allocation is
irrelevant because the parties bargain over who pays the insurance premium1515.
Mr. David Peck suggests, in this respect, that a no-fault insurance scheme In
carriage of goods can be based on parties free contractual allocation of liability amongst
themselves attributing X per cent of the damage or loss to the carrier with the shipper
retaining the rest ofliability1516. He further argues that competition rather than law would
force carriers to be more attentive of the cargo and that legislation could help them be
more effective by requiring them to disclose all shipping accidents so that shippers can
evaluate the precautions carriers take with respect to the cargo1517. The author finally
maintains that system's benefits would outweigh its costs and complexities (i.e.
multiplicity of individual contracts) since, after trial and error, standard practice would
allocate carrier the percentage of its liability in most cases1518 as is currently the case with
U.S./Canadian rail and U.S. motor carrier liability amounts (contractual uniformity).
Applying our mainstream line of thinking to this hypothesis, the present
suggestion should be rejected as too remote from ground practice, which is based on
cargo and carrier liability (fault) insurance and contractual definition of it. However,
because Mr. Peck's arguments seem rather convincing and because no-fault insurance
systems are currently in place in other areas in the U.S. and Canada, more convincing
answers should be given to counter author's arguments.
Proponents of the no-fault insurance system argue that it permits reduction of
insurance costs, efficiency, timeliness and fairness of compensation, elements to be
1514 Whatever the type of no-fault insurance adopted, (pure no-fault, limited no-fault), insurers always maintain fault
based criminal actions and premium penalties against the carrier. Craig Brown, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in
Canada (Ontario: Carswell, 1988) at 1. In pure no-fault jurisdictions, as is the province of Quebec for automobile
accidents, the victim is compensated for any injury but denies recourse to any tort actions. Ibid. and Robert Astroff,
"Show Me the Money" (1996) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 9-17 (QUICKLAW-JOUR). In limited no-fault jurisdictions
the tort system remains in place for outcomes not included as automatically compensable. Robert Astroff, "Show
Me the Money" (1996) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 9-17 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1515 David S. Peck, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: the Case for the Carrier or
is It?" (1998) Transp. L. 1. 73 at 105.
1516 Ibid at 104. The author adds that the carrier would provide a sliding rate schedule dependent upon the
percentage of liability which it agreed to accept. The shipper would compare the list of rates with the cost of cargo
insurance and choose the cheapest combination of freight and insurance. Ibid.
1517 Ibid at 104 and at 96-97.
1518 Ibid at 105.
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opposed to the costly, adversarial, unfair and frequently arbitrary fault-based system1519.
They note, more specifically, that no-fault insurance favors speedy settlement of claims
without need for lawyers, courts, delays, judges and juries since it is the insurance
company that automatically pays for damages 1520. This results in reduction of insurance
premiums because less cases end up in court (cost-effectiveness, litigation argument)1521.
No-fault insurance also provides compensation in all cases without regard to fault not
excluding, at the same time, certain tort (fault-based) actions ('peaceful coexistence' with
litigation)1522. Moreover, the system is more fair than current fault-based tort actions
because the latter only punish parties at fault and, in certain cases, arbitrary decisions
may withhold or limit compensation to some claimants while overpay others (fairness
argument) 1523. Finally, because of its flaws and the presence of liability insurance
companies, fault-based system loses its deterrent effect and cannot create disincentives
with respect to undesirable conduct (deterrence argument)1524.
Opponents of no-fault insurance argue that this system is not without fault and its
considerable disadvantages make it non-appealing. Litigation costs, presumably avoided
under no-fault insurance, are not really done away with since the time and effort insurers
once spent defending litigation claims are now spent defending lawsuits brought by their
own insureds for failure to pay no-fault benefits orland determining whether thresholds,
conditioning compensation, have been crossed1525. Studies have also shown that under
1519 Robert Astroff, "Show Me the Money" (1996) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 9-17 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1520 No Fault Insurance, The Basics (2002) online: Insurance. Com Homepage online:
<http://www.insurance.com/insurance_options/auto/auto_basics_nojauIUns.asp>(lastvisited:April4.2002).No
Fault Insurance (2002) online: 4Insurance Homepage <http://wwwAinsurance.com/auto/nofauILasp> (last visited:
Feb. 22, 2002).
1521 No Fault Insurance, The Basics (2002) online: Insurance. Com Homepage online:
<http://www.insurance.com/insurance_options/auto/auto_basics_no_fault_ins. asp> (last visited: April 4, 2002).
1522 Ibid. See also Craig Brown, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Canada (Ontario: Carswell, 1988) at 2 and supra
note 1514.
1523 Robert Astroff, "Show Me the Money" (1996) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 9-17 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1524 Ibid.
1525 No Fault Insurance, The Basics (2002) online: Insurance. Com Homepage online:
<http://www.insurance.com/insurance_options/auto/auto_basics_nojauIUns.asp> (last visited: April 4, 2002).
Under a system of thresholds, the threshold is passed once a person exceeds a certain dollar amount in damages
(monetary threshold) or meets defined criteria (verbal threshold i.e. severity of injury). Having a low monetary
threshold is a bad idea and no-fault systems with such thresholds will just increase premiums without having much
of an efficiency effect on the system. Some thresholds, however, are extremely severe requiring serious damage to
goods. A Message from the Coalition against No-Fault (2001) online: BC Coalition of People with Disabilities
Homepage <http://www.bccpd.bc.ca/commalert/nofauILhtml> (last visited: Junel, 2001), Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and
No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 21-26 (QUICKLAW-JOUR) and Paul Eisenberg, Wharton
Study Explores no-Fault Insurance (2000) online: Business Journal Homepage
<http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2000/04/10/focus3.html> (last visited: April 7, 2000).
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the Quebec pure no-fault automobile insurance scheme there has been reported no
significant difference in insurance costs when compared to other fault-based provinces
(cost-effectiveness, litigation argument)1526. A major Ontario study, the Osborne Report
of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario, indicated that under
the Ontario system of tort, a move to no-fault would only result in 5% reduction in
expenses1527. Further, experience with no-fault, especially in New Zealand, and its very
high costs have led to a significant 'reform' of the scheme1528 . Authors conclude that how
much would actually be saved by moving to a no-fault system is highly speculative.
Moreover, studies have shown that the threat of tort liability does deter unreasonable
conduct and further proof to this effect is provided by the fact that tort judgments can
result in high liability insurance premiums (deterrence argument)1529. What's more, in the
area of automobile insurance, it seems that no-fault insurance has increased accidents
because it has promoted drivers carelessness1530.
Finally, and most importantly, it may be that a fault-based system is unfair
because it always punishes persons at fault whereas no-fault insurance compensates not
withstanding a person's fault without, however, excluding latter l531 . However, it is also
true that the fault-based system provides for full compensation of damages whereas no-
fault insurance does not since it is financially prohibitive to cover all possible losses1 532.
Compensation thresholds established by no-fault insurers may be arbitrarily set, in the
\526 Release report of the Canadian Bar Association as reported by Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5
Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 24 (QUICKLAW-JOUR). Four Canadian provinces have no-fault schemes in the
automobile accident area with Quebec and Manitoba disposing of a pure no-fault insurance system in the area of
automobile accidents. Ibid at note 1. No U.S. state has adopted a pure no-fault insurance scheme. History ofthe No-
Fault Concept (1999) online: Consumer Watchdog Homepage
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fsOOOI60.php3> (last visited: March 3, 2000).
\527 Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 21(QUICKLAW-JOUR).
\528 Ibid at par. 25s. A letter to the Herald newspaper stating that the no-fault accident compensation scheme may
have appeared attractive enough to New Zealanders at first, but it did prove to be an abysmal failure in the end,
seems to sum up the prevailing opinion on the issue. Roger Kerr, New Zealand's ACC Scheme: Time for a Decent
Burial (1996) online: <www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/speeches/speeches-96-97/acc-hvcc.doc.htm> (last visited: June
15, 1997).
\529 Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 17.
\530 David Cummins, Mary Weiss, Richard Phillips, The Incentive Effects ofNo-Fault Automobile Insurance (1999)
online: <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/99/9938.pdf.> (last visited: Aug. 16, 1999). An empirical study of
automobile accident fatality rates in all U.S. over the period of 1982-1994 revealed that no-fault insurance is
significantly associated with higher fatal accident rates than the tort system. Ibid under' Discussion'.
\53\ It all depends on the type of no-fault insurance scheme adopted. Supra note 1514.
\532 This is so, even assuming that there may be some financial savings to the system by moving away from tort to
no-fault. Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 13 (QUICKLAW-JOUR). A
Failed Experiment: Analysis and Evaluation of No-Fault Laws (1999) online: Consumer Watchdog Homepage
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fs000218.php3> (last visited: March, 30 2000).
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same way there can be arbitrary court decisions under the fault-based systeml533 . The
latter, however, constitute the exception rather than the rule since, in most cases, the issue
of fault is very straightforward and the conduct of the defendant clearly blameworthy on
any reasonable standard (fairness argument)1534. The same cannot be asserted for no-fault
insurance thresholds since there are no-fault jurisdictions that may maintain very severe
thresholds (permanent injury, disability) in order to compensate victims1535. These may
be some of the reasons why no-fault insurance systems, tried in many parts of the world,
have been extremely unpopular or repealed since they have resulted in increased
premium costs and reduced benefits 1536.
Because defects exist in both fault-based and no-fault based insurance systems, we
believe that the choice between the one or the other lies in a more extended reasoning of
this latter 'fairness' argument1537. By punishing wrongful conduct and promoting
reasonable behavior the fault-based system promotes values such as fairness 1538. It is
inevitable, therefore, that the legal community would prefer such a system. Yes, but one
could argue that, in practice, fault cannot always be attributed as this is very frequently
the case of concealed damage in multimodal carriage. What is the system that one could
apply in such a case? Can it be a fault based system?
1533 A Message from the Coalition against No-Fault (2001) online: BC Coalition of People with Disabilities
Homepage <http://www.bccpd.bc.ca/commalert/nofault.html> (last visited: June 1, 2001). The slogan for this
Coalition is Threshold = No-Fault = No-Choice = No-Fairness. See also No Fault Insurance, The Basics (2002)
online: Insurance. Com Homepage online:
<http://www.insurance.com/insurance options/auto/auto basics no fault ins.asp> (last visited: April 4, 2002).
1534 Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault-;- (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.-3, 2-8at par. 15 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1535 In the U.S., for instance, Kansas no-fault automobile insurance has set such serious injuries as permanent
disfigurement, bone fractures, permanent injury or permanent loss of a bodily function as threshold conditions in
order to compensate victims. You Were Irljured in an Automobile Accident (2002) online: My Counsel Homepage
<http://www.mycounsel.com/content/personalinjury/hurt/auto/> (last visited: Mar. 2, 2002).
1536 No Fault (2001) online: Pushol & Mitchell Lawyers Homepage
<http://www.pushormitchell.com/articles/nofault.html> (last visited: March 20, 2001). Choice No-Fault and other
Recent Proposals (2000) online: Consumer Watcherdog Homepage
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fs000285.pbp3> (last visited: March 3,2002). History of the No-
Fault Concept (1999) online: Consumer Watchdog Homepage
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fsOOOI60.php3> (last visited: March 3, 2000).
1537 See also concurring opinion of Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health. L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par.
22 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1538 Other values promoted: common sense of rights, a common sense of duties, a demand for fair hearing, an
aversion to inconsistency, a passion for equality of treatment, an abhorrence of illegality and a commitment to
legality. H. J. Berman, The Interaction ofLaw and Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Pres, 1974) at 26 as reported by
ibid.
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We have suggested that in case of concealed damage we simulate the situs of
damage to attribute liability1539. Even in case of non-localized damage, therefore, we
attribute liability, we do not determine compensation based on thresholds, as no-fault
insurance does. We remain, thus, within the sphere of the fault-based system.
It is true that the costs of doing things fairly are not trivial 1540. Based on the
previous analysis, however, it is not certain that a no-fault insurance system will provide
the desirable result. What's more, what is to be expected under the no-fault insurance
system? To have powerful and affluent claimants capable of buying more insurance
coverage overpower smaller and powerless ones?1541. This is not our answer with respect
to no-fault insurance or with respect to multimodal carrier liability. We cling to our belief
that justice, fairness should serve realistic uniformity solutions adopted that are not to be
exchanged for pure economic measures 1542. Eventual flaws in the thereby established
system -fault-based system and multimodal carrier liability regime in the present case-
leave margin to correction. Correction of some legal flaws of the presently applicable
multimodal carrier liability regime is exactly the initiative undertaken in the present study
with uniformity suggestions made to this regard.
1539 Supra at 258. One could argue that no-fault insurance would be perfectly suited for covering damages due to
concealed damage since, not knowing where the damage has occurred, the fairness argument fails in the absence of
elements identifying the liable party. So, instead of presuming ocean or land carrier liability in case of concealed
damage, as it is currently the case, no fault liability insurance should take effect. This is a very interesting idea that
should be further examined within the uniformity context. Its remoteness from applicable legal reality (pragmatism)
and the fact that the fairness argument is not totally eliminated in the sense that more powerful parties would be
mostly favoured under a no-fault insurance system for concealed damage, makes the idea less appealing under the
proposed suggestions. However, the proposal is quite interesting and deserves further examination.
1540 H.W. Arthurs, "A Review of Advocacy and Dispute Resolution in the Ontario Automobile Insurance System"
(1993) a report prepared by the Ontario Minister responsible for Automobile Insurance Review 1 at 11, as reported
b{;; Lewis N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 22 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
I 41 In Peixeiro v. Haberman [1997], 3 S. C. R. 549 (S. C. C.) the court noted that full compensation, justice,
accident deterrence, safety and education goals of tort are not the aims of no fault-insurance. As reported by Lewis
N. Klar, 'Tort and No-Fault' (1997) 5 Health L. Rev. No.3, 2-8 at par. 22 (QUICKLAW-JOUR).
1542 Supra at lIs and at 302.
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Conclusion
In a world where trade is booming, uniformity of multimodal carrier liability rules
is desirable and actually sought at the international leveL Absence of such rules in the
U.S., Canada and worldwide has led to application of fragmented unimodal liability
rules, with contractualism rising in importance in the U.S. and Canada as a result of
transport deregulation.
Considering failure to elaborate international or national uniform mandatory
multimodalliability rules and absence of fervent political support for adoption of a single
uniform multimodal carrier liability regime at the national, international or industry level,
gradual, modest changes towards uniformity are more likely to be adopted by industry
participants and governments. In the present study, we followed the trend currently
prevailing at the international level by adopting a contractual document of voluntary
application. Following our suggestions, the document prescribes an ocean
(mandatory/formalist) v. land (contractual) carrier liability pattern as the minimum level
of uniformity of multimodal carrier liability in the U.S. and Canada. All our therein
contained multimodal carrier liability suggestions on uniformity are based on a detailed
cross-modal (motor-rail-ocean) and cross-country (U.S.-Canada) case law study and
harmonization efforts, directed by the need to serve pragmatism and fairness.
By opting for the well settled-in deregulation prescribed contractualism to govern
land carrier liability and the presently applicable mandatory liability rules to govern
ocean carriage, we served pragmatism. This corresponds to the presently applicable
reality in the U.S. and Canada. Undertaken harmonization of presently applicable cross-
modal and cross-country liability defenses, amounts and measures also served the
suggested ocean v. land carrier liability suggestions and, therefore, pragmatism.
It is true that being the guardian of the principle of freedom of contract and
laissez-faire policies deregulation favors the stronger party in the transport contract.
Because favoring the stronger party in the transport contract overpowers the weaker party
-most likely the shipper- it could be argued that fairness, the second great guideline of
our reasoning is not respected by our suggestions.
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However, this is not a solid argument since our suggestions did not neglect to keep
a fair balance between carrier and shipper interests while always remaining within the
sphere of pragmatism. Considering the need to promote justice within what certain may
regard as unjust suggestions based on the principle of freedom of contract, we tried to
overcome the principle's pernicious effects by inserting strong doses of justice. In this
way, we maintained that judicial consideration of parties sophistication and equal
bargaining power, notions whose case law components we tried to clarify, is necessary in
giving effect to contractually defined conditions of carriage (judicial safety net). We also
refuted current reality of insurance companies substituting for the (lack of) legal and
more fair uniform liability rules. In making our suggestions we provided for shipper
compensation for goods concealed damage, so frequently occurring in multimodal
transport and so carefully neglected, so far, in domestic, international unimodal or
multimodalliability laws. For the rest, we specifically tried not to give one sided benefits
to carriers (or shippers) in phrasing each one of our carrier liability exceptions, basis of
carrier liability principles (presumption of liability, presumption of fault), limitation of
liability and loss of carrier limitation benefit.
Pragmatic uniformity and fairness in the relation between the camer and the
shipper are just empty words if the suggestions made do not advance clear solutions.
Even though adopted deregulation trend and its corollary, freedom of contracting, do not
advance clarity of the applicable rule, we tried to decompose case law elements on
examined liability issues to create guidelines for future litigation (shipper sophistication,
package/unit, fair opportunity doctrine, presumption of fault and liability principles).
Moreover, in depth analysis and clearer classification of the list of exonerations causes
accompanying the principle of presumption of fault, cross-modal and cross-country
contractualism and formalism, liability limitation measures and loss of the limitation
benefit are also provisions that intended to shed light on some of the 'obscure' aspects of
multimodal liability rules. Because clarity of instituted liability provisions is dependent
on a follow-up of case law conclusions, case law codification and shipper alertness need
to accompany our instituted suggestions.
In citing John Singer Sargent statement 'every time I paint a portrait I lose a
friend', Pro Tetley did not comment on how little the painter may not have mastered his
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art. He, rather, noted how uniformity suggestions require courage and the willingness to
become unpopular to at least some persons or people in rendering them public 1543 . This is
a danger lurking behind suggestions made in the present study. The ones may reject them
as unjust to the shipper or the carrier, the others may do same because of the modesty of
the measures adopted. Arguing on the former view, we reiterate our commitment to
making realistic suggestions, fairly balancing all interests concerned. Arguing on the
latter view, we insist that our proposals are clearly directed towards uniformity,
something that we do not encounter in the present segmental multimodal reality. We
conscientiously keep away from too audacious uniformity suggestions that have proven
fruitless in the past. History teaches us, once more, that 'it is better to be safe than sorry'!
1543 William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons and Alternatives to
International Conventions" (2000) Tul. Mar. L. J. 775 at 824.
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